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A Monthly Review of all National Questions.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

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H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge.

ANOTHER link is broken; on the past,
  Already dim, a deeper shadow falls.
"The Duke" is gone; in him we lose the last
  Of those who led our troops before the walls
Of grim Sevastopol, and saw the day
  When point met point, and blood heroic ran
All round the spot where Britons fought at bay,
  Majestic on the heights of Inkerman!

Countless the changes since that day have been;
  Gone are the columns that were wont to reel,
When through the smoke the British line was seen
  Proudly advancing with its matchless steel.
And he indeed was loth to cast aside
  Some old traditions—cherish'd them too long;
Yet more than once, it cannot be denied,
  The Duke was right, the newer methods wrong.

Nigh forty years he held the chief command,
  His watch-word "Duty;" worthily he wrought
From first to last, to serve his native land,
  Straight as a line, without one crooked thought.
A loyal gentleman, a gracious Prince,
  An able soldier; and no truer friend
Man had—nor woman—in his youth and since,
  Through all his days, until the very end.

A. W. A. P.

THE CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC ROUTE.

By H. B. Bignold, Author of 'The Burden of Empire.'

Those who have studied the course of the trade-distribution of the world, are fully cognisant of the effect of the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1870, 486 vessels passed through, of a tonnage of 436,609. In 1890, 3425 vessels of a tonnage of 6,783,187, 77 per cent. of which was British. In 1898, 3503 vessels of a total tonnage of 9,238,603, 68 per cent. of which was British—and it is instructive to note here that while the percentage tonnage had shrunk by nine, the total British tonnage between 1890 and 1898 had increased by considerably over a million tons!

The protection of every British ship of this enormous number, huge tonnage, and incalculable value falls practically on the British Navy.

Protected by the Channel Squadron the trade passes to Gibraltar, a harbour of refuge; next Malta supplies another resting-place, while the Mediterranean Squadron takes up the task of protection; coming past Port Said and Suez, with its canal—which may not be blockaded—Aden, another rest-house, is reached; and then the trade branches off to India, and China or Australia, or East and South Africa. In the former case the East Indian Squadron, with bases in India and Ceylon, continue the task of safe-guarding, until the China Squadron or the Australian Squadron takes it up, while the Cape Squadron carries on the task of guarding such of the fleets of commerce as are destined for South Africa.

Everywhere the same system; squadrons each policing its own waters, but all available for mutual co-operation, and each with one or a number of naval bases and harbours, and if the British command of the sea pre-supposes one thing more than another, it is that there shall always be naval bases available for our Navy, which our possible enemies shall lack.

Every fortified naval base, containing fast cruisers for commerce destroying, means a hornet's nest to be watched on the eve of hostilities and to be blockaded the moment war is declared.

This pre-supposes enormous naval preponderance.

Those economists who keep on bewailing the fact that a nation

of 40,000,000 cannot keep its relative as well as its absolute preponderance in commerce, who regard the progress of powerful and highly civilised communities like the United States and Germany as being significant of the coming ruin of the British Empire, perhaps expect Great Britain to maintain the same relative preponderance on the sea, as she now has—but the thing is as impossible in the one case as in the other.

Now that the Great Powers have turned their attention to the sea as they have never done before; now that Germany, France, the United States, Japan and Russia, have all embarked on Navy building;—the Navy of Great Britain, while easily the strongest of all, must gradually lose its present proportional strength.

Such being the case, it behoves all who take an interest in the future of our race—which future, like our past, must be on the sea—to make such provision as it is possible to do against the coming struggle for the Pacific.

THE PANAMA CANAL.

The Panama Canal will probably be open for traffic inside of ten years. The United States Government has fully made up its mind that the Canal shall be—and who shall withstand it? certainly not a little Central American Republic.

Bearing in mind the effect that the Suez Canal had in diverting trade from the old route, it is easy to see that the Panama Canal must have momentous consequences for Australia and New Zealand.

The distance of London from Sydney by way of Suez is 12,682 miles, by way of Panama and Tahiti it will be 12,370, and shorter still by way of Panama and Fiji. Avoiding the coast of France, with her commerce destroyers, our fleets of commerce will at once seek the open sea—where they are safest—until they come at length to the West Indies. Here the possessions of foreign Powers are trifling, Martinique and Guadaloupe; and it is to be noticed in this place, that at the end of each war France has always bargained for the restoration of these islands, if they happened to be in our hands—she has always recognised their strategical value.

It is remarkable that the abandonment of Port Royal as a British naval base should be determined on at this precise juncture!

Coming through the Panama Canal, the Cocos Islands, belonging to us, are passed, and then the Galapagos, belonging to Ecuador—and it is significant that France has been endeavouring to purchase one of them from the present owners for a naval base. The Marquesas, belonging to France, are next in the line of ocean

traffic, but they have no good harbour. Fiji, an important dependency of the Empire, which must have a great future before it, will doubtless be a port of call, and Samoa is passed on the way, some two or three hundred miles out of the direct route—but Apia, as the men of the *Alder* know, is a perilous harbour, and can never be a naval base. (America has a harbour in Pago Pago on Tutuila.)

After passing Fiji, on which the trade routes from Australia and New Zealand must converge, with the single exception of New Caledonia, belonging to France, there is no possibly hostile power within striking distance, and while Noumea is suitable for a naval base, having a good harbour, when once inside, it is difficult to enter. At present the New Hebrides are under the dual control of England and France. Havannah Harbour in Sandwich Island, and Port Sandwich in Malekula, two of the group, are undoubtedly two of the very best harbours in the whole of the Pacific. There are no British traders at Port Sandwich itself—though in the neighbourhood the British predominate. The French in New Caledonia admit that the failure of France to obtain the New Hebrides would isolate and mean the ultimate loss of New Caledonia itself.

"The Harbour of Havannah, in the Island of Sandwich, one of the group, is" (writes a well-informed correspondent, Mr. W. E. Johnson, in the *Sydney Morning Herald* of 18th June, 1901) "one of the finest in the Southern Hemisphere. It is commodious enough to comfortably accommodate the whole of the French and British Navies combined. It has splendid anchorage, is land locked, and has plenty of depth; and as the islands are within a few days' steaming of Sydney, it will readily be seen what immense strategical value they will possess in the hands of a hostile power. With such a convenient naval base to operate from, our mercantile marine could be perpetually preyed upon; our own Navy would need to be immensely strengthened in Australian and New Zealand waters to afford anything like adequate protection to our commerce."

M. Paul Beaulieu, writing in the *Economiste Française*, advocated in June, 1901, the annexation by France of these islands in exchange for the surrender by her of the rights of the Newfoundland French shore.

The trend of matters in connection with the New Hebrides shows conclusively that the French Authorities in New Caledonia, the few French settlers in the islands themselves, and public men of more or less standing in France, are each and all turning covetous eyes on these fertile and soon to be strategically important islands. It must not be forgotten that position affects the value of territory no less than chessmen, and while we could afford to overlook the acquisition of territory in regions, such as Central Africa, which



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have no immediate bearing on our position as mistress of the sea, it would be suicidal on our part to permit the establishment of a hostile naval base in the very track on what must soon be one of the great trade routes of the world.

As France, true to her practice, assists her Colonists with bounties, and the British Government, with a wealth of Colonies on its hands, is very indifferent to the fate of its own Colonists, it is easy to see under what disadvantages English settlers in these islands are labouring.

More land is said to be represented by documentary titles held by French traders than the total area of the islands can show, and while one could afford to look at the matter not too seriously if it stopped there, it is easy to see that when the alleged sale is supported by an effective occupation by the purchaser and his family, the position of affairs is immediately altered very much to our disadvantage.

Le Journal des Nouvelles-Hebrides, published in Sandwich Island, stated as far back as September, 1901, "that the only solution possible is the annexation pure and simple of the Archipelago of the New Hebrides by France." Later developments are significant, also, and no less a person than M. Etienne, the leader of the French Colonial Party, has since suggested in the *National Review* of July, 1903, a partition of these islands, thus acknowledging rights on our part, once scouted. France in the suggested partition was, of course, to have the southern islands having the harbours!

The group consists of thirty-five islands and islets altogether, more or less considerable, with a population of from 60,000 to 100,000. Sandwich Island has about 200 French residents.

The *Daily Express*, surely with small knowledge of the subject, advocated in January, 1902, that full recognition of French rule in the New Hebrides should be made in exchange for the settlement of the French shore dispute, and although the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in reply to a cable from Sir Edmund Barton, then Federal Prime Minister, stated that the position in regard to the question had not altered since the cable of 26th March, 1900 (in which it was stated that nothing of the sort was contemplated by the Home Government), still the very fact of the cable having been considered necessary by the Federal Prime Minister is significant.

The Federal Prime Minister, in his Maitland Manifesto of 9th January, 1902, stated, "As to the annexation of the New Hebrides by either France or England, I do not think that is likely, for some time to come at any rate, and notwithstanding some articles from French papers, which have been republished here, which articles

you may take with a grain of salt." But it is as possible for Sir Edmund Barton to have been mistaken in 1902 as Lord Derby in 1883.

THE NEW GUINEA FIASCO.

The annexation of New Guinea by Sir Thomas McIlwraith, the then Premier of Queensland, in 1883, was made on the ground that its possession would be of value to the Empire, and conduce especially to the peace and safety of Australia and the development of Australian trade, and the prevention and punishment of crime throughout the Pacific, and that the establishment of a foreign Power in the neighbourhood of Australia would be injurious to British and more especially to Australian interests. The Imperial Government was asked to ratify the act of annexation—an act with which the other Australian colonies were wholly in accord. Lord Derby, then in power, refused to endorse the annexation, stating at the same time, "that the apprehensions that some foreign Power was about to occupy New Guinea appeared to be indefinite and unfounded." The very next year Germany established herself on the territory! And although in answer to the strong representations of the Convention of 1884, called by Mr. James Service, then Premier of Victoria, the Imperial Government moved, with the result that the following year (1885) a division was made between herself and Germany of the territory which Sir Thomas McIlwraith had endeavoured to annex, the delay cost the Empire 40,000,000 acres of territory, the protectorate of New Britain, New Ireland, and the islands adjacent, and meant the lodgment of a strong colonising foreign Power in the close neighbourhood of Northern Australia.

The thing that happened in the case of New Guinea may possibly take place in the case of the New Hebrides if the Imperial Government does not realise its responsibilities more in the one case than it did in the other.

It cannot be too strongly reiterated that the magnificent harbours of Havannah, Port Sandwich, and Vila, when taken in conjunction with the fact of their being so near one of the great world-trade routes of the future, give to the New Hebrides an importance quite out of proportion to their acreage, population, or present worth.

MALTA.

Malta is a tiny speck of territory, but what would be the fate of any Government which proposed to give up that stronghold in the Mediterranean? Havannah harbour is capable of being made

just such a stronghold in the Pacific. We cannot hope for ever to be in a position to blockade every hostile naval base; let us therefore make them as few in number as we can.

FRENCH DESIGNS.

To show how really in earnest the French are in their designs on the New Hebrides, it is only necessary to refer to the attempted annexation in the Eighties, which was only gone back upon at the direct instance of the British Government, and, moreover, we cannot blame France for attempting to do what we should have long ago ourselves done.

An Englishman (Captain Cook) discovered and chartered these islands, British vessels did most of the subsequent surveying in the group, and Englishmen commenced commerce with them in 1840, forty years before the French had any landing on the islands to speak of—and the islands must belong to the English.

The great Australian shipping firm of Burns, Philp and Co., Ltd., has done more for British control in the Pacific than people at home know, and Mr. James Burns, the Managing Director, is the last man in the world to advertise himself. To British traders in the islands they too often represent the only link with the outer world. They offered, to take one example, 80,000 to 100,000 acres of land in the New Hebrides, held by them under good title, to intending settlers on long leases, at nominal rents and no re-appraisement of the land to make the leases other than nominal, and in addition the firm promised free passage to intending settlers, and on the 1st June, 1902, the first batch left Sydney for the Island of Santo, and others have since followed.

It is not unimportant to note that the final division of the New Hebrides may possibly be determined by the counting of noses, French and British.

The building up of a tariff wall round Australia has a disastrous effect on British colonisation in the Pacific—in the New Hebrides as elsewhere—and undoubtedly makes the number of British colonists less than it would otherwise be.

AMERICA.

The Americans have embarked on a colonial policy, and are looking about for naval bases—and small blame to them. The Island of Suvarrov, which lies in the very track of the coming Panama Canal trade, is the object of their immediate longing. This island belongs to us. It possesses an excellent harbour, and as such, as pointed out before in this article, has a value quite out

of proportion to the fertility or extent of territory or commercial advantages. America already has Pago Pago on Tutuila, one of the Samoan group.

GERMANY.

But while America for a long time to come cannot be regarded as a rival of ours for sea-power (and in any case the fact of the strong sympathy existing between the two nations would make her the least dangerous of our competitors in that direction), and while France, owing to her enormous national debt and diminishing population, is badly situated for the coming contest, Germany, on the other hand, is undoubtedly our coming rival; she has two of the requirements of a great Colonial Power—she has production, she has shipping—and she is in the course of obtaining the last link—colonies. It would be the utmost folly on our part to assist her by letting her establish a naval base in the direct line of the Panama route. It is an open secret that she wishes to exchange comparatively useless rights in the Solomons for a position in the Tonga (or Friendly) Islands. One has only to glance at the map to see how immensely she would benefit by the proceedings she contemplates. True she has a position in Samoa, but Samoa has no good harbour capable of conversion into a naval base; the Harbour of Vavau, in Tonga, is well situated for this purpose, being right in the line of traffic; indeed a line drawn from Sydney to Colon passes through Tonga. And Germany makes no secret of her longing for sea-power. Time and again the Emperor has stated that the future of Germany must be on the sea. The German Navy League, established in a great many cities of the Empire, has tens of thousands of members. The German Navy is supposed to be excellent in *morale;* in a few years the scheme of expansion will be complete. Her carrying trade, which is increasing enormously in volume, must be protected, and small blame to her if she seeks to take advantage of our supineness.

Tonga is a British Protectorate—it can only change that character for a British possession.

I have already referred to the prompt advantage Germany took of Lord Derby's blunder in New Guinea in 1883. Her Colonial possessions in the Pacific are by no means insignificant. Yap, Pelew, and the Carolines, German New Guinea, New Britain, and New Ireland, and the Marshall Islands, Buka and Bougainville in the Solomons, Samoa, represent a great advance in one generation. What she has not got, what she needs, wants and requires badly, and what she must not be allowed to obtain, is a naval base on the line of the Panama traffic.

German Trade in the Pacific.

Sydney commercial men feel the difficulty of competing against rivals heavily subsidised by their Government. There is no doubt that Germany is very much in earnest. Their Government system of subsidies, while disastrous for the taxpayer in the Fatherland, makes things delightfully easy for the German in the Pacific in competition with a British subject.

An interesting example of this was given in the case of the trade in the Gilbert and Ellice Group. The Germans brought out an English trading company, and, owing to the fact that German cargo was carried to the Marshall Island practically at the expense of the taxpayer in Germany, were rapidly gaining great influence in these islands. The enterprising firm of Burns, Philp and Co., Ltd., of whom I have already made mention, with the help of a small postal subsidy, have been for some time running steamers to the group regularly, with the result that the British influence is rapidly extending—and one more service has been performed for the Empire by the great shipping firm.

Reported Annexation of Tonga.

The cable in the Sydney papers of 17th October last reported the annexation of Tonga by Germany in return for the cession of some of the Solomon Islands to Great Britain. As was pointed out at the time, Germany relinquished any supposed rights she might have had—which she could easily afford to do, not having any—over the Tonga Islands, at the time of the Samoan agreement. It might possibly have been only a kite to show the way the wind was blowing, but it is high time that Great Britain awoke to the fact—and showed by her action that the awakening had taken place—that the coming Panama Canal will give to the Tongan Harbour an importance quite out of proportion to the present commercial value of the island. Clearly, being a British Protectorate, the annexation could not take place without Great Britain's consent. Later cables and an assurance from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, the Premier of New Zealand, have shown the rumour of annexation to be baseless, but coming as it did from a blue sky, it was significant—and Vavau has an excellent harbour. Moreover, the possible number of inhabitants in the German Solomons which Great Britain was said to have had ceded to her is, when compared to the number of inhabitants of the Tongan Group, no great attraction for a Power which counts its subjects by tens of millions; whereas the fact of Tonga being in the line of the Panama Canal

traffic is of the utmost consequence, when taken with the fact of the great harbour of Vavau we have before referred to.

To use the homely expression—Germany is "playing for keeps." The Governor of German New Guinea issued a proclamation recently, roughly translated as follows:—

"From the Imperial Government. At a meeting of the 26th June, the important question of language in the Colony came into consideration, as well as the matter of a language to be spoken to labourers and natives. It appears very sad that a meeting consisting of Germans could, under the guidance of Anglicised Germans, favour the retention of 'Pidgin' English, seeing that even the presence of any Anglicised half-caste is sufficient to compel a body of Germans to carry on the conversation in more or less faulty English. Surely it is high time that in this at least a change should take place, and that the hearts of the Germans in the Bismarck Archipelago, if they retain any sympathy at all for the Fatherland, should awaken to the consciousness that this continuation of, this leaning towards English national ways, must end in the amalgamation of the Colony with the Australian Commonwealth as soon as the financial independence is gained and an independent policy develops itself.

"I expect the awakening of a healthy German sentiment, tenacity in the use of the German language in conversation and correspondence, guarding against all foreign ways and influence, as well in home life as in company, and I beg to communicate the contents of this exhortation to all subordinates, employees, and friends.

"The Imperial Government,
"(Signed) HAHL."

With conspicuous tact the Governor refers to the Anglicised half-castes, and this requires a word of explanation: I understand that a former United States Consul married a daughter of the family of Mataafa, the celebrated Samoan Chief, and their daughters, who were educated in Australian and American schools and colleges, and are now all married to prominent German citizens and officials, are the half-castes referred to.

One word more—the day of Russia on the sea is not yet, the day of Germany to her Empire-builders seems dawning, but with due care on our part our sea-power can do for us in the future what it has so often done in the past. But we must be the strong men armed.

The foregoing brief points draw attention to the need of supporting two bodies in the Empire; two non-political, non-sectarian bodies, with a platform so broad that free-trader, and revenue-tariffist, and preferentialist, men of every shade of religious belief, can find room, and ample room, for each and all of them; the only qualification being that he should be a subject of the Empire, the only open sesame demanded that he should be anxious for that Empire's prosperity—I refer of course to the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee and to the Navy League.

It is a far cry from here to the heart of the Empire. A New Zealand Statesman said, referring to the distance, that there were 1200 excellent reasons against New Zealand joining the Commonwealth; on the same basis of argument there might seem to be 12,000 excellent reasons against the Home Government taking heed to the present position in the Pacific; but we know that wherever the English flag floats is truly a portion of the Empire as though it were within sound of Bow Bells, and it is only by invoking the aid of powerful and well-established journals and organisations that the individual can hope to have his voice heard in the din of the vast Empire who claims us as her children.

And it is in the hope that public support will be given to these great organisations, striving to do their utmost for a strong Navy and a logical scheme of defence based on that Navy, by showing one more example of the vital need of that Navy and of that organised scheme of Imperial Defence, that I have ventured to draw attention to the pressing question of the control of the Pacific route.

H. B. BIGNOLD.

COLONIAL PREFERENCE, AND COLONIAL NAVIES.

By Norwood Young.

Colonial preference aims at increasing Colonial, at the expense of foreign, trade. If it had that effect how would the position of the British Empire be changed in regard to war, and the preparation for war?

That it would be changed goes without saying, because in all countries preparation for war is determined, to a large extent, by trade considerations. If you alter the character of your trade you will have to reconsider your war equipment. In any commission of experts to inquire into the effect of Colonial preference, one half of the members ought to be drawn from the fighting services, and the majority of these should be naval. Meanwhile the House of Commons contains not a single representative of the Navy, and while the Empire's best brains are concentrated upon the trade problem, its naval aspect is seldom mentioned.

Not being a member of either of the fighting services, I should hesitate to enter upon a discussion of this subject were it not that the bearing of naval war upon trade is neglected by the recognised authorities in naval history. To the civilian Colonist the trade results have as great an interest as the incidents of battle.

It may be as well to consider briefly the main effects upon trade produced during the chief British wars of the last century—the Napoleonic and the Crimean.

After the battle of Trafalgar the British Fleet had a supremacy at sea to which there is no parallel in history. Any State which ventured to oppose it lost Colonies, shipping, and sea traffic. Britain insisted, in accordance with a time-honoured rule, in regarding enemy goods as liable to capture even when carried upon a neutral vessel; and thus derived the fullest profit from her naval superiority. Napoleon, having nearly the whole of the land of Europe under his control, ordered the closure of all European ports to British goods, and also prohibited the export to Britain of certain goods such as hemp, timber, tar, etc., which were required by the British Navy. The sequel showed that he hurt the Continent

more than the island. British ocean trade, having no European rivals to fear, extended enormously in non-European countries; and even in Europe, though restricted, it continued, in spite of all Napoleon's efforts. Europe had no sea-trade but this clandestine intercourse with its British enemy. At last Spain and Russia refused any longer to stew in their own juice. Spanish resistance to Napoleon gained back for Spain some of her losses, by the opening of Spanish ports to the great world of non-Napoleonic trade. The campaign of Moscow was the result of the Russian refusal any longer to be excluded from British markets.

Napoleon's error was that he did not realise the profit Britain would obtain from non-Napoleonic trade, and the loss to Europe by exclusion from such trade.

When, forty years later, the Crimean War began, the conditions had greatly changed. Railways on land, and steamers at sea, had immensely improved the methods of transport. The volume of the world's trade had increased enormously, and especially at sea. Every nation had become gravely interested in ocean traffic. Neutrals stood far greater risk, in war time, of disturbance of their prosperity. It was evident that some of them would resent any such interference with their trade as was experienced in the Napoleonic wars, when a British cruiser would stop and search any neutral vessel, and if it had enemy goods on board, would take it in to a British port, and confiscate the goods. Anxious not to offend such neutrals, the British Government announced that it would abandon, for this occasion only, its right to capture enemy goods on a neutral ship. The British and French Navies had little effective work beyond the blockade of Russian ports, whereby the safety of the shipping and commerce of the Allies was assured. The effect of the blockade upon Russian trade was merely to deflect it from its usual route, and thus increase the cost of transport. Russian goods crossed the land frontier into Germany, and, by means of the new railroads, easily found an outlet on the sea from German, Dutch, or Belgian ports, in Allied or in neutral vessels. There was a dislocation, and a diminution of Russian trade; but not such as to constitute a portentous national calamity.

Since the Crimean War other great changes have occurred. The British Navy, though still the strongest, has several formidable rivals; the British policy of free imports has made Britain the dumping-ground of the world; and as a natural sequel, the increased importance of the British market has stimulated the growth of transport facilities to that market, both by land and sea.

In keeping with these changes was the rule of conduct in

maritime war agreed to by Britain and the other Powers at the close of the Crimean War. By the Declaration of Paris in 1856, Britain abandoned those rights against neutrals which she had maintained throughout the Napoleonic war, but temporarily allowed to lapse during the Crimean conflict. The rules then formulated have been adhered to in all wars since that date. They provide that the neutral flag protects the cargo, even though that cargo belong to a belligerent, unless it be contraband, and unless the neutral vessel was attempting to use a blockaded port. They constitute a premium upon neutrality, and it may be regarded as certain that no strong neutral will, in future, allow a belligerent to interfere with goods carried in the neutral's ships which are not contraband nor striving to break blockade. It follows that in the next great war the trade of the belligerents will seek the shelter of the neutral flag, thus avoiding all the risks of war. No merchant will pay war insurance if he can help it.

Let us take a concrete example, and imagine that the British Empire is at war with the Dual Alliance—France and Russia. Whatever may be the fate of the hostile Navies, the merchant flags of the belligerents would, if the war were prolonged, eventually disappear. The largest British ships would be taken by the Admiralty for naval work. There would be difficulties, undoubtedly, in the transference of the remainder of our shipping to neutral flags. Most of the ocean-going ships of the world are British, and the purchase of so enormous a property, even if all neutral States opened their registry to ships built and owned in Britain, could not be conducted in a minute. Many of the British officers and men would be wanted for the Navy, others might be unwilling or unable to serve under a foreign flag; it would not be easy to improvise a new *personnel*. Efforts would be made to keep the British merchant flag afloat by the expedient of convoy, but even with such naval protection war insurance would be high, a tax that the neutral ship would escape. The ultimate fate of our shipping would be to fly the neutral flag. The safety of the transport of goods would be more important even than the carrying trade. There would, however, inevitably be scarcity of shipping, and loss, by changes in the *personnel*, of efficient service. There would be delays caused by searches for contraband: and some ports would be closed by blockade. Freights would rise. More would have to be paid for imported wares. Anglo-Russian trade would, as in the Crimean war, be conducted through neutral channels, finding its way across the sea from a German or North Sea port. Anglo-French trade would seek similar means of transit. Exchanges would not be so easily manipulated as in time of peace, and prices would rise; but

the bulk of the British trade would continue, under the protection of the neutral flag.

It is sometimes said that an enemy such as the Dual Alliance, having far less shipping and sea trade than Britain, being much less dependent upon the sea, would refuse to recognise the sudden transfer of British ships to a neutral State; and would also enlarge the definition of contraband, so as to make it include those commodities, such as food stuffs, and raw materials for manufacture, that are of chief importance to Britain. But in either case they would be inflicting injury on neutrals. Any serious interference with the British merchant service, or with British merchants, would gravely affect the prosperity of every country in the world. If British ships were laid up, and British shipbuilding stopped, the world's sea commerce could not be carried on. If the British market were closed the world's producers would be ruined. It is not probable that the neutrals of the world, who are so much more powerful now than they have ever been before, and have every reason to expect profit from their neutrality, would submit to the loss they would sustain from such action.

Meanwhile the rival navies would be contending for a mastery whose ultimate reward would be, not, as in the Nelsonian days, the capture and destruction of the enemy's sea trade, and his complete exclusion from ocean commerce, but—a very minor prize—the blockade of certain of the defeated enemy's ports. Now blockade is not what it used to be. Its difficulties have gravely increased; the number of ports to be watched is greater; and even if the whole of the enemy's coast were closed (an utter impossibility) his sea trade would continue, carried by the railways to a neighbouring neutral port, and thence in a neutral ship. Steamers, railways, and the Declaration of Paris have between them greatly curtailed the injury that can be inflicted by the exercise of sea power upon a State which has many ports, either on its own cost line or on that of its neutral neighbour.

In the case suggested, of war between Britain and the Dual Alliance, if invasion of the parent State were found to be impracticable, attack upon Colonies and upon Colonial trade might offer some advantages.

Colonies, as a rule, are backward countries, in need of further development. They are deficient in railways, in ports of their own, and in neighbouring neutral ports; and they are not thickly populated. They are thus peculiarly open to effective blockade, and to invasion by the landing of troops. Their safety consists in their distance from the great European naval Powers. But any Colony which cannot be used as a naval base would be a source of

weakness to the parent State in a serious naval war. Colonial trade also, being belligerent, would be exposed to a danger that Anglo-neutral trade would escape.

The only Colonies that are of value in naval war are those which have little trade with the mother country, and can be used as fortified naval bases. The greater the trade with a Colony the more serious is the injury and loss from the dislocation of that trade in war.

Neutrals, on the other hand, are of immense value to a belligerent. Britain, especially, must lean heavily on neutral assistance. By means of strong neutrals she will get some return for her lost shipping; to them she will look for the continuance of the greater part of her trade, and especially for her imports of food and of raw materials.

It is said that, deriving, as we do, most of our supplies from the United States, the position is highly dangerous for us in case of war with that Power. It is supposed that in an Anglo-American war we should not get United States supplies, and we would get Canadian; and, therefore, that we ought in time of peace to encourage Canadian, and discourage United States trade. The position is exactly the reverse. In case of war with the United States the Canadian export of corn would be stopped by a United States land force, which would cross the Canadian border, and hold the railways. The movements of American produce would not be so restricted. The British Navy would not be able to blockade the whole American coast, nor would the American Navy succeed in closing all Canadian ports. Unless the whole North American coast were hermetically sealed the producers of the United States would get their wares out of the country somehow, if necessary even by the use of Canadian ports. The aim of the United States would be to damage Canadian corn growers, and benefit the American; to replace Canadian by American corn in the world's markets, of which Britain is the chief. As I have already shown, at a time when ocean trade was trivial to what it is now, Napoleon, the most powerful tyrant Europe has known, failed to stop the trade between the countries under his influence and Britain, owing to the determination of European producers to get their goods to the best market. Similar causes will produce similar, and even greater, results now that the British market is so much more important than it was in the early part of the last century.

The radical difference between the British and all other Empires should be remembered. Every State but the British (and the Japanese) has a land frontier. Except on the Canadian border, the British Empire has no land frontier abutting upon a civilised

neighbour. Nearly all Anglo-foreign, Anglo-Colonial, and inter-Colonial—that is non-domestic—trade passes over the sea, a highway open to the ships of all nations. The British communications, being by water, are permanently exposed to attack. No British superiority in naval force can make so wide a public path secure from belligerent operations. Throughout the Napoleonic war, even when there was no Navy in existence on the high seas but the British, the enemy's privateers continued to inflict grave losses on British shipping. The American and German States are strengthened by Federation, because such union enables them to make safe from molestation their internal roads and rails. It is possible for such Powers to become self-sufficient, to keep out foreign intruders. That is not possible for the British Empire. Its blood-vessels are permanently infested with foreign bodies. In time of war some of these will be so controlled and directed by the enemy as seriously to retard the circulation. No such conditions are to be found in any other Empire.

It is true that if the British Empire were at war with the whole world, if there were no neutrals, then, indeed, Anglo-Colonial trade would be most advantageous, although some trade would still continue between the belligerents themselves. In such a case the naval conditions would revert to those of Nelsonian days as far as regards shipping. The modern difficulties of blockade would still keep that method of pressure comparatively harmless when applied to countries well provided with ports and railways; but all the British trade would have to be carried in British ships. It might well happen that the safety of the Empire would then depend upon the extent to which its various parts had learned to be mutually dependent, to be self-sufficient, to do without foreign intercourse in time of peace. It seems to me that this is one of the ideas that lies at the base of the preferential proposals, namely, that as all foreign Powers have anti-British tariffs in time of peace, so they are all enemies, and would be so in time of war. The important fact is that, in spite of tariffs, British foreign trade steadily increases, and consequently foreign countries are more and more unwilling to lose that profitable trade by the forcible interference of war.

In the Boer War the assistance of Australia and Canada was of great value, both materially and morally. Yet it was worth less to Britain than the neutrality, unfriendly as it was, of Germany, France, and the other Continental Powers. That neutrality was due partly to the strength of the British Navy, but also, perhaps in a greater degree, to the large trade carried on between Britain and the Continent, most of which would be lost in a war. If there

had been no such trade it is not probable that either the British Navy or the Colonies would have succeeded in preventing a European support of the Boers.

It is clear, then, that if Colonial preference attained its aim of encouraging Colonial, at the expense of foreign, trade, it would increase in time of war the exposed area of British trade. It would also lessen the improbability of war. The free imports of Britain have, for half a century, been the dominant factor in the history of the world, the chief stimulant of trade, the main influence in cheapening commodities, and the great incentive to peace. A change in this policy would lower the value of the British market in time of peace, and therefore reduce the effect of the loss of that market by war. At the present foreign States do not care to quarrel with their best customer. Reduce the value of that custom and you lessen the disinclination for war.

Enough has been said to show that Colonial preference and preparation for war ought to go hand-in-hand. If the Imperial use of the sea is to be increased in time of peace, special arrangements should be made to meet the increased disturbance of that sea-commerce in time of war.

The Colonial share in naval expenditure at present takes the form of a small cash payment to the Admiralty. It is, for many good reasons, highly unpopular in the Colonies. In any case it is certain that no really substantial payment of that kind would ever be made by the self-governing Colonies. But these countries, Australia, for instance, would welcome any assistance the Admiralty might give them towards the formation of an Australian Navy allied to the British. Personally, I think that the best, the most Imperial, policy would be one of complete confidence, supported and endorsed by a willing, and unstinted, generosity. Instead of demanding cash, Britain should give it. She should make a present to Australia of a modern war-vessel, without any conditions or stipulations whatever. Australia, I have no doubt, would herself voluntarily engage to man and equip the vessel at Australian expense, and to place it and its *personnel* entirely at the disposal of the Admiralty. For such a purpose Australians would willingly put their hands in their pockets, and an Australian Navy would gradually be created, which would be of great value to Britain in time of war. In this way the increased danger to Australia and Australian trade that would result from Colonial preference might be nullified, without any set-back in Australian loyalty.

There is an idea that Imperial Naval Federation on the basis of Colonial contributions to the British Navy, and Colonial representation in the councils of the British Navy, may be forced

upon the separate parts of the Empire, by the common sentiment of fear, which would result from a preferential tariff. Experience has shown that, where all other arguments fail, the separate units of a nation may be forced into a coalition by an enemy from without. The German Federation, which is thought to have begun with a Zollverein, and to have been consummated by war, and the danger of war, is much in men's minds. But the analogy is unsound, owing to the fact that the German Federal Units are joined together by land contact, while the British are separated by the sea.

What we all want is to strengthen the British Empire in peace as well as in war. That can only be done by arrangements which are of mutual and permanent benefit. The question will not be solved in terms of "sacrifice," but of advantage and profit. For this reason (with all respect) it is a mistake for Britain to "think Imperially," if by that is meant that she is to consider the wants of the Colonies before her own. There is only one possible basis of Britannic Federation, and that is the continued prosperity of Great Britain, the maintenance of her position, not necessarily of primacy, but at least in the front rank of the world's Powers. It is often said that as soon as a Colony has grown to the size and importance of the parent State, it will wish to separate. But loyalty is not, as is commonly supposed in this country, an admission of inferiority, and, therefore, destined to terminate as soon as a Colony is great and powerful. Loyalty is a mixture of self-confidence and ancestor-worship. If the parent State for any reason loses the respect of the Colony, then, but only then, will loyalty diminish. The relative magnitude of parent and Colony is a matter of small importance so long as the parent is able to maintain a respectable figure in the world. There was nothing inevitable about the American Revolution. If the revolting Colonies had always been treated as Canada and Australia are now, they would not have revolted, and the United States would at this moment be a British Colony, and proud of the position. Britain with her bold self-confident policy of free imports, her readiness to meet all competition, her refusal to take shelter behind a wall, her great success and importance, is an object of respect and admiration to all nations, and thus of warm loyalty from the Colonies. It is not the size of the Colony, but the character and position of the parent that determines loyalty. If, then, Colonial preference is a British sacrifice, reducing British trade in peace, and increasing her weakness in war, it must be regarded to that extent as an anti-Federal, even a disruptive, factor.

Colonial preference may, as Lieutenant Hordern has remarked,

create an "atmosphere" in which the germs of Imperial Federation may ultimately grow. But the attitude of British naval authorities towards the Colonies is hostile to such a growth. Lieutenant Hordern, for instance, in the February issue of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, gives expression to what is probably a very general opinion in the Navy, when he says that the Australian desire for an Australian Navy is due to her "wish eventually to become independent." This is a most unfortunate error, and it shows an ignorance of Colonial feeling that augurs ill for a satisfactory scheme of Imperial Federation. If that were Australian sentiment there would be no chance of a Federal Union on any voluntary basis; and Australian assistance in the South African War would be incomprehensible.

Lieutenant Hordern also expresses a common naval opinion when he says, "If each of us had separate navies, the total required would be very much larger than a single Navy to protect us." He would, then, presumably, consider that if the money spent by Japan upon her Navy were paid to the British Admiralty, the resulting British Navy would be "very much" stronger than the two separate navies would be now, as allies; and that the safety of Japan would be greater than at present. The Japanese would not agree with him. The undoubted advantage of unity of control may easily be exaggerated. If by that unity you reduce to almost nothing the contribution of Australia, and thus prevent the Colony from making the considerable exertions which she would willingly undertake for an Australian allied Navy, you lose more than you gain.

Colonial preference may, or may not, be advantageous to the trade of the British Empire. As to that, it seems to me vain to attempt any reliable forecast. It will, however, weaken the Empire in war, and thus force Australia to an increased expenditure in naval preparation. The only direction that outlay can take will be the gradual formation of an Australian Navy. Even without Colonial preference this will come in time. When that day arrives, the mistaken obstruction of the Admiralty to Australian desires, and the ungenerous suspicions of British naval authorities, will be forgotten; and an Anglo-Australian Federation will be formed on the basis of a Naval Alliance.

NORWOOD YOUNG.

COLONIAL GRIEVANCES.

By C. De Thierry.

In the February number of the United Service Magazine, Lieutenant Hordern criticised my article on the "Colonies and Free Trade" in the January number. But, if he will pardon me for saying so, I am at a loss to account for his title. True, Colonials differ in opinion from Englishmen who think on Imperial questions after the manner of Lieutenant Hordern, but wherever the grievance may be, it is not on their side. That "England never likes to give anything for nothing to her own" he denies, saying that "at least we gave them their lands without asking a return." Evidently, in his opinion, "we" and "they" are two different breeds, and the obligation is all on one side. But were not the men who made Canada, Australasia, and South Africa British citizens? Were they not as much entitled to develop the Empire, for which their fathers fought, as their brethren for whom they made room at home? Were they not animated by a nobler spirit in creating new communities oversea than Englishmen, whose energies were wasted in the pursuit of such political will-o'-the-wisps as disarmament, Free Trade, and universal brotherhood? To-day the effect is apparent to all the world. The work of Colonial Englishmen will give to England a position even more glorious than any she has yet known; the dreams of insular Englishmen have exposed her almost naked to her enemies.

Again, what would be the value of Australasia or Canada without Colonists? They would be an even greater drain on the Mother Country than the Colonies of France and Germany, because the native population is too small to give any return to trade. They are, and always have been, one of the main sources of England's wealth by reason of the faith, labour, and enterprise of the settler. Surely Lieutenant Hordern cannot possibly wish his readers to understand that "we" gave the Colonies their lands without asking a return. But, for the sake of argument, let us admit the transaction. Then all I can say is "we" never made a better investment. It has yielded us cent. for cent. "We" were not quite so disinterested as Lieutenant Hordern would like to

believe. Nothing was done for the Colonies without a clear idea of receiving an equivalent in an increased volume of trade. Before the Crown was robbed of its privileges by the House of Commons, charters were, indeed, given to Colonists conferring on them certain lands oversea, but the colonisation of the nineteenth century was carried out on different lines from the colonisation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For instance, when did "we" give the Colonies in Rhodesia their lands? Most people believe that the Empire owes that great Province to the genius of a man who received no support from the Home Government whatever. The same is true of Nigeria; and over how much territory west of the Great Lakes would the British flag wave to-day had Canada not built the Canadian Pacific Railway? Not a square mile. The history of the Empire is a magnificent refutation that "we" gave the Colonies their lands.

Lieutenant Hordern says that "the duty of the Navy to ward off attack on territory is ignored, and yet it is the fulfilling of this duty which has enabled the Colonies to develop in peace." Seeing that no Power during the first half of the nineteenth century had a Navy worth talking about, it is difficult to see how any Colony, with one exception, could have been attacked. That exception was Canada, which has been invaded from the United States several times. The Colonies developed in the peace secured to the Empire by the Napoleonic wars, which left England supreme in the world. As a matter of fact, the Navy until twenty years ago was allowed to decline until it was admittedly inefficient as a basis for diplomacy. It was the growth of rival Fleets, largely paid for by British Free Trade, which waked us out of the lethargy we fell into after Waterloo. Apparently Lieutenant Hordern looks on defence and the Navy as one, but what would Canada have done without her Militia in 1812, in 1837, and in 1866, when she was invaded by the Americans? New Zealand has also had to rely on her Militia in war time, and so has South Africa.

That the Colonies have looked on the Navy as a bulwark of defence is certainly true, but is there a nation in the world which would not welcome Colonies on similar terms? England, a small country with wealth and resources accumulated in a thousand years of effort, without adding a man to her Army or a ship to her Navy, saw herself gradually becoming the centre of a world dominion whose Provinces are practically Continents. They, however, rose from the ground in less than a century, and everything they used came from the Mother Country. They were thus potential sources of wealth, as they are now of political power. The return, which Lieutenant Hordern denies, has been so magnificent that it inspired

the statesmanship of Disraeli in the nineteenth century, and to-day inspires the statesmanship of Mr. Chamberlain.

Heaven preserve us from an Imperial House of Commons, which is a purely insular ideal. The Colonies want representation in the capital, but not at Westminster, and a beginning was made last year when the Canadian Minister of Militia took part in the deliberation of the Imperial Council of Defence. I have never maintained that "we" were careless of Colonial interests, as these are well looked after on the spot. What I do maintain is something very different, that we have only lately begun to see great national questions from the Imperial point of view. Even now the payment of ship-money is the one way in which we can conceive Colonial aid to the Navy. Our brethren over sea, however, decline to accept the principle to any great extent. They want to develop Navies and Armies of their own, and in this they are quite right, for without them neither a national character nor sense of responsibility can be fully developed. A nation that pays for its defence is a nation that is not worth defending. What the Empire needs is not centralisation, but decentralisation, with a supreme Imperial Council which will secure harmony in policy, training, organisation, and direction in war-time; and because the Colonies venture to say so, Lieutenant Hordern suggests that they are both selfish and insincere. Apparently he does not perceive that if the sea unites, it also divides. Hence an Imperial House of Commons is never likely to be realised. As for the independence cry, it is played out. When the Colonies disagree with the Mother Country they always want to be independent. Else why should they disagree? When their Imperialism stood the strain of fifty years of Little Englandism, it will stand anything.

Lieutenant Hordern argues on the question of defence on much the same lines as the Opposition argue on the question of Fiscal Reform. Because their idea of a commercial policy is Free Trade, no Colonies have ever made preferential offers. They shut their ears to popular opinion which finds expression in resolutions of commercial and industrial associations; to the voice of distinguished Colonial Statesmen in Office and in Opposition; to the general tend of Colonial policy as it was moulded by Macdonald, Rhodes, and other great leaders of the past; to the deliberations of Colonial Conferences; and to the Conferences of Premiers. In the same way Lieutenant Hordern assumes that, because the Colonies see nothing to be gained by representation in the House of Commons at Westminster, and refuse to pay ship-money, they want to shirk responsibility for defence. To convince some Englishmen that the Colonies are serious in their desire for

Preference and a sound system of Imperial Defence is impossible, for, like the woman convinced against her will, they are of the same opinion still. What they want is a paper scheme, though who is to draw it up, and how it can be constitutionally presented to the United Kingdom, no one knows. Their attitude towards a foreign country in such circumstances is unthinkable. Why, then, should it be tolerated in our relations with our own people?

"Our common forefathers struggled for proper representation for many centuries. What has happened to their descendants in the Colonies that they, too, do not insist on the same?" This is rather good, seeing that they took fifty years to secure self-government, and by the time they have secured Preference and representation in the Mother Country another fifty will have passed. They are insisting on the need for both, and have insisted, constitutionally, of course, since the Confederation of Canada and before it. "You shall have representation in Parliament," says the insular Englishman, and is quite shocked and hurt that the Colonial is not overwhelmed with gratitude at the honour. He forgets that the House of Commons is a declining factor in public affairs, and hardly ever discusses a great Imperial question without making itself a spectacle for gods and men. Even if the idea were practicable, which it is not, it could never be carried out on a population basis as Lieutenant Hordern proposes. A few millions of people living on a continent which was a wilderness a century ago are not in the same position as forty millions of people living in a small group of Islands which have been settled for a thousand years. Fortunately, Colonials are confident that they will bring the Mother Country round to their way of thinking because they have so often done it before. It is not they, but she, whose mind changes on great Imperial questions. For instance, she was violently opposed to self-government, then just as violently in favour of it. She despised Colonies, and wanted to get rid of them; now she glories in them and wants to keep them. She was wedded to Free Trade in the nineteenth century, the twentieth finds her seeking a divorce. And in every instance the change of attitude has been brought about by Colonial influence. Hence the concentration of the Colonies on the question of Preference. When that is settled the Empire is practically united, for a common trade policy must produce a common policy of defence.

C. DE THIERRY.

THE COLOUR OF WARSHIPS.

BY JAMES S. RAMSAY.

WITHIN the last few years the British fighting services have abandoned the war colours given them in the days of the Commonwealth. Oliver Cromwell clothed his sober Ironsides under breastplate and buff-coat in the scarlet which has now been discarded for khaki and "heather mixture." So in the Commonwealth Navy, the uniform of the ships was appointed to be black. The naval black, however, proved less constant than the soldier's scarlet. During the greater part of the eighteenth century British warships were coated yellow, with black streaks along the lines of ports. Those were the days of elaborately carved and gilded sterns, with huge square lanterns, decorative effect being carried to a height from which more utilitarian ages soon fell away. But why should the naval architect have rejected the services of the carver and gilder, and the painter with his pots of canary yellow? Ranges were short, there was small chance of a misunderstanding when battles were conducted almost at stone-throwing distance, and finished, in the last resort, by boarding. Build and rig were better guides in the eyes of a seaman of that age than the colour of hulls, and for a fleet to slink away unseen was difficult when fleets were numerous and must perforce increase their mass of canvas with the necessity for speed. Much could be learned from the canvas. Lord Cochrane, reproaching the Admiralty for their failure to keep the British cruisers properly equipped during the Napoleonic wars, declared the enemy's coasters disappeared into port whenever the worn and blackened sails appeared on the horizon. A quaint instance of the naval application of the principles of Sherlock Holmes is recorded by the late Admiral Sir Henry Keppel. On one of his earlier voyages, a signalman reported a passing vessel as from home. Asked by his officer how the deuce he could tell that, he called Keppel's attention to the fore-topsail being discoloured. What had that to do with it? The signalman explained that the look-out men were young hands, and their stomachs could not stand the difference of motion in a swell! When Sir Sidney Smith reconnoitred Brest in 1795, he merely altered the appearance

of the *Diamond* and stood boldly in, conversing in French with an officer who hailed him from a French ship lying near. So in the Mediterranean, Lord Cochrane's famous little *Speedy* conducted part, at least, of her commerce-destroying under the guise of a Danish brig.

It was Lord Nelson who broke away from the orthodox colour of the British Navy and introduced a new system of painting, which lasted with only a trifling change as long as "wooden walls" held the sea. It consisted, Captain Mahan tells us, of black hulls with yellow streaks at the lines of ports, and the port-lids black. Sir Edward Codrington, who joined Nelson after his return from the West Indies in pursuit of Villeneuve, says in a letter, "Lord Nelson's squadron (of which we have eight with us) seems to be in very high order indeed; and although their ships do not look so handsome as objects, they look so very warlike, and show such high condition, that when once I can think *Orion* fit to manœuvre with them, I shall probably paint her in the same manner." The Nelson style, it would thus appear, was eagerly adopted by vessels coming under his command, and the 'Forecastle Recollections' of a seaman of the time inform us that one of the first causes of a certain tyrannical officer's unpopularity with his crew was an order to paint out the famous "chequers." Not even in the British fleet at Trafalgar, however, was there uniformity of colour. In the recently published memoirs of Captain Hoffman, R.N., 'A Sailor of King George,' we are told that on joining the blockading fleet off Cadiz his ship was ordered to paint in yellow, with black streaks and yellow masts. The allied fleet was in all colours. A narrative of the battle, quoted in Sir W. Laird Clowes' 'History of the Royal Navy,' thus describes them: "Some of them were painted like ourselves, with double yellow * sides, some with a single red or yellow streak, others all black, and the noble *Santissima Trinadad* with four distinct lines of red, with a white ribbon between them . . . the *Santa Anna* . . . was painted all black." Here was a case where confusion might have occurred in the kaleidoscope of a battle where breaking the line was from the first the British leader's object. "It was remarked by Nelson," continues the narrator, "that the enemy had the iron hoops round their masts painted black. Orders were issued by signal to whitewash those of his fleet, that in the event of all the ensigns being shot away, his ships might be distinguished by their white masts and hoops." The black hulls which Nelson reintroduced remained the uniform of

* The term "double yellow" refers to the Nelson colouring—the double line of yellow at the ports.

British ships of war for fifty years, though white lines were in time substituted for yellow, and on hot foreign stations yellow remained the standard colour till, in the days of ironclads, it gave place to white. Sir Henry Keppel, on going out to China in 1867, found the flagship at Hong Kong, the *Princess Charlotte*, "a huge three-decker, painted yellow and white, and looking shorter and higher than any Ning-Po junk."

When wooden ships began to give place to ironclads, in the sixties of last century, "invisibility" for ships of the line remained unthought of by naval men. Already, however, the advantage of colour protection for small craft had begun to be realised. In the Russian War of 1854, a British squadron under Sir Charles Napier dominated the Baltic. The Russians would not venture out; they lay in their fortified harbours chiefly at Cronstadt. Had the mobile torpedo-boat been in existence, no doubt they would have attempted to harass the British ships, which patrolled the Baltic from the breaking up of the ice till the winter storms compelled them to go south for shelter. Not having torpedo-boats, the Russians employed fixed torpedoes—submarine mines we should now call them—to secure the channels of approach. The late Admiral Sir B. J. Sulivan, then captain of the paddle-steamer *Lightning*, and an officer of distinguished surveying abilities, was employed in reconnoitring. At Bomarsund the Master of the Fleet made an unsuccessful attempt, going in with three large black boats on a moonlight night. He was fired upon when a thousand yards from the shore. Two nights later, Captain Sulivan went in on a cloudy night, in a small boat painted light blue, the men dressed in the same colour, and was able to make investigations and fix buoys five hundred yards nearer the Russian forts. It was during the Crimean War that ironclads first made their appearance in the armoured batteries propelled by steam, which our ally, Napoleon III., sent out to bombard Kinburn. Those vessels, says Mr. H. W. Wilson, in his 'Ironclads in Action,' "had a heavy, sullen appearance, were spoon-bowed, and painted grey."

The American Civil War, however, was destined to afford the first real trials of the ironclad in naval war. It was a one-sided business, for apart from armoured river gunboats on the one hand, and commerce destroyers like the *Alabama* on the other, the South had no navy. On both sides the protective value of colour was recognised. When Farragut forced his way up the Mississippi, running the gauntlet of the Confederate forts, not merely did he improvise armour by winding chain cables round the vital parts of his ships, but he had them daubed externally with river mud so as to make them hard to differentiate from the banks, and so to

confuse the aim of the rebel gunners. A step further was taken at the bombardment of Vicksburg. There, as narrated in Willis J. Abbot's 'Bluejackets of '61,' Admiral Porter, commanding the gunboats and mortar vessels, "had the masts and rigging wrapped with green foliage so that, lying against the dense thickets of willows that skirt that part of the river, they were invisible. Other boats that were in more exposed positions had their hulls covered with grass and reeds so that they seemed a part of the swamp that bordered the river." On the Confederate side colour protection was chiefly appreciated in connection with the blockade-runners. Several British naval officers, finding time hang heavy on their hands while waiting for promotion, took up the command of fast steamers for this purpose, and the officer afterwards known as Hobart Pasha was one of these. The vessel in his charge had her masts and spars cut down to bare poles, with only a "crow's nest" for the look-out man. The hull showed no more than eight feet above the water-line, and was painted a dull grey. For blockade-running, however, Hobart expressed the view that speed was the prime essential.

The same officer was destined to make further experiments in the science of colouring and backgrounds in naval war. Passing into the Turkish service, he held a command in the Black Sea during the Russo-Turkish struggle of 1877. Here the first practical experience of torpedo-boats in war was gained. With their large ships, the Turks had a superiority on the open sea. But they were most vigorously and persistently attacked by the Russian torpedo-boats. Carried to the scene of action on fast steamers, those little craft—painted sea green—were launched to the attack with their crews fresh. More than one Turkish armour-clad fell a victim to Russian enterprise. Several bold attacks were made on the Turkish squadron lying at Batoum, and in the Sulina mouth of the Danube. Describing an attack at Batoum, Hobart says: "As a sportsman, I calculated that to fire at a dark object in the night, especially when that object had a background of high hills, such as we had at Batoum, was most difficult, so the first order I gave was no lights, not even a cigarette light; utter darkness under severe penalties." A Russian sympathiser lit a fire on the high ground behind the town as a beacon to the prowling torpedo-boats, but even with that, the darkness prevented accurate or effective torpedoing of the ships. Darkness in harbour and motion at sea were Hobart's great safeguards against torpedo attacks. "A ship," he says, "cannot be seen in the dark, if she shows no lights, at more than five hundred yards' distance, and a moving ship would have been most difficult to hit."

Down to our own day, no great naval war has furnished data as to the value of particular colours as between two hostile squadrons. In the Austro-Italian war of 1866, the Austrian ships were painted black, and the Italians grey. But this distinction of colouring is worth recalling only in connection with Tegetthoff's order to his inferior and improvised fleet, "Ram everything grey," an order, the spirit of which was so effectively realised that the day of Lissa ended the war at sea. So, in the Chino-Japanese war, we cannot find it to have been of any particular moment that the Japanese fleet was painted white, and the Chinese black. The Americans, however, in the operations off Cuba in 1898, thought it well to substitute a leaden hue for the brilliant white hulls and saffron upper works in which their warships figured during peace. Here, probably, we have an indication of the fear of torpedo attack, to which a blockader is exposed in modern war. The blockaders off Cuban ports had more than one terrible night's work repelling torpedo-boats which existed only in imagination, and even "Fighting Bob," now Admiral Evans, has left it upon record regarding one of those scares, that "if I saw one torpedo-boat that night, I saw a thousand."

In the British Navy of recent years a striking and picturesque colour scheme—black hulls, white upper works, yellow funnels, and orange, or tawny, masts and fighting tops—reigned until the Admiralty order of 1902, which substituted a uniform grey tint. From time to time, however, experiments in colour had been made. Thus, when exercises intended to represent a blockade were carried out at Bantry Bay in 1885, much was heard of the ram *Polyphemus*, a unique type in our Navy, and one which constructors have not repeated. Mr. Villiers, one of the press correspondents with the fleet, thus describes her:—"The *Polyphemus* is painted a low tone of grey, so that in misty weather she mixes herself up with the background of hills in the bay, and is almost invisible at a few hundred yards; though ugly enough, it is the right sort of war paint." Experiments in colouring were not resumed upon a large scale until the Boer War had directed general attention to the desirability of making a fighting force inconspicuous. By the summer of 1901, the Admiralty's search for an "invisible" tint was manifested in the variegated colouring of several of the ships engaged in the naval manœuvres, and in the end the present leaden hue emerged triumphant.

There is one peculiarity of naval "khaki." Tested as it is by every variety of atmosphere and light, it can scarcely be said to possess finality. On the occasion of the visit of the Channel Squadron to the Forth a few months ago, the writer had his

attention directed to the remarkable change in the appearance of the ships, from black to a pale ashen grey, according as they were seen against the light or with a background of the dark trees on shore. In a haze, all distinction of outline becomes blurred. With such large bodies as ships, however, an "invisible" tint in the military sense is hardly possible. We must not be led to expect too much in this respect, for the analogy of land war does not fully apply. The soldier takes cover in the inequalities of the ground. On the sea, as Napoleon said, there is no "field of battle." The combatants are in the open, in a field as fair and unimpeded as the floor of an arena. Such an idea as a ship of twelve or fifteen thousand tons trying to skirmish behind rocks only requires to be suggested for its absurdity to become manifest. Further, though the sea's surface tells no tales, as ground does, trails of smoke may indicate the passage of a fleet, even though the ships themselves are not to be distinguished. Particular colours may assist torpedo craft to approach, unobserved, closer to their prey, and might conceivably assist battleships to escape a torpedo-boat attack, though the odds, of course, are against the bigger object. In the case of the Japanese attack upon the Russians off Port Arthur in the present war, it does not appear that any other colour than the black, in which Mr. Bennet Burleigh saw them, would have materially benefited the latter, their fleet lying, as it did, at a fixed point, with lights apparently burning, and its officers not anticipating an attack, as one of them confessed, for "three or four days." In a fleet action in the open sea in daylight, probably the best that can be claimed for "invisible" paint is the momentary hesitation imposed on gunners in taking aim. Nor should it be forgotten that invisibility may constitute a peril in certain evolutions, either in war or peace. The recent collision between the *Prince George* and the *Hannibal*, while the Channel Fleet was carrying out night manœuvres off the coast of Spain, has its own suggestiveness in this connection.

JAMES S. RAMSAY.

THE APPARENT MOVEMENTS OF THE STARS.

WITH SOME REMARKS ON MARCHING BY THE STARS.

BY MAJOR T. E. COMPTON, late The Northamptonshire Regiment.

THE apparent movements of the stars are usually described as of two kinds, due the one to the diurnal revolution of the earth on its axis, and the other to the annual movement of the earth in its orbit round the sun.

The apparent movement caused by the first motion of the earth—that is to say, the first kind of apparent movement—is the rising of the heavenly bodies eastwards, and their movement towards the west exactly as the sun appears to rise near the east and set near the west. The second kind of apparent movement, although not so noticeable, is equally well known (also as east and west movement), *i.e.* each star will be found to rise four minutes earlier each twenty-four hours, so that a star that at this moment is rising in the east will in about six months' time be setting in the west at the same hour, because four minutes a day = two hours a month = twelve hours in six months.

If we treat the apparent as real motions, it is the heavenly sphere that really moves. The stars, and the sun, which is also a star—the nearest star—and, in fact, all the heavenly bodies for a brief period of time may be considered as set in the sphere, and as it moves the stars move with it. The sun and stars for ordinary practical purposes are absolutely fixed, but, of course, the moon and planets have their own proper movements, and into these I do not propose to enter. Nor do I propose to refer at length to what I will call the four minutes' movement or second kind of apparent movement. It will be sufficient to state the fact that a star rises and sets practically four minutes earlier every evening, and that it is well to keep this fact in mind when wishing to make use of the

star for marching by, or for orientation by night. Diagram, Fig. 1,* is intended to illustrate this phenomenon, showing cause and effect. It is obvious that as the earth moves round the sun, the set of stars seen by an observer on the equator, rising this evening, must be entirely lost to the view six months hence. Here in England, latitude 51°, there are large numbers of circumpolar stars which are visible all the year round at any hour of the night, others which are lost to view for shorter or longer periods, and some southern stars that cannot be seen at all. This is the effect of latitude; for with regard to southern stars, for example, we cannot see more than 90° from our zenith, and consequently in latitude 51° all southern stars with a declination more than 39° must be invisible.† The earth moves in its orbit 1°, equal to four minutes of time, each twenty-four hours. This is the cause. The effect is to produce the apparent movement I have attempted to describe.



FIG. 1.

N.B.—This figure shows that a star or constellation rises six hours earlier every three months, which is equal to four minutes a day.

Owing to the immense distance, all lines drawn from the earth's orbit to a star may be considered as parallel.

It is, however, with the first point of apparent movement, *i.e.* the revolution of the starry sphere from east to west, that I wish especially to deal in this article. As I have already said, the revolution of the earth on its axis has the effect of making the sphere appear to revolve in the opposite direction, and the stars to pass eastwards to westwards by night, exactly as the sun appears to move by day. This is obviously true, but it is not nearly the whole truth. What I wish to draw attention to is that for purposes of marching and of orientation generally there is not one movement of this kind, but three movements. In fact, in this latitude I might even say there are four movements.

In section 41, *Combined Training*, it is stated that the general direction can be effectively kept by means of the stars, and further

* The ellipticity of the earth's orbit is much exaggerated in this figure.

† 51 + 39 = 90. The declination of a star is its angular distance from the celestial equator.

that it is important that an officer should acquire sufficient knowledge of the stars to enable him to ascertain his bearings by them.

In order to find their bearings by the stars, in the Southern Hemisphere especially, officers must know two things at least—

(1) How to identify a star.

(2) The bearing of that star at the moment of time required.



FIG. 2.

In the Northern Hemisphere Polaris, the North Star, revolves within 2° of bearing of the Pole. In the Southern Hemisphere the principal star of the Southern Cross, α, is on the meridian when the Cross is nearly vertical, *i.e.* when γ the upper star (superior transit) of the long limb of the Cross is from the vertical one-eighth of the distance between γ and δ Crucis (see Fig. 2). When the Cross is vertical both α and γ have passed the meridian, but will be

approximately south. This fact is referred to in a manuscript which the present writer submitted to the War Office in June of last year. I observe that it has now been included in the new 'Manual of Field Sketching and Reconnaissance' (page 116).

But the difficulties of finding your bearings by the stars, excepting only Polaris, in this sort of fashion is well illustrated by the subsequent paragraph in that Manual, where the statement is made: "an idea of the true south at other times than when the Cross is vertical may be obtained by remembering that this constellation is about 30° distant from the southern celestial pole."

The mean polar distance of these four stars is about 30° as stated. But the polar distance of stars with a declination greater than the latitude has only a slight and very deceptive relation to their azimuth or bearing; and it is the approximate bearing of the stars that an officer wants to know. For instance, in latitude 34° S the bearing of γ crucis at four and a quarter hours from meridian (upper transit) is either 138° or 232° before or after meridian respectively. From its position from the vertical at that time an intelligent observer following the Manual would estimate the bearing at 25° from the pole, whereas the mean bearing is clearly about 40°; and the higher the latitude the more this divergence will increase, so that in New Zealand, say latitude 40° S, where the intelligent observer following the Manual might assume the mean bearing of the Cross from its position from the vertical at three hours fifty-four minutes from meridian to be about 24° from the pole, the divergence amounts to nearly 20°. It is really about 44°, the bearings with this hour angle in that latitude being 136° 14′ and 223° 46′ before and after meridian respectively.

Assuming a star to be identified, what is its bearing at any given moment of time?

No book, I believe, has ever been printed in any language giving the information required, for the stars' bearings change irregularly, not only with regard to the hour of the night, but with regard also to the latitude of the place. On page 38 I have shown that this want can, however, be supplied immediately, if required, for those parts of the world where it would be most useful; but in the first place it is important to understand the movements of the stars, for the alterations in bearing differ with each movement very materially. In order to explain clearly, it is hoped, to persons who are not well acquainted with astronomy, the apparent movements of the stars caused by the diurnal movement of the earth, I have adopted a convention which is illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4; and I begin by assuming all lines and circles to be in the same plane. This is not, I am aware, the usual method of attacking an astronomical problem,

but in this instance it works well, and I may mention with regard to my statements generally that they would never have been published had I not previously submitted them to competent criticism, and received an imprimatur of unquestionable authority.

The latitudes that I had in mind when I set myself to consider this subject were from the equator to latitude 34° on either side, for within these limits are included the whole of Africa, India, and the greater part of Australia. It will be easily understood as applied to England; but in this latitude there are, as previously noted, a considerable number of circumpolar stars which do in a



FIG. 3.

way certainly introduce a fourth movement, viz. from west to east below the pole such stars make an inferior transit, and with these I will deal later on. For the present it must be understood that the superior transit is alone referred to when the meridian is mentioned.

An observer in either hemisphere looking towards the pole will find that the stars appear generally to make a convex movement; whereas, looking in the opposite direction, the arc which a star appears to make is concave. Fig. 3 will explain what is meant. It will be observed, however, on looking at the diagram that some stars may rise in front of the observer, and moving eastwards as regards bearing, pass to their meridian behind him, *x.y.x'.*,

thus making a concave movement round the observer. I have therefore divided the stars into three categories.

1. Stars with a declination of the same kind but greater than the latitude of the observer (which in the diagram is identical with the horizontal line passing through his zenith).

2. Stars with a declination of the same kind but less than the latitude of the observer.

3. Stars with a declination of an opposite kind to the latitude of the observer, *i.e.* north if the observer's latitude is south, and *vice versâ.*

The movement which stars of the first category appear to make is convex. The movement which stars of the second category appear to make is as shown in the diagram, *i.e.* they rise in front of and pass behind an observer facing the pole to the meridian, and then again pass in front of him as they sink towards the horizon. The movement of the third category is concave.

The movement of the third category (southern stars in the northern hemisphere) is simple enough. To an observer in the northern hemisphere looking south they rise in the east, *i.e.* on his left hand, and pass gradually over to the west, their bearing increasing continuously. This increase, though not regular, is calculable, and the approximate bearing of any one of these stars at any moment of time can easily be determined. The disadvantage with this category is that they are always in comparatively rapid movement, especially in their first and second hours from the meridian; but even with the most unfavourable conditions it is possible to make some use of them.

The *third category* has been dealt with first because it is the simplest to explain, and taking them in order, as we began with the third, we will now consider the second category. For the sake of simplicity, I will confine myself to the northern hemisphere, but if for north we read south, the explanation is in a general way equally applicable to the southern hemisphere.

The stars of the *second category*, it will be remembered, the declination of which, though north, is less than the latitude, make a concave movement round the observer. Their bearing six hours before and after meridian is known, being in the lowest latitudes nearly equal to their north polar distance, or to 360° – N.P.D. respectively * (in the southern hemisphere 180 – or + their south polar distance), and their bearing on meridian is, of course, also known; it only remains to find the hour when such a star is due

* In the higher latitudes the bearing will differ considerably from the polar distance; but all to the observer's advantage, as the star will vary so much the less from the east or from the west and its movement will be slower in consequence.

east or due west. Scales can then be worked out to determine its approximate bearing at any moment of time. All this is merely a matter of computation. The peculiarity of stars of this category is their comparatively slow movement in bearing before they arrive at the east or west line.

It is evident that if at six hours a star bears its polar distance when rising, the angular distance it has to pass over before it reaches the east and west line is 90° minus its polar distance. But it is also clear that its declination equals 90° minus its polar distance. Therefore the angular distance it has to travel in bearing between six hours and due east (90°) is equal to the declination. Now, for example, let us say a star's declination is 12°. In latitude 17° the time from meridian when it will be due east is three hours. Consequently the angular distance in bearing which it has to travel in three hours from P.D. to due east is 12°, or 4° in one hour on the average.

When the declination is less, it is evident that the average rate of movement will be less. The most favourable combination of latitude and declination in this category is when they are nearly equal. The movement of these stars up to the east and west line and from it when setting is very regular, and as this movement is slow, they offer themselves for use as guides while in this position.

We now come to the *first category*. In the latitudes to which I have referred on a previous page, viz. 1° to 34°, a very large proportion of stars are included in this category, increasing, of course, as we near the equator. Looking at diagram Fig. 4, it will be seen that a star of this category moves eastwards, *i.e.* its bearing increases up to a certain point of its arc, which we will call T, from which point it decreases until the star arrives on the meridian, where its bearing will, of course, be 0° or 360° (180° in the southern hemisphere). From the meridian, again, it moves westwards, and its bearing decreases from 360° up to a certain point which we will call T′, and which is at the same angular distance from the meridian as T. Thence its bearing increases until in the lower latitudes, in India, for example, every prominent star of this category with one or two exceptions sets. The points T and T′, it will be noticed, represent the maximum and minimum bearing of the star before and after meridian respectively. Now, the great peculiarity and great advantage of this category for orientation is this: that when a star is in or near the position indicated in the diagram by T or T′, the apparent movement of the star is very slow indeed. The rate of movement varies somewhat with the latitude and declination of the star, but for two or three hours it will remain at very much the same bearing, and this is obviously exactly what

is required for making use of it successfully and easily in night marching.

It is necessary, however, to determine the bearing and also the hour of the night when the star is there. Looking again at the diagram, Fig. 4, it will be seen that, assuming all lines and circles to be in the same plane, the star arrives at the points T and T′ at the moment when the line from the observer's eye to the star is



FIG. 4.

tangent to the circle it appears to make round the pole. We therefore require: (1) to determine the hour when the star is tangent to the circle, (2) to determine its bearing at that hour. This, again, is merely a matter of computation. Astronomically expressed, the problem reads, "to find when the azimuth of a star is greatest and its motion vertical, the declination being greater than the latitude;" but as the hour-angle of the vertical motion is equal to the hour-angle of the supposed tangent, and the greatest azimuth is equal to the tangent bearing, the results are identical.*

From the foregoing notes it will be seen that marches could be carried out in all latitudes almost at any time by first category stars with certainty and without much special intelligence being required of the person responsible for the march. The tangent

* The hour-angle of a star is its distance in time from the meridian.

times and bearings of 107 stars for all latitudes, 1° to 34° from the equator, have been computed, together with tables for making use of second and third category stars in a similar way. These have been ready for many months. It is, however, a case of supply and demand, and up to the present the degree of interest evoked has not been thought to be sufficient to justify the expense of publication.

Before going on to consider the important matter of identification, a further remark is necessary to clear up the question of those northern stars which in these latitudes make an inferior transit. These, as previously stated, after passing six hours from meridian westwards commence a west to east movement below the pole. What is this movement? Does it constitute a fourth movement? The answer is, No. For the twelve hours during which they are making the superior transit half-circle they are for the most part in the first category; and for the twelve hours of the inferior transit their movement is the same as that of the third category, and they should be treated accordingly (see page 36). The same remark applies to the higher latitudes of the Southern Hemisphere; in New Zealand and in America south of Buenos Ayres.

With regard to the identification of the stars I have prepared rough charts, Figs. 5, 6, and 7, by the aid of which I hope I may be able to give an idea of the way to easily recognise constellations and stars of the first and second magnitude. These charts refer solely to stars which are visible in England in the month of April much in the positions they are shown, between the hours of 7.30 and 9 P.M.

In each chart there is a star of reference which the observer should face when he begins his observations. *Polaris* is the star of reference in Fig. 5. On one side is the first magnitude star, *Vega*, and opposite to it, nearly equidistant from Polaris, is another first magnitude star, *Capella*. Above Polaris is the *Great Bear*, and below and also nearly equidistant is *Cassiopeia*. *Draco* lies between Vega and the Great Bear, and Cepheus lies between Vega and Cassiopeia. The second magnitude star α Cephei lies very near to a line drawn from Vega to γ Cassiopeia; and γ Draconis, a very useful and prominent second magnitude star, is near to Vega and on a line drawn from that star to β of the Great Bear, which is the pointer furthest from the pole. In this figure therefore we have seventeen stars easily identified.

7 of the Great Bear.	1 of Lyra.
5 of Cassiopeia.	1 of Cepheus.
2 of Auriga.	1 of Draco.

Polaris, or the pole star, is situated nearly on a line drawn from β through α of the Great Bear prolonged about six times the distance between these two latter stars, which are for this reason called the pointers.

Although the first magnitude stars and many of the second magnitude stars have names which have for the most part been handed down from the remotest antiquity, yet, as of course is well known, the ordinary astronomical way of distinguishing them is by the characters of the Greek alphabet. There is, however, no necessity to burden the memory with these. When an observer can

FIG. 5.

N.B.—The Zenith is the point in the sky immediately above the observer. From the Zenith to the horizon is an arc of 90°. As the altitude of the pole is always equal to the latitude, it follows that in latitude 51° N. Polaris is approximately 39° from the Zenith. The polar distances of α and β of the Great Bear (the pointers) being 28° and 33° respectively, they have an altitude of 79° and 84° respectively when on meridian.

recognise the constellations, a glance at a star map will be sufficient to refresh it. The seven principal stars of the Great Bear are lettered consecutively, beginning from the pointer nearest the pole. Cassiopeia's five bright stars are also lettered consecutively; but this is by no means always the case.

Two pairs of third magnitude stars further from the pole than the plough of the Bear are easily recognised on a clear night. They represent two of the Bear's paws, a hind and a fore; they are lettered ι, κ and λ, μ respectively (see Fig. 5).

Regulus is the star of reference in Fig. 6. At half-past eight

on the 15th of April the pointers of the Bear will be nearly overhead. β—α, the pointers, point to Polaris (see Fig. 5). Similarly α—β, pointing the other way, lead us to the Great Lion, which is very much the same distance from the pointers as Polaris, but rather farther, viz. eight times the distance between them.

The seven principal stars of the Great Lion are easily distinguished. The brightest at the handle of the reaping-hook, as the head and shoulders of the Lion is often called, is Regulus, a first magnitude star, the next brightest being *Denebola* at the tail.

FIG. 6.

Regulus is on the meridian, *i.e.* due south at this hour on this date and four minutes earlier or later for each subsequent or previous date respectively. Looking due south at these hours, this beautiful star cannot be mistaken, for it has an altitude, when on the meridian on this latitude, about equal to that of the pole star, *i.e.* about 50°.

Denebola, as previously stated, is at the end of the Lion's tail, and following the curve from Regulus through θ Leonis and

Denebola we come, at an interval of a little more than the distance between Regulus and Denebola, to Arcturus α Boötes, and still following the curve, to *Corona* (the Northern Crown). This is a small constellation composed chiefly of third magnitude stars, and is only readily seen with the naked eye on a very clear night; but the principal star (α Coronae) is of the second magnitude and is always distinct. The stars between Corona and Vega are of the constellation *Hercules.* A line drawn through the Great Lion from the blade of the reaping-hook through the Lion's back to the horizon will pass through Spica, a first magnitude star (α Virginis).

Another way of identifying Arcturus is to follow the curve of the tail of the Bear. Arcturus is in prolongation of this curve at about a little more than the length of the tail from the end star, and if the curve be still further prolonged towards the south it will



Looking West

FIG. 7.

indicate Spica, which when visible is always near the horizon, its meridian altitude in this latitude being only 29°.

Alnilam of the constellation of *Orion*, the centre star of the belt, is the star of reference in Fig. 7. The splendid constellation of Orion in which are two stars of the first magnitude (Betelgeuse and Rigel) cannot fail to be recognised.

Alnilam is only 1° from the celestial equator; to the north are *Betelgeuse* and *Bellatrix*, and to the south *Rigel.* In a half-circle round it, and as seen this month above it, are five stars of the first magnitude. A line drawn through the three stars of Orion's belt towards the southern horizon will indicate Sirius, the most brilliant star of the heavens. Sirius is at one end of the bright half-circle and Capella (see Fig. 5) is at the other. Sirius is south and Capella north, and on the arc between them are *Castor* and *Pollux* and *Procyon* (α Canis Minoris). Draw a line from Sirius through

Orion, between the belt and Bellatrix, and nearly equidistant from Orion is Aldeberan (α Tauris). This deep red star may also be recognised as near the Pleiades, likened by Tennyson to fireflies tangled in a silver braid, which belong also to the constellation of the Bull. Alcyone is the brightest star of the Pleiades.

The Pleiades would lead us to Aries, Aries to Andromeda, Andromeda to Pegasus; but these two latter constellations will have set soon after dark..

From the Pleiades also the constellation of Perseus can be identified. A graceful curve of small stars leading us from the former group to α Persi. β Persi is *Algol*, the remarkable variable star (see Fig. 7).

The constellation of Perseus has recently been especially interesting owing to the sudden appearance, on February 22nd, 1901, of a *Nova* of great brilliance, brighter than Aldeberan. I was in India at the time, and well remember seeing it on the next evening. It was then about as bright as Aldeberan. Every week its brightness declined, until by the end of April, when at sunset it was on the western horizon, it could be scarcely seen. When Perseus next appeared in the eastern sky the newcomer had disappeared altogether. The cause of its light was undoubtedly a mighty conflagration; but the cause of the conflagration is, I believe, still somewhat obscure, as more than one theory has been put forward to explain it. It is hoped that this brief description of a part of the heavens may show how easily the stars can be identified by any one who desires to know them, and further that the explanation of their apparent movements which preceded the description may be of some help to officers and others who may wish to make use of them for orientation or as guides to march by.

Useful star maps at a low price are those by W. Peck, F.R.A.S., published by Gale and Inglis. They are contained in that author's 'The Constellations and How to Find Them,' issued separately for the northern and southern hemispheres. I have found them invaluable for purposes of identification.

T. E. COMPTON.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN STRATEGY.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, late R.E.

VI.

WHILST countless commentators have wearied their readers with their views on Bonaparte's campaign of 1796, the equally brilliant, and for British purposes far more useful, exploits of the Archduke Charles during the same year in the valley of the Danube and upon the Rhine have received but scanty attention even in the country of the victors, where until within the last ten years no adequate study of this, the most instructive of all their many campaigns, had even been attempted.*

Where in Italy Bonaparte had only been handling somewhere about 30,000 men in a mountainous region some fifty miles square, Moreau and the Archduke in Germany had been at the head of armies, numerically not insignificant even in the present day, and moving in a district complicated by forests, rivers, and mountains fully four times as large in area, and whereas, in the former, the victor owed his successes mainly to the absence of the supply difficulty; in the latter, the Archduke was almost as much hampered as Wellington in Spain, by the necessity of conciliating the inhabitants of the region in which he was moving.

I would wish particularly not to be misunderstood on this point of supply. Neither Bonaparte nor the Austrians could afford to neglect their communications altogether, but whereas victory solved all difficulties for weeks for the former, the Austrian magazines being generally well provided, the French when defeated left nothing but a desert waste to the conqueror, who thereby found his freedom of movement curtailed almost in direct proportion to the freedom and rapidity of movement the other gained.

In pursuing Joubert after his victory at Wurzburg, neglecting for the time the threat of Moreau's presence in his rear, and harassing him till the loosely knit French Army became a mere rabble, then returning in time to threaten Moreau's retreat to the Rhine, the Archduke showed greater boldness than Bonaparte and more real insight into the true nature of war; but this alone will not

* See 'Geist und Stoff im modernen Krieg,' by C. von B. K. Vienna, 1893.

suffice to place him in history on the same level as a "strategist," a master of the art of leading armies, because he was lacking in that extraordinary driving power which characterised Napoleon, and could not exact from his followers of all ranks that extraordinary self-abnegation which seemed to permeate all ranks of the French Army when under their leader's eye.

The Archduke was a master in the art of moving armies about, Napoleon in the art of making them fight, and of the two the latter seems to me the greater gift.

The success of the Austrians, however, by no means suffices to condemn the French design. The special circumstances of the case must be taken into account; but this is just what the average commentator, from the days of Jomini onwards, has always declined to undertake. To him the French were foredoomed to failure by the form of their operations—an advance on exterior lines. I submit that this form was not a matter of free choice, but of necessity for the French Government, and that nothing known or which could reasonably have been known to their authorities at the time of its conception justified any want of confidence in its ultimate success.

A French Army in those days needed a vast area to subsist upon, and if both their armies had been moved on one line, the probabilities are that it would have starved before it could have caught up with the retreating Austrians, who, being numerically much the weaker, must have fallen back to pick up reinforcements. By the lines selected, the French moved through the richest country available, and each wing was not only strong enough to give a good account of itself, but quite as big as any General of the time could handle in action or on the march with effect.

Against any other Austrian leader but the Archduke, the plan promised almost certain success, and his qualifications at the time of its inception were quite unknown even in his own Army; but even he would have failed if the French had possessed the cohesion of regular troops and been better served by their cavalry, for at the crisis of the campaign it was the superiority of the Austrian horsemen in the duties of reconnaissance and screening, helped by the fact that the great collision took place in districts which especially favoured the latter and hampered the former, which alone enabled the Archduke to withdraw unperceived from the front of one enemy and concentrate his whole force upon the head of the other.

The real miscalculation of the French Government lay in their over-estimation of the strength of their materials. Their armies were not homogeneous enough, their leaders not energetic enough for their task. Had the latter been able to impress on the former but a mile a day additional mobility, the weight of numbers must have

told, and the Archduke would have been crushed between hammer and anvil.

To attempt to establish as an axiom on these and similar data that exterior lines of operation necessarily place an army at a disadvantage seems to me a negation of all true scientific reasoning, which is careful always not to generalise from insufficient examples. A broader survey of the facts is needed before a sound conclusion can be arrived at.

If double lines of operations were under all circumstances undesirable, what becomes of all the chapters and arguments by which Jomini and his faithful followers, amongst whom Hamley may be assigned almost the first rank, seek to bolster up their theories as to the advantage of a re-entering frontier, as demonstrated in the campaign of Marengo, 1880, Uhu, 1805, and more recently in Bohemia, 1866? In all three the exterior lines were successful; but can any one suppose that the existence of a mere imaginary line drawn across a map can seriously modify the result of collision between two fighting forces?

A more detailed survey of the facts is necessary before one proceeds to any generalisation, and, as much new light has been shed on the subject by recent historical investigations *—light which enables us to view Napoleon from quite a different standpoint than that of a mere conjurer with words and phrases—I propose to deal with his campaigns at somewhat greater length.

When Napoleon returned from Egypt in 1799, he found on every frontier his work of conquest undone. In Italy the Austrians, to whose armies for the time Suvaroff had succeeded in imparting some of his own energy and resolution in attack, had swept the French back behind the Alps, leaving only Genoa, where Masséna still held out as a rallying point, and in the north also the French were behind the Rhine; only Switzerland still remained under the control of the Republic, though it would be hardly accurate to describe it as friendly.

The finances of France were almost at as low an ebb as in 1796, and it seemed to Europe that her last reserve of men and horses had been expended during the previous struggle.

Only one man even in France thought differently, and whilst the Austrians, after Suvaroff's withdrawal, had relapsed into their habitual lethargy, he was at work creating out of the most unpromising materials a new army, which in his hands became destined to reverse the tide of ill-fortune.

I have always considered this as by far the greatest triumph his

* See the recent publications of the French General Staff, especially de Cugnac's 'L'Armée de Reserve,' 1800.

creative energy ever accomplished, for he was not yet emperor and had still to fight against ignorance, incompetence, and political intrigue, practically alone, with no trained staff to help him.

Though the ranks of the armies had been terribly depleted, there were yet men and units in France who, under one pretext or another, had managed to adhere to the depôts, and taking the Army List and distribution returns, he proceeded to "dig out" every man he could find still available for service. Once these had been "rounded up" they appear to have accepted their fate with sufficient cheerfulness—for the *morale* of the "Army of Reserve" was undeniably above reproach—and though the temperament of the nation may account for this in part, the fact that the pinch of hard times, as in 1792, was again beginning to exercise its customary effect on human nature, furnishes probably the stronger half of the explanation.

These units he proceeded to concentrate by a series of route marches, embracing every post-road in France on a general line of cantonments from Dijon to Geneva, and one must study the maps and original orders given in Monsieur de Cugnac's 'L'Armée de Reserve,' my principal authority for these pages, to realise the astounding capacity for detail labour this whole proceeding involved. Of course he had assistants, but from the exceedingly confidential nature of the matter they must have been few, and he himself must have carried the thread of the whole design in his own brain through all the turmoil, danger, and excitement of his day-to-day life, for the year was a critical one in his fortunes, and though First Consul, he was by no means secure in his seat.

The execution of this concentration took time, of course; many units had 600 miles to march, and long before the heads of the columns could reach their ultimate destination, it was allowed to leak out by the secret police that a great army was concentrating at Dijon, further that a visit there would well repay any foreign secret agent, for Bonaparte himself was about to review the gathering.

Following the hint, the secret agents, all or most of them well known to the police, journeyed down to Dijon and saw General Bonaparte review an exceedingly mixed force—of boys, old men, and cripples, not 10,000 strong, who had been collected for the occasion and dignified with the title *pro tem.* of "Army of Reserve."

They sent off their "secret and confidential" reports in all haste, and this time these were not interfered with in the post; and presently all the Courts in Europe were laughing over stories and cartoons ridiculing the "Corsican's" ridiculous bombast in styling such a collection an army; but hardly had the authors withdrawn from the scene, having been carefully induced to move by the same

secret police, than the heads of the real columns began to arrive, and in the first days of May a very sufficient Army of Reserve took up its allotted position.

Practically this "ruse" determined the result of the campaign, for so convinced were the Austrians of the truth of the information they received, that to the very last, even when the whole Army was on Italian soil, and almost in their rear, they refused obstinately to credit the reported strength with which they had to deal, and hence the hesitancy which marked their preliminary concentration.

Except in the wilds of Manchuria, such a scheme would seem to have but little chance of success nowadays, and it would seem, from Mr. Balfour's statement of our Naval and Military policy, made in the debate on the Army Estimates, 9th May, that some such calculation lies at the base of his recent change of opinion as to the possibility of a "surprise raid" upon our coasts. If, however, the increased power of rapidly moving troops conferred by railways and telegraphs be considered, the conclusion seems hardly a sound one, and rather suggests want of information and deficiency of grasp on the part of his strategic advisers.

The French Army and War Office of to-day is in a very different condition of readiness to what it was a century ago, and it would seem to me a very simple matter to arrange in peace time for the despatch of, say, 150 trains from almost as many inland stations by upwards of ten separate double lines of railway to deliver their contents along a front from Dunkirk to St. Malo between 6 P.M. and midnight on any particular day of the week without exciting diplomatic attention; nor would it take much *finesse* to decide on a line of operations which would suffice to occupy very fully the attention of our Navy during the critical six to eight hours these troops would require for their sea-passage. Once on shore, how long would it take our new "Districts" to concentrate for the defence of London? Should we prove very much quicker than the Austrians?

The point is this: all history teaches that the maintenance of peace depends, not on the knowledge of facts as they are, but on the view taken of some few of these facts from opposite standpoints. How those facts which are known strike the respective observers is almost entirely the consequence of the previous training their minds have already received, and I submit that no foreign statesman or soldier, trained to view war from the Napoleonic standpoint, in contra-distinction to ours, the "Nelsonic," to coin a word, could hesitate in his answer if called on to give an opinion.

I hold the "sea-power" standpoint as firmly as any man in the country, and would give very little for the chances of success of

such an enterprise ; but even if we sank every transport within a mile of their beach, the war would have begun and we should be in for a bloody struggle of endurance which could not last much, if at all, less than two years, and which would cost us one thousand million even if we were successful.

My impression has always been that the object of our expenditure on armaments is to preserve peace unbroken. Our present policy seems to me expressly calculated to invite aggression.

No officer occupying the position of the French generalissimo could, if called upon by his Government, declare on his honour and conscience that the Army under his command was incapable of attempting by surprise raid the capture of London, for to do so would be to confess that he and those under him had neglected their duty. Only six weeks ago a mere stroke of the pen on our side would have sufficed to give him the necessary facts to decline the responsibility. Since the Prime Minister can hardly change his mind for the third time, I confess to awaiting the future with no little anxiety.

Reverting again to the main current of our story, even when the Army had been thus successfully concentrated, it was very far from being a mobilised field force in the present sense of the words. Though organised in divisions, it was almost without field artillery, its trains were chaotic, and its ammunition supply ludicrously inadequate.

Though everything had been foreseen and ordered by Bonaparte, there was then as always a difference between giving an order and getting it obeyed ; and now comes a fresh display of that marvellous capacity for work and the development of energy in others which formed the dominant characteristic of this unique nature. Again, one must turn to the pages of de Cugnac and read the sheaves of orders and despatches that flowed from his pen.

Instructions to send on ammunition by post relays, to pick up so many hundredweight of lead in one arsenal, so many pairs of boots in another. To form factories for the manufacture of cartridges, and the baking of biscuit at Geneva. Orders to seize every boat on the lake to provide transport for provisions, in fine, orders to every subordinate to carry out and complete the duties which each ought to have done without any reminder.

Ultimately by the 14th May a sufficiency of stores and munitions were collected for the movement to begin, and if space permitted it would be interesting to give in detail the whole list of deficiencies which even then remained to be made good.

It raises the whole question of when an army passes from the stage of being a mere aggregation of individuals and becomes a

concrete fighting entity. In view of the many discussions of recent years on army organisation, it is well worth considering this point at some length.

Neither the dictionary nor even the *Encyclopædia Britannica* can help us to solve the riddle. Theoretically an army becomes an army from the moment the orders appointing a commander, staff, and naming its units are issued, and it remains one until a similar edict decreeing its dissolution appears; but the range of its fighting value meanwhile may vary almost indefinitely, and this is a point that statesmen who are not soldiers and soldiers who are not statesmen are both apt to overlook.

The former, having decreed the constitution of a field force, forthwith imagine they have created a counter of definite value in the game, and expect it to justify its existence by deeds forthwith. The latter, knowing all the thousand and one details that remain to be adjusted before ideal efficiency is attained, hesitate to act before all things are perfect, and by hesitation lose the whole chances of a campaign.

Thus, in 1870, a first victory was the one and only chance of the French Army, and a comparison of the numbers available on both sides up to the 3rd August show that more than the chance, almost the certainty of winning such a victory existed, had the different Corps and Division Commanders been ready to move.

But they were not, or considered that they were not. One had no water-bottles for his men, another no "flannel bandage" (?) "cholera belts," a third wanted to put his men through a course of musketry with the new rifle, etc., etc. Surely, as the French official account now in course of publication points out, had the uncle, not the nephew, been in chief command, he would have made short work of all these objectors.

The driving energy, that all-conquering will-power which accepts no excuse for failure, knowing well that men have marched and conquered, shoeless, ragged, and starving, was needed to set the men in motion, and what such energy can accomplish this marvellous campaign of Marengo remains as an example; but it must be studied in de Cugnac's pages, not Hamley's.

Almost to the day the Army started, but so short of musket ammunition that a special order was issued prohibiting the use of ball cartridge for the training of the recruits in musketry, though many had only the day before received their arms for the first time; and to teach a man to load his weapon in those days was not quite such a simple process as it has since become.

Does not the ability combined with the iron resolution needed to judge exactly the moment at which the fighting value of this

army would suffice for its task and to launch it forward for its performance, undismayed by the cloud of uncertainties which still encircled the future, suggest rather more of the "art of the leader" than the mere recognition of the advantage to be derived from falling upon the enemy's communications—a trick obvious to every schoolboy at play.

Actually, there is no evidence to show that this idea of drawing advantage from the possession of Switzerland, *i.e.* from the angular base, was originally the conception of Bonaparte at all. On the contrary, the plan had been in the air for months beforehand, indeed, ever since Switzerland fell under French control. De Cugnac's work and the despatches on which it is founded can leave no doubt on the point, which, of course, lay equally at the bottom of Moreau's simultaneous invasion of South Germany; but whereas Moreau took over an army organised and equipped in all except one essential detail (horses for his pontoon train), Bonaparte had to find, organise, and equip his own, and that, too, with such rapidity that the secret could not leak out.

That an army could cross the Alps admitted of no doubt whatever, they had done so repeatedly for centuries, and only in the preceding year MacDonald and Suvaroff both had succeeded in surmounting them by more difficult passes and in far more severe weather.

The men who marched from Gilgit to the relief of Chitral, or who are even now forcing their way into Thibet, at an altitude nearly double that of the summit level of the St. Bernard, would laugh at the physical obstacles of the route even as they stood in those days; but how many men have we had since the days of Sir Charles Napier who would have dared such an effort with such an army, and with no better information than lay at Bonaparte's disposal?

The only moves of modern times which can be placed in approximately the same category are Sir Donald Stewart's march from Candahar to Cabul, and Lord Roberts' move in the reverse direction; but in each case the fighting superiority of our force was incontestable, the country easier, and both were assured of abundant supplies on arrival at their destination. Bonaparte had to take his supplies from his enemy first, and, as matters actually turned out, to capture both the guns necessary to complete his equipment, together with their ammunition also, for the protracted defence of Ford Bard cut off his artillery and ammunition columns for some ten days; and his advance guard, under Lannes, actually entered the plains of Italy and stormed Ivrea without any guns at all.

Reading his St. Helena despatches, I have always been reminded of the story of Blücher who, having won a brilliant victory over the

French, very much to his own astonishment, said to his Chief of the Staff, Gneisenau: "Now sit down at once and show them that we can not only win a battle, but explain how we did it." It has, in fact, always seemed to me that having won a most glorious campaign, Napoleon felt bound to put himself right in the eyes of the "strategists" with their "science of communications," by calling their attention to the care with which he moved to Milan in order to establish an alternative line of retreat and supply in case of disaster. But what kind of a line of retreat or supply would the St. Gotthard have been for a beaten French Army; there was no St. Gotthard railway, the pass was even worse than the St. Bernard; what stores were there awaiting his arrival at Zürich, and what would have been the attitude of the Swiss mountaineers, particularly the German-speaking ones, to a French force in disordered retreat, Napoleon does not say. But the Swiss must have had very short memories, for in quite recent events had they behaved much better to their oppressors than the Afghans did to us between Cabul and Jellalabad in 1838.

This excentric movement not only sacrificed Masséna in Genoa, to relieve whom had been the object of the march, but set free the besieging force under Ott, and gave time for Elsnitz, who was then opposed to Suchet on the Var, to retreat and rejoin the main army, the two together very considerably outnumbered the reinforcement Moncey brought to the French main body at Milan.

The whole movement is so opposed to the Napoleonic practice, that one can only suppose a yielding to overwhelming necessity, that necessity being the provision of subsistence and ammunition for his exhausted men out of the rich Austrian stores which had accumulated at Milan.

It would be an interesting experiment to prepare a war game map, altering the names and eliminating all political considerations, then give the situation as it appeared to Bonaparte on the 24th of May, to a series of players trained in the modern school and see what the consensus of opinion would make of it. I have little doubt what the result would be: a concentration against the nearest fractions of the enemy's field army with a view to defeat them in detail before they could reunite. Surprise is so evidently the essence of the operation that no one would dream of sacrificing the opportunity as Napoleon actually did; the presumption, therefore, as I have already stated, is very strong that the compelling force to which even his will had to bow must have been of a very unusual nature.

It is unfortunate that the Austrian records of this campaign are unusually scanty; but quite recently the Staff at Vienna have

published two monographs, the first by Count Neipperg, who was on the Staff of General Melas, the second by the Prince of Hohenzollern, who throughout the campaign was with General Ott. Both contain much which is of interest with regard to the internal condition of the Army; but neither gives sufficient explanation of the extraordinary slowness with which information and orders circulated within the Imperial Army.

When one considers that no point in the whole theatre of operations was more than seventy-five miles from headquarters—and that four days should have been ample to mass the whole 90,000 men that Melas commanded anywhere in the vicinity of Alessandria, one is absolutely amazed at the appalling lethargy which let some twenty days, from 24th May to 14th June, slip by in inaction. The truth seems to be that up to the very last the Austrians did not believe in the existence of the Reserve Army at all, but thought they had still only to deal with the small column methods of the previous decade—small commands which could be brushed aside whenever their concentrated Army chose to move—and their initial success at Marengo, in spite of all their blunders, goes far to justify this view. After all, it was only a relatively small column—22,500 (less Desaix on detachment)—which opposed them that day, and the Austrians ought to have crushed it beyond hope of rallying long before Desaix returned to the ground, in which case the state of the French would have been a good deal more hopeless than that of the Austrians; for there was not a peasant in Lombardy after the French excesses of 1799 who would not have risen against them once committed to a retreat.

Neipperg's diary shows quite clearly that Melas was absolutely "bluffed" into surrender by the astounding audacity with which Napoleon lied. The Imperial Army was still far more numerous and better in hand than the French, and might easily have renewed the attack next day or slipped away to Genoa, where their supply and transhipment to any point of the coast, thanks to our fleet, was assured, but their commander's nerve had given out, and his imagination entirely failed to grasp the enormity of the falsehoods with which he was confronted; nor is it easy to blame him, for the effrontry with which the French officers carried off their claims was and remains unparalleled.

With not 5000 men in hand, and the bulk of their Army still flying in panic twenty miles to the rear, they spoke as if still at the head of victorious masses, and the Austrians may well be forgiven if they failed to "go one better."

F. N. MAUDE.

NOTE.—With reference to de Cugnac's work, so often referred to above, I would call special attention to Major-General Furse's book, 'Marengo and Hohenlinden.' This is the first attempt in our language to utilise the value of the material published by the French Staff, and deserves the closest attention of all students of Napoleonic times. It has further the great advantage of being written by a practical soldier, not by a University professor.

(*To be continued.*)

ON HEAVY ARTILLERY.

By Captain A. A. McHardy, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.

Much has been written and much has been said in recent times on this subject, and it is with some diffidence that I venture to express my views, especially as on several points I know that they are not those generally held.

Practically all the arguments used nowadays for and against heavy artillery must be, and are, supported by instances from the Boer campaign, and although this campaign was in some respects an approach to what we may expect a Continental war to be, still we must be careful not to regard all its lessons as absolutely final.

To the Boers we owe some gratitude for having shown us, from the earliest days of that campaign, the important *rôle* that this branch of the regiment must play in future warfare; and now that the bulk of the Continental armies have taken the subject into serious consideration, we must not allow ourselves to lose ground and take a second place in this branch.

As far as is at present understood, Continental Powers are considering heavy artillery more as giving great power against earthworks than as "mankillers"—except in Switzerland, where recent experiments have altered their views on this point.

Roughly, the Russians are still undecided as to the armament of any branch except that of their Field Artillery. The French have a gun approaching 5-inch calibre for heavy artillery work. The Swiss have 4-gun batteries of 4·8-inch guns and 8-gun batteries of 4·8-inch mortars. The Germans have their 4-inch and 6-inch guns, a 6-inch howitzer and 8-inch mortar, though the last is likely to be superseded in the Field Service.

Of the four nations mentioned above, the first three have their organisation completed; but the Germans have now under consideration the question of the organisation of their heavy gun batteries. The present resolve of foreign armies is to fight their guns in mass rather than dispersed.

Heavy artillery, as understood by some, means anything up to 7 tons behind the motive power—shell of any weight up to 200 lbs.

and range perhaps 10,000 yards. But what is implied in this paper are guns of 5-inch calibre firing a shell not over 60 lbs. up to 11,000 yards, and giving not more than 4 tons behind the team or traction engine; and a smaller number of howitzers weighing not more than 4 tons behind the team and ranging to 9000 yards. The present 4·7-inch gun was found in South Africa too long, and, like the 5-inch gun, too heavy behind the team. There is no doubt that much heavier armament can be manipulated in the field should necessity arise, but our organisation would hardly admit of this necessity being "often."

In the latter part of May, 1900, the Boers mounted a 6-inch gun on the top of Pougwan Mountain, the southern buttress of Laing's Nek. To do this required the united strength of 3 span (54) of oxen plus the Wakkerstroom Commando, then 500 strong. This gun was hastily taken down the mountain early in June, the same commando manning the drag ropes, and after a successful trek northwards to the eastern line, it was eventually destroyed, the remnants being found by the 19th Hussars.

During the fighting on the Tugela at Vaal Krantz a Boer 6-inch moved about on the Doornkop heights to the eastward of our lines, and played its part well, but was removed long before the day of "Pieters Hill," without, I believe, much difficulty.

But our case is different, and it is hard to believe that even the keenest of battalion commanders would relish being called upon to perform such service. There was one day (the 17th February, 1900) in which a British 6-inch gun did useful work from the unusual position of a railway truck anchored in Chieveley Station (Natal). The shooting was excellent, and the heavy lyddite shell this gun threw so well at the Boer lines told that day. Three or four such guns ready with their railway trucks might usefully be kept in store ready to proceed with the 1st and 2nd Army Corps to any land where railways exist or where they can be laid.

It is obvious that the longer the range of a gun, the flatter will be the trajectory of its shell at short ranges, and hence, to be able to employ searching fire, a percentage of howitzers will be necessary in the heavy artillery. It is not intended for one moment to detract from the merits of searching fire—on occasions it is most useful, as was seen on the Tugela during the four or five days immediately preceding the Battle of Pieters Hill—but it will not be the form of fire most used even in wooded country.

Howitzers will be required also to deal with field works against which the flatter trajectory of guns is ineffective. A proportion of two guns to every one howitzer should meet all requirements in future campaigns.

Accuracy of fire from howitzers has been brought to great precision in the Siege Artillery, but the system adopted is not, of course, applicable to heavy artillery, and much training will be required to ensure quick and accurate laying and consequently good shooting at long ranges.

It seems generally agreed that the proportion of shrapnel shell with a heavy gun should be 75 per cent. as against 25 per cent. of lyddite; and I would add 80 per cent. of lyddite to 20 per cent. of shrapnel with the howitzers.

As to the draught of the future—the present 12-ton traction engine is good on a hard dry road, but not on a wet one. Some ten traction engines left Frere (Natal) on the evening of the 11th January, 1900, with the column under Sir Charles Warren bound for Spion Kop, via Springfield. About 9 P.M. a heavy shower came on, and lasted for perhaps an hour. When dawn broke next day the ten engines had run aground in every conceivable position, the furthest out being some eight miles from Frere.

Once off the road the present engine is out of its element, and no liner facing the south-west monsoon rolls and pitches, smokes and groans more, than does our friend the 12-ton engine.

Much lighter engines would seem indicated. One writer has suggested a form of motor, and there is no reason why at some future date this form of power should not be efficient for work across country.*

Eight horses of the Army Service Corps type can move four tons with ease over any country that they may be called upon to manœuvre over—team, two abreast and drivers mounted on the near horses. This type of animal, or better still, the Field Artillery horse, is more serviceable for this class of work than, as has been suggested, the heavy dray horse. The latter requires more food, is more expensive, more delicate, and must be more carefully handled than his lighter brethren in order to get full value out of him. One argument that has been used against horse draught for heavy artillery is the large amount of forage that will be required; but the engine requires forage too. Coal is not picked up in the fields, and oats and grass sometimes are, and one thing is certain, that a horse will go a great deal longer without water than any engine will.

In a recent campaign the horses of one regiment were called upon to go without water forty-eight hours. They did so without a casualty; no engine could do this.

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* The pedrail, if its value proves to be as great as is claimed for it, appears to furnish a complete solution of this question of military traction.—ED. U.S.M.

The training of heavy artillery has been very fully dealt with of late; but, in these days of specialism (vide our American cousins), we must not expect that any nation will give the companies that we send out to act as heavy artillery so long time as did the Boers to get accustomed to their guns and the vagaries of field life, to get accustomed to long land ranges and land targets, and generally to know how to take their places among mobile troops. A writer in a current magazine had recently an excellent article on this subject, and should a line ever come to be drawn between coast defence "gunners" and those that are to operate with troops in the field, the problem will probably be easily solved.

The choice and occupation of a heavy artillery position requires perhaps more care and skill than that of any other, for, being granted that no gun in the open can live against a gun of even equal power under cover, the delay necessary to move a heavy weapon from an exposed position might cost us very dearly.

The importance of having an establishment of capable signallers in all batteries, but more especially in heavy artillery batteries, cannot be too strongly urged, not only from the point of view of the battalion commander, who sees with natural indignation the few signallers he has taken away to act with detached batteries and guns, but to save time and labour by keeping up communication between the C.R.A. and the battery commanders, and the battery commanders and their observation posts. But in no case does a signal message mean that the signaller must at once move on to the sky-line.

As to the future *rôle* that heavy artillery batteries must play in warfare, the question of supply of ammunition will possibly prove a difficult one; but granted that sufficient ammunition exists at the base, the advance depôts, and in the ammunition columns, as one modern writer has said, "undeniably the battery which has solved the question of ammunition supply will conquer in the war of the future."

About 290 rounds was, I think, the greatest amount of ammunition expended by any heavy battery in one day during the late war; and, under the present organisation, with selected officers in charge of the ammunition columns, the supply necessary to provide for an expensive day here and there ought to be kept up without great difficulty.

When we mass our guns, the control of the supply of ammunition will be a simple matter, but it is when we come to disperse our guns that difficulties must and will arise; and, if we are to take the new German method of infantry attack—namely, in lines of groups of men, each group five to ten yards apart—as a general

example, massed guns will be a necessity, at any rate in the early stages of the war.

The Boers obtained their best effects by dispersed guns. At Spion Kop, at Vaal Krantz, and all along the line, there are many instances in which single Boer guns well earned their laurels; and as the late Colonel Walford, R.A., has said, it is impossible to realise what would have been our difficulties on the Tugela had the Boers employed shrapnel fire with massed guns.

It would seem fair to suppose that in any Continental war we must be prepared in the early stages of the war to meet massed brigade divisions of heavy artillery. Whichever form the campaign may take—either, as was suggested recently, a running fight for several days followed by a form of siege, or, as in our recent experiences, a big fight of two months gradually merging into scattered fights of small bodies—it is evident that as one side or the other becomes gradually weakened and broken, it will be impossible for the leaders of that side to employ their troops in that most difficult of organisations—large bodies—and with this in view heavy artillery, after it has played its part in the early battles, will be more useful in sections and single guns.

The necessity for heavy guns with the attack in these days of smokeless powder has been witnessed by most of us and fully discussed by Colonel Callwell in his 'Tactics of To-day.' It would go hard with any infantry attack that tried to get home without artillery support; and just as at Pieters Hill the heavy guns played on the Boer trenches till our brigades were almost up to them, and then, increasing the elevation, searched the ground beyond the Boer lines, so must heavy artillery be prepared to support their infantry in the future. And as with field artillery, once launched into the attack, the fewer changes of position the better.

In the defence, heavy guns in mass should be very effective with shrapnel, but one can only assume what would happen, as we have no experiences at present of this manner of fire. Provided that the artillery of the defence do not expose all their guns at first, allowing themselves to be drawn into an artillery duel, a heavy blow might be dealt to the attackers' lighter artillery, his mounted troops, or infantry reserves. While on this point, the difficulties attending the location of guns even when firing smokeless powder sound almost worse than they are in reality. Those in the line of fire could generally locate the gun to within a degree from the sound of the first round. Even in wet weather a thin vapour, much resembling smoke, could almost always be seen (with a good glass) to rise from subsequent rounds of a Boer gun.

Whether this vapour was dust or not it is hard to say. If the infantry and mounted troops were accustomed to pass to their artillery any information regarding the presence of a hostile gun or guns, good results would inevitably follow, but this was not always carried out in the late war.

A special use of single heavy guns that allies itself most closely with the defence is that of firing an occasional shot at extreme range, and, if necessary, with sunken trail, into the "Brown" of the enemy's troops.

Early in June, 1900, the Boer 6-inch gun on Pougwan Mountain, that has been mentioned before, fired a single round at 10,800 yards into the "Brown" of Lord Dundonald's Mounted Brigade just off-saddled on the slopes of Mount Prospect. Three men of the mounted infantry were hit, and the brigade had very hastily to move.

Later on in the year, about August, the Boers near Lydenburg dropped a shell into the Volunteer Company of the Gordon Highlanders on the march at a range of about 10,000 yards with dire effect! The general results of such rounds, if effective, and one must be now and then, is undoubtedly great throughout the troops in the vicinity.

The question of "sniping" with heavy artillery guns is one that has evoked much hostile criticism, as it leads to expense of uncommonly heavy shell; but this, too, may have its points if used in a discreet manner. One example will perhaps suffice to explain my meaning.

There was in 1901 in Northern Natal a post on very commanding ground. This post owned a heavy gun. Away to the north-east, on ground which was neither ours nor the enemy's, were three or four Kaffir kraals. The commandant of the Utrecht Commando was wont to send a patrol from time to time to these kraals, gaining, no doubt, invaluable information of our movements every time. This patrol baffled the efforts of the most resolute of mounted troops. But one day the post commander got his chance. The Boer patrol rode up about 9 A.M. to the kraals; and to make a long story short, the heavy gun sniped six times at 6000 yards. The Boers ran from kraal to ant-heap and ant-heap to donga and away, but no Boer patrol ever visited that region again till after peace was signed.

Mobile heavy artillery being practically in its infancy as an organised body, has as yet had, of course, no opportunity of distinguishing itself in what are known as small wars. In such countries as Somaliland, where the extent of view is generally limited to about 100 yards through the bush, where the going is

sandy and in wet weather impossible for wheels, heavy guns would be useless, even the two mountain guns and the 7-pounder camel guns could do but little in the last campaign. But in other countries, such as Uganda, single guns should be useful; while on the Indian Frontier there are many places where, with our South African experience, heavy guns now could go. The 10th Field Battery experienced but little difficulty in travelling into most valleys with the Malakand Field Force, and that was in 1897 and 1898.

A few 50-pound lyddite shell fired against the Pathan towers and villages would save the hard-worked sappers and miners a vast amount of extra labour.

With advanced guards, horsed heavy artillery guns should be most useful, especially in dealing with temporary positions of the defence such as are referred to in section 24 of 'Combined Training.' But with the rearguard, unless the heavy guns of the force are literally mobile, they would be best employed, as has already been suggested, in occupying positions some distance ahead and employing long range shots. A retiring force, strong in mounted infantry, could afford to allow the guns to hold on to these positions till the enemy's troops were within, say, 4000 yards, but as a general rule this could not be done.

It has been said that artillery has no moral effect if no real result is taking place, but this is not borne out by the experiences of many of the Boers. When we come to analyse moral effect, surely it means the fear of the individual lest he get hit, and if that is enough to keep one's adversary behind his stone or at the bottom of his trench or wherever it may be, but little more is asked for except that a shrapnel bullet may eventually hit him. Artillery officers who were at Pieters Hill will remember the strings of yellow Boer prisoners that filed that day down the hill across the Tugela—made yellow, clothes and skin, by the lyddite shell, and whether true or not, I was told then of the terrible stomachic and neurotic complaints engendered by the lyddite explosions and the number of burghers invalided to Pretoria therefrom. I heard this from prisoners in 1901, from the Boer Generals at Vereeniging in 1902, and in the latter end of that year from ex-prisoners returned from the over-sea camps. I have been assured by specialists that these effects are more imagined than real. If so, is not this moral effect?

In conclusion, we must remember that the Republican gunners in the late war, gallant fellows though they were, did not distinguish themselves by the way they kept their guns in action under disadvantageous circumstances; in fact, a remarkable case of this was

observed on the Brakfontein position just below and immediately east of Spion Kop. A gun emplacement had been erected, but was not occupied for some days. At last a gun opened from this spot only to have some eight or ten rounds of naval 4·7 flung at it. The Boer gun hastily withdrew, and examination of the ground a few days later showed that no round had struck within twenty yards of the emplacement.

But we were not then fighting against thoroughly disciplined troops, and in the future we must expect in our big wars to encounter gunners who can give and take far more punishment than did the Staats Artillery, and nothing but a very high standard of specialism will win, more especially in the important branch of mobile heavy artillery.

A. A. McHARDY.

THE EDUCATION OF ARMY OFFICERS.

By Colonel M. J. King-Harman.

Surely the country has been afforded a splendid object lesson by the recent entrance examinations for Woolwich, Sandhurst, and Osborne respectively; from which all who wish to do so can form an opinion as to the best way of commencing and carrying out the education of those who are intended to become officers in the fighting forces of our country. Those who differ from the opinions expressed in the following few pages, might possibly assist much towards a proper solution of this important national question, if they would take the trouble to ask the Editor to allow them space for the expression of their views in this Magazine.

How does the case stand to-day? On the one hand, we see the Navy, with their usual practical sagacity, taking carefully selected boys of twelve to thirteen years of age, subjecting them to a medical examination first, closely followed by a simple common-sense test of their educational grounding, and then sending them off to their school at Osborne to be there trained up step by step, under strict discipline, as professional naval officers. During the most impressionable years of their lives, those boys are continuously breathing a naval atmosphere, becoming imbued with naval instincts and traditions, having their characters built up morally and intellectually, and their physique developed; so that they are ready-made officers, in the fullest sense of the word, by the time they join their first ships.

The excellent result of that training is proved by the universally acknowledged fact that British Naval officers are incomparable. It has been repeatedly proved by the past history of the nation, and it will be proved again and again whenever we are engaged in war.

On the other hand, we see totally different methods pursued by the vacillating, unready War Office, that recognised plaything of Party politicians, which alters its rules and regulations almost as often as it changes the uniform of its officers, and to as little purpose.

A miscellaneous lot of lads of between seventeen and nineteen

years of age, who have been subjected to no previous selection or medical test of any kind, most of whom have been specially "crammed" for the occasion, are collected at certain centres and are put through a long, difficult, and unpractical examination, which is not in any way a test of their fitness for a military career. The successful ones have then to go to London for a medical examination, which could have been carried out with equal efficiency and with less inconvenience at the centres before the literary one; and at which no test whatever of physical endurance, or stamina, or manly qualifications is applied. They then go to Woolwich or Sandhurst as the case may be, where for the first time they get any instruction in military subjects or any taste of discipline, and are put through a course for which they have not been previouly prepared, and which is erroneously supposed to fit them for the onerous and responsible duties of army life—*which includes the command of men.* It is only fair to state here that the course at Woolwich is a much more soldierly and more useful one than that at Sandhurst; but even there the Cadets are not made to take off their coats and learn all about the making and the mechanism of modern artillery and engineering appliances, in a real practical manner calculated to make them efficient instructors of their men when they leave the academy. And further it may be added that the new practice of sending Cadets out into camp to attend and take part in military manœuvres, is all nonsense, and a waste of valuable time. This innovation was introduced merely as a sop to satisfy a popular outcry, and it has not acted beneficially in any way; so the sooner it is put on one side, with all other shams, the better.

Even on paper, the difference between the methods adopted in the sea and land Services is sufficiently striking to make one anxious to find out which is right and which is wrong—for they cannot both be right; but when one comes to see the finished article, and to compare the naval officer of twenty years of age with the infantry or artillery subaltern of the same age, there is no longer any room for doubt that the naval system is the right one. It is, therefore, high time for the nation to inquire why the system, which is so obviously wrong, should not be discontinued at once. Now is the time to root out our antiquated and unmilitary system of miscalled military education, which is giving us such a mixed lot of unprepared officers, many of whom are not gentlemen by birth, and who are consequently not so desirable as those who are. It has been well said that the essential quality for a British officer is that he shall be a gentleman, and if any one wishes to learn the reasons for that, he will find them correctly given in the review of the life of that fine specimen of an officer and a gentleman, the late

Prince Christian Victor, which was published in this Magazine for May, 1903.

It should be borne in mind that our much-vaunted system of officering the Army by means of open competition, was not introduced—even ostensibly—for the sole purpose of improving the military efficiency of our officers; but for political reasons, that the Government of the day might gain a fictitious popularity by opening the commissioned ranks to all classes, and so democratising the Army. The Admiralty stood firm and declined to approve of such an uncalled-for change, which they wisely foresaw would act prejudicially on the whole force under their control, and the naval lieutenant is now—as indeed he always was—worth his weight in gold.

Lord Wolseley was the right-hand man of the Secretary of State at that time, and must have approved of the change; but his Lordship's subsequent condemnation of that, and other changes of the same date, which we find referred to in the issue of this Magazine for August, 1900, shows how clearly that broad-minded soldier saw the evils resulting from such unwise legislation. Lord Cardwell's declared belief was that open competition would give us a body of officers devoted to their profession, caring for nothing else, industrious and frugal, and that the country would then, for the first time, get full value for the money spent. He knew well that Germany was the first military nation in the world, and that the methods by which the highly-trained, devoted, and aristocratic officers of that army were obtained, were exactly the opposite to those which our Government was introducing on his recommendation, but he cared not. Successive Governments have deliberately adhered to the upsetting rule then enforced, and we find ourselves to-day in the anomalous position of being a nation which is constantly engaged in war, and yet still unable or unwilling to adopt one universal system for officering our sea and land forces.

It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for any one to prove what advantages the country has gained during the past forty-two years from the competitive system, which operates, not by the selection of the best material, but by the rejection of the superfluous aspirants in excess of actual requirements. But we do know for certain that it has not given us a body of officers who are one whit more devoted to their profession, more frugal or more industrious than their predecessors; we also know that a more extravagant style of living has been introduced by the new-comers, which is not working for the good of the Army, and we further know, what is much worse, that the physical standard of our officers has been lowered, as can be seen from the official returns of

invalids during the war in South Africa, and that we have many now in the commissioned ranks who are neither liked nor respected by their men, and who ought not to be holding such positions.

It is not necessary for the good of the Army that the officers should be men of means, but it is absolutely essential that they should be born gentlemen.

As regards the literary qualifications of the boys who pass the severe but unpractical educational tests for commissions, there is not much to be said that was not known before. Lord Roberts quite recently referred, in an official report, to the reiterated complaints regarding the defective handwriting, and the want of knowledge of grammar and English composition among the cadets, which he rightly attributed to the neglect of proper instruction at school. Then we have Sir Oliver Lodge, who is one of the leading educationists of the day, bringing an unanswerable indictment against English schools, beginning at the top, in which he correctly states that "The majority of the boys turned out of them are ignorant." That "they are not ashamed of their ignorance; they are not usually even aware of it." And, lastly, we might easily be led to believe that very little practical importance is really attached to education by the War Office; since, under the stress of the late war, a large number of aspirants were admitted into the Army without any educational test at all, many of whom were sons of gentlemen and had previously failed to pass the competitive examination.

We now have a strong-minded, intelligent and courageous War Minister, who is quite capable of bringing our military educational system into line with that which has succeeded so well with the Navy, if he can only find time to devote to it, and, if he once takes the matter in hand, we may rest assured that he will not spare himself until he has matured a scheme, under which the officering will be as good in the Army as it now is in the sister Service.

But the first question to be asked is this: Does Mr. Arnold-Forster read the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE? *

M. J. KING-HARMAN.

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* It may, I think, safely be asserted that Mr. Arnold-Forster has read every article on naval or military organisation or administration, that has appeared in this Magazine during the past fifteen years. But I doubt whether there are a dozen other members of Parliament who ever consult any Service publication whatever.—ED. U. S. M.

THE GYMNASTIC TRAINING OF RECRUITS IN THE BRITISH ARMY.

By "Chancton."

When a man enlists in His Majesty's Service, whether he becomes a cavalryman or an infantryman, he goes back, as it were, to the beginning of things, and whatever he may have known, or fancied he knew before his enlistment, becomes of no avail, and he has to be taught his new profession from its very beginning. If he has joined the infantry, he is at once put to drill on the "square," morning and afternoon, besides going to the regimental school, doing fatigues, and generally learning the business of soldiering. The cavalry recruit does all the above, and in addition goes to riding school, learns to groom and take care of a horse and saddle, besides being taught something, if only a very little, about the nature and simple ailments of the animal he attempts to ride. All this makes the recruit's day a pretty busy one, and there is not very much spare time in which to amuse himself after he has done his work and cleaned his kit for the morrow. But into the midst of all this teaching comes another and most important course of instruction. It is the recruit's course of gymnastics. This course lasts for three months—one might almost say, is scattered over three months—in lessons of one hour per diem when the recruit can be spared from his other multifarious duties. The lessons, in most stations, are held about eleven o'clock in the morning, a time when the recruit is probably beginning to feel somewhat tired, having been kept pretty well on the run since dawn. The instruction is generally in the hands of qualified gymnastic instructors who have been through the long course of gymnastics, and who are consequently well-developed men and generally in hard condition.

In the gymnasium the recruit is drilled more strictly than anywhere else, riding-school not excepted, and is made to "jump" to the word of command in a manner that is never dreamed of on the "square." He begins his gymnastic instruction by being taught how to stand properly, march properly, and "double" properly. Even in these simple exercises many, hitherto almost unused,

muscles are brought into play, as the recruit finds out to his cost the next morning when he gets out of bed. He is stiff and sore in the thigh, calf, and instep, and continues to be so for some days till the muscles become harder and more accustomed to the exercises.

For about a month his work in the gymnasium is confined to free gymnastics, which comprise exercises requiring no apparatus to work on except a boarded floor and an iron bar to pull up to.

These exercises, to go more closely into the matter, are raising on the toes, bending and stretching the legs, bending and stretching the arms, raising and lowering the legs (both lying on the floor and hanging on the iron bar), pulling to the breast on the iron bar with ordinary grip and hands reversed, pressing up from the floor, with straight back, on the hands and toes, hopping on either foot, the gymnastic march, and deep breathing.

All these simple exercises set the recruit up, develop his muscles, broaden and deepen his frame, and make him hold himself up, and walk as if he were a man, instead of the rather round-shouldered, shambling individual he was when he enlisted. He is then, at the end of the first month, fit to go to recruit's exercises, very simple ones, on the parallel bars and the wooden horse, such as clearing the bars to the front and rear, pressing up between the bars, and jumping and vaulting the horse in various ways.

All this is very good exercise—some might call it hard work, and not be very far from the truth in so doing—and of the best kind, as it develops the recruit equally all over his body, and gives no undue preference to any muscle or set of muscles which would tend to cramp him.

Simple dumb-bell exercises are also used on the lines laid down by Sandow, the only fault with these being that the dumb-bells issued for use are far too small in the grip to be of any good. To work dumb-bells without gripping them tightly is quite useless, and no man with an ordinary-sized hand can get a good grip of the present dumb-bell issued for use in gymnasia. The inspector of gymnasia in India invented a dumb-bell some two years ago that combined lightness with a very good grip, composed of strong metal tubing with the ends splayed outwards at right-angles to the tube, the whole thing being about six inches long, and the thickness of the metal being regulated to make each bell about two pounds weight.

But to return to the recruit, it seems to be a great objection that all this gymnastic training should come in the middle of his every-day task. To begin with, he has done half a day's work before going into the gymnasium, and is consequently not very

fresh; he goes out of the gymnasium rather tired and is at once pounced upon to finish grooming his horse, if he be a cavalryman, or to do "fatigues," etc., if he belong to the infantry. He is, then, in the afternoon taken on the "square" again, where he is drilled by the regimental drill sergeant, who probably has ideas of his own as to training recruits, and who puts him through "extension motions" or perhaps "physical drill" in his jacket and belts, which hamper him considerably without doing him any good. Sometimes the coats and belts are taken off, but even then the man is in heavy trousers and thick boots, which hinder the free movement of the legs and body, which is so necessary. Added to which the different style of drill must confuse him a good deal. He is not asked to, nor is he expected to, move so smartly on the "square" as he is in the gymnasium, nor is the discipline so strict; besides, the instructor, not going through the exercises himself with the men, is very apt to forget how tiring they are, and very often keeps the men at it longer than they should be, and in constrained positions. How often does one see, during the sword exercise, an instructor, having given the order to form, let us say, the second guard on the left, keeping the whole squad in this very constrained and awkward position, while he explains to some recruit how it should be done? It stands to reason that this sort of thing must be bad for growing lads, as our recruits generally are, since it not only makes them sick of the work, but tends to unduly tire and cramp them.

In the gymnasium the greatest care is taken not to over-tire any one, the principle being that work done when a man is tired does not do him good, but does do him harm. It only disheartens him—he cannot do it properly, and in endeavouring to so do it he may strain himself severely.

Would it not be much better if all recruits were handed over to the gymnasium entirely for the first three months of their service, and were made to go through a really good course of gymnastics, beginning as has been described above, so as to strengthen and fill them out as well as to set them up and make men of them?

Then, having been more fully set up and developed than is possible at present, they would be quite fit to take their place at riding-school and foot-drill, as they would have been taught a certain amount of drill in the gymnasium, and would be much more fitted to bear arms and be taught to ride than they are now. There is nothing like a gymnasium for improving men's nerve and confidence in themselves, as they are brought on gently and allowed to "feel their feet," as it were, gradually, without in the smallest degree being allowed to shirk the work.

Of course this would mean more gymnasia and more instructors all over England, and not only all over England but wherever British troops are stationed, but surely it would be worth doing. The extra expense entailed would not be very great, and the benefit to the men would be enormous.

Besides, it would not delay the recruit in his training, as he would be the more fitted to receive instruction, and so get on quicker afterwards, from having had a thoroughly good grounding to start with.

By "handing the recruit over to the gymnasium," it is meant that he should do perhaps three or four hours of gymnastics and drill in the gymnasium per diem, and then he would be at liberty to attend schools and lectures when he came away. But he should be set to do no other drill or fatigues of any sort, or even guards, during his first three months of service.

This could the more easily be done if recruits were all enlisted at a specified time in the year, as perhaps may soon be brought about.

Under the present system the recruit gets a little of this and a little of that under all sorts of instructors, all through the day, when his muscles are really not fitted to do the work, and he himself can hardly take in all the various forms of instruction, and understand them.

Let the recruit go to the gymnasium for his first training, but let him be handled by instructors of his own branch of the Service. At present there are many more Infantry gymnastic instructors in the Service than there are of other arms, and rightly too, as the Infantry largely exceed in number the Cavalry and Artillery, but might not a due proportion of instructors to each arm be secured? Men do not like being drilled by instructors who do not belong to their own branch of the Service. It may be asked why. The answer is that there is a big difference in the drill and customs of the different arms of the Service, and naturally men prefer to be brought up and drilled in the customs and drill to which they belong. As a very small instance of this, it may be pointed out that, in numbering off from the right, the Cavalry soldier is taught to turn his head smartly to the left on giving his number, and if he should chance to do this in the gymnasium when under an Infantry instructor, that instructor generally takes the keenest pleasure in checking him sharply, and in pointing out to him before the whole class, and with a good deal of sarcasm, that he is not there to show off any of his Cavalry tricks. And, *vice versâ*, the Cavalry instructor is often heard to say, "You may do that in the Infantry, but you don't do it here." This is all very galling

to the recruit, and might be very easily overcome by having instructors from all arms to teach their own men. They would also be necessary in order that the recruits should learn their own form of drill.

The School of Musketry, Hythe, forms separate squads for the instruction of Cavalry and Infantry, though in that case the instructors themselves are all, or very nearly all, Infantrymen.

Surely it would cost no more to have separate squads of the different arms in the gymnasium than it does at present, and it would tend to promote keenness and emulation among the recruits composing those squads. If this system were to be carried out—viz. a three months' course of gymnastics on enlisting, without any other work, but schools and lectures for the recruit—and carried out under instructors belonging to his own branch of the Service, would not the recruit be more fit in all respects to join the ranks, and to receive the ordinary instruction which is his lot, than he is at present?

To hark back a bit; surely the first task, not to say aim and object of the drill instructor, whether he belong to the gymnastic staff or not, is to make the recruit stand up and hold himself smartly!

Yet nearly, if not quite all, his efforts in this line are brought to nought by the present mode of "standing at ease." When bearing arms it is a most constrained and uncomfortable position, but when without arms it is much worse. Most animals when standing at rest slack the hock and stand in an easy position, but the soldier is made to plant his feet firmly about ten inches apart and stand with a straight leg and knees braced, which is a good deal more tiring and irksome than standing at "attention." But when no arms are carried the soldier is made, in addition, to hold his hands behind his back, thereby forcing his shoulders forward, rounding his back, depressing his chest, and protruding his stomach. Let any one stand up stripped before the looking-glass, and standing sideways to it, first assume the position of "attention." Note the position of the shoulders and chest well, and then "stand at ease" as laid down in the drill book, with hands behind the back and feet apart. Mark how the point of the shoulders moves forward, the chest is depressed, the back rounds up like that of a drowned rat! Let the experimenter stand thus for a few moments and see if a longing to throw his chest out, and his shoulders back, does not come over him!

It will be said: "But if the man stands properly, as laid down, all this ought not to occur." The only answer is, "Try it." Read the instruction for "Standing at Ease," and try it. How long can

any man keep the constrained position required by the drill book, and consider that he is standing at ease ?

The old way of drawing back the right foot and of holding the hands in front of the body was a much easier and less constrained position, besides being much smarter in appearance.*

Let the recruit work hard while he is at work, and give his whole attention to it ; but when he is told to "stand at ease," let him be comfortable and easy. Let us give our recruits a more thorough and systematic gymnastic training (be it understood that trick-work is in no sense advocated), at the same time grounding them well in elementary drill and schooling, and Government will be well repaid when they become trained soldiers, which they would do with greater rapidity and thoroughness than they do at the present time.

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* The amusing or, perhaps more correctly, the melancholy feature of the reformed "stand-at-ease," is that it was introduced by the gymnastic authorities themselves, and after some years of illicit existence within the precincts of the gymnasia only, was finally foisted upon the Service in general through the medium of *Infantry Training*. The position is a decidedly uneasy as well as an unsightly one.—ED. U. S. M.

THE INTERESTS OF OFFICERS AND THE SERVICE.

By Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Carr-Ellison.

There has recently been a good deal of interesting correspondence on this subject. Still, however, a few things remain to be said.

The inducements offered to officers to improve their minds and enlarge the horizon of their thoughts and ideas are very inadequate and disappointing. The hard-working officer of small means has not sufficient inducement offered to him to give up time and money to follow out any particular line of study, or to go abroad to learn languages and see how things are done in other countries. No officer, except he have pretty certain hopes of a nomination, or a fair chance of success in the Staff College examination, thinks now of working for it or of incurring the expense of preparation.

At present an officer can only enter the Staff College on completing five years' service and before attaining the age of thirty-five. Under the existing system, the Staff College affords the only hope an officer has of showing his power and capabilities, and the only inducement to him to step out and free himself from the ranks of the "mental loafers." But, even though he should be fortunate enough to get into the Staff College, it may mean nothing unless fortune favour him with a Staff billet. To encourage young officers early in their career some opening might be given by allowing them, on completing three years' service, or reaching the age of twenty-three (and being duly recommended by their C.O.s), to go up for and qualify for the Staff College; such qualification to be recognised as making them more eligible for billets as Adjutants, Intelligence Officers to Regiments, and minor Staff Appointments. And further, that half the marks above the number required to qualify should be carried forward and count in the competitive entrance examination for the Staff College which every officer might be eligible for, after six years' service, or at the age of twenty-six.

Such a scheme would help to open the way for many a young soldier with a wish to improve his career, before his zeal became

dulled by the humdrum of home soldiering and stereotyped ideas.

Interpreters.—Better inducements should be given to officers to qualify and keep up their knowledge of foreign languages, especially in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, or Turkish. There might be some system of annual allowances to officers, varying in value, according to the standard of examination passed, and officers in receipt of such allowances should be liable to be called on to come up for examination as required, or if they wished to try to qualify for a higher rate of allowance. This would bring the system for the promotion of officers of the Army more into line with the latest Naval re-organisation scheme, where promotion so much depends on examination and merit.

Promotion.—In spite of what many people feel about inter-regimental promotion interfering with *esprit de corps*, there is much to be said for it. If the liability to outside promotion was limited to officers on attaining captain's and field rank, and in the Cavalry to within the Corps into which regiments would be formed, viz :—

Dragoon Guards' Corps	... ...	7 Regiments
Lancers' Corps	... ...	6 Regiments
Hussars, 12	1st Corps	6 Regiments
	2nd ,, ...	6 Regiments
Dragoons' Corps	... ...	3 Regiments *

the officers affected by this scheme of promotion would have reached a time in their career when the question had begun to force itself upon them as to whether they meant to stick to soldiering as a profession, or only to remain on in the Army until it suited them to retire.

To induce the latter class to leave and make way for those who hoped to make soldiering their profession, some greater inducement should be held out to persuade them to leave on their becoming majors, or before attaining a certain age, and so help to form a large reserve of officers, which is so urgently required, besides unblocking promotion and conducing to general efficiency, by bringing younger men into the higher ranks. I cannot think that *esprit de corps* would be materially affected. The good soldier does his duty because he is a soldier. Such a man drops easily into the customs and feelings of a new Corps as he takes its uniform.

In the Navy an officer is proud of the service to which he belongs.

* For the last case the numbers should be brought up to six by raising three new Dragoon Regiments. They are badly wanted in our Army, ill-supplied as it is with mounted troops.

He does not lose *esprit de corps* on account of a change of ship, though this is not altogether applicable to the Army. If a vacancy occurred in the field-rank of a regiment, when the senior captain had above the average service of the captains in the regiments of that Corps, then the step would naturally go in the regiment. Expenses would be materially decreased by the scheme of Corps promotion—the necessary alterations in uniform would be but trifling compared with those necessitated by other changes, such as from Hussars to Lancers, etc. Exchange should be encouraged within Corps.

Regiments' Supply of Drafts.—The Corps organisation would also simplify much the supply of drafts to regiments abroad, and be more easily worked than the linking of regiments for the training and supply of trained men, which is also unsatisfactory to the commanding officers of both regiments; moreover, the linking system is very liable to total dislocation through any alteration in the tour of service. In the "Corps System"—all recruits enlisted for the Corps could be sent from recruiting centres in batches of the number required and suitable for instruction to any one regiment of the Corps, and on reaching it posted to any one squadron, thus facilitating the instruction and training of recruits by "batching" them.

To go even further than this, a system of Corps depôts might work very well, and to a still further extent prove the advantage of "batching" recruits, thus saving labour, time, and instructors. Regiments at home and abroad would then be composed entirely of trained men only, and be fit for service at a moment's notice. Corps' depôts would, I think, have the advantages, without many of the disadvantages, of the depôt system now to be done away with, and of the linked regimental system. However, this is rather outside my subject, so I will not go further with this interesting and much-discussed question of regimental organisation, instruction, and supply of trained soldiers.

Confidential Reports.—This is a question the difficulty and unpleasantness of which, I know, is often felt by no one more keenly than by those who have to make the reports. Reports are, of course, a necessity. They must be confidential, but they need not be secret, which only surrounds them with doubt and suspicion. To decentralise, and to obviate the above disadvantages, I would suggest that squadron leaders should report on their officers below the rank of captain. These reports should be read over to the officer himself, in the presence of the commanding officer, the second in command, the squadron leader, and the Adjutant, and should be signed by these four officers and the officer himself. Captains

and field officers should be reported on by the commanding officer and the second in command, the reports being read over and signed by them and the officer himself.

Training of Officers.—It is to be hoped that soon there may be at least one officer per squadron who has passed a course of riding at Canterbury, and so qualified, not necessarily to drill all the recruits of the squadron, as that should be done by the troop leaders, but to assist the squadron leader generally, especially in the equitation and training of selected N.C.O.'s and men as instructors, and of "young horsemen," or horses requiring special care and time in training.

Later, when certain schemes have had time to produce their effect, every officer coming up for promotion to captain should be in possession of a riding certificate. Surely this is as important to a cavalry officer as the very necessary Hythe certificate and the rather ignored signalling certificate.

If an officer joined the Army with the necessary certificates, as they do in Foreign Armies and in America, how much sounder that would be than his being withdrawn from his duties with his regiment at a later period of his service, in order to study subjects and gain certificates, which it should have been necessary for him to hold before taking his place as an officer competent to fulfil his duties.

Cadet School.—With this object it is hoped that before long a Cadets' School will be formed at which young officers may be trained for a year after leaving Sandhurst, or passing from the Militia. Under this arrangement the Sandhurst College Training should be curtailed to one year, and devoted to languages and the usual educational subjects, as well as to military subjects—tactics, military law, topography, fortification, mobilisation, and organisation.

The Cadet's school training should be on the same general lines for Cavalry and Infantry, the instruction suggested, such as musketry, pioneering, signalling, etc., being the same for both arms, and a knowledge of veterinary and mounted duties would not come amiss to Infantry officers, who, in our various small campaigns, so often have to fulfil mounted Infantry and transport duties. The marks made on leaving Sandhurst to be added to those made at the examination on leaving the cadet school, and precedence given accordingly. Cadets, on being gazetted to their respective branches, to be antedated to time of leaving Sandhurst. The school might even be universal, as in America; Cadets joining from Woolwich would thus have the advantage of a general service training.

The training together of young officers about to enter different arms of the Service would broaden their minds, and allow of what is at present unattainable, a free exchange of ideas and interests.

All Cadets at the school should be in addition to the present numbers at Sandhurst, and supernumerary to the Army.

One of the chief results obtainable from this alteration in the educational system of the Army would be the provision of a most needful reserve of young officers, who, in the event of hostilities or sudden requirements, could be at once posted to the depôts, Reserve squadrons, etc., of their respective branches.

Pay.—The present system of paying the men and keeping accounts should be so simplified as to put the minimum of responsibility on the officer, whose whole time and attention is required for the training of his men. The system advocated is the only one which is really practicable on active service. The officer should be responsible only for paying out the money to the soldiers in the amounts settled by the Regimental Pay Office; and the latter should be responsible for the list of payments due, and the keeping of all accounts. The N.C.O.'s, at present oppressed with a very complicated though lately somewhat simplified system of account keeping, would be free to carry out the many duties which fall to them. These duties on Active Service are full and sufficient for any man.

So much for a few thoughts and suggestions on the subject of reform—in those things that more materially affect the individual officer. But, above all, let us get clear of the old idea that all new ideas are innovations, and are to be treated with distrust. To get the best officers we must encourage and foster by every means, individuality, freedom of thought, initiative, and action—and this in the end must tend to the increased efficiency of the Army.

R. H. CARR-ELLISON, Lieut.-Colonel.

A RETROSPECT ON A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN.

By "An Old Soldier."

Before the assurance came from high authority that the Boer War was "virtually over," the civil section had been busy urging upon the Government the reorganisation of our military system. However much this may have been needed, it was hardly the time to do more than to organise into something like shape the material we had then available at home. But a new broom was demanded, and the Parliamentary ruler of our Army lost no time in taking the burden of this popular outcry on his shoulders. Perhaps if he had waited until the war was *really* over, and with more experience to guide him in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed change, he might not have so readily pledged himself to a scheme more or less forced upon him, when the public mind was agitated by a prolonged resistance, and could not or would not realise the difficulties that had to be surmounted before it could be brought to a complete and successful ending.

The reason for this outcry was no doubt caused by several serious reverses; everything had not gone so well with us as we had expected. For had we not sent to South Africa the flower of our Army, never better in discipline and equipment, and so many anxious to wipe out an old stain. Commanded by tried men; who could beat that Army? Certainly not the Boers—such was the opinion of the country and of our military experts.

The urgent need of adapting ourselves to meet a new condition of warfare was not apparently thought of. Only a few (and they were not considered worthy of attention), who knew from experience the subtle foe we had to deal with, would believe what an extremely mobile force, armed with a magazine small-bore rifle, in a country of vast extent could do.

Our fighting organisation was not at fault. But we had to change our tactics to meet abnormal foes. A rough experience soon convinced us of this necessity, which should have been recognised from the beginning. It was a poor game to ask a man on foot to catch a man on a horse; and it was late in the day

before we were able to copy the mobility of our opponents. After a time of wearisome hunting and guerilla fighting, we at last subdued a very formidable foe.

Subordinates cannot be blamed for mistakes made by those in authority. The bright side of the campaign is to be found in the bravery and endurance of our officers and men, the unimpaired morale of the troops after three years' arduous warfare, and the way our regimental system stood the great strain to which it was subjected. The British officer and soldier is good enough, the honour of the country could not be in safer hands; no one is more ready to learn, or to adapt himself to changing necessities of war; only, he must be given the opportunity to train himself. If this is not given to him, he cannot be held responsible. Manœuvres on a large scale are expensive, instructive only to a few, and can never be under war conditions; they teach the rank and file nothing but what they could learn better in a few hours' campaigning. The generals and staff could equally well be taught their duties in a less expensive way. What is required, is ground always ready for the exercise of troops in the detail of fighting, and our regiments should have a full complement of serviceable men, so as to be something more than skeletons when required for active service.

Men ignorant of the ways of modern war got hold of many "regrettable incidents," as they were called, and these were made the most of. Under the influence of this clamour—it is hard to believe it could have been from any other cause—the order was promulgated to the world having reference to white flags and the Army Act—a general and most ungenerous imputation on a class of men whose courage was undeniable, and whose honour has never been questioned. Troops may get into positions, under present conditions, when to prolong the fight is useless; all the bravery in the world won't save them; they can be destroyed, but when the power to damage their opponents and the object of resistance is over, continuing is only a waste of life. Recent orders seem framed for the purpose of making an impression on the civilian mind. Every soldier knows the penalty of disobedience. Therefore why end with an unnecessary threat "of dismissal if not complied with?"

As science improves our fighting weapons, changes must take place, in formations and in many other ways, to meet them; but such changes, too, do not necessitate a complete change of a system. Our cavalry, infantry, and artillery should be as perfect as they can be, and we should make every effort to keep our auxiliary forces in a state of ready preparation—not forgetting that they are voluntary, not compulsory soldiers. Far better to do this

than to waste time in erecting a large and costly framework and making frivolous alterations. If each part of the machinery is right, it needs only putting together. All thoughtful men must allow, that of the lessons that have been taught us by the Boers, only a few can be applied to a European war.

Appointments have had to be made for popular favourites, men whose names have been constantly before the public. These, and a few fortunate War Office officials, were the first to benefit. Although some had no experience of war, they passed over men of long and varied services, whose only fault was want of opportunity. Work had to be done at home of the greatest importance, some one had to do it, and what greater privation to a soldier than to find this was his duty, and not with his comrades in the field? To be a leader of a column or a force, which had a large superiority of numbers and armament over any adversary it could meet, required keenness, energy, and power of command, but not necessarily a man of great military ability. The safety of numbers was very valuable to some at least.

The mainspring of the Promotion Board was the Commander-in-Chief. He selected, the Board approved. If the Board had been conducted on the lines which are generally believed, viz. that each officer, taken in seniority, should have his claims carefully considered, before being passed over, the feeling of insecurity, which has no doubt existed, would not have been prevalent, and there would not have been so much diving into the depths to find suitable men.

In the hope of giving a stimulus to recruiting, reins were loosened which before long must be tightened, and a great deal of the pomp and vanity of war, which is really so attractive to the soldier, has been struck out as a cause of irritation. Drill, steadiness, smartness bear considerably on *esprit de corps*. All these combine to make the groundwork of discipline and efficiency. When has this training failed us? So deeply impressed were some of our leaders with Boer methods and Boer costumes, that "ceremonial" was to be considered a thing of the past; it was said that it deadened a man's faculties and made him too much of a nonentity. Such faulty reasoning could not last long. Our premier military paper gauged the effect of a new *régime* at Aldershot by the appearance of the troops on the recent parade held there by his Majesty (trusting the writer will pardon the reproduction): "To the expert eye . . . the first comment must be of unfeigned approval of the good work done by Sir John French since he assumed command, so plainly evidenced in the demeanour of the troops on the ground" (*Army and Navy Gazette*, July 11, 1903.

A suitable climax to a campaign, carelessly entered into, having no general plan of action, but each commander fighting his own battle, ambitious to be the first to score, was the publication of the War Commission report. The world is so eager to see our faults; it could not be supplied with sufficient copies. To collect information for our future learning, it would have been good, but beyond that line it should not have gone.

It has been very boldly stated "that there is no such thing as interest." A statement easily made and difficult to contradict, except by objectionable personalities. One thing, however, is as certain as that the sun sets, that unless a man has exceptional opportunities, he can rarely get on without it, in some form or other. It is only natural that as a man rises in his profession he should select those who have been with him in preference to others —who can blame him? But so successful do some of these *protégés* become, that they make themselves believe that they have nothing to be thankful for—that their own abilities have only met with deserved recognition. It may be so; but such is not the general opinion.

WHERE WAS THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA SIGNED?

By Commander Hon. Henry N. Shore, R.N. (retired).

Is it not extraordinary that after the lapse of nearly one hundred years, and all the painstaking research that has been expended on the subject, there should still be uncertainty as to the actual scene —not only of the negotiations that led up to, but of the signing— of one of the most famous conventions in our military annals? Of the fact, however, there can be no doubt. The conflicting statements indeed that continue to find their way into print afford ample proof of the divergence of views which still exists on the subject. In the latest edition of the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' for example, we read that "the Convention by which the French were allowed to leave Portugal unmolested was signed at Cintra, August 22, 1808." Whereas Sir Herbert Maxwell, in his recently published 'Life of the Duke of Wellington'—a work which, one may reasonably suppose, would never have been offered to the public without a careful sifting of evidence and the most painstaking verification of authorities—alludes to the famous Convention as "commonly, though erroneously, referred to as the Convention of Cintra." And he goes on to explain that "Byron, scorning topographical accuracy, depicted the imaginary scene of Britain's humiliation—the Palace of the Marchese Marialva, at Cintra,* although the treaty was really signed many miles from that place." But what does Byron actually say? "The Convention of Cintra was signed in the Palace of the Marchese Marialva" is the note appended to the following well-known lines in 'Childe Harold's Pilgrimage':—

> "Behold the hall where chiefs were late convened!
> Oh! dome displeasing unto British eyes!
> . . . . . .
> Convention is the dwarfish demon styled,
> That foil'd the knights in Marialva's dome:
> . . . . . .

* Any one who is interested in the historical associations of this once splendid Quinta will find many curious particulars in William Beckford's 'Travels in Portugal,' 1787–94 —a most fascinating book.

Here folly dashed to earth the victor's plumes,
And policy regained what arms had lost.

. . . . . .

And ever since that martial synod met,
Britannia sickens, Cintra, at thy name!"

Now, it is easy to sneer at Byron's contempt for "topographical accuracy;" but it is certain that in the above lines the poet was merely giving expression to popular belief at the time of his visit (1809). And if he sinned in this respect, he sinned in good company. The Rev. W. Bradford, for example, who was "Chaplain of Brigade to the Expedition" during the years 1808–9, in a work entitled 'Sketches of the Country in Portugal and Spain,' tells us that "a Convention was concluded at Cintra between Sir Hew Dalrymple and General Junot, whereby the French were to be transported to the north of France in British ships." While, in a 'History of the War,' published in 1812, and compiled largely from materials supplied by officers on the spot, we learn that the Convention "was called, from the place of its conclusion, that of Cintra."

How, then, came doubts to arise on the subject? Because Sir William Napier, in his 'History of War,' published many years subsequently, declared that "the armistice, the negotiations, the Convention, the execution of its provisions were commenced, conducted, concluded, at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had not the slightest Connection, political, military, or local. Yet Lord Byron," he goes on to remark, "has sung that the Convention was signed in the Marquis of Marialva's house at Cintra; and the author of 'The Diary of an Invalid,' improving upon the poet's discovery, detected the stains of ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion."

It would be natural to suppose that a writer who scoffed at Lord Byron's version of the affair, and laughed at Mathews' supposed discovery of Junot's ink-spots, was quite sure of his facts. But was Napier so? And is his own account of the transaction authoritative? Assuming, for the moment, that the Convention had no connection, "political, military, or local," with the place it has been called after, it may easily be shown that Napier's assertion as to its having been "commenced, conducted, and concluded at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra" is every whit as absurd as the statements he holds up to ridicule. It stands to reason that the Convention must have been commenced and concluded at one or other of the respective headquarters, or at some intermediate point between the two armies. Now, it so happened that the French headquarters, if not at Cintra, were at Lisbon,

sixteen miles off; while the British were at Ramalhal, a distance not exceeding twenty miles from Cintra—if, indeed, they had not been advanced to Torres Vedras before the Convention was signed. So much for Napier's version of the affair. But he stultifies himself out of his own mouth; as, for example, in another part of his history he informs us that the treaty was "finally concluded at Lisbon," sixteen miles off! In this matter, however, he is at direct issue with another, and equally celebrated writer. Southey, in his "History of the War," concerning which he tells us that "no history compiled by one who was not an actor in it has appeared with higher claims to authority," affirms that "the Convention was concluded and ratified by the British commander, not at Cintra, but at Torres Vedras."

When great authorities differ, who shall agree?

In connection with Napier's ex-cathedral statements on the subject, it may be remarked that though he was not in Portugal at the time of the events which culminated in the Convention, he might easily have corrected his erroneous ideas concerning the distances.

To come back to more recent statements, we gather from 'Haydn's Dictionary of Dates,' under "Cintra," that "Here was signed an agreement on 22nd August, 1808, between the French and English the day after the battle of Vimeira. As it contained the bases of the Convention, signed on 30th August following, it has been termed the Convention of Cintra;" while one of the most popular and reliable 'Handbooks to Portugal,' in citing the Marialva Palace as the house wherein the Convention was signed, cautiously adds, "the fact, however, has been denied." The '*Times* Gazetteer of the World,' moreover (1899), confirms the statement made in the 'Encyclopædia Britannica' regarding the signing of the Convention of Cintra. While, on the other hand, Mr. Oman, in vol. i. of his admirable 'History of the Peninsular War,' now in course of compilation, and which represents the latest opinion on the subject, tells us that "the Convention of Cintra, a designation which it is hard to understand, was first sketched at Torres Vedras, and was discussed and ratified at Lisbon. The only connection which it had with Cintra was that Dalrymple's despatch to the British Government enclosing the document in its latest form was dated from that pleasant spot." And he goes on to explain that "the details were settled in Lisbon where Colonel Murray took up his residence, sending back frequent reports to his superior officer at Ramalhal." In confirmation of this statement may be adduced the fact that the Convention itself contained the following sentence: "Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of

August, 1808," to which was appended the signatures, "George Murray, Quarter-Master-General; Kellerman, General de Division."

As regards the position of the British headquarters, it may be of interest to note that they were removed to Ramalhal the day after the battle of Vimiera; that on the 29th August Sir Hew Dalrymple established his headquarters at Torres Vedras; and that on the 31st, at half-past seven in the morning, Lieut.-Colonel Murray, with an aide-de-camp of General Kellerman, Captain Fanshawe, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, arrived with the definite treaty. It was on the 2nd September that headquarters were established at Cintra. From that place, on the following day (3rd), Sir Hew Dalrymple penned his despatch giving a *résumé* of events since his landing, and enclosing a copy of the Convention which had been signed on the 30th August.

In view of so many positive assertions, and equally emphatic denials, the scoffer might be tempted to exclaim, "A plague on your disputes: I don't believe there ever was a Convention of Cintra!" The controversy, in fact, reminds one of that famous one, in days gone by, which drew from Archbishop Whately his celebrated skit, entitled, 'Historic Doubts concerning Napoleon Bonaparte,' in which the author proved, on paper, that there never was, and never could have been, such a person as Napoleon.

But how came it to pass—people may ask, and with good reason—that the celebrated Convention has been associated, these ninety years past, with a place it had no real connection with? And, furthermore, how are we to account for the circumstance of a certain well-known palace at Cintra being habitually shown as the scene of the concluding act of the drama, if, as Napier declares, the Convention was "commenced, conducted, and concluded at the distance of thirty miles from the place?" Moreover, how is the coincidence to be explained away that every person who visited Cintra subsequently to the conclusion of the treaty refers to the place as having been the actual scene of the signing?

I have already alluded to a 'History of the War,' published in 1812, in which mention is made of the Convention "called, from the place of its conclusion, that of Cintra," and in 'The Journal of a Regimental Officer,' published in 1811, the author, describing a visit to Cintra in January 1809, within a few months of the signing of the treaty, mentions the Palace of the Prince Regent, latterly the country residence of Junot, as "the house where the Convention of Cintra was signed." General Cockburn, too, who visited Cintra in 1810, alludes to the signing of the Convention at the Marialva Palace as if it was a circumstance of common knowledge, and beyond dispute. And he tells us that he was shown the room,

"and even the spot," and mentions the ink-spots on the floor, "which the Portuguese preserve and show."

Now, surely the evidence of these writers, who had certainly no interest in inventing the story, carries as much weight as the statements of Napier and those who have followed his lead! What object, moreover, could the Portuguese have had in concocting the story about the Marialva Palace and the ink-spots? The legend would have been refuted and laughed to scorn by every British officer conversant with the facts, had no foundation existed for the story. Mathews was certainly not the first person to "detect the stains of ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion," as asserted by Napier.

Curiously enough, even the modern appellation of the building —Palace of Seteaies—has been connected, by rumour, with the Convention: "The name, I have been told," wrote a visitor in 1873, "is also due to the signing of the Convention, of which, when the officers and soldiers who then filled the building were informed, they gave seven loud Aies! or hurrahs—not sharing, it would seem, in the vexation of Junot, and in commemoration of the event dubbed the mansion the Palace of the Seteaies."

This much is certain, that Junot, following the example of every wealthy Portuguese fidalgo, would seek refuge from the summer heat of Lisbon amidst the shady groves of Cintra. It is equally certain, moreover, that he took up his abode in the best situated and most sumptuous of the Cintra quintas, whose owner, curiously enough, was, at the time, a refugee in France, in consequence of his pro-French sympathies. And, as the Convention was negotiated during the hottest season of the year, what more natural than that the negotiations should have been conducted, in part, if not concluded, at Junot's summer Palace?

It is impossible for the present generation to realise the storm of disapproval with which the news of the Convention of Cintra was received throughout the United Kingdom. All echoes, however, of that storm have long since died away, and now, to the majority of Britons, the very *raison d'être* of the Convention is unknown. I shall venture, therefore, by way of enlightening them, to quote the most terse summing-up of the proceedings that has ever been offered to the public. It is from the pen of Sir Richard Henegan, head of the Field Train Department of the Army, under Lord Wellington:—

"No sooner had the force under Sir Arthur Wellesley left the Cove of Cork, than it was wisely remembered that only a Major-General had been placed in command, and that nothing short of the dignity of a Lieut.-General could uphold the honour of the

British name. Who was nearest at hand?* Sir Harry Burrard. That Lieut.-General was accordingly forthwith despatched to supersede the Major-General; but this was not all. Scarcely had he set sail for his destination, when it was remembered that there was a senior Lieut.-General to Sir Harry Burrard, and one, therefore, still better qualified to take the command. In consequence, another vessel was despatched to carry off from his governorship at Gibraltar this senior Lieut.-General, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and land him on the coast of Portugal. But here fortune did for England what her own wise rulers did not, and wafting Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley first on shore, gave him an opportunity of giving Marshal Junot a sound thrashing before the arrival of the two Lieut.-Generals.

"Sir Harry Burrard was the next to land. The action was nearly over, and as the smoke cleared off, the optics of the Lieut.-General could discern the French running away, and the Major-General pressing on the pursuit. But here the Lieut.-General, assuming his authority, called out: 'Halt, Major-General! I have in my pocket the warrant which gives me the command over you, and as I have scarcely recovered from sea-sickness, the men may rest until to-morrow.' Before the morrow came, the arrival of the senior Lieut.-General had completed the trio of Commanders-in-Chief, and Sir Hew Dalrymple thus swallowing up the dignity of Sir Harry Burrard, as he had previously swallowed up that of Major-General Wellesley, the troops were ordered into inactivity, until new surveys of the ground and fresh information had enlightened the mind of the latest arrived Commander-in-Chief.

"Hence the Convention of Cintra!"

HENRY N. SHORE.

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* See review of 'The Diary of Sir John Moore,' p. 96 of this Magazine.—ED. U.S.M.

THE CAPTURE OF HAVANNAH.

By Major W. H. Chawner, 2nd Essex Regiment.

A distinguished regiment of the British Army bears on its colours the battle honour "Moro."

This honour might with equal reason be granted to many another corps, yet there are British subjects ignorant of the brilliant military success which this word should recall—ignorant even whether the word "Moro" stands for town, fortress, or river.

Indeed, a query on the subject usually elicits the reply from soldier or civilian—"A Peninsula battle." I venture therefore to offer the following short account to the readers of the United Service Magazine. Moro or Morro, a fort guarding the entrance to the harbour of Havannah, was captured by the British from the Spaniards in the middle of the eighteenth century, and if the event does not rank with one of the "fifteen decisive battles of the world" it was a "heavy blow and great discouragement" to half Europe, and decided not a little old England's place amongst the nations.

In 1761, three of the thrones of Europe, viz. those of France, Spain, and Naples, were occupied by members of the Bourbon family. They all cordially hated England, and made the secret treaty against her known as the "Family Compact."

William Pitt was then Prime Minister, and learning of this treaty, advised King George III. not to wait till England's enemies declared war against her, but to strike the first blow by seizing Havannah and other valuable Spanish Colonies. Unfortunately, however, the young king was entirely under the influence of the Earl of Bute, his former tutor, who persuaded him to disregard the great statesman's advice. Pitt forthwith resigned, and Bute took his place. Three months afterwards Spain declared war (7th January, 1762), as Pitt had foreseen, and in March a powerful British armament was bearing down on Havannah.

This city "was the key of the Gulf of Mexico and centre of Spanish trade. The appearance of the city at the entrance of the port is one of the most picturesque and beautiful in equatorial America. The strong fortifications that crown the rocks on the

east side, the noble internal basin, where more than 1000 ships might anchor, sheltered from every wind, the majesty of the groves of palms which there grow to a vast height; the city itself with its white houses, all of the Saracenic and Gothic style, with quaint galleries and deep red roofs, the pillars and pinnacles, towers and domes, half seen and half hidden amidst the forest of masts and sails, seen under a clear and burning sun, all conspire to present a most imposing *tout ensemble.*" *

This magnificent harbour was defended on the west by Fort Puntal, and on the east by Fort Moro, and the entrance was closed by sunken ships and a boom, behind which twenty Spanish men-of-war were anchored. Fort Puntal was connected with the town of Havannah, which itself was defended by a strong rampart and ditch seventy feet deep. Fort Moro had also a formidable ditch cut in the solid rock.

To attack this fortress, defended by 13,500 Spaniards and the same number of island militia, a British expedition, under Lord Albemarle and Admiral Pocock, sailed from Portsmouth on the 6th March, 1762, with the following troops on board: 22nd, 34th, 56th, and 72nd Regiments of the line, and two companies of "Protestant prisoners." On the way, this force was increased by troops picked up at Martinique, and by 200 negroes from Jamaica, and the expedition was now composed of 200 sail and 11,000 soldiers, representing 22 regiments of the line.†

This, the most formidable armament ever collected under British flag, reached its destination on the 5th June without mishap, thanks to the splendid seamanship of Admiral Pocock and his subordinates, who had to conduct a portion of it through 600 miles of narrow and dangerous navigation in the straits of Bahama.‡

The troops were landed six miles east of Fort Moro, between two rivers, and were divided into two corps, of which the larger was to act against the fort, and the other was to cover the besiegers from the city of Havannah.

It has been suggested with some reason that the main object of the expedition, viz. the capture of Havannah, would have been more quickly effected by attacking the city itself, of which the defences are very weak.

It seems, however, that Lord Albemarle feared to direct his efforts against the city without first reducing the powerful fort

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* Cassell's 'British Battles on Land and Sea.'

† Lord Albemarle's instructions authorised him to obtain 4000 additional troops from General Amherst's command in America, but these could not after all be spared.

‡ There was an alternative and easier route, but the one chosen secured the only passage by which the French could send supplies to their allies.

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on the east, garrisoned as it was by the flower of the Spanish troops. The operations commenced, therefore, by a bombardment of Fort Moro. Three men-of-war took part in this, but at once came under such a hot cross-fire from Fort Puntal on the west side of the harbour that nothing more was attempted in that direction, and the rest of the operations were left to the troops.

The chief obstacles to the besiegers were: First, the rocky nature of the soil, which made the process of sapping up to the work most laborious, and gave no means of filling sand-bags. Secondly, the dense woods through which the necessary roads and approaches had to be cut. Thirdly, the scarcity of drinking water, all of which had to come from the ships. Soldiers and sailors vied with each other to meet these difficulties, and the operations appear to have been conducted throughout with great energy and ability.

In a few weeks the roads were finished and formidable batteries erected, the sand-bags for these and for the saps being filled from the cotton cargoes of passing merchantmen bound for England.

For some time the great depth of the ditch round the fort baffled all efforts of the miners to attack the parapet, but at length a way across was found in a narrow ridge of rock left to flank the ditch. On the 20th July a lodgment was effected in the covered way exposing the parapet itself to the attacks of the engineers. Success seemed certain, and the hopes of all ran high. So severe, however, was the labour entailed, and so hot and enervating the climate, that the besiegers had now no less than 5000 soldiers and 3000 seamen temporarily *hors de combat*, whilst many brave fellows actually died from fatigue. At this crisis the principal battery, which had taken 500 men seventeen days to erect, was set on fire and destroyed by the hostile artillery. It had been placed unnecessarily close to the fort, and the mistake probably added three weeks to the length of the siege.

"The hearts of the most sanguine began to sink when they beheld our Army wasting away, and remembered that the fleet anchored upon the open shore must be exposed to certain destruction if the West Indian hurricanes came on before Havannah was reduced." *

Now was the time for the enemy to strike, and in truth he was not slow to seize the occasion. On the 21st July, 1500 island militia and negroes dashed out from the city to succour the fort. They were at once met by four companies of the 1st Royal Scots, who were afterwards assisted by several other battalions ably brought up at critical moments by Colonel Carleton, brigadier-

* Cassell's 'British Battles on Land and Sea.'

general of the day. After a sharp encounter the enemy were driven back with a loss of 400 killed, wounded, or prisoners. Numbers of them were drowned in the harbour across which they attempted to escape. Our own loss was only fifty *hors de combat.*

The success of this sally would have been equivalent to raising the siege, for the enemy would undoubtedly have destroyed our batteries. As it was, little progress could be made without reinforcements. Yet the situation admitted of no delay, as has already been shown. To have awaited troops from home, in those days of slow communication, would have sealed the fate of the expedition. Happily, Great Britain could already muster soldiers from many parts of the world, and was undisputed mistress of the seas. The heavy losses in men were made up by reinforcements from New York, which infused new life into the besiegers; provisions were poured in from Jamaica, and the siege went on without interruption.

The ruined battery was replaced by another at a more respectful distance from the fort, which, however, it could command as effectively as the first. The grip on the covered way had never been relaxed, and now miners began to attack the parapet.

On the 30th, at 1 P.M., several mines were sprung, and a breach was made which was deemed practicable, though it only allowed the attackers to pass two men abreast.

The storming party was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, 90th Regiment, and consisted of detachments of the 1st Royal Scots, the "Regiment of Marksmen," * and the 90th Regiment, with a support from the 35th Regiment.

A forlorn hope, led by Lieutenant Charles Forbes, 1st Royal Scots, mounted the breach amidst a storm of musketry, and after a sharp conflict swept the ramparts from end to end. Yet the assault was gallantly withstood by the Spanish commander, Don Louis de Velasco, and his brave garrison, who resisted to the last, and until their leader and his second in command had both fallen, mortally wounded. Then, having lost 150 shot or bayoneted, 400 threw down their arms, and the rest, trying to escape to Havannah in boats or by swimming, were all killed or drowned.

Our own loss was 2 officers and 30 men.

Don Louis' gallant defence was fully recognised by his sovereign, who created his son Viscount Morro, and ordered that in future the Spanish Navy should always possess a ship called "Velasco."

As soon as the people in the city saw the fort had fallen, they turned their guns against it; but in six hours they were silenced

* The writer has up to now been unable to find any particulars as to the composition of this corps or of that of the Protestant prisoners previously noticed. He would be glad of any information on the subject.

by the tremendous answering cannonade, and Havannah, with its wealth, its forts and harbour, was ours.

The treasure was at once shipped off to London, where, "preceded by a troop of light horse, with kettle-drums beating and French horns and trumpets sounding, in eleven waggons, surmounted by the Union Jack having the Spanish flag beneath, the captured gold and silver was conveyed through the streets of London, and carried to the Tower with great parade. Each waggon was escorted by four marines, with bayonets fixed, and the procession was concluded by a mounted officer carrying the British flag." *

This disaster to the Spaniards was greatly due to their incredible negligence in not preparing the place for defence, though they had a month's warning. They had hardly any shot to fit their cannon or cartridges for their muskets. Their fleet was retained at anchor in the harbour instead of going out to fight.

The foregoing is a slight and imperfect account of one of the most important operations ever undertaken by the British nation.

Strange that to the majority of our countrymen it is almost unknown! Modern history books either do not notice it at all or dismiss it with a few lines. Yet by this brilliant feat of arms thirteen Spanish men-of-war fell into our hands, seventeen were burnt, and booty to the value of £3,000,000 was realised.†

I cannot better conclude than by the following quotations, which show the value once placed on the capture of Havannah:—

"It was a military achievement of the highest class. By its effect on the enemy's marine it was equal to the greatest naval victory, and in the plunder it equalled the produce of a national subsidy. The conquest of Havannah was perhaps the greatest blow ever struck by any nation. With it Spain lost her principal fortress, the West Indies and a large fleet."

"The occupation of Havannah gave us the absolute command of the passage pursued by the Plate fleets of Spain, and seemed to lay the wealth and glory of that Empire at our feet."

HAMPDEN CHAWNER.

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* Cassell's 'British Battles on Land and Sea.'

† The seamen's and privates' share of the batta paid out of this only amounted to £4 each. This is said to have caused great discontent, and to have had a serious effect on recruiting, especially as regards the Navy.

NOTE.—For the materials of this paper the following works, etc., have been consulted: Beatson's 'Military Memorials,' Hume's 'History of England,' Russell's 'History of Europe,' 'Pictorial History of England,' 'Secret Instructions to Lord Albemarle,' dated 15th February, 1762, and Lord Albemarle's 'Despatches.' The writer has also to acknowledge the courtesy of Messrs. Cassell & Co. in allowing him to draw largely on their interesting and popular 'British Battles on Land and Sea,' by James Grant.

SUNDRIES.

I.

ACCORDING to the *Danzers Armee Zeitung* the parties of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, represented at the Reichsrat at Vienna, are responsible for the recruiting of 254 infantry battalions, 24 cavalry regiments, 8 field artillery brigades, 1 mountain artillery division, 14 fortress artillery battalions, 9 pioneer battalions, and 9 transport divisions.

Those represented at the Buda Pesth Parliament are responsible for the recruiting of 196 infantry battalions, 18 cavalry regiments, 6 field artillery brigades, 4 fortress artillery battalions, 6 pioneer battalions, and 6 transport divisions. The railway and telegraph regiments are recruited from the entire monarchy. As a general rule, then, 55 per cent. of the men raised each year come from the Austrian, and 45 per cent. from the Hungarian provinces.

The Navy and the XVth Army Corps (in occupation of Bosnia, and Herzegovina) are not included in these calculations.

II.

There will be no autumn manœuvres held in Belgium this year. There will only be brigade and divisional manœuvres in the manœuvre camps, as well as mobilisation and cadre manœuvres in the fortified towns, Antwerp, Namur, and Lüttich.

III.

The *Belgique Militaire* announces that the War Department has just published the new organisation of the field forces of the Belgian Army according to the recent military regulations. The chief changes have been made with regard to the composition of the division, which consists, in addition to 1 reserve infantry brigade, of 2 regiments of 2 battalions each and of a divisional squadron of gendarmerie; a decrease in its composition has been made of 2 cavalry squadrons and of a provision column. The cavalry divisions are composed of 4 regiments of 5 squadrons. The second provision column is done away with. An infantry company has no longer any waggons; each battalion, in addition to its provision waggon, has two ammunition waggons and baggage van. Cyclists are attached to each staff, including those of battalions and detachments.

IV.

The death of Field-Marshal Count Alfred von Waldersee, which took place on the 5th March last, is a serious loss to the German Army, in whose service he had spent 54 strenuous years. The late Field-Marshal, who was the son of the former cavalry

General, was born at Potsdam on the 8th April, 1832, and was given his commission in the Guard Artillery Regiment in 1850. He served through the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German campaigns of 1866 and 1870–71 with great distinction. He held many important commands, and succeeded Field-Marshal Count von Moltke as Chief of the Great General Staff on the retirement of that famous soldier. In 1900 Count von Waldersee was appointed to the chief command of the European troops sent to the Far East, on the occasion of the Boxer insurrection in China, and was nominated Field-Marshal by the German Emperor prior to his departure. His command lasted from the 27th September, 1900, to the 4th June, 1901, and was, owing to his personal qualities, exercised to general satisfaction, in spite of the difficulties of the situation, and of international susceptibilities.

V.

The instructions with regard to the German Grand Manœuvres have been recently published. The so-called Imperial Manœuvres will be carried out by the IXth and the Guards Army Corps, the two opposing army corps having a precisely similar composition; both will consist of 3 divisions, with a balloon park and machine-gun sections. The operations will take place in the Southern Mecklembourg district.

Three provisionally constituted cavalry divisions will carry out special manœuvres in the camps of instruction at Alten-Grabow, Münster, and Senne. The IIIrd, VIIth, and XIXth Army Corps will execute attacks on fortified positions, all three employing heavy field guns. The VIIth (Münster) Army Corps will, throughout the operations, carry out firing under service conditions. Large pontooning operations will take place on the Oder at Custrin, and on the Rhine at Neu-Brisach. Finally, it should be noted that special manœuvres will be held, in which the various transport battalions will take part, bearing on the composition of administrative convoys on a war-footing, and on the organisation, command, and supervision of convoys in time of war.

VI.

The composition of the German Infantry is as follows: 175 regiments of 3 battalions, 41 regiments of 2 battalions, 18 Jaeger battalions; total 625 battalions. It has in addition 15 machine-gun detachments attached to Infantry or Jaeger battalions. The budget for 1904–5 provides for the formation of a 16th machine-gun detachment. Not including doctors, paymasters, and one-year volunteers, the budgetary effective of the German Infantry amounts to 12,521 officers, 45,707 non-commissioned officers (all re-engaged men), and 334,302 men.

VII.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* says that the completion of five ships of the *Wittelsbach* type strikingly demonstrate the great energy of the German naval dockyards, and proves how enormously those establishments have developed. Each of these vessels was built in three years, whilst smaller ones, of the *Kaiser* type, took four

years from the time they were first placed on the stocks to their being put in commission. Battleships built a quarter of a century ago, of inferior displacement and tonnage to those of the *Wittelsbach* class, took eight years to build. Thus the *Baden* was commenced in 1876 and completed in 1884; for the *Bayern* the dates were respectively 1874 and 1882, and for the *Wurtemberg*, 1876 and 1881.

VIII.

From the 1st January of this year the Japanese Army has entirely re-organised its administrative *personnel* on a new basis. Whilst there formerly existed two separate corps, viz. officials of the Army Service Corps and Administration officers, there is now only one. The two corps which formerly existed have been disbanded and merged into one.

At the head of the Administrative Services is a general officer of the army, on the active list, with the rank of lieutenant-general, with officers of various ranks under him, and with non-commissioned officers and officials to assist the officers in their secretarial work. All the administrative *personnel* wear a grey stripe down their trousers and a grey band round their headdress as a distinctive colour.

Formerly, Army Service Corps officers were recruited from captains and lieutenants of all branches of the Service, and from a certain number of officers from the Administrative branch, who went through a course at the School of Administration. The officers of the Administration, on the other hand, were recruited from non-commissioned officers of all branches of the Service who had first been through a special course at the School of Administration. In future, candidates for the new corps will be taken from non-commissioned officers of all branches of the Service who have completed a course of secondary instruction, from one-year volunteers recommended by corps commanders, and from non-commissioned officers of the Administrative Services. The three lists of candidates will go through the same examination for fitness. Those successfully passing will first receive nine months' training with corps, and will then go through a two years' course at the School of Administration before appointment.

IX.

The recruiting statistics of the Netherlands Army for 1902 are as follows—

The number of young men who reached the age for military service amounted to 49,194, who were thus classified :—

Unfit for service	too short	650
	on account of infirmities	4,550
Exempt from service	as only sons	5,052
	on account of brothers' services	10,954
Not permitted to serve (convicts, etc.)		68
Deceased between period of drawing lots and enrolment		28
Enrolled (508 in the Navy)		10,961
Young men who benefited from the drawing of lots		16,931
	Total	49,194

X.

The Spanish contingent, which was enrolled on the 1st March last, amounted to 48,000 men. In conformity, with the provisional measures of the regulations of the 25th December, 1899, which raised the age for military service from 19 to 21 years, this contingent consists: first, of 24,000 men of the 1903 class, or two-fifths of the active contingent; second, of 24,000 men of the 1902 class, or two-fifths of this contingent, who were not enrolled last year. The remaining two-fifths, or 36,000 men, will be called out with the 1904 contingent.

The budgetary effective for 1904 has been fixed at 83,000 men, an increase of 3000 men on that of 1903.

REVIEWS.

'THE DIARY OF SIR JOHN MOORE.'

Edited by Major-General Sir J. F. MAURICE, K.C.B. With Portrait and Maps. In two volumes. London: Edward Arnold, publisher to H.M. India Office. 1904. Price 30*s*.

ALL that a good advocate, pleading a manifestly just cause, can do for a maligned reputation, Sir Frederick Maurice has done for Sir John Moore; and as it is now clear that a large majority of the jury—the reading public—is favourably disposed, the desired vindication is assured. "Greatness in the eyes of contemporaries is measured by success; posterity sometimes pays due homage to merit." Thus it has been written; and the aphorism is peculiarly applicable to the case of Sir John Moore, whose career until the Corunna campaign had been attended by an increasing and well-earned confidence in his consummate ability, shared alike by his superiors, his subordinates, and the bulk of his countrymen. Then came the occasion when failure to accomplish the impossible was laid to the charge of the great man who had done his best, and in so doing had actually effected all that was in the circumstances practicable. By his daring enterprise, Moore had attracted against himself a concentration of the vastly superior forces of the enemy, and thereby afforded to the Spaniards the breathing-time which they so terribly needed for the reorganisation of their shattered powers of resistance.

An incompetent Government, inattentive to the counsels of experts, and in this case relying upon the fatuous advice of a credulous and foolish politician, Mr. Frere, determined upon an

expedition already foredoomed to extreme danger of wholesale disaster. The genius of the General to whom the actual operations were entrusted indeed saved the British Army from destruction, and achieved results of the highest importance; but the childish optimism of the Cabinet having at the same time been rudely shattered, an unworthy attempt was only too successfully made to fasten upon the shoulders of the dead hero the blame that belonged to those for whose folly he had paid the penalty with his life. Canning, to his lasting shame, desired to make the condemnation official, and his overtures to Lord Castlereagh upon this subject brought about the famous duel. Castlereagh had not behaved well to Moore, and he was not an immaculate person; but such meanness revolted him, and his resentment of the suggestion does him credit. Canning and others had, however, done their slanderous work only too well. The true facts were obscured, and Moore became a scapegoat, just as the erring yet by no means incompetent War Office has recently been sacrificed for the sins of the present Government.

That Sir John Moore, had he been spared and permitted to conduct the Peninsular War, would probably have achieved all and more than was accomplished by Wellington, has long been the opinion of many; but until now there has been no opportunity of seeing events through the eyes of Moore himself; and however decidedly the real greatness of the man may previously have impressed itself upon his admirers, the effect of reading his diary, together with the masterly comments of Sir Frederick Maurice, cannot fail to confirm the original conviction upon a doubly sure foundation. If Moore had a fault, it was that he was no politician. He was too honest for his day, and that which he conceived to be best in the interests of his country, that he invariably advocated quite regardless of himself. Yet even upon his own behalf he could speak his mind, as Lord Castlereagh had reason to know after the abortive expedition to Sweden, and when the imbecile jealousy against Moore caused the Government to appoint Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Henry Burrard to the command of the force despatched to Portugal. That Wellesley would have served loyally under Moore, and that these two great men understood each other, is now happily established. With Moore in command, there would have been no Convention of Cintra, the victory of Vimeira would have been followed up, and the unconditional surrender of Junot would have resulted. Yet Moore, chivalrous in this case as he always was, had excuses for Dalrymple and Burrard. Intolerant of incapacity as he indeed was, Moore never failed to give all due regard to the existence of any "military reasons" that could justly be pleaded. Dalrymple and Burrard were both placed at the disadvantage of being compelled to take the reins suddenly in the conduct of operations that they had neither initiated nor participated in—always an occasion of obvious difficulty. Therefore Moore gave some credit to their motives of caution, though he regretted the result.

For the further light thrown upon the events of the memorable retreat to Corunna the reader must refer to the book itself, and it

must now suffice to recall the fact already known, that the corps which were well disciplined, and which moreover fought continual rear-guard actions, lost far fewer men than the others—the latter were, unfortunately, the majority. The march was an undeniably severe one, but it was under the circumstances inevitably so; and actually, as the figures prove, it was not severe beyond the limits that good troops could endure without demoralisation. That the majority were *not* good troops was no fault of Moore's. The Light Brigade has furnished a lasting monument to the practical abilities of its talented instructor; so that to impugn his capacity to train troops is beyond the power of even his most prejudiced detractors. The pity is that Sir Frederick Maurice has, to his infinite regret, been unable to procure any evidence relating to the system followed by Moore at Shorncliffe when building up the incomparable efficiency of the 43rd, 52nd and Rifle Brigade.

Space prevents any attempt to describe the earlier events of Sir John Moore's career, or to refer to his boyhood. From first to last, from the day when his skill and courage, as a subaltern in command of a picquet of twenty men in the American War of Independence, saved the day at Penobscot, to later times when he was the right hand man of Dundas and Abercromby or encountered the unprovoked jealousy and animosity of the foolish Sir Gilbert Elliott in Corsica, the genius for war and commanding personality of the man never failed to manifest themselves. A "born soldier," he let no opportunity slip, and spared no pains to still further improve himself by brilliant service and careful study. The story of this great leader of men, as it has now been presented to us, is of absorbing interest; a nobler subject for a biographer could hardly be found, nor a biographer who could have proved himself more thoroughly fit for the task. Had not Sir Frederick Maurice already won his spurs upon the field of literature, the admirable manner in which he has put together and explained the career of Sir John Moore would have itself sufficed to establish his reputation. Every soldier and every thoughtful Englishman should read this book and learn for himself how Moore has been misunderstood and misrepresented.

'THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.'

PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF, BERLIN.

Authorised translation by Colonel W. H. H. WATERS, R.A., C.V.O., late Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy at Berlin. With Maps and Illustrations. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W. 1904. Price 15*s*.

THE scope of the present narrative is confined to the period commencing with the events immediately connected with the outbreak

of hostilities and ending with the surrender of Cronje. There is no attempt to follow the operations as a whole, but the leading and especially important incidents are described and criticised in order to procure from them the greatest possible number of lessons. It is indeed true that in the majority of cases we have learned, from the Boer War, *what not to do*, or *how not to do it*, rather than, more directly, how war should be made; yet there were sundry bright exceptions, and the German staff has done them full justice. For example, the prompt and correct decision of General French, and the signal success which attended his daring charge from Klip Drift against the Boers opposing his advance on Kimberley, have obtained the praise and admiration that so brilliant an exploit most clearly deserves—and the lesson conveyed has been duly recognised.

Accustomed as we have become to the foul abuse so liberally heaped upon us by the Continental press, it is now gratifying to find our exculpation recorded unmistakably in the pages of this official account of the war. Not only is it admitted that the general conduct of our troops was "chivalrous and humane," but in the case of the occasionally severe measures adopted after the struggle had become inevitably embittered, it is frankly allowed that the circumstances were of a character that "not only explains much of their severity, but also justifies it."

That we should hitherto have received but scant courtesy or justice from foreigners is not, however, very remarkable, when we reflect that so many of our own countrymen were at such pains to libel our gallant soldiers; and that even an ex-Cabinet Minister, his sense of decency smothered by party passion, did not scruple to dilate upon our "methods of barbarism."

The adverse criticisms of the German staff upon the military conduct of the actual operations of the war are confined chiefly to the delinquencies of the British Government, Lord Roberts, Sir Redvers Buller, Lord Kitchener, and our system of training. The Government is blamed for its obstinacy in declining the excellent and often-repeated advice of Lord Wolseley; Lord Roberts is charged with failure to understand the strategical situation; Lord Kitchener with tactical incompetence; and Sir Redvers Buller with lack of skill and moral courage. The evidence is judicially examined and the verdict given with perfect impartiality. We cannot by any method of reasoning dispute the justice of the conclusions arrived at. The charges made may be summarised as follows:—

1. Had the Government listened to Lord Wolseley instead of yielding to its fears of an unpatriotic opposition, we should have been ready instead of unready, and an actually inferior enemy would not have enjoyed that local superiority at the outset, with all its strategical advantages, moral and physical, that our lack of preparation placed at his disposal.

2. Lord Roberts failed to grasp the obvious strategical fact that the destruction or capture of Cronje's force represented the real key to the entire problem, and that no half-measures, such as merely dislodging that force, could possibly meet the case. The actual surrender of Cronje was brought about almost entirely by

the fatuous proceedings of Cronje himself, and, so far as we ourselves were concerned, was wholly fortuitous. The famous ride to Kimberley was valueless; it produced a certain moral effect, counterbalanced, however, by an awful waste of horseflesh. There is no such thing as bad strategy; there can only be strategy or the absence of it; and in the case in point the latter is regrettably evident.

3. With regard to Sir Redvers Buller, it is abundantly clear that the battle of Colenso was fought upon an unjustifiable supposition that all would be plain sailing, and without the slightest attempt to prepare against the unexpected. The key of the position, Hlangwane Hill, was so lightly thought of that the orders to Lord Dundonald were merely that he should "endeavour" to occupy it. The word "endeavour," when used in orders for battle, is usually a silly one. Lord Dundonald could not, and General Barton would not, take the hill—*hinc illæ lachrymæ.* The battle was lost; but, as the Germans tell us, it is undeniable that "it was the General and not his gallant force that was defeated." A cursory glance at the map is sufficient to expose the absurdity of the plan of operations, and a comparatively brief study of the actual proceedings to suggest that success might not improbably have attended a renewal of the contest in a wiser fashion.

4. Lord Kitchener, who has been ridiculously blamed by British critics for his decision to attack at Paardeberg, obtains no more than justice in his honourable acquittal upon this account at the hands of the Germans. But strategically sound as the delivery of the attack most undoubtedly was, and equally certain as it is that it ought to have been renewed, the fact still remains that there was entire absence of method; that Lord Kitchener lost his head, and that he commanded, very inefficiently, all the units under him, one after another, but never his force as a whole. The strictures upon Lord Kitchener's tactical deficiencies are, indeed, severe, but it is impossible to deny the justice of them.

5. For the imperfect results, due to our lack of sound training, the Germans offer all the excuses that we ourselves could urge—and they are many. The pity, however, is that although conscious of our past shortcomings, we have up to the present made no appreciable improvement. This, however, may come, and there is at least a reasonable prospect of better times in the future.

The charges made being unanswerable in themselves, any attempt to deny the justice of them would be useless. Yet we must also look at the other side of the picture. Lord Roberts, indeed, was more fortunate than skilful in the Paardeberg campaign; but this must not cause us to forget that, in spite of all the faults he may have committed, he has claims upon our admiration and gratitude, as a nation, that have not often been surpassed in our history. The superlative courage and splendid readiness to accept full responsibility uniformly displayed by Lord Roberts throughout his career clearly mark him as one of the greatest amongst our rather small number of great soldiers. That Lord Roberts made mistakes cannot be denied; but it has been truly said that "the General who has made no mistakes has never made war." Again,

in the case of Lord Kitchener, it is upon the whole more profitable for us to remember his businesslike management of the Omdurman campaign than to trouble ourselves about his tactical failings at the battle of Omdurman itself, or at Paardeberg. Gifted with a great intellect, boundless energy and indomitable resolution, Lord Kitchener will for all time be a commanding figure in our history. It is not a small thing that a man to whom circumstances denied a practical military education should have worked his way to the top of the military tree. Tactically inferior as Lord Kitchener is to many of his contemporaries, he is undeniably the greatest man now on the active list of the Army. That he would have been a more competent general, had he served as a young man in the cavalry, artillery, or infantry, is likely enough; yet the fact remains that he has achieved greatness in spite of every disadvantage.

To read the German account of the war in South Africa is a wholesome lesson to us in many ways, and if the criticisms are occasionally severe, they are always just. Our operations are criticised, on the evidence, with the same impartiality that the same writers would display when discussing their own manœuvres; and parallels for many of our errors are frequently quoted from the records of German mistakes in the Franco-German War. Praise is given us where we deserve it, and without stint.

The translation is generally excellent, and the author is to be congratulated upon it; but the omission of the account of the engagement at Driefontein is inexplicable, because this was emphatically the most instructive as well as the best conducted action of the whole war. The absence of the map of Paardeberg is also very regrettable.

'FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE.'

TWELVE LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

By EMIL REICH (DOCTOR JURIS). London: George Bell & Sons. 1904. Price 5*s*.

THAT this is a very valuable work is as certain as that it is easy to find fault with it. Regarded generally, it will by most readers be accepted as an exceedingly able epitome of modern European history, military and political. Cause and effect are shrewdly discovered and every page conveys its lesson. The career of Napoleon very naturally obtains special attention, and four chapters are devoted to events connected with the rise and fall of probably the most remarkable man who ever lived. Upon questions of policy, as affecting the interests of the various Powers involved in the long series of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the author makes many thoughtful remarks and displays exceptional insight as well as knowledge. But Mr. Reich is not found proof

to the temptation to pose as a strategical critic, and, as the result of his efforts in this very dangerous direction, he lays himself open to hostile criticism. For example: the influence of the "Spanish Ulcer" is rejected as a powerful factor towards the downfall of Napoleon, and greater, or indeed supreme, importance is ascribed to an alleged lack of loyal perseverance upon the part of the French people themselves. As to the latter contention, there is doubtless some truth in it. We all know that many possibilities presented themselves at the close of the memorable campaign of 1814. We may differ as to whether even a Napoleon, supported ever so enthusiastically, could actually have saved the situation; but that the people, tired of war now that it was once again waged upon their own soil, threw over the Emperor before the cause of their country had been irretrievably lost is undeniable. Let this, however, pass, and let us for a moment consider the author's views in reference to Spain. His argument amounts to this: that Wellington was not after all a very great general, and that whatever the comparatively slight influence upon the European situation at large exercised by the war in Spain, it was achieved by the Spaniards themselves and not by the British. Now, it is undeniable that had not the Spaniards been in arms, Wellington's small army would have been powerless against the vastly superior forces of the enemy; but it is also certain that had the British failed to intervene, the Spaniards could neither have had breathing time to organise and reorganise their resistance, nor could they have obtained the sinews of war. Moreover, it should be evident that had Napoleon been free from the incubus of maintaining so great an army in Spain, the Moscow disaster would in itself have been greatly mitigated, and its effects consequently rendered far less ruinous. Had the final stages of the retreat been covered by French instead of by less than half-hearted Prussian, Austrian, and other contingents, the complete *débâcle* would probably have been averted. For instance, had any capable and loyal French marshal, with an equal force of French soldiers, been substituted for Schwarzenberg and his 30,000 Austrians, Tschitschagof would scarcely have been permitted to gain the rear of the retreating army. No; the Spanish ulcer was a very real sore upon the strategical body of Napoleon, and Wellington's British troops formed the core of it. To take now another example. Mr. Reich gravely blames Wellington upon account of failure to move from Quatre Bras to the assistance of Blücher at Ligny! The distance from Quatre Bras to Sombreffe is seven miles, and superiority at the former place was not attained until dusk. Even had Wellington been strong enough to contain Ney, and at the same time to detach a sufficient force to have any effect on the battle of Ligny, the inexorable factors of time and distance must effectually have prevented him. Apart, however, from such military imperfections, resulting from the temerity of the author in venturing beyond his depth, the 'Foundations of Modern Europe' is a highly interesting and instructive work.

'INTERNATIONAL LAW.'

A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW.

By WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, M.A. Fifth Edition. Edited by J. B. Atlay, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1904. Price 21*s.* net.

THE moment is peculiarly opportune for a new edition of this standard work. Inasmuch as Mr. Hall died more than nine years ago, at a time when the fourth edition was passing through the press, Mr. Atlay has had a number of modern instances to consider in the preparation of the new edition. Foremost among these is the Chino-Japanese War, then come the Spanish-American War, the South African War, and the Hague Peace Conference. The lessons drawn from all of these, besides the minor struggles of the same period, have been added in due place to swell the weight of authority. But it is open to quarrel with Mr. Atlay in that he has not given us as much new material as he might have done. As the fifth edition is slightly less bulky than the fourth, mere lack of space cannot be held responsible; the omission seems to be due rather to the respect with which Mr. Atlay treats Mr. Hall's memory. It is to be hoped that in a sixth edition, and it is quite possible that one will be necessary after no long delay, Mr. Atlay will carry on the work more boldly. It will, no doubt, in time be necessary to swell the bulk of the book to two volumes, and there is no need to shrink from contemplating such an event. To give one or two instances of points on which further discussion is desirable. There is the vexed question of the supply of coal to belligerents, there is the question of the raising of loans for them by neutrals, and there is the exceedingly doubtful state of the law with regard to submarine cables in time of war. On the last-named of these three, practice, as exemplified by the United States Naval Manual, is not in accord with theory, as illustrated by the rules framed by the Hague Court some eighteen months ago.

It is impossible in a short review to indicate in how many respects the knotty problems of the present war can be resolved from this book. But it is proposed to return to the subject in the next issue of this magazine and to publish an article quoting the doctrine of this book where it illustrates current events.

'MODERN NAVIGATION.'

By WM. HALL, B.A., Chaplain and Naval Instructor, R.N. London: University Tutorial Press, Ltd. 1904. Price 6*s.* 6*d.*

THIS book professes to be primarily a text-book for students, and secondarily a hand-book for navigators. It puts practice first and theory afterwards. Thus more than two-thirds of the book are

devoted to dead reckoning, observations, and notes on the use of charts and instruments. The remaining third part is devoted to mathematical theory, with a chapter on the phenomena of tides. The idea of "position lines" is introduced at the very first, as being the foundation of modern methods. The manner of the book is concise and clear, the definitions are numerous and good, and there is no attempt to gain more than a practical accuracy of computation. "To use more figures than are necessary," says Mr. Hall, "is an unpardonable sin." Students and teachers alike will agree with him.

'PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE.'

VOL. XXIX., NO. 4. DECEMBER, 1903.

Edited by PHILIP R. ALGER.

THERE are three great questions with which the naval mind is exercised at present all the world over. These are: the need for a General Staff, the power and prospects of the automobile torpedo, and the probable outcome of the war between Japan and Russia.

Inasmuch as the papers contained in this volume were written some six months ago, it may appear at first sight that they have of necessity been left by the rapid progress of events in the Far East. But this is not so. Where theory is sound, sound practice does but emphasise it. And that has so far been the case with regard to the latest American theorising both on naval administration and torpedoes. The very long paper, or, more strictly, the two lectures, by Mr. Brooks Adams, on "War as the Ultimate Form of Economic Competition," deserves more than a purely professional audience. These lectures throw an important light on the inevitable policy of the United States with regard to all economic questions, and are concerned as much with the future of northern China as with the Monroe doctrine. To be forewarned is, or ought to be, to be forearmed. We have already been warned that the most formidable competitor in northern China will be found in America. Most of us close our ears, presumably because some one in St. Petersburg repeated the truism as a taunt. But Mr. Adams puts it forward as a scientific proposition, and from the history of the Seven Years' War, the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the American Civil War, he proves it up to the hilt. His paper should be read and pondered upon. It is possible indeed to cavil at some of his premises, and it is possible to question some of the lines of argument he has followed. But this objection rises probably from a need for compression which has at times rendered the author somewhat obscure. From his conclusions, however, it is not easy to dissent, and a careful study of them is recommended to all students of Imperial politics.

The rest of the volume is concerned chiefly with historical or technical subjects. The professional notes are as welcome as ever. Lastly, there is a reprint of a short paper on "The Admiral's Flag," which appeared in this magazine.

'THE FLEET SERIES.'

'BREAK!' HOW THE NAVY PREPARES FOR WAR.

By TRE-POL-PEN. Illustrated. The Westminster Press. Price 1*s.*

THIS vivacious little book is the first of a new series. The object is to familiarise the public still further with the details of naval life, lower-deck life, and in this way presumably to help on the great cause of naval recruiting. The book is well designed for the purpose and deserves to succeed. It is readable, well illustrated from photographs, and accurate in all essentials. The substance is of a nature similar to the letters of correspondents before the manœuvres begin. It treats of such necessary events as steam trials and pay day, and is chiefly concerned with modern evolutions —always from the point of view of "first ship."

'HOW TO PASS IN TOPOGRAPHY.'

By Major G. W. REDWAY. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., Dryden House, Gerrard Street, W. 1904. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*

SEVERAL plain guides to Topography have recently been published and all have merits of their own sufficiently great to give them claims to favourable consideration. Major Redway's book is certainly entitled to a high place on the list; it is thoroughly practical and the explanations are particularly clear. Interpolated amongst the examples worked out are many questions that have been set in examinations, including one in which the examiner is shown to have been at fault. Such an illustration is very useful, because it prepares candidates against the perplexities that must arise in the event of encountering an ambiguous or wrongly set question. In the present day, when garrison classes are no longer available, the real value of a book on Topography depends very much upon whether a student who has no previous knowledge of the subject could teach himself without other assistance. In the present case, a reply in the affirmative may most confidently be given to this important question.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR MAP.

MESSRS. W. and A. K. JOHNSTON have published an excellent map of the theatre of war, mounted on pasteboard and supplied with a box containing twenty-four steel pins with "flags." The scale is 85 miles to 1 inch, and the price 3*s.* 6*d.* Six reference maps are printed on the unoccupied space and at the foot. Officers and others who wish to follow the operations cannot do better than purchase this map. Cheap folding editions, printed on paper and cloth, are published at 1*s.* and 2*s.* respectively.

'SOUTH AFRICAN WAR RECORD]

OF THE 1ST BATTALION SHERWOOD FORESTERS, DERBYSHIRE REGIMENT, 1899–1902.'

Printed by Noronha & Co., Government Printers, Honkong. 1904.

THIS is merely a preliminary issue, interleaved, and intended to furnish the foundation of a revised edition that is to follow; yet even as it now stands the narrative has considerable merits and is of much general as well as particular interest. Some parts are a trifle confused, and there are a few inaccuracies which the regimental readers of the volume will no doubt point out to the editor. For example, the story reads as if the criticisms directed against the previous lack of tactical preparation at the Bushman's Hoek camp had reference to Sterkstroom—as indeed it just as well might—and that the Derbys had proceeded to the former place on their arrival. This is but an unimportant matter, yet it will serve the present purpose as well as any other. Meanwhile, the fact remains that the Derbys in South Africa were a battalion of exceptionally fine physique, in admirable order, and had for their C.O. one of the best, if not the very best, all round soldier in the Army. The record of work done will prove that the battalion acted worthily of its advantages.

'MAINLY ABOUT SHOOTING.'

By Captain REGINALD F. LEGGE, Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment, Adjutant, 2nd V.B. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. With an Introduction by Major-General Sir ALFRED TURNER, K.C.B. Illustrated with Plates. London: Gale and Polden, Ltd., 2, Amen Corner, Paternoster Row, E.C. Price 1*s.* 6*d.* (net).

THIS little book is replete with sound common sense, and furnishes ample proof that the author not only understands his subject, but

has the gift of teaching. Captain Legge has many original ideas upon every branch of musketry training, and officers and non-commissioned officers who take a proper interest in the efficiency of their companies should make a point of reading what he has to tell them. The chapters are "Lectures," and the style of them so attractive that it is impossible to help envying those who had the good fortune to listen to them from the author's own lips. Sir Alfred Turner praises the book highly, but not a bit more highly than it deserves.

'A TROOPER'S NARRATIVE

OF SERVICE IN THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE, 1902.'

By STEWART CULIN, Private Second Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry, N.G.P. George W. Jacobs & Co., Philadelphia.

THE Author of this narrative is so evidently a man of superior education and attainments, that his views upon the variety of questions, which he gives freely, are of real value as well as interest. He discusses the inhabitants of the strike district, who appear to have come chiefly from Central Europe, and sees in their regeneration a great work standing sadly in need of accomplishment. The lesson to ourselves is that if only it is known that troops will really shoot, if such be necessary, the occasion for strong measures is seldom provided. At Shenandoah, where the mere handful of cavalrymen rode freely through the streets, not a sign of violence was offered to them, even though they arrested on the passage a man who ventured to insult them. They understand dealing with mobs in the United States better than we do at home—they don't let the mob get out of hand. At the first sign of disturbance in go the cartridges, and the mob knows what will happen if it is refractory. Therefore the mob climbs down promptly, and bloodshed is avoided.

'LIFE IN A GARRISON TOWN.'

THE MILITARY NOVEL SUPPRESSED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

By Lieutenant BILSE. John Lane, the Bodley Head. London and New York. 1904. Price 6*s*.

THIS is not a nice book, and it is little wonder that it should have been "suppressed;" at the same time it may have good effects in Germany by procuring attention to the evils resulting from the state of affairs described, and the adoption of measures calculated

to remove the cause. Curiosity, or a morbid appetite for unpleasant disclosures of disgusting moral depravity, will no doubt add many more to the already numerous readers of the narrative, but it is to be recommended that those gentlemen who desire to read it should be careful not to leave it lying about where it can be accessible to their female relations. It may safely be said that to have read the book through would be sufficient proof of at least a serious want of refinement in any woman.

'FRANÇAIS ET ALLIÉS AU PÉ-TCHI-LI.

CAMPAGNE DE CHINE DE 1900.'

Par le Général H. FREY, ancien Commandant-en-Chef des forces français au Pé-tchi-li, de Juillet à Septembre, 1900. Avec 5 cartes en couleur et 1 carte dans le texte. Paris: librairie Hachette et Cie., 79, Boulevard Saint-Germain, 1904. Price 7 francs 50 centimes.

THE above work enjoys the twofold advantage of being written by an officer of high authority and of appearing at an opportune moment. General Frey, as Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Force, was intimately associated with the campaign of the allies in China; the work is, in addition, most opportune in appearing at a time when most of the great Powers, who at that time found themselves fighting side by side in generous rivalry, may possibly find themselves opposed to one another in the same Far East. These are, however, not the only merits of this book, which is as full of anecdotes as of history. It initiates the reader into the motives of certain events, undertaken by the allies, which have been hitherto unknown; it also gives the General's opinion of the relations existing between the various contingents, and that officer's appreciation of their good qualities or their defects. In this regard it may be as well to mention that the General's relatively poor opinion of our native troops was not shared, at all events by the American contingent. Whatever, however, one's private opinion may be on some of its minor details, General Frey's book will undoubtedly be read with interest and profit by military men of all nationalities.

The Log Series.—The commission of H.M.S. *Renown* is the subject of volume 8, and a worthy addition to the number. This "Log" has special interest owing to the fact that the ship had the honour of conveying the Duke and Duchess of Connaught from Malta to India for the Delhi Durbar. There are also a number of amusing yarns, "Captain Bobby's Anchor," and others, by "Tre-Pol-Pen." The story of old Renowns is, moreover, excellent. Altogether this is an excellent "Log," and should greatly help the good work. It should not be forgotten that every "Log" sold means some little help towards the "Log" room of the Union Jack club. The Publishers of the series are The Westminster Press (Gerrards, Ltd.), 411a, Harrow Road, W., and the price 4*s.* 3*d.*, post free.

Questions and Answers on the Royal Military College Text Book of Military Administration, compiled by Captain H. R. Gall, and published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall, S.W., price 2*s.*, can be entirely relied upon for the purpose intended. The young officer who has mastered the contents of this little volume need have no fears about passing his examination. Such books are a necessary evil. The system demands "cramming," and such being the case, what we must do is to select the books best suited to the occasion—therefore Captain Gall's preceptor is to be recommended.

Notes on Mounted Infantrymen, by Captain Llewellyn Saunderson, the Rifle Brigade, cannot be too strongly recommended. The Author does not labour matters already fully dealt with by many other writers, but teaches what to do and how to do it from the point of view of a Company Commander who is teaching his Company to be efficient M.I. It is assumed that the men have been properly instructed as Infantry soldiers, and require merely to be taught to use their knowledge in mounted service. We are given the art of Mounted Infantry tactics explained by an officer who clearly understands tactics and M.I. The result is consequently excellent. The price is 1*s.*, and the publishers Messrs. Gale & Polden.

Cyclists in Action—published by Forster, Groom & Co., price 1*s.* 6*d.*—by Lieutenant A. H. Trapman, 26th Middlesex (Cyclist) V.R.C., is the title of a little book containing a great deal of useful information. But the Author apparently labours under the too common error of regarding cyclists as a distinct arm of the service. Cyclists are merely a variety of Mounted Infantry, superior to any other so long as they are working on even moderately good roads, but not so when compelled to move across country. Occasions may arise in war where 200 Cyclists would be of greater use than 2000 Infantry; others where an equal number of Infantry, unencumbered with cycles, would be preferable to Cyclists; and others where a dozen M.I., provided with ponies, would better serve the object in view than many times their number of Cyclists. For all classes of Mounted Infantry, the essential qualification is that the men shall be perfectly trained Infantry soldiers, and beyond this there is nothing to learn except how to utilise, to the best advantage, the accelerated means of locomotion actually employed.

The Volunteer Annual, 1904 (Metropolitan Corps), published by Adam and Charles Black, price 1*s.* 6*d.*, is an exceedingly useful book of reference for London Volunteers and Imperial Yeomanry. It contains the year's work, etc., by corps, up to October 31st, 1902, and all needful information as to new regulations, etc., etc. An alphabetical list of the officers is placed at the end, with the usual

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

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

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DISCIPLINE IN THE NAVY.

OFFENCES OF STRIKING SUPERIOR OFFICERS.

BY "WARD-ROOM."

ALTHOUGH the amount of serious crime in the Navy, as revealed by the Court Martial returns for 1902, is not large, yet there is a point which gives rise to serious thought in the large proportion that the offences of striking or attempting to strike superior officers bears to the whole number.

Three hundred and twenty-one men were tried for various offences during the year, and of this number no less than 172 were tried for these grave offences—53·8 per cent. of the whole of the serious crimes detected in the Navy.

This matter would not be so grave were it not that it is feared that this is a growing offence, to some extent encouraged by the comparative leniency of the punishments awarded. I say comparative leniency because, although the sentences at times amount to five years' penal servitude, they often do not exceed a few months' imprisonment with hard labour, with or without dismissal from the Service.

It is perhaps difficult for the civilian mind to grasp the gravity of these crimes, because ashore, although there are class distinctions, there is equality between all men in the sight of the law, and there is not the same necessity for the maintenance of discipline such as exists in an armed force, particularly in the confined limits of a ship. Ashore a man may take the law into his own hands, and the infliction of a small fine or an injunction to keep the peace meets the case. There are, indeed, instances where one gains

rather than loses in self-respect and the esteem of a general public by resenting personal affronts by physical force; the person assaulted always having the option, so far as his strength admits, of retaliating in the same manner, and perhaps punishing his antagonist. But there are offences of assault on shore which meet with general disapproval and reprehension, such as assaults on women or on persons incapable of defending themselves, and these offences the law can deal more severely with than by the infliction of a fine.

The position of a superior officer on board ship is very much that of a person who cannot defend himself, or is incapable of retaliation, for though he may be quite capable, physically, of administering severe punishment to his assailant, his hands are tied by discipline, and therefore it is but a matter of simple justice that the force which ties his hands should defend him and mete out a strong and deterring punishment to the offender.

It will be generally admitted that however reprehensible it may be for an inferior to strike a superior, it would be far worse for a superior to so far forget his position and his duty as to strike an inferior. This gives protection to the inferior, a protection that is so rarely withdrawn and so severely dealt with when it is that it may be left out of consideration.

Every one knows who his superiors are. A superior officer includes all officers, whether commissioned, warrant, or subordinate, and also petty and non-commissioned officers. There is no room for doubt on the subject, and the marks denoting rank are clearly visible to every one. Equally, there is no doubt as to the law on the subject, for the Naval Discipline Act, originally drawn up by sailors for the control of sailors, is a model of what such an Act should be, and enacts by Section 16—

"16. Every person subject to this Act who shall strike, or with any weapon attempt to strike, or draw or lift up any weapon against his superior officer being in the execution of his office, shall be punished with death or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned; and every person subject to this Act who shall, otherwise than with a weapon, attempt to strike or use or attempt to use any violence against his superior officer being in the execution of his office, shall be punished with penal servitude or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned; and every person subject to this Act who shall strike or attempt to strike, or draw or lift up any weapon against, or use or attempt to use any violence against his superior officer not being in the execution of his office, shall be punished with penal servitude or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned."

The section requires a short explanation, clear as it is to those acquainted with the Act.

A distinction is drawn between a person "in the execution of his office" and one who is not in the execution of his office. To translate the phrase into ordinary English, a person when in the execution of his office is "on duty;" and he is always on duty so long as he is on board his ship, even when asleep in his cabin or hammock and not performing any of the functions of his office. It is impossible to be on board and not on duty in the sense of the Act. He is also on duty when sent on any specific service away from the ship, but when absent on leave he is not on duty, although he may still be in uniform.

To entail the death penalty it is necessary that the superior officer should be actually struck either with a weapon, or with the fist or feet, or that an attempt should be made to strike him with a weapon, or there should be evidence of such being the desire or intention of the inferior by his lifting up or drawing a weapon against his superior. The only point of any doubt is as to the definition of a weapon, but that would probably be judged by results. For instance, a feather pillow would probably not be considered a weapon under ordinary circumstances, but if it inflicted injuries to an eye it might reasonably be considered as such, for an offender is responsible for all the results of his offence, though such results may not follow as an ordinary sequel to his act.

No man who stands in danger of the death penalty can be tried summarily. He must go before a Court Martial; but it will be noticed that it is only to the offences mentioned in the first paragraph of the section that the death penalty attaches, and consequently an attempt to strike a superior on duty without a weapon, or the striking or attempting to strike a superior even with a weapon, when not on duty, can be tried summarily and a maximum punishment of ninety days' imprisonment awarded. But generally speaking, all offences of striking are dealt with by a Court Martial, because the offences committed when the superior is not on duty are often premeditated and more subversive of discipline than if they had been committed in the heat of the moment on board.

There is more than one cause for these acts of insubordination, and perhaps the principal one is the daily allowance of spirit. It is not that the ration of grog is excessive, but that it is served out at a time which, in the opinion of many officers, is unsuitable. The men have been hard at work all day since about 5 A.M. and have just had what until recently was the only real meal of the day, their dinner, and on top of that have had their tot of grog. In the hot weather the combination of heavy meal and spirits tends to

drowsiness, and when the hands turn to again after the dinner-hour, there are some of the men who are not in a condition to be roused up roughly by a not too tactful ship's corporal. He, of course, has his duty to do, and does it without thought as to the temperament of the particular individual he is dealing with. A word or two passes, or the man is slack, and is taken on the quarter deck before the officer of the watch, and his temper becomes excited. He may be a very good man, but has not sufficient hold over his temper and hits the corporal, his superior officer, who has reported him.

Perhaps the man's own tot of grog is not responsible for this, but it is often the custom that the cook of the mess shall have more than his share of grog, and this, especially with young men, is a very undesirable practice. Not much harm would be done if the time for serving out grog were altered to a later hour, for then, the work of the day being over, the men would not be so liable to be called on for duty, and consequently would not have the same incentive to commit this and other offences of a similar if not so serious a type.*

Many cases no doubt occur among young men, recently entered, who have not yet imbibed the spirit of discipline, and who forget in the heat of the moment that the conditions and rules of their life have altered since they joined the Navy. And there are others who would be insubordinate under any circumstances.

One thing is certain, and this is that the hasty blow is very frequently repented of, and every one is sorry for the young man of hitherto unblemished character who is forced to appear before a Court Martial which has no option but to award an exemplary punishment in the interests of discipline.

For every poison there is believed to be an antidote if it can be found, and it is a pity that an almost effectual antidote which we possess ready to hand cannot, under existing regulations, be used. The Naval Discipline Act and the Summary Punishment table provide for the award of corporal punishment. The Act limits its award to men below the rank of petty officer except in the case of mutiny, and the maximum number of lashes that can be given is forty-eight by sentence of Court Martial and twenty-five in the case of summary punishment by a commanding officer.

It is, perhaps, not generally known that a pattern "cat" is supplied to all ships, even though the award of corporal punishment is suspended, and has been for many years, by Admiralty orders.

* This seems to be no new idea, as I find in Tucker's 'Life of St. Vincent,' vol. ii. p. 198, the following note: "Sir George (Grey) used also to state that it was an invariable rule with Lord St. Vincent never to inflict punishment after noonday, nor after the ship's company had received their allowance of grog."

The limitation of the number of lashes and the necessity for using a "cat" of uniform pattern has taken away many of the objections to corporal punishment, the greatest of which was the brutality with which it was inflicted in times past, when a sentence of a thousand lashes was not unknown.

Naval literature seems to be singularly reticent on this subject, and it is not often that a description of the punishment is found. A writer in *Macmillan's Magazine* for November, 1902, gives an interesting extract from a little-known book called 'The Life of a Lower Deck Sailor,' written, I believe, in the early years of the last century:—

"In the harbour of St. John's one of the crew of the *Surprise* was whipped through the fleet for theft, and the poor wretch, to drown his sufferings, had drunk a whole bottle of rum a little before the punishment. After he had been flogged alongside of two ships, the captain noticed that he was drunk, and gave the order to stop the punishment until he became sober. He was rowed back to the *Surprise*, his back swelled like a pillow, black and blue; some sheets of thick blue paper in vinegar were laid on. Before this he had appeared insensible, now his shrieks rent the air. When better he was sent to the ship abreast of which his punishment had been stopped, and it was there renewed and so finished."

In 'Snarley-yow' the thief's cat is particularly described as having three knots in each tail, and was probably a more cruel instrument than the one used for the punishment of ordinary breaches of discipline.

In the "Historical Notes," published in the *Gibraltar Directory*, some instances are given of floggings in the Army:—

"Margaret Doe, by sentence of General Court Martial, for making a disturbance in her quarters and cutting the throat of Alexander Stewart, three hundred lashes by the drummers, one hundred every other day at Landport, the Parade, and Waterport, and afterwards, with a rope round her neck, to be drummed out of the Garrison."

"A bombardier, by sentence of Court Martial, reduced to serve as a Mattross and to receive three hundred lashes with a cat with nine tails for playing the quack and giving opium pills to a soldier contrary to orders."

"Private Thomas . . . to receive a thousand lashes with a cat of nine tails, the last fifty of which are to be given by the hands of the common hangman between Southport and Waterport; he is afterwards to be drummed out of the Garrison with a halter about his neck."

It is easy to understand the popular outcry against such punishments as these, but it is not so easy to understand why, after the punishment had been so immensely reduced to the limits now imposed by the Naval Discipline Act, there should have been any objection to corporal punishment. We know some of the arguments used. It was said to brutalise both those who received and those who inflicted such a punishment. It was supposed to be merciful to the man to take this power of repression from the hands of authority. Unfortunately, these arguments fail in practice. It cannot brutalise the man who is already so brutalised as to make a cowardly attack on a practically defenceless man who is but doing his duty; it may be bad for the man who has to actually inflict the punishment, but it is going rather far to say that it brutalises him; and when we come to the question of mercy, which is the more merciful, to give a man one, two, three, or even four dozen lashes, and then to have done with the matter, or to give him several months' imprisonment with hard labour, and then to throw him on the world branded as a criminal, and probably with no means of earning his living?

Many of the offences of striking could be very well dealt with by the "cat," and the services of the offender retained; and at the same time the fear of physical pain would have an excellent deterrent effect, especially on cowardly natures, and on those youngsters who commit this offence purposely with the hope of effecting their discharge from the Navy, a boon which may be granted to a man of excellent character on payment of a considerable sum of money.

It is certainly a pity that the brutality of the past should be a bar to the merciful administration of corporal punishment in the present.

TWO IMPERIAL PROBLEMS.

By Lieutenant Lionel H. Hordern, R.N.

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and armies will lead to this, and that as the "national character" becomes accentuated there would arise a desire for further "responsibility," until separation became a fact, is one of the arguments I have urged in favour of adopting the alternative course. This alternative course is that we should all consider ourselves as one nation, and have one Navy and one Army, so that we may develop a common national character and a sense of common responsibility. And yet M. de Thierry says that it is I who consider "we" and "they" as separate breeds! Though I am in favour of the one course, which, on his own showing, is the only one which will bind us into one nation, and he is in favour of the only policy which will ensure our growing into separate nations! I argued that the tendency in the Colonies seemed to be towards separate armies and navies of their own. M. de Thierry states that this is their desire. I suggested that this was done in case they might one day wish to become independent nations. M. de Thierry denies that they want independence, but agrees that they want, and in his opinion rightly want, to become nations. It seems to me that, notwithstanding his denial, his arguments go to prove I am right.

What seems to me, judging from their actions, to be a tendency, M. de Thierry and Mr. Norwood Young, who claim a far more intimate knowledge of Colonial views, say is a fact, namely, the desire for separate nationality and separate defensive forces. (If I refer to naval rather than to military forces, as M. de Thierry complains, it is because the latter cannot be much use without the Navy, and because the South African war has focussed Colonial attention on military to the neglect of naval preparations.) But if their statements are right, why do not the Colonies make a start in this direction? True, Canada is said to be building some revenue cruisers, and Australia started a naval force with some vessels we gave her, and bought another, but this was many years back, and they haven't made much progress, while the fleets of the world have increased enormously in the mean time. America, Germany, and Japan—two of them, at least, nearer to the Colonies than to the United Kingdom—have in the mean time created large modern navies, while Germany has openly stated she means to challenge us at sea, so that there is far more need now for an increase of naval strength in the British Empire than ever before. It cannot be because the Colonies cannot afford it, for Canada officially advertises her "light taxes" amongst her many other advantages; one of the Australian Agents-General says, that the people in his State hardly know the meaning of the word taxation; and another, that his State debt has been only incurred for such objects as any commercial undertaking would go in for. All, I think, pay their

members of Parliament, some have old-age pensions, and the total cost of these luxuries must be considerably over a million a year, or say three times what they pay for their naval defence. It cannot be because they do not see the necessity of doing anything so long as we will do it for them, because this would imply that they do not desire to possess any "national characteristics" at all.

It seems to me—I speak with all deference to the superior knowledge of M. de Thierry—that it is, at all events, possible there are two political parties in each of the Colonies, one holding the views I have advocated, one fleet, one flag, the other holding the views of Mr. Norwood Young, M. de Thierry, and Mr. Matheson, *i.e.* strongly "national" as opposed to racial, and that these two parties each fear to take active steps to carry out their views, either because the electorate are insufficiently informed, and, therefore, uninterested in the question, or because each fears to lose votes by being the first to advocate the increased expenditure which either course would involve. If I am right in this, it seems to me the United Kingdom, in the interests of the Empire, should take steps to bring the question to the front. The British race are enthusiastically loyal, but they want organisation and a lead. They look to their parliaments, but in vain, for the "national" aspirations of M. de Thierry and his friends block the way to Imperial Union, and debates on the colour of the parish pump are of more immediate interest to the majority of politicians.

We were abused, and rightly abused, by the Colonies, for our inadequate preparations before the late war; we were accused, and rightly accused, of having "muddled through," and having spent far more both in life and money than would have been the case had we been properly organised beforehand. The Colonies promptly, and with the most splendid Imperial feeling, responded to the call on that occasion. The larger feeling of race patriotism swept away the local patriotism advocated by M. de Thierry, and well was it for the Empire it was so. But, after all, it is a very different thing to spring to the call in time of stress, and to make the deliberate and costly preparations which are required in time of peace if the enthusiasm which war calls forth is to be effective. We now see the results of leaving preparation too late. The South African war has made us think. It cost us some two hundred millions, and added enormously to our taxation, while it seems to have had no financial effect on the Colonies. We now pay some thirty shillings per head for our Army and Navy, which have to defend the Colonies as well as ourselves, and some ten shillings more per head is raised by taxation to pay the charges on a debt incurred for past wars, so that the cost of defence is to

us a very real burden. We ask the Colonies, who realised our fault before we did, to join in making preparations for the future, now in time of peace; but they make little or no sign of any intention of doing so. If they fail now the result will be inevitable when next a war occurs, and it will be unreasonable of them to expect then that the whole of the loss shall fall on us. The present Russo-Japanese war has shown how quickly a fleet may be disabled, and how impossible it is to replace that fleet in time. Surely this should be a sufficient object-lesson to the Colonies that expense and preparation are absolutely necessary in time of peace, so far, at all events, as a navy is concerned. It should prove that they cannot improvise navies after war is declared.

The whole scheme of Colonial defence is founded on the assumption that the British fleet shall prevent any attack in force on the Colonies, and that, therefore, they need only make preparation locally to repel small forces of the enemy. This scheme was just and right while the self-governing Colonies were poor and struggling communities, but now that they are rich and powerful States, with revenues, trade, and population about one-third of that of the United Kingdom, we suggest they should take their share in the Navy, which is really their main defence. And, according to M. de Thierry, they say no, we want our own little squadron, all we have to do is to look after our own local defence, and we expect you, for your own interests, to do the rest. Some of those of M. de Thierry's way of thinking even go further, for they say that we ought to give the Colonies the necessary ships, and I am not sure they don't want us to pay the crews also—of course at the local rate of wages.

If we are to hold together, the scheme of defence must be one for the Empire as a whole. The ships, forts, and men to man them, the striking army, the coaling-stations, docks and repairing yards, have all to be fitted into one plan. If each part of the Empire is to provide only for its own local defence, the whole must fail. No Colony could hold its own if the rest of the Empire were to look on and do nothing, and it could do nothing unless the highways of the sea are kept open. "But," say those individuals who think with M. de Thierry, "the United Kingdom must keep open the sea for her own purpose, so the Colonies needn't bother about it. She must protect her trade or starve. She couldn't reduce her fleet by a single ship, even if the Colonies didn't exist, and, therefore, they cannot fairly be expected to pay for that." This argument, as I showed before, though Mr. Norwood Young has misunderstood, is capable of being used the other way also. If we did not exist, the Colonies would have to maintain armies

and navies of their own, and the cost of these would be enormously greater than the small sums they have hitherto paid for defence. The point is, that if the Colonies had not our fleet to fall back upon, or rather to bear the main brunt of attack, they must have large fleets of their own. Therefore the present arrangement, by which one fleet and army does duty for the whole Empire, is an economical one; but the whole of the economy goes to the Colonies. Would they think this a fair arrangement if our positions were reversed?

I have argued, as Mr. Norwood Young does, that the adoption of the fiscal policy favoured by the Colonies, and proposed by Mr. Chamberlain, must involve greater risk in time of war, and, therefore, that they should show some sign that they are prepared to take their share in the extra cost involved in adopting it. Mr. Young implies that they would do this if we would let them do it in their own way, but I think it would be more effective if the Colonies said so themselves, and I cannot see why we should be expected to help them to adopt a course which we do not believe in, when they are perfectly able to do it by themselves if they wish.

If there are to be separate navies there must be some agreement as to their use, something corresponding to a treaty of alliance. Such a treaty implies two parties, each with its own interests to look out for. Neither we nor any of the Colonies would agree that its fleet should be at the disposal of any one of us who chose to go to war. We could not have as many foreign ministries as fleets, there can be only one foreign ministry if we are to be an Empire, and either the various fleets must be attached to it, so that it may negotiate effectively—in which case they had much better be one fleet—or they must be used as and when the various States independently decide. In the latter case, as there could be no certainty of any particular fleet being available when wanted by the rest of the Empire, it would be necessary for us all to provide an extra number to make up the deficiency. If there were different fleets there would be different types of ships built by each State to suit its own local wants, there would be no homogeneity, and the value of the whole would, therefore, be lessened; there would be different systems of training, different ideals, and probably different rules by each State as to where its ships should serve. Besides, no nation would make an alliance without some guarantee that the ally would maintain an efficient fleet of a definite strength. Our alliance with Japan is an example—we do not join her unless she has to fight two Powers; hence her fleet must be able to cope with one, and her foreign policy does not necessarily drag us into war. Notwithstanding this alliance, we keep a large fleet in the China Seas, and

so does she, and the total of the two fleets is much larger than would be necessary if Japan was part of the Empire, with one fleet between us. The closer the connection between two countries, the greater the saving.

An alliance can hardly be perpetual; different national ideals must exist, and difficulties which are not really of vital importance often seem to be so in peace time. Even an alliance so close that one sovereign presides over both countries is an unstable arrangement so long as the feeling of separate nationality is fostered by separate parliaments. We tried it in the United Kingdom with Scotland and Ireland; Canada and Australia have both tried it; Norway and Sweden, Austria and Hungary, may be cited as existing examples. In the stress of war these details are forgotten, and the two nations become one; but the longer the peace, the more the rifts become accentuated. War is a heavy price to pay for unity. To be really binding, then, the connection between two countries must be so close as to stand the strain of peace—the laying down of a foreign policy, and the costly defensive preparations needed to ensure it, are probably the most important of these.

I think there is a good deal to be said against what M. de Thierry calls the "payment of ship-money." If it is looked upon in the Colonies as a hiring of the United Kingdom to defend them, it must be bad for both; but I think we, at all events, look upon it as a slight recognition of what they owe to the Navy. We would, of course, far rather that they joined us in maintaining and directing a common navy. We have offered to share with them the finest Navy in the world. M. de Thierry says they do not want this, they want brand-new little navies of their own instead. But whatever they really do want, they have neither accepted our offer nor made a start on their fleets. Instead, they have preferred to pay, in some cases, a small subscription, and in others nothing at all; but I have never heard that they look on this as the equivalent of the protection they receive, or that they consider it a forced payment, as was ship-money in the old days.

The main evil is, however, that it still leaves one-fourth of the white population of the Empire disfranchised in external affairs. Would M. de Thierry think it a good bargain to be disfranchised if he could save his pocket? Would he consider any one worthy of belonging to the British race who held such a view? Not in such a spirit has the race progressed until it has overflowed to lands in all parts of the world. It is not the people, it is those of their leaders who think with M. de Thierry who are responsible for this. How can such men claim to talk of the Empire, when it is with them merely a collection of separate States.

II.—Council or Parliament.

May I point out that I referred to representation in a reformed Imperial Parliament, and not in the present House of Commons, in which the local affairs of the United Kingdom take up far too much of the time, and overshadow the interests of subjects such as a body representing the Empire should mainly have to deal with, and of which, probably, the most important are Foreign Policy and Defence.

It is easy to say this body should be a council. It is comparatively easy to form one, but it is far more difficult to say what should be its powers and duties. I believe it is past the wit of man to give any body which can properly be called a council any power to carry out its decisions in a democratic community—and what will its advice be worth? It would almost seem that the very indefiniteness associated with the name is the reason why one hears its formation advocated as settling the question of the unity of the Empire, and I suppose it assumes as many forms in men's minds as it has advocates. The first question I would ask M. de Thierry, therefore, is what kind of council he advocates—or, rather, do the Colonies want?

There are certain objections which apply to any kind of council. Presumably it would be a comparatively small body—a Committee of the Privy Council seems to be the favourite form—but how are the various States to be represented? Whom would the Colonies trust in matters involving peace and war, such as Foreign Policy and Defence? Would their Prime Ministers come over frequently to discuss these matters? Would they trust any one appointed to represent them if he lived over here, such as an Agent-General, for instance? Of course there are other questions than these important ones; but if these are left out, it would hardly seem to be worth while to form a council at all. Then, again, the decisions could hardly fail in every case to be those of the Government of the United Kingdom, and the only debates would really be for and against that policy. Even if some sided with us at one time and some at another, the result would seem likely to be merely to bring the United Kingdom into a sort of general antagonism to the Colonies, though it might perhaps bring the latter closer together. Even if we all agreed on some special question, there could be no certainty of the policy being carried out, for it might be the very cause of turning out our Government, and so bringing in another opposed to the Colonial wishes. A council would thus almost of necessity be subordinate to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It does not seem as if the Colonies would be any better off than they are now,

for at present they have a very strong unofficial voice. Then, again, a council would not conduct its business in public, its debates would not be reported, and consequently there would be no educational value, no public interest roused, and no public opinion to carry things through; this could only arise afterwards, when its proceedings were debated in the various parliaments, where purely local considerations might easily outweigh the conclusions reached. No minister, therefore, would dare to bring forward or support a matter unless he felt sure of being able to carry it through his Parliament, and the result would be a kind of stagnation.

If we go a little further, councils may be divided into two classes; they may be advisory merely, or they may be executive. As an advisory council is that favoured by those who are the strongest advocates of this system of a central body, we will consider it first. Taking again the two main questions, Foreign Policy and Defence, how is the council to work? These two questions are so bound up together that I do not see how it is possible for them to be dealt with except by the same body. Suppose the council all agree on a Foreign Policy, and that with the best will in the world they apportion the corresponding cost of defence to meet it between the various States, how can they ensure that each State will accept the share allotted, or that, if they do, they will carry it out as the council desire? And supposing that even one State declines to agree, who is to make good the deficiency? Of course, if there should be a difference of opinion, which is much more probable, as to what each State ought to do, it would be a foregone conclusion that the decision would not be carried out. And if the council cannot ensure the necessary preparation to carry out its Foreign Policy, how can it have a Foreign Policy at all? In a council of this kind the representatives must be responsible to their respective Parliaments, and even questions of Foreign Policy would, in consequence, have to be debated in each of these Parliaments. What chance is there of agreement? A policy advocated by Canada might be opposed by Australia, and *vice versâ*. Our weight would be preponderant in either case, and, though we might gain the goodwill of whichever we supported, it could only be for a time. The nation with whom we were negotiating would see at once where the weakness lay, and instead of avoiding a war, we should probably precipitate it, although all the time one or more States would disapprove. It is all very well to argue that such a council would make for peace, but it would almost inevitably be peace at any price, for the enemy would assuredly count on our disagreement, and would say plainly he meant to gain his point or fight. Let us take the latest examples. The alliance with Japan was

necessary to our Eastern interests, and as important to Canada, New Zealand, and Australia as to ourselves. But suppose the question to have been debated in the various Parliaments, how many of them would have voted in favour of so novel a departure as an alliance with a non-white Power? And yet if this had not been effected, it must, ultimately, if not immediately, have required a large increase in the Navy. Would the Colonial Parliaments have been prepared to vote an increase, or would they have left it to us to do this who did approve the alliance? Take the Alaska Boundary question, and admit that the other States agreed with us and not with Canada, that it was wise to get this constant source of friction out of the way. We may agree that our hands would have been strengthened, but it would not have facilitated the settlement, for it would have shifted the soreness of Canadian feeling from us to the Empire at large, which would have been far more serious. Or if this question had really come to one of peace or war, though Canada and the United Kingdom might have both been prepared to make enormous sacrifices, would Australia or New Zealand or South Africa have been equally prepared? If, again, the New Hebrides question became acute, would Canada or South Africa be willing to vote the necessary credits?

If, on the other hand, the council is to be executive, that is, to have power to carry out its decisions and the responsibility which should attach to them, we are met with the difficulty that it would be as difficult to form as an Imperial Parliament. For, in the first place, we must come to some agreement as to what is the fair proportionate share which each State should bear, both now and in the future, and, in the second, we must invest the council with the power to carry out its decisions without any popular opinion behind it. To arrive at a fair proportionate share on any basis such as population, trade, or shipping seems to me impossible. The only fair basis is that of ability to bear the necessary taxation. This might be got over by giving the council the power to fix the rate for certain taxes—say income tax and excise—and to say how the sums thus raised should be expended. But this practically gives the council the power of taxation, and the council represents only one party—the Government—in each State. There would be no wholesome discussion, no chance of the minority making its voice heard, and I do not believe that any of the States would be inclined to give such exceptional powers to a council.

However, as M. de Thierry assures us the Colonies want a council, let us see how far they have got. "If you want our aid

call us to your councils," is the strongest expression I can call to mind, and this was promptly met by Mr. Chamberlain's "We do want your aid. If you are prepared to bear any proportionate share in our burdens, we will gladly consider any proposal you may make." This answer, however, does not seem to have been what was required, for we have heard no more of the matter, and, instead, have been told that separate treaty-making powers are desired—as a further step, I suppose, towards M. de Thierry's "national" ideals.

This really is the crux of the whole question—so long as local or State nationality overshadows Imperial or race nationality, so long is any scheme of unity impossible. We, in the United Kingdom, for instance, though we are proud to be English or Scotch, Welsh or Irish, put loyalty to the Flag first. We have one Parliament controlling one Army and one Navy. We do not apportion the cost to each nationality, but we join in a common system of taxation to provide them, and we have a common system of representation to share the responsibility for our actions. Responsibility in democratic communities is very largely founded on taxation —on the pockets of the individual. Taxation without representation in such communities is always resented, and is now impossible. Representation means the election of two parties with different views, who debate and decide by a majority, and who do this publicly in the face of all men. How can a council carry out these ideals? It seems to me that true unity can only be assured by an Imperial Parliament—a body elected by the race and representing both the majority and the minority. Parties in such a parliament would not be formed according to the locality of the representative, but according to one of the two ideals of government which all of us have. Each State would be divided on these lines, and the representatives, whether in the minority or majority, would find other representatives from each of the States by their side. There would be community, not division of interests, and separate nationality would be sunk in the larger patriotism of the Empire.

I am quite ready to admit that the attainment of this ideal must take some time; but I think we should keep it before us, and should not take any step which will lead us away from it. To my mind, an Imperial Council would not only fail to fulfil what is expected, but would postpone this ideal, if it did not do worse, for it would keep alive all the existing local jealousies.

In place of a council, I think it would be far better to develop the existing Colonial Conferences, which it has now been arranged to hold every four years. These might be called, what they really

are, Imperial Conferences, and be attended by our own Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Secretary of State for India, and meet more frequently, say every two years. If the members will not consent to their speeches being published, we must, I suppose, go on making it a secret meeting, but more publicity would be a great educational advantage. Then I would suggest that at the same time there should be a meeting of members of Parliament of all the States, both Government and Opposition, the more the better, who should discuss Imperial questions in public, so that the debates might be published and the people interested. The effect of such public discussion would be to clear away many of the suspicions and misapprehensions which now exist, and to teach us all to understand one another better. Public interest would be aroused and public opinion formed, not on "national" but on Imperial lines, and a beginning might thus be made which might lead to a real unity and a true Imperial Parliament. In such a conference there would be no division on "national" lines, for each State would have both parties represented, and, speaking generally, these two parties disagree on most things. We should instead get two Imperial parties with opposite views, but the nationality would be that of the race and not local.

It would be far easier to carry out such a scheme than to create a council, for it would be merely the development of an existing piece of machinery, and I believe it would be far more effective in uniting the Empire. A desire for a true Imperial Parliament would grow up, a desire which a council without powers of taxation could never create, and until the various States are prepared to "take up the white man's burden" the responsibility for external affairs would remain with the United Kingdom—as it should do so long as she has to pay the piper.

LIONEL H. HORDERN.

POLICY GOES BEYOND STRENGTH.

By L. G. Carr Laughton.

Richard Gibson, erstwhile purser in the Navy, illustrates the above-quoted old proverb by a yarn about the *Bryer*, a small man-of-war belonging to the Commonwealth of England. Inasmuch as Prince Louis of Battenberg, now Director of Naval Intelligence, makes no mention of this ship in his list of "names formerly borne by British men-of-war," the *Bryer* may be said to lack formal introduction. Built as a private ship, she was one of the many small craft employed by the Royalists after the death of the king, and, like many of her fellows, fell into the hands of the Commonwealth. There is no record of her capture, but from her name it seems practically certain that she was one of the ships taken in the neighbourhood of the Scilly Islands at the time when Blake was besieging Rupert in Kingsale. At any rate, she was taken from the Royalists in the year 1649, and was brought into the Navy. She was rated as a fifth-rate, and was assigned a maximum establishment, for "war at home," of 100 men and 22 guns. For "war abroad" she was supposed to carry 18 guns and 80 men: and on a peace establishment her crew numbered 65. Her length by the keel was 70 feet, her beam 26 feet, and her draught of water 11 feet. Her tonnage is variously stated as 180 and 250 tons burden. At a time when the "great ships" retired into port before the autumn equinox, there was plenty of employment in the winter months for the smaller fry of the Navy; and doubtless the *Bryer* had her share of duty on the winter guard. Her only exciting service, however, seems to have been in 1658, the episode referred to by Gibson, and later on, in 1665, when she was one of the ships engaged under Sir Thomas Teddeman in the attack on Bergen and the Dutch East India ships which lay there. On the latter occasion the fighting was very hot, and the *Bryer* lost her captain. In 1666 she was disrated and made into a fire-ship, with 12 guns and 40 men. She survived the four days' battle and the St. James's Fight, possibly because she was not with the fleet, and in the following year, the record year of naval neglect, she passed from the Navy List with the entry, "given to Mr. Golding." It does not appear that the name has ever been revived.

So much for the ship herself. Gibson relates how in the Spanish war, "before the year 1658," Captain Parker commanded this ship in the Channel. He had on board only "about 65 souls, of which 15 boys," so that the little ship must have been very seriously undermanned. The 22 small guns appear to have been sakers, minions, and fowlers, *i.e.* 6-, 4-, and 2-pounders, and the height between decks was about 5 feet. After being five months off the ground the ship was very foul and went to Plymouth to clean and refit. But there was then no dockyard at Plymouth, and the resources of the port were limited, so the commissioner there ordered the *Bryer* to sea again for fourteen days till he should be ready for her. When Parker had got 12 leagues south of the Eddystone, the wind being easterly, a sail was seen from the top-masthead east of him standing out of the Channel. The *Bryer* stood the same way as the stranger, W.S.W., into the sea. In two hours the sail came up so much, though both ships were under the same sail, that they could see her hull from the deck; and in another hour they could see her making preparations to board. On this Parker ordered the six lowest ratlines of the shrouds to be cut away, and the shrouds below the other ratlines, as well as all ropes hanging over the ship's side, to be tallowed. This was then the established method of keeping a boarding-party from sending men aloft to cut down the yards. The device was effective, but not novel, and is related of various commanders, including the great De Ruyter, who when in a merchant ship once beat off a Dunkirker by the help of a few tubs of butter. Parker's next move was decidedly original. He ordered half a dozen baskets of minion, falcon, and saker shot to be brought up on the quarter-deck. Next he ordered a select quartermaster to the helm, and told his company that as long as he was able he would conn the ship himself. He then ran out his maindeck guns, and directed that not one of them should be fired until he rang the ship's great bell, placed on the fore part of the quarter-deck (this signal was another commonplace of the time), and that after the lower tier was fired every man between decks should forthwith hasten upon the upper deck, leaving only one man to every gun on the side engaged to make fast the gun and close the port so that the enemy could not get aboard that way. Before this was done the enemy spread his colours, the Ragged Staff, that is, the flag of the Spanish Netherlands. So after hailing each other the ships began firing, the *Bryer*, however, not using her maindeck guns as yet. The enemy ranged up on the port hand and tried to luff across the *Bryer's* bows: but Parker luffed too and blanketed her, and the ships fell gently aboard of each other. Then the *Bryer* gave all she could, from

below with round and bar shot, from the upper-deck guns with round and bags of scrap-iron, and with muskets, half-pikes, brown bills and pole-axes repulsed the enemy from entering her in the waist. It was only in the waist that she was particularly vulnerable, for her opponent, the *Fox* of Ostend, was a flush-decked ship, and therefore could not reach her forecastle or quarter-deck. But the *Bryer* profited in another way from that high-charged quarter-deck, for from it her men were busy flinging the small round shot out of their hands "so fast that no one Fleming could abide to stay upon the *Bryer's* main chains, or their own chains, gunwale, or their decks, but to avoid that storm of gunshot jumped down into their ship's hold. Upon which the *Bryer's* men entered the *Fox*, took her, and brought her into Plymouth."

The prize was 14 feet longer and 4 feet broader than her captor, sailed 2 feet to her 1, mounted 18 heavy saker guns, and had a crew of 150 men. She was, in fact, one of the celebrated Ostend-built corsairs, from which the *Constant Warwick*, and a few other ships in our service were copied. Such ships were the parents of the frigates of the Seven Years' War. They were fast, owing to their length, and they were weatherly, owing to their absence of superstructure. But they were for that very reason less suitable for boarding tactics than high-charged ships, as Parker was at pains to prove.

Parker's action affords one of the earliest instances of a just appreciation of the value of rapidity of fire, and—ludicrous as such primitive methods may seem to-day—his happy inspiration had its reward.

"This stratagem," concludes Gibson, "of flinging of round shot from off the *Bryer*, a two-deck ship's quarter-deck, into the *Fox* that had but one deck, with early taking away all occasion of easy getting into the *Bryer*, who having all hands upon the upper deck in time, prevented the *Fox's* taking the *Bryer*. And made good the proverb, the policy (ofttimes) goes beyond strength."

L. G. CARR LAUGHTON.

NOTICE.

THE Editor regrets that the MS. of the article promised by Mr. Carr Laughton in his review of INTERNATIONAL LAW, published last month, was not received until too late for the current issue, and is consequently held over until June. The article is entitled, "Belligerents and Neutrals."

IMPERIAL DEFENCE IN ITS RELATION TO FISCAL POLICY.*

By General Sir Richard Harrison, G.C.B.

Fiscal Policy is one of the burning questions of the day, and, when under discussion, it is apt to be all absorbing.

Yet there are other subjects of exceeding interest to the taxpayers of this country, and among these, one has been brought into great prominence by the Report of the Royal Commission on the late war in South Africa.

This subject may be described as follows:—What should we spend on our Navy and our Army, and what organisation would give us the best value for our money; in other words, what should be the scheme of defence for the British Empire.

It will be remembered that, on his return from South Africa in the spring of 1903, Mr. Chamberlain stated that in the interest of the Empire it was necessary to make a careful inquiry into the present working of our fiscal system, and that he advocated such changes being made as would enable preferential tariffs to be established with our Colonies, and would give us power to retaliate should foreign Governments ever become fiscally hostile to us.

This statement of opinion was the cause of great excitement throughout the country, and has led to the breaking up to a certain extent of the Ministry of which he was a member.

In order to give that Ministry a free hand to deal with the question, he resigned his post in the Government, and we have had the somewhat strange experience of a late Colonial Secretary explaining to thousands of eager listeners the details of a scheme which he has prepared; which, he believes, will not only consolidate the Empire, but bring additional employment and prosperity to every part.

However, it is not my purpose to deal now with this fiscal question, I only allude to it, as far as seems necessary, in its relation to our immediate subject—Imperial Defence.

Not long ago I found on a bookstall a new edition of a book which I had read as a child, in which a very good description is given of a system of local defence. The book is called 'The

* Given in substance as a Lecture to Volunteers at Bristol in December, 1903.

Adventures of Robinson Crusoe," and it relates that when that somewhat remarkable man found himself stranded on a desert island, his first care was to defend himself against attacks from possible enemies; and so he built works of fortification, and armed them with the best weapons that he could procure. His next care was to provide food for his garrison, without which all his other arrangements would have been of no avail.

The book describes what trouble and anxiety was caused by this question of food supplies; how Crusoe husbanded the few grains of corn that he recovered from the wreck of his ship; how carefully he planted them; how he watched them as they grew, and protected them from the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air; and how, when at last they bore fruit an hundredfold, he gathered the harvest into his habitation; ground the grain and made the bread that kept him alive until he was rescued.

The story is well told, and might serve as a lesson to many a worker in this country of ours.

But I wish to apply the lesson generally, not to individuals; and so I say that as Robinson Crusoe acted on his desert island, so the British nation, wishing to hold its own among the Powers of the world, must not only establish such armed forces as are necessary to keep off all intruders, but must so arrange that sufficient food and clothing and other necessaries shall be supplied to all parts of its territory, and that the arts of peace shall continue even when the Empire is threatened by war.

What does this mean?

Surely a carefully prepared scheme—an Imperial scheme of defence—which shall give to Navy and Army their proper places, and their due proportion in the general system; which shall, for economical reasons, supply no more than is required; and at the same time shall, for reasons of security, ensure that the whole machinery of defence is amply sufficient for the purpose for which it is intended.

What such a scheme might consist of I will now attempt to show.

Statements have frequently been made regarding what is required to efficiently guard the British Empire from foreign aggression: notably in the Army book which was published in 1893.

Speaking generally, it is as follows:—

1st. An Imperial Navy, which, by a more or less complete command of the sea, guards against serious attacks from over the water and protects commerce.

2nd. Garrisons and fortifications, etc., for naval bases and coaling stations.

3rd. Local defence forces.

4th. Imperial forces to act in conjunction with the Navy in bringing a war to a successful termination.

A few words seem necessary in regard to each of these heads.

No one, I suppose, will deny that the first and most important item for consideration in a scheme of defence for a scattered Empire such as ours should be the Navy.

By it alone the water-ways of commerce, which are so essential to the welfare of all parts of the Empire, can be protected in time of war. By it alone can any security be given to the due arrival of food and other necessaries for the workers in the crowded cities of the British Isles. This leads us to a further consideration of the question that I have already dealt with to a certain extent in my allusion to the story of Robinson Crusoe, viz. the supply of corn.

Now, this question is not only vital to every scheme of defence, but it is also the crux of the fiscal problem. Where does our corn come from? Can we ensure its safe delivery in time of war? Can we in any way improve the supply?

Every one knows that in these islands of ours, and especially in England, we grow a very small proportion of the grain that is required to feed man and beast; and that by far the larger proportion comes from the outlying parts of the Empire and from foreign countries.

In a Return just published by the Board of Trade for 1902, we find that the principal present exporters of *wheat*, whether in grain or in flour, are Russia, the United States, Argentina, Canada, India, and Australia, and of these by far the largest are the United States, from which we import no less than fifty-nine million hundredweights per annum, followed by Canada with eleven and a half million, and then by India with nearly nine million.

When we take into account barley, oats, maize, and other grains in addition to wheat, the United States still remain at the head with sixty-five million hundredweights; but Russia mounts up to second place with thirty-two million, Roumania follows with twenty-six million, and then Argentina with nearly eighteen. Other countries mentioned in the Return are Denmark, Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Egypt, Chile, New Zealand, etc., and there are others which bring us various kinds of meat and sugar.

Many valuable lessons regarding supplies can be gathered from these tables. But, for our immediate purpose, it is enough to note that the British Isles are dependent for a large proportion of their food on North and South America, nearly all the nations of Europe, on Morocco and Egypt in Africa, on India in Asia, and on Australia and New Zealand, and that our Navy has to protect the water-ways leading from our ports to all the ports in those countries from which the goods mentioned are shipped.

Whether or not we can ensure the safety of our supplies in time of war must depend on circumstances. If several of our chief markets were closed to us, there seems little doubt that, whatever the strength of our Fleets, the supply must decrease, and the price would go up. Possibly we might get an increased supply from our Colonies, or from such countries as were taking our part. But in any circumstances the danger is a great one; and it is distinctly the business of statesmen to foresee it, and take all possible precautions in time of peace to avert it.

From a defence point of view, the first point to consider seems to be which lines of supply can be most easily protected by our Fleets, and the more numerous the sources from which grain can be discharged into these lines the better.

The choice of these lines is purely a Naval question. But the diversion of supplies from one line to another seems a matter for policy, fiscal or otherwise. Thus Mr. Chamberlain's scheme aims at transferring the bulk of our supply of grain from foreign countries to our Colonies.

The next question is how can we best store up a reserve of grain in such parts of the Empire as are not self-supporting.

This means something more than storing so many bushels in granaries. A special Royal Commission is, I believe, dealing with this important question, so I will say no more about it now.

Let us turn again to the fleet, and see what would be its duties in time of war.

They would, I presume, be somewhat as follows—

(*a*) To guard all important lines of commerce from attack by an enemy's cruisers.

(*b*) To attack an enemy's fleets, and endeavour to drive them into their harbours.

(*c*) To attack, in conjunction with military forces, the harbours on which an enemy's fleet is based.

(*d*) And to support the military forces in any action on an enemy's coast.

A consideration of these duties, together with the duties required in time of peace, should determine its strength in commission and in reserve.

The popular idea of strength is to have a number of battleships and cruisers equal to those possessed by any two other Naval Powers. But such a calculation is apt to be misleading. It does not go far enough. No doubt we should obtain, by means of our Intelligence Departments, the best possible information regarding the Navies of other nations, and consider what are the probable combinations, for and against us, under various circumstances.

This done, we should also study the lessons taught by history, and then estimate carefully what squadrons would enable us to hold our own in every sea in which we have interests to guard. Should the result of this process show a sufficiency of Naval strength on our side, we might rest satisfied with keeping it up. But should it show an insufficiency of strength, it is clearly the business of the Government of the country to increase it.

Again, a scheme of defence should not only state generally what should be the strength of the Navy that we require, but it should also say how the men are to be obtained, and with what weapons our ships and sailors should be armed. For in these matters there may be competition with Army Services.

At present the systems of recruiting for the Navy and the Army are altogether different. The Naval system is to take boys between the ages of 15 and 18, train them in harbour ships, and then engage them for 12 years as seamen, with the option of extending their service for another 10, and then receiving a pension. For the Army, with few exceptions, recruits are taken from the young men of the country between the ages of 18 and 25, and engaged for service at home for 3 years with the colours, and 9 years in reserve. Then extra pay is offered to as many as are required for Indian and Colonial service, to induce them to extend their term to 8 years; that is to say, for 5 years in addition to the 3 at home.

In regard to recruiting; now that so many more men are required than was formerly the case, for the Navy as well as for the Army, and also that there is a wish to extend to the Navy some system of "Reserves," a careful inquiry into the whole business seems advisable.

In regard to stores a similar inquiry would, I think, be useful.

Let me sum up what, I think, an Imperial scheme of defence should do as regards our Navy.

It should not only satisfy itself that the number of ships of all sorts that we possess are sufficient for our Imperial needs, and that all the arrangements for mobilising our fleets are satisfactory, and that the systems of enlistment and of obtaining stores are as good as they can be; but it should also lay down a peace distribution of the fleets in commission, and have secret schemes prepared for such changes as might be necessary to meet all probable eventualities in case of war. This having been all settled, the administrative business of the Navy and its training should remain in the hands of the Admiralty.

It has been argued that, as Naval bases and coaling stations are required solely for the support and sustenance of the Navy,

they should be under Naval management. But there are reasons against this. As far as I know, the Navy don't wish it. And, if the whole business of defence is regarded from one standpoint, all parts of the chain being kept equally bright and strong, it would probably be better in every way to leave the arrangement alone, viz. the Army being held responsible for the passive defence of localities, and the Navy for the active defence, being prepared to strike a blow at short notice in any required direction.

The principal Naval bases and coaling stations are as follows:—

The Thames, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Cork, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Bombay, Trincomali, Singapore, Hong-Kong, the chief harbours in Australia and in New Zealand, Mauritius, the Cape, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Bermuda, Halifax, and Esquimalt.

Each of these has a scheme of defence of its own, founded on the Imperial conditions that have been assumed so far. And in each scheme there is a statement showing how the Imperial conditions affect those of the locality. Then to each a garrison, which was thought sufficient to carry out the prescribed *rôle*, has been allotted; the distribution of that garrison in peace and war, the arrangements for all issues of war-like and other supplies, and the measures that have to be taken when war threatens, are detailed with considerable care. And finally each scheme is sent annually to headquarters for observations, with a view to such revision as from time to time may be required.

An Imperial scheme of defence, such as I am now contemplating, would, I presume, having laid down the size and distribution of the Imperial Navy, also state whether any changes should be made in our existing Naval bases and coaling stations, and whether the garrisons provided for them are sufficient. And it would prescribe how and by whom the efficiency of these stations should be maintained. It should also, I think, state whether any commercial harbours should be defended, and if so to what extent.

Local defence forces are the troops that each portion of the Empire keeps for purely local defence, and in certain cases as the nucleus of an Imperial force. An Imperial scheme should take stock of these, and of the conditions under which they serve. And it should indicate any changes that might be considered desirable from an Imperial point of view. But it would, I think, be contrary to the traditions of our Island Empire, and of the system under which the various States comprising it are bound together for mutual protection, for it to lay down too dictatorially the strength or conditions of service of such forces.

Finally, Imperial troops acting in conjunction with the Navy are necessary in order to bring a war to a successful conclusion.

These are, at present, chiefly raised in the British Isles, and in that part of the Empire they are more or less mixed up with the local defence forces. Moreover, the great proportion of the garrisons of our Naval bases and coaling stations, as well as the European Army in India, is supplied from the same source. Consequently an Imperial scheme of defence, in considering what forces it can put into the field in support of the Navy, must take into account the military system existing in Great Britain and Ireland (or, as it may be called, the scheme of defence for the British Isles).

How do we now stand?

I have shown that, for the defence of the Empire, we require a Navy holding all important seas, and controlling all important water-ways of commerce. And, as a support to this Navy, that we require a certain number of fortified harbours, where repairs can be undertaken, and stores lodged in safety. And that, in regard to an Army we require, besides local defence forces, an Imperial force able to act in conjunction with the Navy in carrying out rapidly executed expeditions against an enemy's coasts.

Now, all this requires a good deal of money. It cannot be done without it, and so here again defence becomes mixed up with fiscal policy.

Evidently our forces on sea and land should be sufficient for any duties that they might be called upon to carry out. At the same time, there should be no waste, and the only way to prevent this is to have a general scheme of defence which should define all that should be provided. The preparation of such a scheme would be the business of the great Council of Defence of the Empire.

I have also alluded to subsidiary schemes that must be made for the various countries, large and small, that in their aggregate make up the Empire, viz.:—

One for the British Isles,
„ for India,
„ for Canada,
„ for Australia,
„ for New Zealand,
„ for East Africa,
„ for West Africa,
„ for South Africa,
„ for Bermuda and the West Indies,

One for St. Helena,
„ for Gibraltar and Malta,
„ for Cyprus and Egypt,
„ for Aden,
„ for Mauritius,
„ for Singapore and Pinang,
„ for Hong Kong and Wei-hai-Wei,
and one for the Pacific Isles.

Some of these places, being naval bases and coaling stations, have schemes already; others have not. But all, no doubt, require

looking up, especially when a new general scheme is set on foot. And an organisation must be established which shall at first construct schemes and afterwards keep them up to date.

The most important of these schemes will be the one for the British Isles, because, as I have already said, it has so much to provide for. In fact, on this scheme hangs the organisation of the Army. And its construction should, I think, be the duty of the Military Intelligence Department.

A few words are necessary in regard to it, to show what we have got and what we ought to have.

In these days, thanks in a great measure to "the Volunteers," the Army is much more in touch with the people than was the case years ago. A soldier is no longer looked upon as a thing apart, not fit to associate with, as was the habit in the early part of last century.

We have, then, first the Regular Army, enlistment for which is now very simple and easy. Secondly, we have a Militia which springs from the old constitutional force of the country, and was established on a firm footing at the time of the Restoration. Its theory is conscription, but its practice is voluntary engagement. It is raised primarily for home defence, but it can be used abroad if it volunteers, as was the case in the late war. Then we have the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, the former being the remnant of the Volunteer force raised in the country in the early part of last century, and the latter started generally in 1858.

Let us see how the Forces we have got are distributed, and then we will consider what the Royal Commission says about them, and finally what changes seem necessary.

The counties into which the British Isles are divided are grouped together for Army purposes in military districts. These districts contain not only a certain number of units of the Field Army (depending on the location of barracks and of the ground for military exercises), but also in some cases coast fortresses, and troops detailed for local defence, and also depôts.

The infantry depôts are the regimental centres for auxiliary as well as regular troops. All the recruiting as well as discharge work is done at them, besides the training of recruits. They have never quite carried out the intention of those who founded them, which was that they should form battalions for Home Defence when the regular battalions had left the country for some foreign war, the reason being that their barrack accommodation was not sufficient for the purpose.

Let us take a district as an example of the present distribution of troops. The Western District comprises the counties of Cornwall,

Devon, Somerset, Gloucester, and Monmouth, and all South Wales. The regular troops are quartered at Devonport, Exeter, and Milford Haven; and there are infantry depôts at Bodmin, Exeter, Taunton, Bristol, Cardiff, and Brecon. This district is still at the time of writing part of the Army Corps which has its headquarters at Salisbury.

The system of preparation for war that has existed hitherto was to collect together in brigades and divisions the troops forming the Army Corps and to equip them with such stores as they required. When they moved off, the troops detailed to garrison the fortresses and to form columns for local defence would have been ordered to take their place, and the depôts would have had to take up the whole work of training and supplying drafts.

It will readily be understood that in a business like this the most careful arrangements are necessary. The work, as far as it went, was done very satisfactorily in the late war. But to carry it out completely for the whole country, as would have to be done in case of war with one or more maritime Powers, a good many details have still to be settled.

Let us see what the Royal Commission on the war in South Africa say in the matter.

The instructions given to them were "to enquire into the military preparation for the South African War, and the supply of men, ammunition, and equipment, and the transport by sea and land, and also into the operations up to the taking of Pretoria."

These instructions the commission considered hardly precise enough, and so they assumed that their business was to discover inefficiency and defects in the administration of the Army as far as they were disclosed by the war, and, if they found that such existed, to indicate, if possible, the causes that produced them.

How far the Royal Commission have carried out their instructions, or the business that they assumed they were meant to do, can be determined by any reader of their report. A great deal of evidence has been collected, and, when it is divergent, the views are compared. Now and then the opinion of the Commission is indicated. But there is no definite statement on which action can be taken, and the proposals for changes which might lead to improvement are not many.

For instance, in discussing the question of the Reserve of Stores, they say that "the maintenance of proper reserves for the Army is so vital that no system can be recognised as adequate which does not give an assurance on which the nation can more safely rely" than has been the case hitherto.

Among the recommendations of the Commission, however, there

is one which is very important, and this is to alter the existing organisation of the infantry battalion and to adopt in its place the foreign organisation of four large companies instead of eight small ones.

They also strongly advise that behind the regular forces organised for war there should be a large force of auxiliary troops. Their words are as follows:—"The true lesson of the war, in our opinion, is that no military system will be satisfactory which does not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the regular forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be."

Personally, I agree with the Royal Commission that the lessons of the South African War in regard to the effect of fire point to organisation in small units. This was recognised many years ago in Germany, and led to the adoption by that astute military country of the infantry organisation that they now have. The same organisation was subsequently adopted by all the other European nations except ourselves.

In regard to "powers of expansion," it may be remarked that the Royal Commission makes no suggestion. It does not hint at any arrangement by which an expansion might be brought about. For my part, I can only hope that our country will not adopt any entirely new plan, but make the fullest possible use of the forces that have grown up in our islands under the voluntary system, and that are now growing up in our great self-governing States over the sea. These forces we call Regulars, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. Each has its own peculiar system of service; and it is absolutely essential, unless you wish to kill the hen that lays the golden eggs, to carefully safeguard these systems when changes are made in arrangements for training or mobilisation. But, this being done, there is nothing to prevent an organisation being established which will provide a sufficient Army for the Empire's needs.

The mother in the fable, when offered by the fairy three wishes on behalf of her son, chose, 1st impudence, 2nd impudence, and 3rd impudence; and the fairy commended her choice, saying that no doubt if her son had sufficient impudence he was bound to succeed in life.

So now I would say that what the British Empire requires for her forces is, 1st organisation, 2nd organisation, and 3rd organisation. You cannot have too much of it, if it is not only worked out theoretically, but also put into real practical use.

In our case it could be taken up at once by our reformed Intelligence Department, the officers detailed for the duty being relieved (for a time, at all events) from all administrative work.

It is for the Government, under the advice of the Great Council

of Defence, to say in the first instance what should be the strength of the military forces to be maintained in commission and in reserve. And the details of a scheme could then be worked out by selected officers.

I said in an earlier part of this article that the Navy must be made sufficiently strong for its duties. So must the Army. But to render these forces of insurance thoroughly reliable, enough money must be spent on them.

It was stated, I think, by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, in one of his last Budget speeches during the war, that to enable sufficient forces to be maintained the basis of taxation required to be broadened. Here, again, comes the fiscal question. How shall this be done with the least detriment to the country?

Mr. Hofmeyer, the South African politician, proposed some years ago (I think at the Conference in London) that every part of the Empire should levy a tax on foreign imports in addition to any existing ones, the proceeds to be given to Imperial Defence. But this scheme did not meet with favour at the time. An alternative one would be for the United Kingdom to maintain the Navy and the Army as she does now, and for the Colonies to give in return to the Mother Country as much preference in their markets as they can. Another alternative would be to adopt a part or the whole of the scheme propounded by Mr. Chamberlain.

Whatever may be done, however, in this direction will have to be threshed out in Parliament. That is to say, it is a political question rather than a military one.

RICHARD HARRISON.

P.S.—Since writing the above, the committee presided over by Lord Esher has issued a most able and comprehensive report dealing with the question of Army government and Army staff. When the recommendations of this committee have been carried out, and the occupants of the new posts that have been created have settled down to their work, there should be a better prospect than ever before of a general plan or scheme of defence being established which would act as a guide to all subsidiary plans throughout the Empire.

THE TRUE INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

(A STUDY IN STRATEGY.)

BY CAPTAIN C. ROSS, D.S.O.

ROMANTICISM IN THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE.

"THE only sound principle of action in a great State is political egoism, and it is unworthy of a great State to fight for any matter which does not concern its own interests." Such was Bismarck's expressed conviction; the opinion of a man who was, perhaps, the most successful statesman of modern times, and whose methods and teaching have remained to this day as the model on which German action is based and the German nation directed. It was under his leadership that Prussia became the dominant power in Germany, and thereafter the dominant nation on the Continent. Some consideration would undoubtedly be due to his views even if those views were unsupported by history; but it is the case that the study of the broad outlines of history, and the motives which have actuated nations in their struggles with each other, not only afford good reason for the belief that his view is the correct one, but that it is the only rational view which can be accepted by the practical man. Whatever may be said by the moralist or the humanitarian, it is yet the case of all nations, that in their dealings with one another, they have been, and are, essentially selfish; that they are not, in the present any more than they have been in the past, actuated by any motive save that of pure egoism.

For example, at the commencement of last century the final partition of Poland took place; three great and civilised nations took part in this act, which, from the point of view of pure morality, can only be termed a crime. In 1854 Great Britain and France assisted Turkey against Russia. The motive which actuated the two former countries was the desire to check the advance of Russia in an undesirable direction; it can hardly be maintained that the Crimean War was due to a philanthropic desire to assist a weak nation which was unrighteously attacked by a powerful neighbour; the motive by which Great Britain and France were actuated was undoubtedly purely selfish. The unprovoked attack on Denmark

committed by Austria and Prussia was made in pursuance of Prussia's ambition; and so similarly the wars between Prussia and Austria, and between Germany and France. It was Russian ambition which urged the war with Turkey in 1878, and it was the desire to check the Russian advance to the eastern Mediterranean which was responsible for Great Britain's intervention in the final stage of that war. It was ambition which drove the Boers to attempt the expulsion of the British from South Africa in 1899. In all these instances one can feel sympathy for Denmark alone; for in the case of Poland and Turkey it was general demoralisation and degeneration, while in the case of Great Britain it was simple imbecility, which invited attack. In the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German wars, again, the losers, Austria and France, were merely awaiting a favourable moment at which to attack Prussia; no sympathy is due to them for the fact that their adversary proved to be the smarter nation. If history speaks true, it would seem that there is no such thing as morality in the national struggle for existence; that there exists the pretence at morality alone; a pretence which has for its object to gain material assistance. It would seem that sentimental, philanthropic, and humanitarian ideas as between nations are beautiful but impracticable, and that the struggle for existence is too stern a reality for the display of romanticism. Let us, before we deal with the practical interests of Great Britain in the present war, try to arrive at the rights and wrongs of the struggle, if rights and wrongs there be; let us glance at the true causes of the war; let us see if the actions of the two combatants support the teachings of history; and, lastly, let us investigate the extent to which either one is worthy of sympathy.

It is said that Russia has, from first to last, been actuated by ambition pure and simple, and that she was determined not only to obtain possession of the greater part of China, but to close every door to other nations, and to reserve to herself the full benefit of the wealth she might successfully filch from the moribund empire. There seems no good reason to doubt that this statement is, so far as it goes, perfectly true. As is well known, Russia has for the past hundred years sought to obtain possession of the Dardanelles through which to gain egress to southern seas, and thus to compete on fair terms in the commerce of the world. She has failed; but in the mean time her rapid extension through Central Asia has brought clearly within view the possibility of gaining her ambition in the Far East. A few years ago China was an obsolete nation—an anachronism—a country of vast and undeveloped, but also of undefended, wealth; a ripe plum, ready for the plucking. As far

back as 1894 Russia had fixed her attention on Pekin and Port Arthur; she had no real adversary to fear, for the antagonism of Great Britain was hardly worthy of the name, and so long as China remained powerless for good or evil, an unwieldy, unorganised, ill-directed, and inert mass, Russia could afford to bide her time and consolidate her power step by step as she advanced slowly but surely towards her object. And such was the condition of affairs when Japan, armed to the teeth, sprang suddenly into full life and vigour; and, attacking and defeating China, took possession of Port Arthur. It is entirely absurd to suppose that Russia could have been expected to stand idly by while the booty on which she had set her mind, and which she had come to regard as already her own, was quietly seized, from under her very nose, by a neighbouring nation, upon which she had looked with all the contempt of the European for the Asiatic. Her prestige, upon which so vast an empire must always depend, would not admit of it; and if only for this reason Japan must be forced to relinquish Port Arthur. But there were other and equally cogent reasons. Japan must not be permitted to gain a footing on the mainland; for, of the same race as the Chinese, it was to be expected that she would quickly gain a dominant position in China; and the danger was to be feared that she might organise and direct the yellow races and convert a thing of no importance into a gigantic force, which would not only check Russian designs in the Far East, but would, beyond doubt, in time, enter into competition with Russia in Central Asia. The future welfare of the Russian Empire would seem to have demanded the expulsion of the Japanese from Port Arthur and the mainland. But, more than this, if Russia intended to gain full value from the possession of Port Arthur, Japan could not be permitted to remain master of so important a strategic position as Corea. We all know how Russia, gaining the assistance of France and Germany, forced Japan to evacuate Port Arthur and Corea, and thereafter seized Port Arthur herself.

And now let us turn to the motives of Japan. The country is small and overcrowded; the population is rapidly increasing; an outlet for the surplus population is not only desirable, but is an absolute national necessity, an essential to the very existence of Japan as a nation. Such an outlet can only be obtained in Corea or on the mainland of China. And Japanese ambition must also be taken into account. It must surely be clearly recognised what a tremendous hope for the future is held out by a Japanese domination of the yellow races; all things would be possible to such an Empire, and the history of Japan within the last fifty years has demonstrated her capacity to weld together and organise these

yellow races into one great nation, provided she can obtain a firm footing on the mainland.

Hence we see two nations each urgently desirous of the same thing, and, as history teaches, war, or what is practically war, commenced; the outbreak of hostilities was merely a matter of time and of strategy. Each combatant made preparation to its utmost capacity for the decisive phase of actual hostilities; Russia by the fortification of Port Arthur, by the construction of dockyards and of a railway, and by the strengthening of her fleet and her army; Japan by the construction of dockyards and the perfecting of her armed forces. There is no doubt that Japan would, in 1895, have attacked Russia had the latter been single-handed rather than evacuate Port Arthur and Corea; but Russia supported by Germany and France was too strong, and Japan was thrown on the defensive; Great Britain's attention was turned to South Africa, and her assistance could not be counted on. It was necessary for Japan not only to await the convenience of Great Britain, but to isolate Russia before she could attack the latter country with any hope of success. With the victory of Great Britain in South Africa, however, followed by the rapprochement between Great Britain and France, Russia became isolated; and hence we see the outbreak of hostilities at the moment at which all the strategical advantages lay with Japan; we see the delivery of a sudden and unexpected blow by which Japan has seized the temporary command of the sea; we see the whole available land forces of Japan pushed to the decisive attack on land; and we also see the most strenuous efforts of each combatant to prove itself in the right and by its promises to gain the goodwill and sympathy of other nations. Goodwill and sympathy, though valueless in themselves, may lead to active assistance in case of necessity.

Which of these two nations deserve sympathy? Each one, notwithstanding its assertions to the contrary, fights for its own hand; for it can hardly be believed that Japan has really jeopardised her existence from a philanthropic desire to assist China or to maintain the "open door" in the interests of Great Britain and the United States; the victor in the struggle will quickly, it is certain, a few years hence, forget that it received sympathy if its interests lie in such forgetfulness; each one is most practically selfish in its dealings with the other, and each one is utterly unscrupulous in its dealings with the unfortunate bones of contention which are too feeble to defend themselves—the Corean and Chinese Empires. It is true that each nation states its intention to guarantee the integrity of China; but—well, we shall see; the motive of such statements is too obvious.

It would really seem that our sympathy is due to China and Corea; but why sympathise with such degenerates? The practical man seldom displays much sympathy for long with the confirmed drunkard; it is success and strength, not imbecility, which breed sympathy, save in those whose sympathy is valueless, the weak-headed. The display of sympathy by one nation for another is a question of policy, or rather of strategy; for the display of generous sympathy, if carried to excess, is likely to force the hand of the Government and to plunge a nation into war without due preparation; it is, consequently, a source of grave danger to a state, and as such should be carefully guarded against, not only by the leaders of a nation, but by the people and the Press. The display of sympathy is one of those strategical problems on which the welfare, or it may even be the very existence, of a nation may depend; and these problems should be argued out closely and dispassionately, the sole object being to ascertain the direction in which the national interests lie, and to avoid the possible commission of a grave strategical error which may well jeopardise the safety of a nation. These are facts which, however unpalatable, no nation of modern times can with impunity disregard; they are facts with which men trained to the study of strategy and the art of war have for long been familiar; but they are unpleasant facts, and for that reason alone are apt to be disregarded by the inexpert leader; while the untrained but all-powerful populace of a democracy which, lacking education in the art of war, habitually permits its heart to run away with its head, not only refuses to be guided by and determinately closes its eyes to such facts, but even denies their very existence. Hence we see a great burst of sympathy throughout Great Britain and the United States for Japan; while a similar display of sympathy for Russia takes place in France. These rival sympathies contain the germ of war between Great Britain and France; and that leader, or those organs of the Press, or even those irresponsible men, who, actuated by motives of philanthropy, morality, or even of religion, advocate, in defiance of the dictates of strategy, the display of an excessive sympathy for one or other combatant, unwittingly accept the grave responsibility for a possible war the magnitude of which cannot be foreseen, but which might, and probably would, result in the ruin of their own country. Charity begins at home.

The question which Englishmen should ask themselves is this: "Is it to the advantage of Great Britain and the British Empire that Russia or Japan should win this war?"

THE SITUATION OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE WORLD.

Great Britain is one of many civilised nations which maintain armed forces, whether on land or sea or both, more or less highly organised, trained, and equipped with arms of precision. Of these nations there are five of the first rank—Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany, and France. Each one of these goes in more or less constant fear of the others, for their interests are, generally speaking, conflicting, and the possibility of war is never very far off. There is not much to choose in strength and resources between these five nations, and any two combined would, in all probability, be more than a match for a third. Hence we find them forming alliances either with one another or with nations of the second rank, generally as protective measures, but sometimes, it may well be, with a view to aggression. Great Britain is, however, differently situated to the others; her territories are scattered throughout the globe, separated from one another by wide expanses of sea; some of her possessions, peopled by inferior races, are held by the sword; while others, the great self-governing Colonies, peopled by men and women of her own flesh and blood, are by degrees rising into prominence as young and vigorous nations. Great Britain and these Colonies are, with the exception of consanguinity, bound to one another solely by what may be termed moral ties—similarity of speech, religion, traditions, customs, and sport. While by no means under-estimating the value of these moral ties, it must be admitted that they are somewhat unsubstantial compared with those more practical ties which result from a common commercial or military interest. There would not seem to be any very great devotion on the part of the great Colonies to Great Britain as the "Mother Country;" but there undoubtedly exists a feeling of pride in the ideal of the British Empire; and it seems possible that, with this ideal in view, the Colonies would rally to the assistance of Great Britain if she were attacked by a great and powerful nation or by a combination of such. There is one exception, however, that of South Africa. It is without doubt the case that the majority of the Dutch population of the country would welcome any opportunity which might arise or which might be made to sever all connection with Great Britain and the British Empire; and it is, moreover, the case that all the Colonies, even if they possessed the will, could afford but little assistance to Great Britain in a European war, for, with the exception of Canada, none of them maintain armed forces worthy of the name.

It can hardly be denied, indeed, that the British Empire

lacks cohesion; and when it is considered that the great self-governing Colonies are in no sense bound to obey orders or suggestions dictated from Great Britain, it will also be clear that it lacks one single and undivided controlling power, and, as a consequence, unity of purpose or continuity of policy. The whole fabric is, in fact, an empire in embryo; a vast, ill-built, and rambling edifice of which Great Britain is the corner-stone; one which, if intelligently directed, may be welded into a force of vast power; but which may equally be shattered at any moment by a single, well-directed blow, or which may even collapse of itself. If, therefore, war be the ultimate arbiter of the fate of nations, it is clear that the British Empire, as at present constituted, is not a factor of any very great significance in the world; and that foreign nations have to reckon, not with the British Empire as a whole, but with the small, if rich, nation in the British Islands themselves.

The question therefore arises: "Is Great Britain in a fit condition to wage a war for her existence?"

Success in war in modern times depends on three essentials—good leadership, national organisation, and national discipline. Japan is at the present moment giving us a startling object-lesson in the display of these three qualities. Great Britain is the only nation of the Empire which maintains armed forces; her fleet is, so far as material strength in ships goes, the most powerful in the world; but the Boer War of 1899 showed most clearly not only that her land forces were entirely insufficient in numbers and ill-organised—in effect, not organised with a view to war—but that the leadership of the nation was unscientific to a degree and organised on a faulty principle, while an entire lack of national organisation and discipline was displayed. Bad national leadership, which renders efficient preparation for war and the conduct of war in accordance with the dictates of strategy impossible, must injuriously affect the sea forces equally with the land forces; and it is day by day becoming more apparent to the British nation as a whole that, under the present system of leadership by the party politician, the nation can hardly, with good reason, hope for success in any great war in which she may unfortunately become engaged. The Boer War also rendered clear to the people that under her present system of leadership the nation was quite as likely as not to slip unexpectedly and unawares into a great war. It is, indeed, undoubtedly the case that Great Britain, the corner-stone of the British Empire, by reason of lack of efficient leadership, national organisation, and national discipline, is not in a fit state to enter upon a struggle with any of the other nations of the first rank; and for that reason alone she invites attack.

Thus the strategical objects of the British nation can be stated as follows :—

(1) To introduce the necessary reforms in the system of leadership.

(2) To introduce national discipline and organisation.

(3) To consolidate the Empire.

It is, evidently, desirable that the necessary measures should be introduced before the advent of war; and the efforts of the British nation must therefore, for the time being at least, be directed to the maintenance of peace; but the evident desire for peace at any price is in itself sufficient to invite attack, and that nation which would avoid war would do well to strengthen its position and its armed forces, and to put itself into a condition of such perfect readiness for war as will render a gratuitous assault on the part of any other power a matter of extreme danger to the assailant. But reforms, of whatever nature, in a popularly governed nation demand time, and this is more than ever the case when, as in the present instance, prejudices, the growth of centuries, must be combated and eradicated. That an excellent commencement has been made is the case; for the War Office Reconstitution Committee has ably laid down the means by which a moderately efficient system of national leadership may, without an absolute change in the Constitution, be ensured; while the political agitation in favour of fiscal reform points the way to the first step in the consolidation of the Empire; and the efforts of the national Service League give grounds for hope that national organisation and discipline, together with the necessary number of trained men for the armed forces may be secured. The rapidity with which the recommendations of the War Office Committee have been adopted augurs well for the future; but, at the same time, it should not be forgotten that Cabinets come and go; and that nothing can really be accomplished without the consent of the people at large; and that such consent involves the education of the masses, not only in the elementary principles of the art of war, but in the strategical situation of the nation. And the question arises: Will foreign nations permit Great Britain to carry her objects into effect; will they not rather—those of them to whom an organised British Empire would constitute a very real threat—strike while Great Britain is as yet unprepared? The answer to this question is to be found in a consideration of the objects of the other Powers, and of the threats conveyed by the past policy of those Powers against Great Britain.

RUSSIA.

The British people has been taught to regard Russia as its bitterest opponent; and it will be as well to discuss the position of the Russian Empire in the world, in the first instance.

Russia's main object in the past has been to obtain an outlet to a southern sea, and there are three parts of the world in which she has endeavoured to do so—through the Dardanelles, in the Persian Gulf, and in the Yellow Sea, through China. It is obvious that the greatest advantages were to be gained by the possession of the Dardanelles, for not only would she hold a strategic position of immense strength, but she would strike at once into the very focus of the world's commerce on one of the chief trade routes of the world. Next in value to the Dardanelles would come the Persian Gulf, as being nearer to the centres of commerce than the Yellow Sea. But aggression in the direction of the Dardanelles was checked by the hostility of Great Britain and France as well as Turkey, and her advance in that direction was, for the time being, stopped by the formation of the autonomous kingdom of Bulgaria. Turning her attention to the Persian Gulf, she again came face to face with Great Britain; and, consequently, her expansion took place on the line of least resistance, that is, towards the Far East. Here she has been checked by Japan, and her defeat, if she meets with defeat, will assuredly raise Japan to such power as will render any future advance in that direction a matter of impossibility; and she will, in all probability, again turn her attention to the line of least resistance, which will probably be Persia. If, on the other hand, she be successful in this present war, she will gain her immediate object, and will yet be fully employed in China and Corea for many years to come, until she has, in fact, finally disposed of Japanese intentions and ambitions. Then, and not until then, will she be in a position to turn her attention to the Persian Gulf. It may well be, however, that neither Russia nor Japan will gain decisive victory in this present war, in which case the peace which will ensue will be but an armed peace, an intake of breath, so to speak, for the renewal of the struggle. In any case, it will be seen that, for the present at least, Great Britain has but little to fear from Russian aggression, for it is absurd to suppose that Russia will deliberately attack Great Britain while engaged with Japan, unless she can thereby obtain the assistance of both France and Germany; and, even so, it is by no means clear that she would have much to gain by such a general conflagration. It would thus seem that there is but little to be feared from Russia in the near future, except in the event of her decisive defeat by Japan.

JAPAN.

If Japan meets with defeat in the present war, she must struggle to the last for her very existence; if a decisive result is not obtained, she must prepare for the next outbreak of hostilities with Russia; if successful in her present venture, she, like Russia, will be fully employed in Corea and China for at least twenty years, or it may be for half a century to come. If ultimately successful against Russia, and if she succeeds in organising the yellow races, then her next move must unavoidably be directed against Australia and the British Empire, if the latter is still in existence. It will thus be seen that neither danger nor assistance is to be expected from Japan in the near future. It is, indeed, doubtful whether Japan, as the ally of Great Britain, could afford any very material assistance against a combination of Germany, France, and Russia; for in such a war the decisive point must, of necessity, lie in the North Sea, the Channel, the Atlantic Ocean, and in Great Britain; and Japan's assistance would be confined to guarding the interests of Great Britain in the Far East and the Pacific. In such a case, Japan would rapidly consolidate her own power; she would gain vastly in prestige, in which Great Britain would lose; she would, in fact, serve her own interests in a primary, while guarding British interests in a purely secondary, degree.

FRANCE.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, there appears no good reason to doubt that the French mind is as keenly set on the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine as it ever was, and that this is still not only the ruling idea with the French populace, but that it is a main object of French strategy. It is, indeed, inconceivable that a great nation, with glorious traditions such as those of the French, could tamely acquiesce in the dismemberment of its territory; for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine must mean much the same to the French nation as the loss of Kent would mean to the British. Any further increase of strength to the German nation would not only constitute a grave threat to the French nation, but would force the French to finally discard all hopes of the recovery of the lost provinces; while, on the other hand, a powerful and consolidated British Empire would be calculated to keep German ambition within bounds, and for that reason alone would bring nearer the possibility of the recovery of these provinces. It is, however, true that the expansion of French power in North Africa, which has made such strides of late years, must infallibly be regarded with some distrust by Great Britain, and

that a powerful British Empire would undeniably act as a check upon such expansion. There are not wanting men, moreover, who maintain that the true interests of France lie across the seas, and that she would do well to finally discard all thoughts of continental expansion in favour of a colonial empire; in other words, to enter into competition with the British Empire, and to grant Germany a practically free hand for her designs in West and North-Western Europe. That this idea has been promoted by the Germans with their own objects in view is, of course, patent to all men, certainly to the French themselves. It is, indeed, difficult to say which is the true interest of France, continental expansion or over-sea expansion; and the answer would seem to lie in another question: "Which would constitute the greater danger to France, a German Empire which should embrace Denmark, Holland, Austria proper, and Bohemia, or a consolidated British Empire? Notwithstanding the expansion of France in North Africa, her past strategy, except in the case of Egypt, does not in one single instance point to an aggressive policy directed against Great Britain or the British Empire; and it is an open secret that during the Boer War she might, had she willed, have obtained the assistance of Germany, and probably also of Russia, against Great Britain. The fact that she refrained, when she might have entered upon the struggle with an almost certain hope of victory, points clearly to the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine as her ultimate objective; and also to the fact that her strategists recognise that the defeat of Great Britain would lead to the overwhelming strength of Germany, which would, of necessity, in the end, result in another attack upon France.

GERMANY.

In a discussion of the probable objects of Germany, the history for the last fifty years of Prussia, the corner-stone of the German Empire, must not be lost sight of; it must not be forgotten that in 1864 she, with Austria, attacked Denmark, her real object being to acquire territory for the construction of the Kiel Canal; that in 1866 she attacked Austria in order to gain the leadership of the German kingdoms; and that in 1870 she attacked France in order to render possible a German Empire. This Empire now holds an exceedingly strong strategical position, which will, unless improbable contingencies occur, be greatly strengthened in the near future. Dominating Denmark and the Baltic on the one side, she also holds a strong position on the North Sea; while on the other side her territories extend to within 150 miles of Venice and the Adriatic. Austria proper lies between her and the Adriatic, and in the forthcoming

disruption of the Austrian Empire—a disruption which is practically certain to occur on the death of the present Austrian Emperor —she will without difficulty absorb that country, which is peopled by Germans, in the German Empire. By this means she will gain access to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and will be in an excellent position to enter, single-handed if necessary, upon a struggle with Great Britain. Such a struggle is the next and most logical step towards the attainment of the German ambition as a world-power and "Lord of the Atlantic." It is hardly necessary to recapitulate the various incidents in German strategy of the last few years which show that she has definitely entered into the lists with Great Britain, and that she will, with or without allies, when she is fully prepared, strike for her legitimate ambition, even as she did at Denmark, Austria, and France. Suffice it to say that, from the date of the German Emperor's telegram to Kruger to the date of Germany's late attempt to separate Canada from Great Britain, her efforts have been directed secretly, as is clear to every student of strategy, to the isolation and enfeeblement of Great Britain and to the disruption of the British Empire—the first step in scientific preparation for war. She has latterly, moreover, thrown aside the mask of secrecy; she now makes little or no secret of her intentions and ambitions, as is exemplified by the extraordinary projected increase of her navy, which can have but one object in view, as well as by the utterances of the German Emperor. During the Boer War she was not sufficiently strong at sea to venture single-handed with the smallest hope of success on a struggle with Great Britain; she could only afford to do so provided she could obtain the assistance of France and Russia, and it is an open secret that this she endeavoured to effect. At the present time, again, she is still endeavouring to form such a coalition; she has, without doubt, attempted to work on the excitable and chivalrous feelings of the French people through Russia; for in the sudden outburst in the Russian Press of vituperation and baseless accusations against the British Government, which were calculated to rouse the fiery indignation of the French nation, the ally of Russia, is clearly to be recognised the hand of Germany. Russia can, at the present juncture, gain nothing either by a rupture with Great Britain or by dragging Great Britain and France into the present war; France, similarly, has nothing to gain by a rupture with Great Britain; while now, as formerly, Germany, who could strike in with decisive effect, has everything to gain and nothing to lose by a war between Great Britain and France. This action of Germany is merely in accordance with the methods adopted by her as against Denmark, Austria, and France, and is strikingly similar to those she adopted

against Great Britain in the Boer War. It is probable that she views with concern the present efforts of the British people to re-organise the Army, and especially the system of national leadership, to form a General Staff, and to introduce national service; for her great hope of success lies in the inept and imbecile leadership which is inseparable from a party Government which is backed by an ignorant, ill-disciplined and unorganised nation. Hence her obvious efforts to force on a crisis.

THE UNITED STATES.

The policy of the United States would, of late years, seem to have been directed into its true channel; there is no longer that playful and puerile desire to "twist the lion's tail." Americans have apparently awakened to the fact that the national life is not all "beer and skittles," but must be taken seriously. The dominant feature of its strategy is a deliberate and carefully thought-out scheme of preparation for the day when the completion of the Panama Canal shall place what will almost certainly be the most important trade route of the world, as well as a "decisive point" of the utmost strategic value, in her hands, and raise her at once to the position of the dominant power of the world. The Monroe Doctrine strikes two ways; for the very fact that the outside world is debarred from interference with the American Continent of necessity must oblige the United States to see to it that no excuse for such interference shall be given; and it is thus the case that her whole attention will, in all probability, be fully engaged for many years to come in America itself. It is true that Canada must always be a possible cause of a rupture between the United States and the British Empire; but while the main attention of the northern country is turned inwards towards its own development, and the eyes of the southern to the south, towards Panama, there is but little fear that any bone of contention can arise between the two nations of such vital importance to either one as cannot be settled by compromise, but must be referred to the stern arbitrament of war.

CONCLUSION.

It would thus seem that, of all the great nations of the world, Germany is the only one whose interest and ambition demand the downfall of the British Empire, and whose object it will therefore be to prevent the attainment of the British objects. With this object in view, and taking into consideration Germany's habitually offensive strategy, we may rest assured that she will do her utmost

to obtain the assistance of an ally in order to strike a decisive blow at as early a date as possible. And that ally must be France, for Russia is at present too heavily engaged to be in a position to render assistance; and Germany could not venture to attack Great Britain while there existed the possibility that France would declare against her. The present *entente cordiale* which exists between Great Britain and France seems at first glance to remove all possibility of a combination between Germany and France, but it must be remembered that friendly feeling is apt to change to hatred just as rapidly as hatred changes to friendly feeling; and though the present friendly feeling may be prolonged, and, in spite of German intrigue, develop into an alliance, yet alliances, as history has so often shown, may be broken or evaded, and only, in reality, hold good so long as they serve the interests of both of the allies. We may be certain that Germany will seize every opportunity, will take instant advantage of any false move, will, indeed, make opportunities, to plunge Great Britain and France into war. If Russia meets with defeat in the present war, Germany will assuredly endeavour to rouse continental feeling against Great Britain as the nation which has given life to a Frankenstein in the shape of the "Yellow Peril;" but before that moment arrives there will be many other efforts of a nature similar to that we have just experienced to embroil Great Britain and France; and it is more than probable that Germany will, in the end, succeed, for, in her strategy, she is acting on the offensive, with all the advantages of initiative and secrecy in her favour, against a nation acting on the passive defensive and to which secrecy is impossible. But even if Germany fail, for the time being, in her object to embroil Great Britain and France, she will yet, in a few years to come, gain such an increase of power on land, through the absorption of Austria, that it would be suicidal for France to assist Great Britain, which has no army as armies go in these days. The French, considering their own interests, will almost certainly stand aloof, and, notwithstanding any treaties of alliance, remain neutral, or, it may even be, assist Germany. Alliances are only of value if formed in view of the delivery of a blow.

There can be but one opinion as to the correct strategical course for Great Britain to adopt. Germany cannot, single-handed, attack Great Britain before 1912; but every day's latitude granted to her in which to perfect her arrangements and to strengthen her navy is one more nail hammered into the coffin of Great Britain and the British Empire; for it must not be forgotten that Germany is—as her past history has clearly proved—an unscrupulous nation, directed by the scientist, and which gains its

objects by war; and that, having definitely decided on her object, she will not discard that object unless forced to relinquish it by defeat in war, but will employ every trick, every artifice, within the range of the human mind, every possible means, moral or immoral, to gain it; and if she seems to give way, or even makes a display of friendliness, we may rest assured that it will be as a temporary measure only, its object being to hoodwink her adversary, and thus to bring about a more favourable opportunity at which to deliver a decisive blow. That man can only be termed a fool who, with a loaded revolver in his hand, permits his enemy to charge the magazine of his rifle. The proper strategical course for Great Britain to adopt would seem to be—

(1) To push forward the reforms in the national system of leadership.

(2) To introduce some form of national or universal service.

(3) To consolidate the Empire so far as is possible.

(4) To form, if possible, an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

(5) As the only safe means of defence to attack Germany as soon as possible.

But an offensive and defensive alliance with France is, probably, possible only provided Great Britain be prepared to put 500,000 to 1,000,000 men in the field to assist in the struggle on land. It is to be feared, however, that Great Britain, with her national policy, in every case, dominated and warped by the childish interests of political parties and of party politicians, will fail to seize her present opportunity, and will inevitably be attacked by Germany, probably in alliance with the great Powers of Europe, at some date in the near future, and will suffer defeat.

In the mean time, however, it is not to the interest of Great Britain that Russia should suffer decisive defeat in the Far East; and neither is it to her interest that Russia should gain a decisive victory; but it is to her interest that Russia should find ample employment for her energies in the Far East for many years to come; and this will best be accomplished if Russia retains possession of Manchuria with Port Arthur, while Japan retains possession of Corea. And it would seem that the British people and the British Press will be wise to refrain from the display of an excessive sympathy for Japan. The avoidance of such a display of sympathy is by no means contrary to the spirit of our alliance with Japan; it is merely a measure of ordinary precaution; for the display of such sympathy is to give Germany the opportunity she seeks.

C. Ross.

FEDERATION IN DEFENCE.

By Major P. A. Silburn, D.S.O., Permanent Staff, Natal.

The strength of the European armaments of to-day is regulated by the various responsibilities of the Governments possessing them —plus the defensive power of the Government or Governments whose interests, geographically, diplomatically, or commercially, are likely to clash.

The strenuous efforts made by some of the greater Powers to become supremely defensive but increases the suspicions of their neighbours, and the result is an ever-increasing warlike activity detrimental to alliances that would alone mean a lasting peace among the dominant races of the world. There lacks that confidence among neighbouring nations necessary to fix the maximum strength required to safeguard each country's interests; the result is that the larger Powers are draining their strength in a nervous anxiety to raise and maintain armaments totally disproportionate to their responsibilities or their requirements, the object to be attained being lost in ambition to eclipse a probable enemy, not so much in actual fighting power as in the amount of bullion expended, thus transferring the sphere of offensive operations from the battlefield to the apparently less, though more deadly field of taxation. In one or two cases an available and equally effective means, because, perhaps, less expensive, is neglected, in this unreasonable anxiety for a heavy Naval and Military Budget, forgetful it would seem that such a course must sooner or later defeat its own object.

None of the Powers exemplify this suicidal course more vividly than does Great Britain. Created and developed by the sea and held by sea power, it would have been logically thought that by sea power she would elect to exist. Her policy for the last few years is, however, in direct contradiction to this. An annually increasing Army vote has culminated in being almost equal to that of the Navy. The fundamental cause of her very existence is, in the future, to be relegated to a secondary position as a means of defence. It needs but a glance at past Budgets to note with concern the growing

interest given to the Army, necessarily to the detriment of the Navy.

Beyond the necessary calls upon our Army in India and a small war in Somaliland, it is beyond human understanding upon what ultimate object such a stupendous sum as that provided for the Army in this year's Budget can be expended. An Army of 240,000 kept on continual pay for what? Invasion? That alone, a Navy can repel. Once the Navy fails in this, no Army can save Great Britain; and as for the Colonies, it depends upon themselves, their strength and their hinterland resources, what becomes of them should the Navy fail. It must, however, be acceded that the ever-growing Imperial needs include an Army of a certain strength, equal to or perhaps stronger, though not necessarily as expensive, as that for which the British taxpayer pays almost as much as for the Navy to which he really owes his immunity from invasion and conquest. It is a matter of reasonable doubt, however, whether such an Army cannot be found by other and fairer means than that of the exorbitant taxation of one section of the Empire.

Should Great Britain be shorn of her Colonies, her own existence would still demand a Navy of the strength it is to-day—the needs for an Army, on the other hand, would be reduced. It must, therefore, appear an anomaly that what contributions are made by the Colonies to Imperial Defence are given directly to that institution to which they themselves are less directly in need. The Colonies, however, of course recognise that the true safety of the Empire lies in protecting its most vital part, and that that protection is the Navy, which by maintaining the command of the sea, furnishes the only means of securing the forty odd millions of inhabitants of the United Kingdom from starvation.

It has been openly said by members of the Government (Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech, 1903) that the Colonial contributions are disappointing, but has it ever seriously occurred to these Ministers that if the whole question of Imperial Defence had been carefully considered by them, or preferably by a committee of experts with fair Colonial representation, that a far more equitable means of Colonial contribution to Imperial Defence would have long ere this been forthcoming, and that the land forces of the Empire would have been federated into an Imperial Army, the cost of which would have been equally borne by every British subject?

The Colonies have of necessity a stronger Military than Naval sentiment, and they are in a position to train a very large percentage of their manhood to arms, and to give that training over an area of country unobtainable in Great Britain. Owing to Colonial life being

analogous to campaigning, this training calls for little expense, when made compulsory by Acts such as are in force in most of the Colonies.

However fondly hopes may be cherished of the Colonies being able to contribute in *personnel* to the Navy, such must by circumstances surrounding Colonial life be doomed to disappointment, except, perhaps, in the case of Newfoundland. Upon the other hand, Englishmen, as apart from Colonials, like all islanders are naturally seamen, and every man recruited for the British Army in England is a man lost to the Navy.

The late war illustrated to the world at large the value of Colonies governed by local responsibility. Burke's advocacy of governing Colonies as free countries has been amply justified. And it further proved how fallacious the belief that in time of trouble for the parent country those Colonies enjoying self-government, and therefore practically autonomous, would give no assistance beyond that of sentiment. The value of the Colonies in Imperial Defence, however, was acknowledged long before the term "Imperial" was thought of, for as far back as 1756 (the Seven Years' War) we find that 25,000 Colonial Militia were supplied by our North American Colonies and upon far more generous terms to the Mother Country than were the Colonial contingents used in the late war, for they were actually raised, clothed, fed and paid by the Colonies. Little was heard of this practical illustration of loyalty. With the close of the war, the prowess of the Colonials was forgotten by English statesmen; though from odd passages in history we find that these New Englanders did yeoman service. The time had not then arrived for any attempt to federate the land forces of the one or two Colonies, then possessing them, with the land forces of the United Kingdom. The Colonies were rapidly forgotten, and there were those who strongly advocated their abandonment. The second opportunity that occurred for federation was during the Soudan campaign, 1885. Most of the Colonies offered assistance, and a few troops were actually accepted from Australia. It was stated by those who should have known better that this acceptance was a precedent. Those Colonials upheld the reputation gained by the Canadians over two centuries before. They were thanked for their services, and that was the end of it, as far as the Empire was concerned. The practical sentiment evinced even then promised development into a Federated Army. Two and a half centuries have elapsed between the first Colonial contingents that served in Empire-making and the last Colonial contingents serving in Empire-keeping, and during that period nothing has been done by the authorities at home to bring the latter any closer to the British

Army than the former were. It would have been thought that when the Army Estimates began to overhaul the Naval, British statesmen would have commenced to study the complex forces of the Empire beyond the seas, with the object of bringing them together for the purpose of federation into an Imperial Army, obtaining a greater Navy and giving lighter taxation in the United Kingdom, and a more just taxation to the Colonies. A juster taxation to the Colonist, because there is no room for doubt that he is more lightly dealt with in taxation, whether direct or indirect, than the less fortunate inhabitant of the United Kingdom; though he is a partner in the privilege of temporary safety that the latter obtains by payment of an undue proportion of its cost. Whilst the increase in taxation was confined to the growing needs of the Navy, the British taxpayer had nothing to complain of, for his own existence demands an unrivalled Navy with or without Colonial appendages. It is a debatable question whether British sea-borne commerce would be much less than it is to-day were the Colonies foreign possessions. The Navy, then, is the effect of the United Kingdom, as it is the cause of the Empire. Can this be said of the Army? How many wars within the last century has England had that have not been in the interests of colonisation—or shall we say Empire-making? But has not the goal yet been reached? Without fear of contradiction, we can say that the Empire has been made, and that there no longer exists the need for the Mother Country to keep the secondary instrument that assisted in its creation. Her duty to herself calls for her to hand over the responsibility of the greater part of its upkeep to those for whose safety it is still required, and who are now in a position to bear that responsibility with ever-increasing strength.

There is just the fear of the same neglect being shown to the Colonial forces to-day as was shown to the Canadians in 1763. By "neglect" is meant that the material at hand in those forces will not be made use of in the moulding of a Federated Army, will not be reckoned an Imperial asset until a crisis arises, and then, through neglect in organisation and unity, their services may be valueless; for it may not be that our future foe will be as neglectful of his opportunities as was the Boer.

In our smaller wars the Colonials are not given an opportunity of training themselves for greater things, and then when greater things occur, the Colonial has not in the eyes of the authorities obtained that experience to fit him for anything but a subordinate position, and thus it is that he has not the opportunity of showing the higher qualities he may possibly possess.

As a step in the direction of the federation now advocated, a

proportionate share in the responsibilities should be allowed the Colonies. The argument against this is that the present Army is kept by the British taxpayer; the Colonial contributes nothing to it, and it is then but fair to give the responsible positions to those who have to bear the burden. But now that burden is increasing in weight, in addition to that immovable and necessary load, the Navy, it is but fair to transfer part of it to those upon whose behalf it has been carried for so long, now that they are in the position to carry it with ease. It will, perhaps, be asked how this transfer of burden (we will not say responsibilities, for they must ever remain the same) is to take place without revolutionising our long-cherished system of Empire-governing. The principle should first of all be recognised that the Colonies contribute in *personnel* to the Imperial Army in proportion to their population, and that they share in proportion the privileges of Empire; at present these privileges are barred them, unless they accept the alternative of casting aside their Colony (an integral part of the Empire) and adopting England as a domicile. This course is open to any foreigner. The Colonist by right of his relationship, the prestige he has given to the Mother Country by his enterprise in the exploitation of her possessions, and the wealth he sends to the Motherland, has, in the past, deserved better treatment than this. If the Colonies had been allowed to take their share (in proportion to their population) in Imperial control in and from the sphere in which they had been brought up, they undoubtedly would have considered it their unquestionable duty to have shared in the responsibilities of Empire; it indeed speaks well for their loyalty and promises well for the future, for the crisis has passed, that they have stood the strain of indifference for two and a half centuries.

To bring about the federation aimed at, there must, first of all, be a uniformity of ideas upon the subject. To obtain this, localisation must be neutralised to allow the Imperial idea to predominate. It has been argued that Colonials are not fitted by education and experience for the higher Imperial posts; but do not *Education* and *Experience* stand for influence? I quite fail to see why an Australian should not do good diplomatic service in Egypt armed with an Australian University degree in lieu of a Cambridge or Oxford one. Will a Canadian make a worse governor of an Imperial possession because he has been educated at a Canadian college? or a New Zealander or South African command troops in India with less skill or courage because his education and experience is Colonial? I presume to think not. Give, therefore, to the Colonies a proportion of these offices, equal to the proportion they contribute to the Empire's defence. What their proportion

should be the Colonials themselves cannot very well determine—and who is to fix it for them? Not the Imperial Defence Committee, for it is hardly in sympathy with the Colonies; its province goes no further than revising Colonial Defence Schemes submitted from year to year, and such revisions are made under War Office methods. The lines upon which each Colony should travel, to arrive at defensive federation, must be carefully laid out by a council of experts; by experts is meant men intimately acquainted with the Colonies and their resources. The object to be achieved should be one of substance; not a mythical one of sentiment, something of an unknown quantity as it has been in the past. The term "federation" is of elastic definition; whereas, prefixing "defence," it should at least mean universal service, uniformity of training, weapons, interchangeability and army rank of officers, an Imperial Intelligence Department with a proportion of Colonial officers, and a proportion of Colonial officers on the Headquarter's Staff.

At present there are not two Colonies in the Empire whose defence system is controlled in the same manner. One Colony has a portfolio of Defence, another a Council of Defence, a third a Defence Committee, and a fourth is controlled by a military secretary. In some of these cases appointments and offices are insecure, promotions dependent perhaps upon the wilfulness of a minister or a member of the local House of Parliament, here to-day and gone to-morrow. In many instances these very members are junior officers in the Defence Force they themselves control for a time, and the career of many good Colonial officers has been wrecked by the animosity of such individuals caused in many instances by personal feeling. The fault is due to the restricted responsibility of the Colonies, which in many cases (notably those but recently elevated to responsible Government) is purely parochial.

It is, perhaps, worthy of record here, as illustrating the low ebb Imperial parties can reach in the smaller Colonies, and showing the class of men Colonial politicians are recruited from, to quote a recent political crisis that occurred in one of our Colonies. There were two questions before this particular Colony, one a Militia Bill that marked a departure in Imperial Defence worthy of the Empire's attention, and the other question was whether or no a new railway should be built. The Government went to the country on the latter question, and was returned on that question alone. Few speeches were made on the Militia Bill then before the country, and two were against the passing of it into law as interfering with the liberty of the subject! Now, this apparent apathy is due to ignorance, and that alone can be removed by the subject being

raised from a local sphere into the atmosphere of Imperial politics, and this should be effected before indifference grows into real live antagonism caused by long neglect. The first step towards this wished-for federation will be the formation of an Imperial Council of Defence with Colonial representation. The second step will be the remodelling of the War Office on Imperial lines, and here again the Colonies would, with advantage to the Empire, be represented. When such departures are made, no doubt the Colonies themselves would be pleased to be relieved of the drudgery that at present falls to their lot, the sordidness of members of Parliament paying off personal grudges on brother officers by questioning their salaries in supply and numerous other annoyances.

A Federated Defence Force centred in an Imperial War Office, such as is here advocated, would in a very short time weld together the varied land forces of the Empire into one Army, and that Army would be strengthened by its common interests. The British taxpayer would have his burden lightened, and the safety of the Empire would be secured by the presence of troops in every possession controlled for the good of the Empire.

P. A. SILBURN.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN STRATEGY.

By Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E.

VII.

The Campaign of Ulm, 1805.

There are probably very few officers in the British Army who have not at some period or other of their military career been confronted with an examination question on strategy, couched somewhat in the following terms:—

"What are the advantages conferred on an invader by the possession of a re-entering frontier? Illustrate your answer by a sketch and description of the campaign of Ulm (1805)."

The question recalls the skeleton map at the end of Hamley's 'Operations of War.' The Main, with its curious double S curves, running along the top of the page and meeting the Rhine almost at right angles to the west; whilst from Bamberg, Würzburg, Mayence, and Strasburg dotted lines converge on the course of the Danube between Donauwörth and Ingolstadt, conveying the impression that the columns of the Grand Army had been quietly awaiting, secure behind the formidable obstacles indicated, the signal to spring upon their devoted prey, which in a climax of intellectual imbecility had elected to remain inert and lifeless under the walls of the celebrated fortress, which has given its name to the campaign.

Probably ninety-nine out of every hundred further believe that Bamberg and Würzburg were two imposing entrenched camps, teeming with stores and provisions, which the "friendly" North Germans brought gladly to the French commissariat in exchange for coin of the realm, and from the pages of our text-books, and the ordinary acceptation of such words as "base," "frontier," "lines of communication," etc., I confess I cannot see what other conclusion could be reasonably arrived at.

Nothing, however, could be less like the reality than this picture, for, if the true development of the plan of campaign is followed—and, thanks to the labours of MM. Alombert and Colin of

the Historical section of the French General Staff, it has now been rendered readily accessible to all—it will be found that the line of the Main, as a section of a friendly frontier, never played any part in Napoleon's conception of his design at all, and by the nature of things exercised no influence on the course of events.

Pursuing the general trend of my investigation, viz. to make it clear that "strategy" is the "art of the leader," and consists, to quote Moltke's definition, in "the practical adaptation of the means at hand to the attainment of the object in view," I propose to devote some little space in the first place to making clear to the reader the nature of the "means at hand" to each of the two leaders engaged, for in no other of his campaigns with which I am acquainted did Napoleon control from the outset such an overwhelming superiority of force, both moral and numerical.

Marengo had established his reputation on such a pinnacle that, henceforth, his orders met with a readiness of unquestioned obedience in excess probably of anything known in history before or since. It was not merely that he had the right as Emperor to command; but it was the trust and confidence of all ranks in his infallibility that procured for him a zealous service up to the limits of human capacity for endurance, which far transcends, in the energy it communicates to the motion of masses of men, the momentum imported by perfunctory obedience to constituted authority.

This alone was a new factor in warfare of far more importance than changes in weapons or equipment. Yet, notwithstanding this new power, he came within an ace of failure, and it will be interesting as a contribution to prevailing fallacies as to Army Reform to study the material at his disposal.

The Grand Army had been formed on the shores of the Channel, its units duly assigned to their respective brigades, divisions, and corps, but already its size was beyond the power of one man's control, and no adequate material for the formation of a "General Staff" as yet existed.

There were, indeed, a considerable number of war-experienced men accustomed to the office work of the field, excellent as individuals, but not trained in the same school to view matters from the same standpoint, or to work in harmony with one another; but even these were insufficient in number, whilst no arrangements whatever existed for the education and subsequent selection of men to fill its junior ranks, and in default of such a school, selection tempered by favouritism produced a plentiful crop of the typical "brass hats,"—men who, insufficiently taught to appreciate the true needs and capacity of the men in the ranks, issue orders which can only be obeyed at the expense of their

fighting efficiency, or circulated them with such carelessness that they always arrived late at their destination.

The actual composition of the Army as regards the rank and file was excellent. From the inspection returns of the year XIII., preserved in the Archives, it appears that 50,538 out of 115,582 had already seen service, though this number was very unevenly distributed amongst the different arms of the service. The sappers coming first with 77 per cent. of their strength, then the light cavalry and the infantry, averaging 42·5 per cent.

The number of men over ten years of service varied considerably—in the 17th Line there were 918 out of 951, in the 13th Light Infantry 540 out of 569, down to the 14th Line 267 out of 741.

Generally, 25 per cent. of the Army had fought all through the campaigns of the Republic, a second quarter had been through Marengo and Hohenlinden, and the remainder had been incorporated since 1801.

Nearly all the officers and non-commissioned officers had seen service, and in each regiment there were still some sturdy survivors of the old Royal Army, some with forty years' Colour service.

The Hussars had retained their old traditions, they had received very few conscripts, but had kept up their numbers by voluntary enlistment, generally from Alsatians and other German families; one half, however, of their officers were quite illiterate, and many did not even know the words of command in French. Marbot's description, written in 1799, is still substantially accurate in 1805.

The other arms had become more republican; particularly the infantry, who seem to have been a pretty rough lot from the unmerciful fashion in which they harassed their recruits. Hence, desertion was pretty rife—from 5 to 8 per cent. per annum. The old soldiers also deserted freely; but this seems to have been merely a republican way of taking furlough, as they generally rejoined after a few months' absence—evidently the punishment must have been merely nominal. The complaints, however, against the want of physical development in the recruits are ceaseless, yet at that time the strain on the population was by no means excessive, though it soon after became so.

The composition of the officers present with the Grand Army is of peculiar interest. The total number was 5000; of these about 100 came from the new officers' school at Fontainebleau, aged from seventeen to twenty-one, 500 to 600 from the original volunteers of 1792, or from the conscripts raised since 1785. These were mostly picked men, selected for their general standard of instruction and social position, like "de Fezensac," or

for distinguished conduct in action, as "Dulong," commanding a battalion at twenty-five; but mostly they are still lieutenants in 1805.

In spite of this element of youth in the cadres, the average age of the sub-lieutenants is thirty-two, and those of the lieutenants thirty-seven, whilst those of the captains and superior officers is only thirty-nine; but there were more than ninety lieutenants over fifty years of age, and four over sixty. "Men were already beginning to grumble in the Grand Army, and it looks as if a few more years of peace would have destroyed it."

"This is not its only fault. It is very poorly trained to manœuvres, almost all the professional officers of the old Royal Army have disappeared, and the few who remain have attained high rank, whence they exercise little influence on the instruction of their men," and drill has become exceedingly neglected. This, by the way, almost invariably happens in an army which has practically grown up on the battle-field and fought with almost constant success. Men feel that they are "good enough," and having never felt the need of iron discipline in disaster, object to what they consider merely unpractical playing at soldiers. It is the "school of defeat" that turns out the better fighting men and leaders, and hence the curious swing of the pendulum that has so often occurred between races of approximately equal fighting capacity.

The recruits were supposed to be drilled at the depôts, but, as usual, all the most infirm and useless officers had been relegated to those positions, and the given instruction appears to have been very indifferent indeed. The cavalry were poorly mounted, and only here and there in the confidential returns is an officer mentioned as showing keenness or knowledge of equitation, proving how low the standard had fallen since former days.

The Artillery and Engineers had suffered least from the Revolution, and the former remained to the last the *élite* of the Army, but the Engineers as a body seem to have been about the standard of our military foremen of works, good at estimating and at the drawing-board, but with no broad grasp of the principles of their profession.

The analysis of the ages and service of the 141 general officers is very interesting—unfortunately too long to give *in extenso* here. They vary from one of twenty-nine years of age to one of fifty-eight, but the mean is about forty. One-quarter had served as officers of the old Army, one-quarter in its ranks, and the remainder came chiefly from the levies subsequent to 1791.

The most crying need of the Army, however, was horses, both

[illegible] Dragoons in fact had to take the [illegible] in the way, and had not [illegible] a circumstance which [illegible] French for these dismounted [illegible] men [illegible] to keep up with the rest of [illegible] across the line of the attempted [illegible] Bohemia; [illegible] the escaping corps, [illegible] by the multiplicity of the uniforms by [illegible] and, of course, not knowing [illegible] main French Army, ultimately [illegible] at Neresheim on the 15th [illegible]

The extraordinary weakness of the transport alluded to above [illegible] of the reality of [illegible] transport would be required for a [illegible] hence none was provided, and it was [illegible] when the alternative of war against Austria [illegible] that an effort was made to supply the deficiency by the conclusion of a contract with the "Compagnie [illegible]" for the "provision of 30 brigades of waggons, of which, however, only 5 with 115 carriages, were actually ready in time." * The deficiencies had to be made good by requisition, and as the service was most unpopular, the drivers, taken by force from Alsace and Baden, lost no opportunity of deserting, taking, of course, their horses with them.

Under these untoward circumstances, supply and transport broke down utterly, and almost from the first entry into Germany the troops had to live on the country, with the usual consequences that discipline went to pieces, and scenes which recall the horrors of the Thirty Years' War marked the progress of the French columns. The diaries of French officers, of men like Thiébault and de Fezensac, show how they loathed the whole business; but they were powerless to check the evil; and we find even that iron soldier "Davout," whose corps was always the best disciplined in the Army, writing imploring letters to the Emperor begging for permission to shoot some of the marauders.

The matter is of so much importance for my general argument that I transcribe almost *verbatim* the pages on this subject from M. Colin's work.†

After directing attention to the extraordinary inclemency of

* 'Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte u. Taktik.,' Part III., p. 13, *note*. General Staff, Berlin.

† 'La Campagne de 1805,' Introduction, vol. iii. p. 5.

the weather, a continuous downpour of rain, snow, and sleet, which lasted almost without interruption from about the 6th to the 25th October,* breaking up the roads and rendering marching almost unpracticable, he continues: "The troops, exhausted by these uninterrupted marches, rarely found sufficient food, and a regular distribution of rations was a most unusual event." It was all very well for the Emperor to issue orders (7th October) recalling that "one should always have four days' bread in reserve;" but where was the bread to come from?

On the 9th October, General Bourcier writes: "It is with the utmost difficulty that my Division has so far been able to provide itself with subsistence. For several days they have had neither bread nor meat, and only most scanty supplies of forage, particularly of oats. The villages I have had to occupy have been completely cleared out by preceding columns."

"The same day Suchet was still able to issue bread to his Division, thanks, no doubt, to the measures taken by Soult (his corps commander); but the remaining Divisions of the 4th Corps, from his own report, had to go without; and, worn out by the awful weather, had to halt at Augsburg to receive two days' rations."

"The troops are exhausted by fatigue," wrote Vandamme, "and suffer particularly from want of food. It is most urgent that we should at last receive some issues of provisions."

Fortunately a convoy of 4000 rations and a magazine of corn and oats fell into their hands about the following day.

On the same date Marmont also wrote: "The troops would have marched at once, and should have slept at Pörnbach if the cruel hunger from which they suffer had not rendered it indispensable to halt in order to distribute to them some provisions. They are to receive a third of a ration of bread and some potatoes, after which they will resume the march and, I hope, make good three leagues on the road to Pfaffenhofen."

Next day he writes to Berthier: "I have the honour to recall to your recollection our want of food; it is extreme."

This state of destitution in which most of the corps now found themselves does not appear to have astonished the Emperor, for in answer to Marmont's complaints Berthier writes on the 11th October:—

"In all the letters which M. le General Marmont writes to me, he speaks of 'provisions.' I must repeat to him that in the War of Invasion now being prosecuted by the Emperor there are no

* From personal knowledge I can state that such weather in this district in October is absolutely unprecedented. October there is usually almost as perfect as in the Indian plains.

magazines; it is the duty of the generals commanding the corps to provide themselves with the means of subsistence in the country they traverse. The General Marmont has received the orders to provide himself with four days' bread and biscuit in advance; he cannot, therefore, count on anything but the resources he procures for himself, as all the other Corps of the Grand Army do likewise, and no one knows better than General Marmont the manner in which the Emperor makes war."

This letter deserves study, as it reveals in the clearest manner the "driving force" Napoleon knew how to apply. As M. Colin points out, "it would be indeed a difficult task to reconcile a satisfactory system of supply with the extreme mobility absolutely essential to the methods of the Grand Army," but be this as it may, the fact remains that the extreme privations undergone by the troops brought in their trains maraud, pillage, and the break-up of discipline.

Davout writes on the 11th October to Berthier:—

"I have the honour to represent to your Excellency that it has become absolutely necessary to take prompt measures to put a stop to the marauding and pillaging, which have reached the limits of excess; the inhabitants of the districts see with the keenest anguish that at the moment when their Prince and Army are making common cause with us, they are receiving worse treatment than when allied with Austria against us. I have the honour to solicit your Excellency to procure for me the authority of his Majesty to shoot a few of these scoundrels—terrible examples are necessary to stop this evil, which is constantly growing."

To this he received no reply—and the fact, taken in conjunction with Berthier's letter to Marmont, reveals only too clearly the Machiavellian insight of the Emperor. Hunger was the "driving force"—what matter if the inhabitants suffered, the weakly men amongst the troops died? The survivors had to hunt for their dinners like wolves in a pack; thus, and thus only, could "mobility," the secret of his "strategy," be imparted to the mass.

Even in the Guard, M. Colin thinks matters were not much better, and cites a letter from Captain Bugeaud, afterwards the celebrated "Père Bugeaud," written to his sister, in support of this view. I translate it literally, as it seems to me hardly sufficient to support the charge.

"Judge for yourself whether when 10,000 men arrive in a village it is easy for each to find something to eat. What troubles me most are the vexations and acts of theft committed on the peasants; their poultry, their wood, their lard, all is taken with or without their leave. I do not do these things myself, but—when

I am very hungry I tolerate in secret and taste my share of the spoil." Personally I would not condemn the Guard on such evidence, but the whole tone of the correspondence above cited prepares one to accept the better known accounts of Thiébault and Fezensac. The former in his Memoires (vol. iii. p. 427) writes: "The night following our departure from Memmingen struck a heavy blow at our discipline, and it was not long before we experienced the results. The men of the Corps who hitherto by their good conduct had shown themselves worthy of having been members of the Camp of Boulogne became pillagers, and even began to rob the peasants of their money. They had a saying, 'The enemy is like a sheaf of corn, the more you beat him the more he shells out,' and this extortion of money by violence became a settled habit."

Fezensac sums up the whole story of these sufferings and disorders in the following passage, which to my mind conveys a picture of facts governing Napoleon's strategy absolutely indispensable for the student's guidance.

"This short campaign proved for me an epitome of all which were to come after it. The extremity of fatigue, the want of food, the terrible weather, the disorders of the marauders, nothing was wanting, and in one month I tasted a sample of what was to be my destiny during the whole of my career. The brigades, even the regiments, were sometimes dispersed. The order to reunite arrived late, because it had to filter through so many offices. Hence the troops were marching day and night, and I saw for the first time men sleeping as they marched. I could not have believed it possible. Thus we reached our destinations without having eaten anything and finding nothing to eat. It was all very well for Berthier to write: 'In the war of invasion, as the Emperor makes it, there are no magazines; it is for the generals to provide themselves from the country as they traverse it,' but the generals had neither time nor means to procure regularly what was required for the needs of such a numerous army. It was an authorisation of pillage, and the districts we passed through suffered cruelly. We were often hungry, and the terrible weather intensified our sufferings. A steady, cold rain, or, rather, half-melted snow, fell incessantly, and we stumbled along in the cold mud, churned up by our passage almost up to our knees—the wind made it impossible to light fires. On the 16th October the weather was so infamous that not a soul remained at his post. One found neither sentries nor pickets; even the artillery remained unguarded. Every one sought shelter as best he could, and never again, except in Russia, did I see the Army suffer so much, or in such disorder. . . . All these causes

developed insubordination and marauders. When in such weather the troops entered a village, it was hard to get them out again—hence the number of stragglers roaming about the country became considerable. The inhabitants were exposed to ill-treatment of all descriptions; and the wounded officers, left behind, who tried to assert their authority, were openly defied and threatened by the marauders. All these details are unknown to those who read the history of our campaigns, one sees only a valiant army whose soldiers vie with their officers for glory, and the price of suffering paid for the most brilliant successes is forgotten." M. Colin concludes: "Such was the condition of the Grand Army in October, 1805, and thus we must picture it, in following day by day its forced marches and its victories."

Resuming now the thread of events. Though after the publication of Captain Desborde's 'Projets des debarquements et invasions sur L'Angleterre,' there can be no doubt of the reality of Napoleon's designs against England in the beginning; the progress of diplomacy, doubtless instigated from this side of the Channel, and which found expression ultimately in the alliance between Russia and Austria, soon compelled the Emperor to frame an alternative line of action, and that this was conceived in its broad outlines at an early date is shown in his letter to Luchesini, the Prussian Ambassador, dated 27th November, 1803, in reply to an attempt on the part of that country to induce him to consent to the neutralisation of the Southern States. In this he states: "It is on the road from Strasburg to Vienna that the French must force peace on Austria, and it is this road that you wish us to renounce."

To this idea he clung all along, until, having set his troops in motion on the 25th August, in the expectation of reaching the Inn before the Austrians, news reached him on the 26th which pointed to the preparations of the latter being far more advanced than he had supposed, and led him to transfer the weight of his forces more to his left than he had at first intended, to meet any possible interference of the Russians coming from the frontier of Bohemia.

In this first project for his "strategical deployment," based on the information then to hand, it was anticipated that Bavaria could be occupied and covered before the Austrians could mobilise, and his ruling idea was an advance on as broad a front as possible, for convenience of subsistence, beyond the line Würzburg–Ulm, both of which he counted on reaching before the enemy, and no destination was assigned to the Bavarian Corps under Wrede, as it was impossible to foresee what might happen to it. In all

probability it would be found in peaceful occupation of its own cantonments, ready to act as an advance guard to the French Army on the march towards the Inn.

Actually the sudden irruption of the Austrians very nearly overwhelmed it long before the Grand Army arrived, and it was only by a clever ruse that Wrede succeeded in withdrawing it northwards, ultimately concentrating it around Bamberg.

In all this there is no trace of a notion of the advantage of a "re-entering base," over which successive generations of our Staff College students have ever since stumbled.

As for Würzburg, or its existence as a fortress capable of serving as a base in any sense to the troops which merely marched through it, the idea is ludicrous to any one who has ever seen the place. It was at the time a rather substantially fortified mediæval "schlosz," overlooking a small German town of perhaps 8000 inhabitants, and, owing to its situation, overlooked by high mountains within easy range of its exposed masonry, the place had no military value whatever. Nor had it occurred at this time to the Emperor to utilise the Main as a line of supply, for it was not till the 16th September that he at last despatched an officer, "Desalles" by name, to find out amongst other things whether the Main was *navigable*, and if so, how many days it required to work up the stream from Mayence; it was only some days later that he learnt that, even when the weather was favourable, it usually took from eight to ten days to make the transit—but that the water would be at its worst within a fortnight. It is, therefore, to the last degree improbable that a single boat-load of stores reached the place till after Ulm had fallen; and though orders were subsequently issued to provide bakeries, etc., in great numbers, it was days before these could be built, and when built the local bakers professed themselves quite unable to understand the use of these new-fangled French ovens.

As pointed out above, the Bavarians went to Bamberg because they had to, no other line of retreat being open to them; but Bernadotte's Corps (the 1st) had been for some time at Göttingen, and ultimately did actually march through Würzburg. The two facts together probably led to the idea that Napoleon from the first had included this march in the scope of his design; but curiously though the facts are as stated, Bernadotte did not march by the straight road connecting the two points, as one would have anticipated, but actually moved due west from Göttingen till he struck the great road from Cassel to Frankfurt, and would have entered that town had he not found it already occupied by Davout's columns. To avoid confusion, he was switched off by Berthier on

to the Hanau–Aschaffenburg road, and had to make such severe marches over difficult roads that, though he reached Würzburg on the assigned date, his men were so done up that they had to be given three whole days of rest. It seems to me, therefore, that at this date no importance whatever can have been attached to the flanking position at Göttingen, first, because it flanked nothing —the Austrians were not yet in Ulm—and, secondly, if it had been important, Bernadotte's orders would have been far too precise to admit such freedom of movement.

The truth would appear to be that Bernadotte's position in Hannover was, under the circumstances, an element of weakness rather than of strength. He had been sent to occupy that country as an act of war against Great Britain, and his presence not only gave umbrage to Prussia, but was intensely resented by all the North German States.

Feeling was so strong against the French that his corps was very nearly in the position of a besieged garrison, his officers had to be ordered to move about in civilian dress to avoid possible insults to the uniform which it would be impossible to ignore and unwise to attempt to resent, and he evidently felt, when at length the orders to move arrived, that any attempt to move through the difficult defiles due south to his objective might lead to acts of hostility which would not only compromise his own safety, but add enormously to the risks attending the whole operation. Under these circumstances he considered it wiser to fall back straight towards the main Army, as the inhabitants were far more likely to welcome this as a sign of evacuation, and would facilitate his withdrawal instead of opposing it.

F. N. MAUDE.

(*To be continued.*)

BRITISH FIELD ORGANISATION.

A SUGGESTION.

BY MAJOR J. L. J. CLARKE.

HOWEVER well the Army Corps system may be adapted for purposes of peace administration, I think it is pretty well agreed that an Army Corps, constituted as it at present is, does not, for several reasons, provide the best possible organisation for our requirements on active service in the field.

An Army Corps in our service comprises the following units ;—

Infantry, 25 battalions.	R E., 9 companies.
Cavalry, 2 regiments.	A.S.C., 14 ,,
Artillery, 26 batteries.	R.A.M.C., 16 ,,

or a total, in round numbers, of roughly

36,000 officers and men, 10,000 animals, 1400 vehicles.

It is organised into three Infantry divisions and corps troops, which latter consist of one battalion Infantry, one regiment and one squadron of Cavalry, one brigade each of Horse and Field Artillery, besides R.E., A.S.C., and R.A.M.C. units.

An Infantry division is divided into two Infantry brigades and divisional troops, which latter consist of one squadron Cavalry, two brigades of R.F.A., and R.E., A.S.C., and R.A.M.C. units.

An Infantry brigade comprises four battalions of Infantry with a supply column, bearer company, and field hospital.

In studying the foregoing component parts of an Army Corps, the following defects become at once apparent :—

(*a*) The very small proportion of mounted troops (exclusive of Artillery) in proportion to the Infantry.

(*b*) The entire absence of any Mounted Infantry.

(*c*) The apparently arbitrary manner in which units are divided and sub-divided; for instance, as regards Infantry there are three divisions in an Army Corps, but only two brigades in a division. Then there are four battalions in a brigade, but eight companies in a battalion. As regards Artillery, there are three batteries in a brigade, and three sections in a battery. As regards Cavalry,

there are four squadrons in a regiment, and four troops in a squadron. Then there are the Cavalry brigade of three regiments, and the Cavalry division of two brigades, but these do not form component parts of an Army Corps.

(*d*) The total number of troops—viz. 36,000, under the command of one General, and forming one tactical unit—would appear to be too great, and the unit consequently too unwieldy a machine for effective use in the field.

Now it appears to me that our field organisation should aim at the production of a force constituted so as to provide—

(1) A compact mixed force of all three arms of the service, with an adequate proportion of mounted troops and guns, but not to exceed in total numbers 12,000 men.

(2) This force to be divided, for purposes of command and administration, into lesser units, in which the different arms of the service would be separate.

(3) The force to be so organised that a detached force of all three arms of the service could easily be formed by placing one or more of the smaller units of each arm together under the command of one officer.

(4) All divisions and sub-divisions of the force to be co-ordinated, and I cannot help thinking that *three* is the best for tactical purposes, and in accordance with our present drill-books. The division of a force into three parts in the field gives a pivot or centre portion with bodies on either flank for deployments and line formations. In small column formations it gives a first line, support, and reserve. In attack formations on a large scale it at once, without any splitting up of units, provides the first, second, and third lines of the attacking force. In outposts it facilitates the formation of the picket line, the supports, and the reserve. In reconnoitring and patrolling it gives a centre pivot, and point, and flankers. Moreover, I think that the division into three would also be advantageous from an administrative point of view.

Now in order to formulate the foregoing suggestions I would put forward the following proposals:—

(1) The Army Corps as a tactical unit to be abolished, and in lieu thereof a mixed force of all three arms to be established as the largest unit in the field. This force to be called a "Field Division." A force comprising more than one "Field Division" could then be styled a "Field Army."

A Field Division might be composed as follows:—

(*a*) Three Infantry brigades.
(*b*) One Cavalry brigade.
(*c*) Three Field Artillery brigades.
(*d*) Three Field Companies R.E.
(*e*) Divisional Supply Column.
(*f*) Divisional Field Hospital.

(2) Carrying on the principle of division by three, an Infantry brigade would consist of three battalions, supply column, and bearer company.

A battalion would consist of three companies (but these would be over 200 strong, and answer to the double companies of the Indian Army and continental systems). A company would be divided into three sections. A section into three sub-sections. A sub-section into three groups. A group to consist of six men (three in the front and three in the rear rank).

A machine-gun with each company would provide a machine-gun section of three guns to the battalion.

(3) The Cavalry brigade to consist of three regiments of Cavalry, one brigade of three batteries of Horse Artillery, one battalion of M.I., supply column, and three bearer companies.

Of the above, a regiment of Cavalry to be organised in three squadrons, each squadron containing three troops, and a troop to be divided into three groups of twelve men each.

To each Cavalry regiment a pom-pom section of three guns to be attached, capable of being split up to admit of one gun being detached with a squadron acting independently if need be.

A battery of Horse Artillery to be divided into three sections as at present; and an ammunition column for the brigade.

A battalion of Mounted Infantry to consist of three companies.

A company of Mounted Infantry to be divided into three sections, and each section sub-divided into three sub-sections. A sub-section to be divided into three groups, each consisting of three men. In action the centre man of each group would take charge of the led horses of the flank men.

(4) Each brigade of Field Artillery to consist of three batteries, each divided into three sections of two guns as at present, and an ammunition column.

(5) A Field Company R.E. to be divided into three sections, so that a section could be detached as an independent unit with a small mixed force if required.

(6) Army Service Corps and R.A.M.C. units furnishing supply columns, bearer companies, and field hospitals to be similarly organised.

The next point to be considered is how can the above proposals for field organisation be adapted to fit in with existing conditions, and with peace administration, without involving too heavy an expenditure? That considerable difficulties would be met with must be admitted, but I do not think they would be insurmountable. Let us consider the following points *seriatim*:—

(1) First of all it must be borne in mind that it is not necessary

for all the units composing a "Field Division" to be permanently quartered in the same station or district, but it should not be difficult to arrange for them all to be accommodated in one "command." In Germany, the units composing a territorial Army Corps are, as a rule, scattered in various garrisons within the area allotted to the Army Corps, and are concentrated by brigades, divisions, etc., for the annual training and manœuvres. A similar system could be adopted by us with advantage.

(2) Under the present scheme, outlined by the War Office Reconstitution Committee, the 1st Army Corps is to be retained and completed, by placing Salisbury Plain and the troops there under the command of the general officer commanding that Army Corps. I would suggest that out of the troops now quartered at Aldershot and Salisbury, two complete "Field Divisions" be organised—the remaining units quartered there would be available for lines of communication or other duties in war-time; in peace they could be brigaded with troops from other commands, or with auxiliary forces for manœuvres and training. The existing Schools of Instruction, etc., at Aldershot not to be interfered with. This plan would involve more barracks being built on Salisbury Plain, as that would appear to be the best place for the Cavalry of the 2nd Field Division; it is believed that the building of these barracks has already been contemplated, but abandoned for the present.

(3) As regards the other "Commands" the Northern, Eastern, and Irish, might, I think, furnish *one* Field Division each without involving enormous expenditure, but it is doubtful whether the same would apply to the Western Command.

(4) From paragraphs (2) and (3) it will be seen that five "Field Divisions" would be provided, each consisting of from 10 to 11,000 men, to be stationed in the United Kingdom. These, in conjunction with the regular troops, Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, required for protection of lines of communication, defence of coast posts, important garrisons, etc., might well suffice for a Home Standing Army.

(5) No mention has been made hitherto of the auxiliary forces, because the field organisation I have outlinedis primarily intended for foreign expeditions or campaigns abroad, carried on by our regular forces without the assistance of the auxiliary forces. Should it be considered necessary, however, it would be possible to extend the organisation so as to form "Field Divisions," consisting of Militia, or Volunteers, and Imperial Yeomanry; but the Field Artillery would have to be supplied from the regulars. For home defence, in any case, the fullest possible use would have to be made of the auxiliary forces, because it would be just when our Field

Army was engaged in a campaign abroad, and our Navy possibly fully occupied in maintaining command of the sea, that an attempt might be made to invade our shores.

As the establishment of the regular forces in the United Kingdom, proposed by this scheme, would, numerically, be considerably weaker than at present, it would be imperative to maintain a thoroughly efficient auxiliary force for home defence, whose organisation might well be based on similar principles to those adapted for the Field Army.

(6) The next consideration is the field organisation for our regular forces abroad. Apart from South Africa and India, the garrisons of our foreign stations are mostly in the nature of defensive forces, consisting of Garrison Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, and there does not seem to be any necessity to alter the present conditions, except in the minor details of organisation. In South Africa, however, I think the forces might well be organised into two field divisions over and above the troops required for lines of communication, garrisons of coast ports, etc.

(7) As regards India, the Army Corps system has never been introduced, and in all the frontier wars mixed divisions of all arms have been employed, with the British and Indian forces combined, with very good results. I would, therefore, only suggest such changes in the composition of an Indian division as might be considered applicable to the requirements of field organisation in that country.

(8) In conclusion, I would summarise the proposals contained in this "suggestion" as follows:—

(*a*) Abolition of the Army Corps as a Service unit.

(*b*) Establishment of "Field Divisions" as the fighting units of the regular Standing Army—and possibly also of the auxiliary forces. Five of the former to be stationed in the United Kingdom, two in South Africa, and in India as may be required.

(*c*) The division and sub-division of all units in a field division into *three* smaller units, and so on.

(*d*) The introduction of the "Double Company System" in the Infantry.

(*e*) The inclusion of a battalion of Mounted Infantry in a field division as a component part of the Cavalry brigade.

(*f*) Reorganisation and greater efficiency to be effected in the auxiliary forces, consequent upon the reduction in numbers of the Regular Army.

J. L. J. CLARKE.

THE ORGANISATION OF VOLUNTEER INFANTRY AND THE TRAINING OF ITS OFFICERS.

By Captain T. Fetherstonhaugh.

When the financial side of the question has not to be considered, it is easy to put forward suggestions and to propose reforms. But when the Army estimates seem to increase at a quicker rate than the British people learn to realise the importance of having their defensive forces at least equal in power to the capabilities of the offensive forces of other nations when landed on our shores, this matter has to be seriously considered. So I will commence these few suggestions that I submit to the criticism of wiser heads than mine, by considering where we can reduce expenditure.

First I would ask, do we require the large number of volunteers that is now shown to be under arms? And would we not get more value for our money if we reduced this number by one-third, and spent the money thus saved by increasing the military value of the remaining two-thirds?

Only those who are charged with the preparation of the country's schemes for defence against invasion have the data at hand for determining the number of men required, but if the existing number is really necessary, most people will allow that the Volunteer Force requires a great deal to be done for it to make it a reliable force for the purpose it was raised. If it be conceded that the numbers can be reduced, let us consider the advisability of doing so, for under the present system the country, in many places, is over volunteered. To begin with, officers cannot be obtained, and it is little use enrolling men when you cannot get the officers to instruct them. The question of how we are going to find suitable officers, trained in accordance with the requirements of modern scientific warfare, for the non-regular forces on whom we rely so much for our home defence, is the most serious one of any, for, given an adequate supply of officers, we can always raise men in our country, but an armed mob is as dangerous to us as to any other country. Now, the supply is nothing near equal to the demand. In a former article in this magazine I submitted a suggestion that the Government should offer premiums for military

knowledge, and so make it a subject in secondary education; but we need not consider this here, for we are dealing with the volunteer when we have caught him, not when we hope to catch him. A volunteer officer should not only have sufficient leisure to attend to his duties and to keep himself abreast of the requirements of the times he lives in, but he should have an assured social or business position. The position of an officer in a corps recruited from one district or town is of more importance than in one generally recruited, for obvious reasons, and a volunteer officer has not only to be respected by his men, but by the whole district his men come from, if the work is to be carried out without friction, and the sometimes baneful effect of local influences to be guarded against. In theory we recognise that, given merit, a cook's son can be as good an officer as a duke's son; but do we carry that out in practice?

Most volunteer commanding officers will allow that, if they were relieved of certain financial anxieties, they could do without a lot of their men, and by so doing have a more efficient corps. To begin with, money might be saved by having only a service dress, which would dispose of the element that volunteers for the sake only of sporting an attractive uniform. Dress may affect recruiting, but the military value of a man whose martial ardour can only be roused in this fashion is open to question, especially when his training has often to be carried out under unattractive conditions and his efficiency as a fighting man greatly depends on his own efforts and enthusiasm. Then the pot-hunting element might be got rid of, and we may hope that the raising of civilian rifle-clubs will facilitate this. Practically this element has little military value, for it refuses to shoot under service conditions, and discourages young volunteers, who, when they see that valuable prizes can only be obtained by spending more money on weapons and more time on the range than they can afford to give, soon lose heart. Also the young generation is beginning to recognise the unpracticability of the usual form of prize-firing. As many of the volunteers who only regard their corps as State-assisted rifle-clubs are physically unsuited for active service on account of age, they would be far better off in these civilian rifle-clubs. The more a battalion is weeded out, the higher rises its reputation as a workmanlike unit in the estimation of its district, the more eager are its members to improve themselves, and the more ready are employers to let their men have reasonable facilities for getting to drill; so its institutions are more willingly supported by the public; greater efficiency, both individually and collectively, with a corresponding greater self-respect, is obtained; and employers feel, when

their men go to them and ask for time off to attend to volunteer duties, that they can accede to these requests, feeling that by doing so they are performing a patriotic duty towards their country by assisting to supply it with well-trained soldiers. Therefore, do not let us be afraid of losing men by increasing the work, but rather put the pressure on until we substitute a smaller force of armed and trained men with a proper complement of officers for an armed one that is acknowledged to be short of officers, and spend the money saved out of the total the country is prepared to give in perfecting the training of the units, the organisation of the transport, the provision of signallers, and on any of the other things that go towards building up a useful, mobile citizen army for the defence of these shores.

A large volunteer force makes great demands on the employers of labour, which is another reason why the active part of it should have a numerical limit. Employers lose money by giving their men time off, and they receive no rebatement of taxation that would help to equalise what should be the common burden. Consequently they may well argue that their contributions towards the defence of the country are greater than of those who do not employ men. If the Volunteer Force is to flourish, it must be on good terms with these, for it is so greatly dependent on them, and it is manifestly unfair that their goodwill should be too severely tried, and that it should sometimes be put out of their power, without incurring serious financial loss, to do what we may be thankful many of them regard as a patriotic duty which they feel they have a moral obligation to perform.

It is very generally recognised now that the volunteer brigades should have an adequate staff independent of the regimental districts. The system of giving the commands of brigades to the officers commanding the regimental districts in peace-time cannot work well in war-time. In the event of a general mobilisation, these officers would have their hands far too full of important duties to be able to command a brigade as well, and in peace-time they are filling the places that the officers who are to command the brigades in war-time should be in, if they are ever to be given an opportunity of getting a personal acquaintanceship with their commands. And one does not have to go far to find suitable brigadiers. In the Regular Army few colonels of battalions can hope to attain general officers' rank, for the supply of experienced men in the prime of life far exceeds the demand for generals. We lose the value of a great deal of experience in letting these pass out of the service, and we are not well enough off for senior officers in our non-regular forces to do so. If volunteer colonels can be found who have been able

to acquire sufficient knowledge of war as to be able to command a brigade in the field, by all means make use of them—but can we do this? We could find no better men than the ex-colonels of regular battalions, who are still active and energetic, and are on the retired list through no fault or wish of their own, but whose interest in the service is as keen as ever. But to make use of these, as well as to teach a brigade to manage its own affairs, the control of the volunteer brigades must be divorced from the regimental districts, for no man likes to serve as junior to one whose senior he has once been, as might easily happen if ex-colonels of regular battalions took the commands of volunteer brigades in districts to which their old battalions belonged. Horse allowance with £200 a year in addition to their pensions would be well spent on employing these officers, and many a useful man would not be allowed to become rusty in undesired non-employment.

The brigade major should be an officer on the active list, who has been an adjutant of volunteers, and who might be appointed to this post after an interval of at least two years' regimental duty, when his work as a volunteer adjutant had been satisfactory. This would form an extra incentive for adjutants to work well, and there would be no difficulty in getting good men, once the work is made such as a good man will take up. An army like ours, which has such a large part of it abroad, loses many useful men on account of their being unable, for private reasons, to soldier abroad in peace-time, for many leave the service every year for this reason, therefore appointments of this kind will serve the country well in two ways.

Most of the brigades already have bearer companies, but they should have supply and transport companies as well. There should be no regimental transport beyond that required for a machine-gun and S.A.A. cart, or S.A.A. mules. The battalions have quite enough to do to train their riflemen, without having odd jobs, however necessary, put on to them, and the work will be far better done if a brigade transport organisation were adopted.

To enable the brigade staff to work its brigade as an independent unit, I would separate the volunteer brigade district entirely from the regimental district, as before proposed, and give the general officer commanding the "training district" a staff officer for volunteers only. The brigade would work as like a regular brigade as circumstances permit, and whilst the brigadier would carry out the inspections of the battalions, the general officer commanding, or a staff officer deputed by him, would inspect the brigade as now.

Volunteer battalions differ so much in the circumstances under which they work, that it is impossible to force an inflexible

organisation on them without seriously handicapping them. So different are these circumstances made by the manner in which their members gain their livelihood in civil life—whether the battalion is in a town where it is all together, or in the country, with many outlying companies and sections; the proximity of ranges and drill-grounds; and the existence of suitable spots for the annual camps—that it would almost seem that we ought to have two classes of volunteer corps and brigades, urban and rural. So it is only possible, without going to a greater length than is suitable to a short magazine article, to discuss the point on broad lines, bearing in mind that the more elastic the organisation is, the more suitable it will be for training the pick of the population. In our reduced Volunteer Force we want to have the best of the available young men.

There is little doubt that volunteer work makes more demands on the time of young tradesmen, and their like, than it is possible for many of them to support, and that many leave for that reason. The week in camp, although a very valuable part of the annual training, causes many resignations through sheer inability of men to get away to attend it. But it would cause some to make extra efforts to attend, did they know that there was a time when, after a certain length of service, they would not have to go to camp and could still remain volunteers. For this reason we might permit 25 per cent. to pass into a reserve after attending five yearly camps, and only call on this reserve to fire its musketry course, perform ten drills per annum, and attend the annual inspection. As to who was placed in this reserve should be left entirely to the volunteer commanding officer, and no volunteer should be allowed to consider that he had a right to enter it after five trainings. Also commanding officers should have power to transfer a man either from the reserve to the active list, or *vice versâ*, when qualified, provided the strength of the former does not exceed 25 per cent. of the whole. In this way commanding officers would be given a means of retaining a useful man temporarily too hard-worked to conform with the requirements of the position of an active volunteer, and of getting rid of an unsatisfactory one, by simply refusing him entrance to the reserve even when qualified. This reserve should be made up in a separate section in each company, and should participate in all the privileges of an ordinary volunteer, so that men should consider that they are on a good job when they enter it. By this means, I submit that many good men will be kept in the ranks, and, although attendance at camp be not compulsory, enough men would attend, where they could, to keep the whole reserve up to the mark.

The Secretary of State for War has been pretty firm about insisting that the regulation regarding the attendance in camp of volunteers should be complied with, and we may hope that he will continue so regarding active volunteers, for it is the most useful part of the training they get, but there are ways in which battalions might be assisted in carrying out those regulations. Brigade camps are necessary to allow the brigade staff to practise their field duties, and battalions always benefit by rubbing shoulders with one another; but every brigade should have its permanent camping area in its own district, and every battalion its own camping ground in this area, to which it should go year after year, so that it could erect permanent cook-houses, canteens, mess-rooms, etc., and by doing so remove one of the chief causes of expense that fall on corps in going to camp. It is difficult to find a piece of ground in most districts on which a brigade can be camped in the regulation formation and trained as well, and there is less difficulty in finding four battalion camping grounds, each within about a mile of a central fifth, headquarter one. As for officers and men getting to know the ground too well, there is little danger of that, for they have plenty of time to forget between the last day of one training and the first of the next. The chief disadvantage of sending a brigade to a place constantly occupied by troops is that in these places it gets too much done for it; and a most important part of its training is that which makes it feed itself, look after its own sick, and run its own transport, as it is forced to do when it camps by itself. The chief disadvantage of a brigade camping at home is that the picnic element is apt to show up too much, but a little firmness soon overcomes that, and the people of a district must be given a chance of seeing the brigade if their interest in it is to be maintained; also it is a matter that affects the recruiting of the Army as well. The time at the men's disposal has to be considered, also the burden put on the employer's shoulders when extra time has to be asked for to get to some far-away place. The easier for the men to get to the annual camp the better; for the provisional camps at odd times of the year are unpopular with them, and if they go to camp, many will either go only with their battalion, or not at all.

When we come to the question of the officers we come to that aspect of volunteering which requires most consideration, but, in my humble opinion, the difficulties can be overcome. We may hope that eventually officers will join their corps with a certain knowledge of the soldier's craft learnt in the days of their youth, but this has not come to pass yet, and we have to consider what we can do for them now. There is only one way of catching

volunteer officers, and that is to make the attractions of their volunteer life and work at least equal in interest to what their lives would be if they devoted them to the ruling British passion of participating in, or watching, games. This at once brings us to the question of training them, and we want to obtain our material when it is young and enthusiastic, and as it learns and grows older, to foster its enthusiasm until military thought and work has become a habit of life. To commence with, the recruit officer should have done at least a year's time in the ranks, both to teach him the ways of reasoning in the lower ranks and to give his superiors an opportunity of judging his capabilities. During the first two years of his officer's service, or when an aspirant to a commission, he should be required to join a class held in the brigade district or at some depôt taught by one of the adjutants in the brigade, who are in a better position than most regular officers for getting to know what a volunteer requires to learn. This course of instruction should last for five weeks of five working days a week, Tuesday morning to Saturday evening, leaving Sunday and Monday for private affairs, three consecutive weeks to be compulsory, the remaining two to be put in at the candidate's option, either following the first three, or during the last two weeks of any class held before the termination of his first two years' service. The young officer should be required to know his company drill before he joins the course, and the day's work would be made up of two hours' drill, and as many hours of tactical instruction, both theoretical and practical, range-finding practice, control of fire, and other necessary things, as can be put in. At the termination of the course examine him, give him his outfit allowance, and award him Certificate A. if ordinarily efficient, and A.T. if he shows good tactical ability. But do not stint the instructor of means of making this course an interesting one, for he has not only to teach his pupils enough to pass an examination, but has to rouse their interest so much that they should carry away from the course a feeling that they are riding a hobby that will ever keep open to them further possibilities of interesting employment. Give him books, maps, models, instruments, and a comfortable room to work in. Make the class live in barracks, so that they may learn the proper bearing of an officer, and become acquainted with the barrack life routine they may some day have to live under themselves, and let the final examination be conducted by the brigadier, the brigade major, and an adjutant.

Before appointment to the rank of captain, require the officer to attend a school of instruction, at some military centre where the three arms can be seen at work, for a fortnight; and require some

evidence of tactical ability from him before he goes. Ordinary drill should not be included in this course, for the battalions should be made responsible that their officers know this, but a great deal of the work that is now done at Hythe, except that to do with machine guns, which is better left to specialists, could be included. Range-finding, the theory of musketry, the employment of rifles in the hands of a company, the leading of a company in action, the principles of the defence of a position, should be gone into as far as time permits, and a few hours spent in an armourer's shop would not be time wasted. As the time that volunteers can afford to spend on attendances at classes is so short, the instruction should be directed more towards explaining away difficulties and showing the officers what they cannot see in their own homes than in driving into them what is in black and white in the drill-books. At the termination of a fortnight have a practical examination, in fact, the written part of it would not lose in value if it were confined to drafting orders, and award Certificate B. or B.T. where the tactical knowledge is extra good.

Before an officer obtains the command of a battalion he should be required to attend at least two manœuvres, and to be favourably reported on as a suitable man by the brigadier and general officer commanding-in-chief. After each series of manœuvres he should be called on to criticise them before a board of regular field officers, and to answer a few questions on the employment of a battalion with a brigade. As before, award Certificate C. or C.T.

Insist on an officer being in possession of Certificates A., B., C., and before he is recommended for the volunteer officer's decoration, for this decoration should not only be a mark of long service, but of good service and ability also. At present it is possible that this is not always the case. When officers are at the classes, give them the pay of their rank, and treat them liberally in the matter of allowances. Do away with the Hythe course, for ordinary musketry is no more a specialist's concern than marching is, but keep machine-guns, signalling, surveying, advanced field fortification, and transport work for those who care to specialise. Have the B. Certificate classes in each army corps, or whenever convenient for the volunteers, provided troops of the three arms are present, and put an officer specially qualified for tactical and musketry ability on to conduct them.

But in addition to having courses of instruction we must, as well, institute something to keep the officers' interest up at home and to afford them facilities for instructing themselves. This might be done by brigade tactical societies, under the personal supervision of the brigadier, the brigade major, and the adjutants.

The State should assist these societies by awarding grants of money for the purchase of books, maps, instruments, etc., and by the provision of lecturers, who would supplement the instruction of the brigade staff with lectures on special subjects. But this society should not confine its operations to the headquarters of the brigade, and should travel, when necessary, to wherever a few officers can be got together, either for practical field work, or for theoretical work in a drill-hall by night. The brigade major should regard the working of this society as his special province, which might with advantage in its membership include selected non-commissioned officers as well as officers, and officers of the local corps of artillery, yeomanry, and militia.

It may be asked, how is all this instruction going to induce officers to study systematically and to compete with games and sports for their attention? It entirely depends on the instructors, and the facilities given by the Government. Select instructors, who, as well as being capable men, will go at their work in the proper spirit. Pay them well, for a man who not only is a capable man himself, but has the gift of making others capable men, is worth extra pay, and let the Government regard the volunteer officer in a more liberal way. Plenty of instructors will be forthcoming once the regular officer is shown that service in the volunteer force is a road to advancement, which is not the feeling in the service at present.

The permanent staff did its work well as long as only drill sergeants were required, but now men who can teach field work are absolutely necessary. The great fault of the present system is that service in the volunteers is looked on as a suitable finish for the military career of deserving old non-commissioned officers. It practically leads to nothing, so men think that their career is about done, and all that they have to do is to keep the pot boiling until the army gets tired of them. This is not a feeling that is conducive to efficiency, and prospects of advancement should be opened out to them. Undoubtedly the sergeant-major should be a warrant officer, and again these warrant officers should be promoted, as required, to the rank of quartermaster, with pay at £100 a year. A quartermaster with clerical experience, who would also act as secretary to the finance committee, is badly needed in most corps. Also the permanent staff should be younger men when they join the volunteers, and they should be sufficiently well educated to be able to give good theoretical, as well as practical instruction to the volunteer non-commissioned officers. Both they and the adjutant should be given facilities for keeping themselves up in their work: the former by a better annual

training in the depôts, or, better still, with a regular battalion; the latter by being given opportunities of attending staff rides and manœuvres, or special courses under a staff officer for instruction which should include battalion and brigade drill.

The volunteer system of finance has few friends, and we may well consider whether it suits its purpose. It assumes that if a volunteer does so much work he is worth a certain amount to his country, so the Government gives that amount to the corps that has raised him. But actually the number of so-called efficients in a corps is little criterion as to the military value of that corps. Any who have worked with volunteers can call to mind efficients who are worth much more than the grant they have earned to their country, and others who are not worth twopence. It would surely be more suitable for the Government to first convene a Board, composed of military and financial members, under the presidency of the general officer commanding the army corps, to consider, first, whether it is advisable to have a corps in a certain district, considering the supply available of prospective officers and men, and the opportunities of training them; the most suitable strength for the battalion; the cost of maintaining it, taking into consideration the buildings and ranges at its disposal and those required, the facilities for getting the corps together for drill, etc., and all the many items that eat away a corps' income; the strategical consideration of the position of the district, and anything else that the state of the times requires that attention should be paid to. Then let the Government decide whether the investment is worth the money. If it is, contract with the colonel for an efficient battalion at such a strength at so much, and let the efficiency of the battalion be judged on by the result of the annual inspection. Unless a general has to decide on the general efficiency of a battalion, it is a little difficult to understand what it is inspected for, and the country would have a better assurance that it has made a good bargain had it the evidence of a skilled soldier judging by what he saw in the field than reams of paper evidence could give it. If the battalion is judged non-efficient, inquire into the causes for this, and either get rid of the colonel, or reduce the strength of the battalion until it represents what the district can give with efficiency. By all means have a fixed minimum of drills, etc., to be performed, but do not punish the corps for the sins of a few. Rather make it compulsory for colonels to prosecute volunteers who fail to carry out their engagements in the civil courts, except in certain cases which should be reported to higher authority before exemption be allowed, and so give the colonel the full support of the weight of the law, for although he has this now, he often finds it expedient,

in consideration of his personal popularity, which is of great importance to the well-being of his corps, not to act up to his full powers.

The present system is unfair in many ways. The cost of maintaining no two corps is the same, although they draw the same amount for the same number of efficients; so one located in London is treated the same as another in an out-country district, with no regard for the difference in the price of living, the rents that have to be paid, and the means of access to ranges and drill-grounds. As a nation, we should be too dignified to have to ask individuals to subscribe towards the provision of necessaries for our fighting forces. By all means ask for subscriptions to supply luxuries, but the funds of the State should furnish the necessaries. Once abolish the capitation grant, and the strength of the force will come down, but it will increase in efficiency, and the public purse will save, for, if we are to trust to the force in the hour of danger, we must see that we do not spend our money on next door to useless men, as many so-called efficients are, and we have learnt the cost of raising troops in a hurry at a moment of emergency, and the folly of doing so.

Many are of opinion that volunteers should be paid for the work they do. But let us hope that it is still possible to hold before our people the ideal that a sufficient quantity of us are ready to come forward to defend our inheritance without other remuneration than the sense of having fulfilled a duty towards our native land and towards our forefathers who have done so much for it. When, however, this is not recognised as a common duty, the State should insure that those who take it on them as a personal duty should not be prejudiced thereby in earning their livelihood. Therefore, any financial estimate for the expenses of a corps should provide for the provision of a subsistence allowance for the members of it when prevented by their volunteer duties from earning their daily wages, as during the annual camp, the word "subsistence" to refer to their civil work, and the amount to be based on the rate of wages and the expenses of living in the district the battalion is drawn from. In this the officers should be included, for the struggle for existence is often more severe in the young professional classes than in others lower in the social scale, and to make the system perfect, employers should be relieved of a portion of the burdens the State puts on them when the State shares with them the service of their employees. This would add greatly to the expenses of maintaining the force, but we must remember that the troops we shall have to meet if our shores are invaded will be the picked men of the nation they belong to, and in the men we send to meet

them we must have our very best, or we shall never avert disaster. The best of our men are not loafers, or those whose leisured life admits their affording a week off whenever agreeable to themselves, even if sufficient of these exist, but the men who do a man's work every day of their lives, and are morally and physically braced by industrious daily habits to support the responsibilities that are placed on them by their country. Therefore let us insure that we get these men in our reduced Volunteer Force.

If any one does me the honour of considering any of these ideas, which I submit with all due deference, I hope they will do so bearing in mind that it is not the large armies that win battles, when their numbers do not represent efficiency, but the small, well-trained ones; that it is better to pay any bill of costs to our own people in money alone than to a foreign power both in cash and national ruin; and that if our own people get our money, we still have the interest of it represented by a manly national spirit, with peace and security; but if the stranger gets it, it is lost for ever, and with its going will commence the decadence of our race. Let it not be said of this generation that it squandered its inheritance through unwillingness to find the time and money to guard it.

T. FETHERSTONHAUGH.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF Q.-F. ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.

By Captain C. Holmes Wilson, R.F.A.

The recent publication of the French drill regulations has led to criticisms in regard to the condition of our own. It has been stated that our drill-books require revision. The situation, however, appears to have been imperfectly understood. The adoption of Q.-F. guns of necessity entails some alteration in the details of the existing drill. These guns have been adopted abroad; they have not, however, been issued to our own Army yet. Consequently there can be no need for criticism when there is nothing to criticise. As, however, it is likely that our artillery will soon be rearmed, the following general remarks may possibly be of interest to those who have not already studied the subject for themselves.

Fire Effect.

The special characteristic of the Q.-F. gun is, of course, the rapidity of its fire. The rate of fire has been increased, but the character of the effect so produced has not been changed. It happens that the adoption of Q.-F. guns coincides with a period in which there have been general modifications in the tactics of all arms. The changes so produced cannot, however, be mixed up with those necessitated by the employment of these guns. It is clear that, though the rate of fire of the gun has been increased, its power has only been added to in regard to the special areas with which it may have to deal. The increase in the rate of fire makes it possible for a battery to produce a greater effect against a given target than it formerly did. It does not, however, make it possible for this effect to be transferred to another target that is at a totally different part of the field of battle. It is true, of course, that it may be possible for one battery, armed with the new gun, to produce as great an effect as, say, two armed with the old gun, and that one may thus be set free to act elsewhere. On the other hand, presuming the conditions to be dealt with to be constant, if we adopt such a line of reasoning we shall be asking one of the new batteries to do what was formerly expected of two of the old. There would then be no increase of power!

Various theories have been adduced as to why Q.-F. guns should be more powerful than ordinary guns. For instance, it is said that a great effect may be produced in a short time. The truth of such a statement must, however, largely depend on the nature of the object shot at. It would be an easy matter to draw up a system to deal with fixed conditions; unfortunately, however, it is the conditions to be dealt with, and not the systems dealing with them, that vary, consequently we must be ready to adopt ourselves to circumstances. Does such an adaptation, however, mean the adoption of a system in which more is to be thought of covering an area in which an enemy may appear, than of hitting the enemy when he does appear?

Systems are too frequently considered from the point of view of the firer without due consideration being paid to the feelings of the object fired on. It is true that demoralisation may be produced by sudden and effective action, and that sudden and effective action may be secured by a surprise. To effect a surprise, however, (1) the range must be known, or (2) the batteries must range rapidly. This at once raises the question of rapidity as opposed to accuracy. If the range is known, a rapid fire can be opened at once. If, however, the range is not known, a long bracket must be used, and if a long bracket is used, effect can only be looked for through distribution. It has been said that distribution for depth was attempted through the use of the ricochet of the shot in the days of smooth-bore guns. The greater precision of modern weapons then led to an attempt to gain effect by accuracy.

The French have now adopted systems in which they seek effect through distribution. Cases will, of course, arise in which systems embodying distribution must be used. On the other hand, if it were always possible to open direct fire, at once, on any part of the field, there would be no need for distribution. The enemy could be followed up by an overwhelming fire, the effects of which would be greater than those produced by any *rafale.* This would, however, necessitate rapid and accurate ranging, and the constant alteration of the range when found. If this were feasible we should then have what we may call a "direct-firing *rafale.*" I believe it to be possible, but as the questions involved are intricate, I shall discuss them, in detail, later.

The power of the Q.-F. gun lies in the rapidity of its fire and the fact that it can deal with any situation quickly. If, however, the gun is placed behind hills and cannot be used without the the manipulation of various instruments, a large proportion of this power will be lost. Consequently, excepting certain circumstances

in which an observing station must be used, everything should be sacrificed to the possibility that may occur at any moment of having to open a direct fire over the sights on any part of the field. Such a procedure cannot possibly involve any risk. Shields have been fitted to the guns to protect the detachments.* Thus as far as safety is concerned, the guns may be placed near the crest. From such a position they can be run forward when the moment for decisive action arrives. Whereas if they are at the bottom of a slope they must adopt indirect laying and distribution, by which no effect may be secured, whilst a large proportion of the ammunition fired must be wasted.

There are, however, occasions on which other methods must be used. For instance, speaking generally, it is clear that the best fire is that which produces the maximum of effect in the minimum of time. Arguing on this assumption, there is a growing tendency to seek results through sudden bursts of a rapid fire. The points in favour of this procedure appear to be these—

1. The opportunities offered for obtaining decisive results will be few and far between.

2. If they are to be made the most of, they must be dealt with rapidly.

We have already said that when the range is not known the best means of doing this is by using a long bracket, and distributing for length and breadth within the limits of the bracket so found. The question as to whether the same procedure should be adopted when the range is known has already been discussed.

It is, however, evident that most of the foreign systems have been framed with a view to firing on moving objects. Again, it is clear that as far as standing targets are concerned, there will be little difference in the method of dealing with them, except in regard to effecting a surprise or attempting to obtain great results in a short time. Thus, though we need not adopt the French regulations in their entirety, some change will soon be necessary. Then, again, there are other points at issue; thus, though the advantages of a direct fire are great, it may, in certain cases, be undesirable to place the guns too near the crest. In addition to this, if a surprise is to be effected, the guns must evidently be concealed. In such cases the only means of dealing with an area that the enemy is likely to cross, will be to cover it with a storm of shells. To do this some method embodying distribution must be used. Then, again, woods or cover can only be searched

* Unless the protection thus afforded is likely to prove effective, there can be no object in adding to the weight behind the teams.—C. H. W.

by distributing the fire over the area where the enemy is supposed to be. In all cases, however, the greatest effect will be produced by opening a carefully prepared fire suddenly. Consequently, to sum up, a long bracket and distribution will be required—

1. When ranging rapidly.
2. When, with a view to effecting a surprise, it is not found practicable to lay over the sights.
3. When the guns are too far down the crest to be run up on an emergency.
4. When searching woods or cover.
5. When for any reason it is not desired to expose the guns.
6. When observation is difficult.

To do this it may be necessary to keep batteries in observation of areas. It is, however, evident that there will be few modifications in many of the systems already in use. It would be foolish to attempt to lay down rules to deal with every emergency that may occur. Given a few general principles, the officers on the spot must be left to deal with the situation as they think best. Thus rules must only be looked on as a guide, or there will be a return to the red tape, from which all are so anxious to be free.

CONCENTRATION.

No regulations can deal adequately with every situation that is likely to occur in war. The tendency of the age is to decentralise responsibility. When a great battle is likely to become a series of small actions, it is impossible to say that the artillery should do this or that when the front involved may be a matter of several miles. The adoption of Q.-F. guns and the extension of the line of battle has, however, led to a cry for the dispersion of the artillery. As we have already said, the increase in the rapidity of the fire of the gun cannot be made an excuse for the distribution of its fire over an area on which it cannot possibly have any increased effect. The fact that it has become necessary to extend the infantry over a wide front cannot be made an excuse for a similar distribution of the artillery. Such action presumes the adoption of a semi-defensive attitude. In fact, it differs from the pure defensive only in this. The commander of the force that has distributed his troops and scattered his artillery is uncertain of his own intentions, and can only hope to win the action by a counter-attack. Such an attack must be supported by a mass of guns, and unless a reserve artillery has been formed, there will be no guns to support it. Then, if we recommend the scattering of our guns where we know that the enemy may concentrate his, we expose them to the risk of being beaten in detail. It may,

of course, be necessary to hold one portion of a long line, whilst the remainder is pushed forward to make a decisive attack; under no other circumstances, however, should preparations be made for the adoption of a purely defensive attitude, such as dispersion infers.

The general points at issue, however, appear to be as follows:—

1. The rate of fire of the gun has been increased.

2. The nature of the fire, however, remains the same.

3. Consequently the means of its application cannot be changed.

That is, if we wish to produce a decisive effect we must aim at obtaining a concentration of fire. Is this primary principle then at variance with the dispersion of the guns? In the eighteenth century battalion guns were used in the intervals between brigades. The artillery so employed produced no effect, because, on account of the short range of its guns, its fire could not be concentrated on any particular part of the field. Now the range of the gun has been increased, and the line of battle has been extended. The extension of the fighting line has, however, increased out of all proportion to the range of the gun.

Consequently the conditions remain the same. The following conclusions may thus be reached:—

1. The degree of dispersion must depend on the nature of the ground.

2. The artillery must, however, retain the power of concentrating its fire on a given spot for the decisive attack, and no cry for dispersion should interfere with this.

However strong or however long a line may be, it is bound to be broken at the spot against which the enemy concentrates a superiority of fire. If the artillery is scattered along this line it will run the risk of being destroyed in detail.

It may be argued that the concentration of the artillery will leave the other arms without guns, and that they will run the risk of being overwhelmed. This is undoubtedly true, but the danger would be the same, if not greater, if the guns were scattered. Speaking generally, any force adopting a semi-defensive attitude must run such risks. A battle can only be won by offensive action, and in this action the mass of the artillery, or a greater portion of it, must be concentrated for the decisive attack. In these days an attack cannot be developed hurriedly, the force attacked has, consequently, timely warning of what to expect, and the guns can be moved under cover to concealed positions near threatened points. To take up positions from which enfilade fire can be brought to

bear on the enemy is, of course, most desirable. But this will evidently not always be possible, especially when the line is one of great length.

CONCEALMENT.

Definite results can only be secured by decisive action, and this action may frequently be accompanied by a great loss of life Consequently, as far as cover is concerned, it should only be used when it confers an advantage on those using it in regard to the main object in view, viz. the annihilation of the enemy. It is, however, of course true that the adoption of some form of protection may prove the surest road to success. Before the adoption of Q.-F. guns and shields, batteries sought protection by hiding behind the folds of the ground. With the use of Q.-F. guns, fitted with shields, cover will be used as a means of concealment with a view to effecting a surprise; the protection will be given by the shields. In this connection we must, however, recollect that the shield will not protect all the *personnel*, and that it will be necessary to find a place of safety for the teams, etc. The rapid rate of fire of the gun makes it possible for artillery to attempt a surprise. If batteries are to effect a surprise, a certain amount of concealment must, however, be presumed. The necessity for this concealment is accentuated by the fact that it will be impossible for artillery to come into action in the open, in the presence of guns already in position. Consequently the use of cover has a twofold advantage in the earlier stages of the fight. It has been rightly said that this phase of the action may be divided into two periods, both critical, namely—

1. The period during which the guns are unlimbering and coming into action, and

2. The time intervening between the moment at which the first shell is fired and that at which an effective fire is established.

It is evident that the risk attending the first period can be decreased, if not removed, by concealment, whilst in the second the risk may be diminished, though not removed.

The principal question involved is, however, where should the guns be placed? It is clear that if they are to be concealed they must be behind the crest. Are they, however, to be in a position from which the target can be seen over the sights, or are they to be so far down the slope as to necessitate the use of an observing party? There are three points to be considered.

1. A moving target can only be dealt with by direct fire.

2. It may, consequently, be necessary to push the guns on to the crest line at any stage of the fight, to repulse a counter-attack.

If this means moving them a great distance it will involve considerable risk and a great loss of power.

3. If changes of target are to be made, the danger angle must be observed, the line must consequently be preserved, which will mean that some guns will be exposed more than others.

The question consequently resolves itself into this—

1. The guns must go forward to the crest at the decisive stages of the action. Thus the nearer they are to it, the more readily will they be moved.

2. How are they to be brought into action?

3. At the present time we have no rapid means of effecting a change of target from concealed positions.

By the use of the reverse slope we must presume that the guns will ascend an incline. It is thus evident that the position most easily occupied will be that in which a man on a horse cannot be seen from the target. Such a position will, however, usually be found some distance behind the crest, and from it a rapid change of target will be difficult, if not impossible. This difficulty is, however, said to have been solved in France by the use of the *collimateur*. If such is the case, this will probably become the normal position for guns when concealed.

Much will, however, depend on the nature of the ground. As the power of the gun depends on the rapidity of its fire, its use must be as direct as possible. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on this. Consequently the choice of positions involving the use of observing parties should be avoided. Then, again, it is very unlikely that ground will be found which will afford facilities for concealment to both sides, and give an observing station to each.

In the future, the risks run by the *personnel* will be minimised by the use of shields. For instance, the French system with waggons up, taken in conjunction with the shields, forms a small fortress for the detachments, and largely eliminates all need for seeking other cover, beyond that necessary on coming into action. In fact, this method of employing the waggons may be said to be the direct outcome of the use of shields. The shields protect the detachments, but they would not protect the numbers that had to supply ammunition from the waggons, if the latter were placed in rear of the guns. This difficulty is, however, overcome by placing the waggon which is bullet proof alongside the gun. That the necessity of having a large supply of ammunition with the guns, is also recognised in principle by the Germans, will be seen from the following. In paragraph 357 of their regulations we read, "In preparing positions a most extensive use is to be made of

earth cover. . . . It is of the greatest importance to place a large supply of ammunition in readiness in the immediate vicinity of the guns." Thus the strength of the position is increased through the use of cover, and the supply of ammunition is facilitated by previous preparation. The guns then practically form a small redoubt, and have sufficient shells at hand to produce a decisive effect. By the time that this reserve of ammunition has been expended, the batteries will either have secured some great advantage that will facilitate the bringing up of further supplies, or they will have suffered so heavily that it will be a question as to whether it would be wise to reinforce them by giving them more ammunition. If, then, for "earth cover" we substitute the shields and waggons as used by the French, we have the system, in its simplest form, available for use in either the attack or the defence. It is, however, evident that the details must depend on the nature of the equipment used.

C. HOLMES WILSON.

NOTES ON NIGHT ATTACKS DURING THE EARLY PART OF THE BOER WAR.

By Major H. R. Mead, Indian Army.

In perusing the narrative of the Boer War contained in the 'Times History,' one of the first things to arrest attention is the frequency with which night operations were undertaken by British commanders.

The present paper is an attempt to analyse the conditions which led to the adoption of this method of fighting, to note the specific objects which it was expected to attain, and finally to seek the causes which generally conduced to success or failure.

It may be noted to start with, that these operations were confined to the British, and that the Boers did not on their side attempt anything of the kind.

Further, we may observe that on the British side four different and independent commanders, acting in three separate theatres of the war, all had recourse to night attacks.

These facts naturally lead us to inquire what were the particular causes which predisposed them to this method of fighting.

Analysis of Causes predisposing British Commanders to resort to Night Attacks.

In order to trace out these causes, it will be necessary to consider what training for war had previously been given to the troops engaged in this struggle, and how such training had been evolved from experiences of former wars, and from the views held by either side as regards the tactics to be pursued in fighting under modern conditions.

Now, the experiences gained by the British in fighting other than savage tribes in the Peninsula, Crimea, and India, all pointed to the bayonet being the final decider of a conflict, whether in the defence or in attack.

The British were also guided to a large extent by continental opinion as regards the tactics to be employed, and this was natural, as the latest wars of any magnitude between civilised nations had taken place on the Continent.

The general theory which was held on the Continent, and

consequently accepted by England, as regards the attack and defence of positions, was roughly as follows:—

The attack, to be successful, must gradually collect in larger numbers opposite, and within assaulting distance of those points of the defence which either offered special advantages to the attack or were weak points in the defence, and from these positions should drive the enemy out at the point of the bayonet.

On the other hand, as regards the defence, it was held that a passive defence would not lead to victory; but that counter-attacks prepared, indeed, by the fire of artillery and infantry, but carried the bayonet, were necessary to obtain decisive results.

It was recognised that, in the attack, the great problem to be solved was how to get the assaulting lines, or columns, sufficiently close to allow of the attack with the bayonet being carried out without suffering undue loss; and the usual solution to this problem was a heavy covering fire of artillery and infantry directed to keeping down the enemy's fire, under cover of which the attacking troops were to advance. Naturally these ideas had their effect on the training to which the soldier was subjected.

Since the view was taken that the great object to be obtained from the covering fire was a hail of bullets, evenly distributed along the position, which would keep down the enemy's fire, it followed that, to attain this end, strict discipline and fire control were essential, and it was considered that this end was better attained by volleys than individual fire. The annual course of musketry was based on these ideas—individual firing was merely used to teach the recruit, keep the trained soldier in practice, and serve as a preliminary to the second period of collective firing. This collective firing consisted only of volley firing at different ranges, with the exception of some five or ten rounds directed to rapid independent firing.

It will thus be seen that in the British service individual marksmanship under anything like war conditions was at this time at a discount; the rifle was looked on as a weapon to be used collectively to pump lead to cover a certain area of ground, and the bayonet was relied on to gather the fruits of victory.

On the other hand, the Boers, who were not even armed with bayonets, were totally untrained in volley firing, and by their previous habits and experience were led to look on the rifle as their one weapon, whether for attack or defence. Hence in their case, individual marksmanship was everything, and collective fire merely meant the application of their fire to a common object. It must also be remembered that, as the result of previous encounters, the Boers had undoubtedly conceived an undue contempt

for the English soldier; and in consequence the British commanders were impressed with the great importance of wiping out the memory of these previous defeats, and at the same time striking a heavy blow at the *morale* of the enemy.

The opening actions of the war more or less confirmed both sides in their previous appreciation of the tactical requirements of the fight. To the British, Talana and Elandslaagte seemed to prove the possibility of success by assault of Boer positions, though their eyes were opened somewhat to the loss which modern weapons could inflict during the advance; whilst the Boers, on the other hand, though they had learnt to respect their foes, had on the whole come off cheaply, owing to the British deficiency in mounted troops, and had in addition learnt to take up still more widely extended positions, which would allow of further development of their fire action.

At this period, therefore, the main point considered by the British was how they could approach within assaulting distance without suffering undue loss, and a method was suggested by the memory of the successful solution of this problem by Lord Wolseley in the attack of the entrenched position at Tel-el-Kebir. Further, from what was known of the Boer state of discipline and organisation, it was unlikely that their outpost work, particularly at night, would be efficiently performed, and night operations were therefore in a special degree likely to be successful if undertaken against them.

To sum up: the British, looking to the assault as the final deciding factor of the contest, and seeing their main difficulty lie in getting their troops into a close enough position from which to deliver it, were naturally led to attempt night attacks, which we see were not entirely new to them; whilst the Boers, relying on their individual marksmanship, which was dependent on daylight, were not likely to attempt anything of the sort.

Specific Objects expected to be attained by Night Operations under Review.

Having thus, in a general way, established what causes predisposed the British to resort to night attacks, we may now commence to examine the various operations in detail, in order to discover what were the specific objects expected to be obtained in each case. For this purpose we have the following operations:—

Maggersfontein,	under	Lord Methuen, on the western side.
Belmont,	"	" " " "
Stormberg,	"	General Gatacre, in Cape Colony.
Willow Grange,	"	" Hildyard, in Natal.
Nicholson's Nek,	"	" White, in Natal.

Of these the first two, carried out under Lord Methuen, are instances of night operations being resorted to, simply to avoid the losses incidental to direct attacks of entrenched positions.

Maggersfontein and Belmont.—It will be noted that they are not even designed to surprise the enemy. So much so was this the case, that at Maggersfontein the position was shelled the previous day, thus not only the fact of an attack being imminent was advertised, but also the point of attack.

These also may be described as major operations, the whole force at Lord Methuen's disposal being in each case employed.

The other three cases, quoted above, differ in that they are more of the nature of raids or enterprises carried out by small forces, or by portions only of the forces at the disposal of the commanders undertaking the operations; they were, moreover, designed to effect their objects by surprise.

Stormberg.—Gatacre, who was in command at the time of comparatively few troops, was charged with the defence of a large frontier, and found it absolutely necessary to take the offensive, in order to stem the Boer invasion and prevent disloyal colonists rising and joining the enemy.

He saw his opportunity in the isolated Boer force laagered near Stormberg, and so planned the operations which terminated so disastrously, utilising for this purpose such troops as could be collected together at short notice.

Willow Grange.—General Hildyard found a force of Boers had come down south from Ladysmith and were threatening his and General Barton's lines of communication, so he resorted to a night attack, in order to capture a big gun which the enemy had brought down with them, and the height (Brynbella) on which they had placed it.

In this case the night attack was only part of major operations, which he had determined on ; and its execution was entrusted to a subordinate commander (Colonel Kitchener).

Nicholson's Nek was also designed as part of major operations which were to take place the next day in connection with it.

The intention was with this force to seize the position on Nicholson's Nek overnight, and thus be on the spot to cut off the Boers' retreat when they should be driven back by the attack which was planned to be carried out by the main force in the morning.

But though these operations differ thus in various points from those carried out in the western theatre of the war, still, at Stormberg, at any rate, there is the general scheme of getting the troops by night within assaulting distance of the position to be attacked,

and thus avoiding losses; whilst at Willow Grange the key of the position is to be captured at night and used as a *point d'appui* for further operations, and here again the avoidance of losses is one of the reasons for resorting to night work.

On the other hand, Nicholson's Nek stands alone in having for its object the seizure of a post within the enemy's lines, which could only be effected by night and through the agency of surprise.

Failure of the Night Operations in Each Case.

Now, in all these cases the night operations were failures. Three of them, indeed, are recognised disasters; whilst in the case of the other two the objects sought for by the night operations were not attained.

Thus at Belmont the attack which was planned to take place at dawn was carried out in full daylight, and at Willow Grange the gun which it was sought to capture was carried away by the Boers earlier in the night, and though the position was occupied, no use of it was made in the next day's action.

It should be instructive, therefore, to examine these actions and determine where the causes of failure lay in order to understand whether they are inherent in operations of this nature, or whether they can be eliminated by previous arrangements or training.

Causes of Failure.

The first point that such an examination brings to light is that in four out of five cases the operations were not concluded in time, so that daylight appeared before all the arrangements were completed. This was owing to various reasons, thus:—

Maggersfontein.—The night chosen was a stormy one, with heavy rain, which delayed the march. Then it was found that thick bush prevented deployment till three or four hundred yards beyond the point which had been previously selected.

The result was, the column was caught in the act of deployment when day broke.

Belmont.—The troops were late at the ganger's hut, which was the point selected for the rendezvous and for the deployment to be carried out. Further, the distance from that point to the position was under-estimated by something like 1000 yards, so that the actual attack was carried out by day, and practically all advantages of the night work were lost.

Stormberg.—The troops were surprised by daybreak whilst still wandering in close order, but the causes which contributed to this were more complicated than in previous instances just quoted.

Suffice it for the present that there was delay at the start and from want of exact knowledge of the ground to be crossed over.

Nicholson's Nek.—The column was delayed owing to the R.I. Fusiliers not being able to get their mules loaded up in time for the start, so that when they eventually arrived under Trechengula at 2 A.M. (being then some two miles from the Nek), the commander despaired of making the position he had been designed to hold before daylight, and therefore took up the preliminary position on the hill, where his force was afterwards attacked and captured.

Willow Grange.—The one exception is Willow Grange, in which operation the troops were in time to seize the hill under cover of darkness.

WANT OF KNOWLEDGE OF GROUND TO BE TRAVERSED.

It may be noted that at Maggersfontein and Belmont want of exact knowledge of the ground to be traversed, as already stated, aggravated the delay, and so contributed to the failures which occurred.

FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLANS TO THOSE CONCERNED.

Another cause which contributed to the failures at Stormberg and Willow Grange may be found in changes of plan, or the actual orders for the movements not being duly notified.

In the first case it is related that several officers were still under the impression, when marching across the lines of rail crossed by the path actually pursued by the column, that the advance was being carried out by the originally selected route passing through Goosen's farm, which had been abandoned owing to rumours of entrenchments and barbed wire.

Again, later on, the guides, having brought the force at 3.45 A.M. to the actual spot to which they had been ordered to lead them, were confused as to the General's plans, and thinking he required to go to another part of the ground, continued to lead on, till eventually day broke, and discovered the movements to the Boers.

At Willow Grange the troops which should have co-operated with Colonel Kitchener are said to have received no orders, and in consequence remained inactive at a critical period.

IMPERFECT RECONNAISSANCE OF THE POSITION TO BE ATTACKED.

At Maggersfontein and Belmont there seems to have been little done in the way of reconnaissance of the position, so that Lord Methuen was ignorant of where the enemy's flanks rested.

This want of knowledge seriously affected the succeeding operations; particularly at Maggersfontein, where the Boers had extended their left nearly to Brown's Drift on the Modder River, thereby threatening to outflank him on that side, and compelling him to gradually use up all reserves and spare troops till he had none left to re-establish the fight.

Miscellaneous Causes which contributed to Failure.

Lastly, there were circumstances which were peculiar to one or other of these enterprises, and not of such a general type as the above.

For instance, in the movements connected with the Stormberg affair, there was the incident of the telegram which went astray, the neglect to take the intelligence officer who knew the country, and the overtaxing the powers of endurance of the troops; whilst at Nicholson's Nek there was the panic among the mule transport, which caused the loss of the spare ammunition, heliographs, and guns.

At Willow Grange the unfortunate reply by the naval guns to the Boer artillery warned them to retire the gun overnight.

Were these Causes Preventable?

These being, as far as we can ascertain them, the main causes which led to the failure of these schemes, it remains to be seen how far they are inherent in operations of this nature, and how, and to what extent, they may be guarded against.

Firstly, as regards delays, whether caused by unavoidable accidents, such as the inclement weather of Maggersfontein, or by preventable circumstances, such as the slow loading up of the transport animals at Nicholson's Nek, or miscalculation of the distance to be traversed, as at Belmont, a general remedy seems to lie in allowing a greater margin of time when formulating the scheme.

It would seem preferable, as a general rule, to start the troops directly the first shades of evening would cover their movements, and utilise the spare time, if any, in giving them a rest when in position.

Secondly, there is no doubt that troops should be systematically practised in peace in night operations, including the marching to distant rendezvous so as to arrive at fixed times, in deploying in the dark, in passing obstacles, and in all the attendant duties, such as loading up of transport.

RECONNAISSANCE OF THE POSITION TO BE ATTACKED.

With regard to the reconnaissance of the position it is intended to attack, it is true that there may be, as in Lord Methuen's case, a woeful deficiency of cavalry or mounted troops, but in this case it would seem absolutely necessary that an attempt should be made to obtain the necessary information by means of individual scouts.

There can be no doubt that there would be numerous officers and others keen on a job of this sort, and it seems curious that Lord Methuen, who would, no doubt, have jumped at such a chance of distinguishing himself when a young man, did not utilise the services of scouts.

It may be noted, therefore, that the training of scouts in peace time to find their way about at night, and to observe and report, is an important point, and requires much more attention in the future.

We also learn the extreme importance of examining the ground to be crossed over, so as to guard against unforeseen obstacles, and verify the distance to be traversed.

This work should probably in any case be carried out by scouts in preference to cavalry patrols, as less likely to draw the attention of the enemy.

EXPLANATION OF PLANS TO THOSE DETAILED TO CARRY THEM OUT.

It is, of course, essential that plans should be thoroughly explained to all who have to do with their execution, and that any change of plan should be as widely notified as were the previous arrangements.

MISCELLANEOUS CAUSES OF FAILURE AVOIDABLE WITH CARE.

As regards the other miscellaneous causes of failure, they are all avoidable by care being exercised in the conception and execution of the scheme of operations, except perhaps in respect to unfortunate accidents of the nature of the stampede of the mule transport at Nicholson's Nek—though even here a thorough knowledge of mule transport work would probably have mitigated, if it did not do away with, this particular source of failure.

LEADING OF COLUMNS BY NIGHT.

We have not touched on the difficulty of leading troops by night across country.

A fact which is most creditable to all employed in these

operations as guides, whether officers, local police, or farmers, is that in no case can they be said to have failed to lead the troops with reasonable celerity to the appointed position.

CONCLUSION.

On the whole, therefore, though our experience in night operations in the early stages of the Boer War were not fortunate, still, they do not necessarily lead us to condemn their employment entirely in future.

In fact, as far as minor operations of the nature of raids, or such enterprises as do not require the employment of large bodies of troops, and for which complicated preparations are unnecessary, are concerned, it seems certain that occasions will in future occur when commanders will find that night operations offer the best chances of success.

But as regards night attacks on a large scale, such as at Maggersfontein or Belmont, when the attendant risks are great, and consequences of failure may be disastrous, it will be necessary to consider more carefully under what circumstances it may be really necessary, or profitable, to resort to them.

IF TIME ALLOWS, APPROACHING TRENCHES BY NIGHT IS RECOMMENDED.

Putting aside the possibilities of being able to manœuvre an enemy out of a position, it will often occur that time is not a matter of the first consideration ; in which case resort might be had to the construction of trenches under cover of darkness, by which means we should secure a slow but steady advance against the position each night, and the retention of the ground thus won during the day ; as happened at Paardeberg in a later period of the war than we are now considering.

SUCCESSFUL INSTANCE QUOTED WHICH OCCURRED IN THE DELHI MANŒUVRES.

Another successful instance of this trench work at night occurred in the manœuvres held in India in connection with the Great Delhi Durbar in 1902, when a portion of Brigadier-General Plowden's brigade pushed up entrenchments by night to within two or three hundred yards of a village in possession of the Southern Army, which caused the evacuation of this point the next morning, and with it the retirement of their whole line of defence.

But supposing that time is a factor of importance, we have yet to consider what conditions would render the attack of a position

by day so hopeless as to justify the resort to the risks of a night attack.

EXPERIENCES IN THIS WAR HAVE LED US TO ALTER OUR VIEWS.

It must be remembered that the experiences of fighting gained in the Boer War have led us to alter or modify many of our former conceptions of the general problem of the attack. Especially is this the case as regards our appreciation of the value to be assigned to individual marksmanship, and of the enhanced results which may be looked for in the future, as a consequence of the intelligent use of fire and cover in action. So great an authority in infantry fire tactics, a soldier of such great experience as Sir Ian Hamilton, has brought out this point very clearly in his evidence before the War Commission, where he states: "At some part of the line, however, it is almost certain that a brook, or ditch, or imperceptible fold of the ground, will give some trifling shelter to a further advance. Half a dozen private soldiers may find themselves at this spot. If they possess sufficient training to recognise the possibilities of their position, together with sufficient new discipline, initiative, and enthusiasm to take advantage of it, they will creep on. They will be followed by others, and if, as a result, the enemy's line is penetrated, even by a few men, *the power of their modern armament will make their flanking fire so demoralising and effective that the position will either be abandoned forthwith*, or so much attention will be concentrated on the intruders that an assault may become practicable all along the line."

THE HOLDING POWER OF THE RIFLE AND ITS USE IN THE ATTACK.

Then, again, we have now learnt to appreciate the holding power of the modern rifle, and to understand that this power may be utilised in the attack as well as in the defence. Through its use we may keep the enemy fully employed and pinned to their position by comparatively few rifles at one point of the field, so that they are unable to move off to reinforce other points where our attack is being pressed in greater force.

Under modern conditions, then, the commander who has under him the future soldiers of the empire, whose intelligence has been developed, and whose efficiency with the rifle has been increased to the uttermost, may reasonably find that the attack of a strong position by day can in the future be undertaken with better prospects of success than heretofore.

In this opinion, too, we are supported by Sir Ian Hamilton, who holds the idea that "under skilful leading, the attack has rather gained than lost by the new conditions." After laying down his reasons for holding this view, Sir Ian Hamilton proceeds to show how in circumstances which are altogether adverse to the attack, it may be still possible to deliver it with good chances of success. He says—

"Even if the country is open, there will always be ways of getting across the fire-swept zone. If the worst comes to the worst, the attack may be delivered in the afternoon, so that it becomes dusk as the men get within point-blank range. *Or, failing this, a night march over carefully reconnoitred ground will bring your troops up to the desired point.*"

SUMMING UP.

It appears, therefore, that there are circumstances which might justify night marches and attacks by large forces as well as small ones. But a commander, before taking the risks, which must be considerable even with troops well trained to this particular kind of work, and notwithstanding the exercise of every precaution, should well weigh the circumstances of the moment, and first convince himself that the ground is too unfavourable to permit of an advance by day, and that time will not permit him to employ the slower but less risky operations of pushing forward trenches by night, before he finally commits himself.

H. R. MEAD.

SOUTH AFRICA FOR SOLDIER SETTLERS.

BY "RED COAT."

SOUTH AFRICA is held up as an almost ideal country for soldiers to settle in on the expiration of their colour service; is it so? What sort of a man is the soldier? These are questions that do not generally get much thought about. Being what he is, is the soldier the sort of man that is wanted in large numbers in this country? The average British recruit enlists at seventeen or eighteen, and is generally without any trade; but at best, he is only partially trained to a trade at that age; or, if he is an older man, he has probably enlisted for his daily bread, having failed to make his way otherwise. Of course, there are exceptions. If he is an agricultural labourer, he is most likely that and nothing more. The farmer wanted in South Africa is not a labourer, but a man with views on irrigation, planting, improvements in methods, improvements in breeds, and with the money to carry out his views—a most unusual combination in labourer or soldier. Artisans are wanted in South Africa, but the number of soldier-artisans is small; unskilled labour is not much wanted. Many old soldiers, especially non-commissioned officers, are well suited for employment as overseers of native labour, but it is doubtful if any large demand for this class of work remains any longer unsupplied. The inducements to a soldier to settle in South Africa are not very great, except the apparently high rate of wages; but, then, three shillings in South Africa is no more than one shilling at home. He is not likely to be favourably impressed by the country in other ways. Now the war is over, the Colonial civilian does not over-appreciate the soldier, who sees on every hand that his own Government is less careful of his comfort and well-being than of the welfare of the repatriated or disloyal Boer. He is paid less and considered less than the Kaffir; he is far from home and friends, and he has less liberty than any other class of man in the country. In many stations, even the public-houses are out of bounds for him. He is badly housed—very badly—and in every way uncomfortable. Bad tents, and crowded, are good enough for him; but, for the repatriated Boer, are new tents *à volonté*. The climate of this country is very

fine; but try it in standing camp, the change and excitement of war over, when the dust-storms of summer and the bitter winds of winter make day or night horrible.

The British soldier is not a farmer of the sort wanted, though from the Imperial point of view the soldier-farmer settler, if he existed, would certainly be the most acceptable. Even if men willing to try farming were assisted with stock, implements, and loans, the number of ex-soldiers capable of employing such opportunities to any useful end is infinitesimal. It has been tried and has failed before. After failure, the men would drift to the mining districts, or to the coast ports, in the hope of finding work. In the mines, unskilled white labour is not wanted; in the coast ports much of the small trade is falling into the hands of foreign Jews and natives of India; of both classes there are already too many in the country. The fact that so few men take their discharge here is proof that they do not like the country, that the country does not want the class of men available in large numbers, and that the conditions of the country and of the men must change a good deal if this state of affairs is to be improved.

NOTE.—"Red-Coat" is a regular officer of knowledge and experience; and that he knows something of the private soldier is undeniable—for the simple reason that he obtained his commission from the ranks. Theoretically, it would of course be an excellent thing for the Empire, if South Africa could be crowded with old-soldier settlers; but under existing conditions the prospects of success for such immigrants are very small. A far better field is open in Canada, where there is plently of work for farm hands, skilled or unskilled, and a free grant of 160 acres waiting for those who care to have it after having learned what to do with it. The letter recently addressed by Mr. Preston, the Commissioner for Emigration, to Sir Howard Vincent, explaining the advantages of Canada for British settlers, has, I trust, received the attention it deserves.—ED. U. S. M.

SUNDRIES.

I.

THE *Canadian Military Gazette* announces that, according to a statement issued from Ottawa on the 27th February, the new Militia establishment on a peace footing, which has just been approved, gives a total strength of all arms as 4924 officers and 42,334 non-commissioned officers and men, or a grand total of 47,258. This, compared with the former establishment, gives an increase of 1475 officers and 3021 men, or an aggregate increase of the force on a peace footing of 4496. The mounted infantry do not appear separately in the new establishment, as they do in the old, having been merged in the cavalry. The largest increase is, of course, in the infantry establishment, formerly 2576 officers and 28,791 non-commissioned officers and men, now 3781 officers and 31,476 non-commissioned officers and men. The establishment of the Corps of Guides is unchanged.

The details of the changes of the various arms is as follows:—

	Officers.	Men.
Field Artillery	152	1,860
Cavalry	599	4,607
Garrison Artillery	221	2,125
Engineers	36	732
Infantry	3,781	31,476
Army Service Corps	40	808
Bearer Companies	27	312
Field Hospitals	24	342
Signalling Corps	18	72
Corps of Guides		25

II.

The Bavarian Army Corps will this year carry out their autumn manœuvres in conformity with the field service regulations; thus the 3rd (Landau) Division will be moved into its own Army Corps zone (the IInd) on the left bank of the Rhine. Special cavalry manœuvres will be held in the IIIrd Army Corps, under the Inspector-General of Cavalry. The following will take part in them: the 1st, 4th, and 5th Brigades belonging respectively to the Ist, IInd, and IIIrd Army Corps, and the Horse Artillery Brigade Division of the 5th Artillery Regiment, quartered at Landau. These units will together form a cavalry division consisting of 28 squadrons in all, 5 of which are for each of the regiments of the 1st and 4th Brigades, and 4 for those of the 5th. After completing its special manœuvres, the cavalry division will take part in those of the IIIrd Army Corps; with that object it will be reinforced by a pioneer and a machine-gun detachment, the

latter joining the division two days before the termination of the manœuvres.

III.

The following numbers, taken from the *Internationale Revue über die gesamten Armeen und Flotten*, shows how strictly the regulations for public education are enforced in Prussia.

Out of the 150,245 Prussian recruits enrolled in 1902, only 71 were illiterate. The provinces of Pomerania, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Westphalia, and Hesse-Nassau, did not furnish a single illiterate recruit. Silesia sent 11, Western Prussia and Posen each sent 18, and Eastern Prussia 19. Almost the whole of the illiterate recruits were Lithuanian Poles.

IV.

The same journal gives the result of the entire German recruiting operations for 1902. According to it, 1,610,741 young men were examined. 574,425 of these were put back, 1337 were not permitted to serve, as bad characters, 41,245 were struck off the lists, 98,651 were drafted into the 1st Levy of the Landsturm, 81,389 were attached to the Ersatz-Reserve, 1384 were attached to the Ersatz-Reserve of the Navy, 16,407 were in excess of requirements, and, finally, 220,558 were enrolled. On the other hand, 30,262 volunteers had already enlisted in the Army, and 1431 in the Navy.

Amongst those called to the Colours, 209,201 were for the combatant, and 4413 for the non-combatant branches of the territorial service, whilst 3756 recruits from non-maritime, and 3188 from the maritime portion of the population were enrolled in the Navy.

V.

According to the law of the 25th March, 1899, the German Field Artillery consists of 95 regiments (one of which, of 3 brigade divisions, is for the Artillery School), of 2 or 3 brigade divisions, and having a total of 202 brigade divisions. The total number of batteries is 583, of which 42 are horse artillery, 475 are field guns, and 66 are 10·5 cm. howitzers. Each Army Corps has a brigade division of 3 of these latter; the Bavarian ones have 2 batteries only to a brigade division.

Of the 42 horse artillery batteries, 22 are attached by twos into 11 brigade divisions, in excess in certain regiments, and are meant for cavalry batteries.

The budgetary strength of the field artillery is—

3062 officers.
11,909 non-commissioned officers.
53,311 men, not including one-year volunteers.
33,624 troop horses.

VI.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* states that the German War Minister announced to the Commission on the Budget that the particular form of the new German field gun had been finally decided upon,

and that the barrel recoil system had been adopted. The Krupp gun forms the basis of the new gun, which will, as usual, be designated officially by the year of its construction only. A full description of the gun is not yet, however, forthcoming.

VII.

Die Flotte, the official publication of the German Navy League, in an article entitled "What do we learn from the Russo-Japanese War?" says that the recent events in the Far East strikingly demonstrate the urgent necessity for hastening the carrying out of the German naval programme. The two principles to be deduced from the conflict, the journal states, are that Russia, against her will, became involved in war, a misfortune that might readily happen to Germany, that battleships decide sea fights, whilst torpedo-boats only achieve results under specially favourable conditions. The obvious duty of Germany, before it is too late, is to hasten the construction already authorised, and to add to the scheme for naval defence adopted in 1900, as since that time Great Britain, Russia, and the United States have increased their navies at a more rapid rate.

VIII.

According to the *Journal de Genève*, the Swiss Military Department has recently adopted the proposals of the Committee it instituted to study the reform of infantry equipment. The Committee proposed the following field kit: the Bordtfeldt hat, similar to that worn by the German troops of the China Expeditionary Force; a single-buttoned kersey with turned-down collar, of blue-grey or green-brown cloth; trousers of the same material; putties instead of gaiters; a poncho cloak, with simply a hole in it for the head; a knitted woollen jersey to be worn under the kersey in cold weather.

The Committee have not yet come to any decision regarding the valise, but three models are at present under discussion. In addition to the jersey, the valise will contain the rations, a second pair of light trousers, slippers, and cap. The cloak will be carried on the valise, to which it can easily be buckled. The proposed kit and equipment is $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilos, or about $9\frac{1}{2}$ lbs., lighter than the old. The Committee urges that the trial of the new system should be made simultaneously by entire squads in all the divisions.

IX.

A royal decree, published on the 20th February last, institutes an annual championship for officers' chargers, to be ridden by subaltern officers in Portuguese regiments, and independent units of the mounted branches of the Service. The championship includes a race of from 50 to 60 kilometres, to be ridden at a maximum rate of 12 and a minimum of 10 kilometres the hour, and of a race over obstacles. The number of riders taking part in each race is limited to one per regiment or independent unit. Cavalry corps are alone obliged to be represented. Only officers with horses at least $5\frac{1}{2}$ years old, and of which they have been in possession

for more than 6 months, are eligible to take part in the championship races.

X.

In *La France de Demain* M. Ardouin-Dumazet discusses the Russo-Japanese War, and says that, with all its reservists, the Japanese Army has 7900 officers, 331,000 non-commissioned officers and men, and 70,000 saddle and draft animals. Her greatest effort cannot place more than 300,000 men on the mainland, and if they denude the whole of the Japanese islands of troops, it might be possible for the Russians to despatch a force from Vladivostok which would ravage a great part of Japan. It will, therefore, be necessary for the Japanese to maintain about 100,000 men at home. It would be interesting to discover from what sources M. Ardouin-Dumazet obtains these statistics of the strength of the Japanese Army. He may possibly considerably modify his opinions with regard to its strength before the end of the campaign. It would also be of interest to learn how the author of the article considers that the Russians could fit out and despatch an expeditionary force against Japan whilst Admiral Togo retains command of the sea.

REVIEWS.

'THE LIFE OF THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE, K.T.'

By SIR WILLIAM LEE-WARNER, K.C.S.I. In two volumes. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1904. Price 25*s*.

BIOGRAPHIES of great men have recently been published with exceptional frequency, and many of them have been of more than remarkable importance and interest. Amongst the latter it is unquestionable that the life of James Ramsay, Earl and afterwards Marquis of Dalhousie, is entitled to a high place; firstly because Lord Dalhousie was a truly great man, and secondly because he has found a biographer worthy of him, a writer of distinction, and one who himself fully understands the merits of the weighty questions that are inseparably connected with the career of the very able and patriotic statesman whose services to his country have now been so admirably detailed.

Lord Dalhousie was a politician only in the sense that a statesman must necessarily be concerned with politics; a man of the highest honour and patriotism, he was incapable of paying the slightest regard to the interests of "Party." This was already manifest in his relations with Sir Robert Peel and Lord John Russell, and on his appointment to be Governor-General of India

he put into words what had consistently been the rule of his political life; he said, "From the moment I assume the government of India, politics is a question unknown to me. Party politics, above all, have no existence in my mind." It would be well for the Empire had we a larger number of statesmen such as Lord Dalhousie. Of politicians we have enough and to spare.

It was under momentous circumstances that the new Governor-General commenced his rule in India. His predecessor, Lord Hardinge, entertained optimistic views relative to the absolute security of the situation, and in the interests of economy had reduced the army, both British and native. That matters were less satisfactory than they were represented soon became apparent to Lord Dalhousie, and although it can scarcely be pretended that he actually foresaw so formidable an outbreak as the second Sikh war, it is undeniable that the massacre at Multan assumed from the first a gravity in his eyes far exceeding the estimate of it entertained by the Company authorities or by the officials around him. It has been urged against the Governor-General that he failed to act promptly, as he was urged to do by Edwardes and others; but apart from the fact that he was strongly advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, to await a more favourable season, common sense was on the side of his decision—that delay was the least of two evils. To act in the hot weather, in the hottest territory on earth, impeded by swollen rivers and mud, was to risk failure; and delay caused by failure would necessarily involve a more disastrous loss of prestige than a delay made solely in order to avoid such risk.

Again, it has also been alleged that Lord Dalhousie restricted the action of Lord Gough, and subsequently, seeing his error, allowed him to proceed. The truth is nothing of the sort. The Governor-General wisely restrained a man whose only claim to generalship was personal courage, from rushing to certain destruction, totally unprovided with transport and munitions, and with an insufficient force. But when time had removed, or at all events reduced, the difficulties, the previous restrictions were removed, and the Pyrrhic victory of Chilianwalla followed. For the absurdities of Chilianwalla the decisive victory of Gugerat furnishes no extenuation; and the supersession of Lord Gough, by order from England, as the result of the condemnation of his proceedings by the Duke of Wellington, after reading that general's own report, seems to have been an entirely proper proceeding.

There is but one charge in respect of his treatment of Lord Gough that can stand against Lord Dalhousie, and this is that, having realised the incapacity of the Commander-in-Chief, an incapacity that had long been notorious, it would have been better to have removed him from his command forthwith than to have restricted him in the exercise of his military judgment. A general to whom it was necessary that the Governor-General should represent the importance of using his artillery as a preliminary to falling on with the bayonet was clearly unfit to be entrusted with an army. Chilianwalla has few parallels in history, not even in South Africa, and Sobraon was little better.

However, the Sikhs having eventually been subdued, Lord Dalhousie had to decide what was to be done with the Punjab, and, in spite of the objections raised by Henry Lawrence, he did the right thing; he annexed the country. Lord Dalhousie realised that a great empire cannot stand still. The inexorable laws of Nature prescribe that the only alternative to growth is decay and death. He was no Jingo, the "Forward Policy" had no pleasures for him—quite the contrary; but, upon the other hand, where the necessity was clear, it had no terrors for him. The event not only proved the correctness of his decision, from the general point of view, but actually exercised a great influence upon our ultimate success in repressing the great Mutiny.

Curiously enough, just as Lord Hardinge left as a legacy to his successor the second Sikh war, so also was the relief of Lord Dalhousie followed speedily by the momentous crisis of 1857, with which Lord Canning was called upon to deal. Much has been said and written to show that Lord Dalhousie was himself at least partly responsible for this outbreak. The true facts seem to be that during his term of office the Governor-General had not fully succeeded in preventing the dangerous growths of disaffection, and that, unfortunately, he was no longer present when his prompt decision and iron resolution might have crushed the first active symptoms so decisively as to have averted the spreading of rebellion. It cannot be denied that sundry legislative enactments in reference to Oudh are open to criticism; that in doing justice to some injustice was caused to others, and that the latter were men of influence. But this was merely a single item out of innumerable causes, and a bagatelle compared with the famous prophesy. As for the claim that Sir Charles Napier had foreseen the danger and uttered warnings against it, this is completely disproved by the documentary evidence furnished by Sir Charles himself. Sir Charles imagined and expatiated upon all sorts of dangers, but a mutiny of the Sepoy army was not amongst them; and, fine soldier as he undoubtedly was, Sir Charles Napier was always an "impossible" person, utterly intolerant of authority, and filled with a belief that no one except himself could ever be right. The more carefully the dispute with Lord Dalhousie is studied, the more certain it appears that Napier was hopelessly in the wrong.

It would be easy to write at great length upon the policy of Lord Dalhousie in reference to the Punjab or Oudh; or, indeed, upon almost any page of this admirably compiled account of his public career at home as well as in India; but space interdicts further additions to a notice that has already exceeded the usual limits. Suffice it, then, to conclude now with the assertion that the biography of a great statesman has seldom been better written, and that a nobler, a more interesting, or a more useful life has seldom been lived. To read these two volumes is in itself an education in the methods of a sound Imperial policy—the iron hand in the velvet glove. Prestige is the basis of peace, and only those who enjoy it can hope to strengthen their position without bloodshed, or make just concessions without being suspected of weakness or timidity.

'STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN MOUNTAIN RANGES.'

By T. MILLER MAQUIRE, M.A., LL.D., Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London: William Clowes & Sons. Ltd., 23, Cockspur Street, S.W. 1904. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*

READERS of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE have already enjoyed the benefit of studying the excellent historical series which now appears in a single volume; but very many of them will doubtless be glad to refresh their memories by perusing again so excellent a collection of useful facts. Dr. Maguire does not dogmatise on the subject of mountain warfare, but seeks to present to his readers the actual methods and achievements of various leaders of men who have successfully grappled with the strategical and tactical difficulties which attend military operations in mountainous regions. Quotations are made from a great variety of works, many of them rare and inaccessible to the majority of officers—and this is not the least valuable feature of the book. The conclusion to which the thoughtful reader will probably arrive, if he has not already done so from previous study of the subject, is that the real difficulties of this class of warfare are chiefly strategical—offered, in fact, by the ground itself to the actual march. To the sound tactician who understands the "use of ground," the enemy, if not strong enough to be formidable on a plain, represents an obstacle far less serious than the steep gradients, rough tracks, and climatic influences. Possessed of numerical or other preponderance, sufficient to warrant offensive operations on ordinary ground, a good general has no greater difficulty in out-manœuvring his adversary amongst mountains than elsewhere. The enemy cannot be ubiquitous, and the secret, of course, is to seize first the positions that have not been occupied by him, in order to use them for his subsequent discomfiture. To rush headlong, without method, to the attack of any position, mountain or otherwise, is to do what the enemy desires you to do, and to court disaster. To fight mountaineers it is necessary that, after providing ample protection for the baggage, a sufficient force may still be available to employ enveloping tactics; but it depends very much upon the skill of the general, in using ground in order to conceal his weakness and use his strength, whether 5000 men will represent overwhelming superiority, or 10,000 a state of dangerous weakness. Tactics, like strategy, in mountain ranges and elsewhere, is the science of using "stepping-stones;" and upon the selection of these, and the manner of fixing foothold upon them, everything depends.

The arrangement of Dr. Maguire's essays is not chronological, but made conveniently so as to illustrate various principles, and also operations in particular countries. The historical area is, however, a very wide one, stretching from Alexandra the Great to Lord Roberts. There are also valuable interpolations relative to the strategical policy of the British Empire.

The preface is characteristic of Dr. Maguire, and may be

misunderstood by some who do not know him. Dr. Maguire is as fond of sport as anybody, and can admire a good performance in the hunting field or football ground as fully as any man living. But he objects to those who do not work hard as well as play hard; and still more to those who do neither. Altogether, this book deserves, and will it may be hoped obtain, the careful attention of every keen soldier. There is something to be learned in every page of it. Dr. Maguire invites his countrymen to emulate the deeds of their ancestors—and such surely represents a right worthy ambition for any Anglo-Saxon or Celt.

'THE SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON.'

BEING THE NARRATIVE OF THE SURRENDER OF BUONAPARTE AND OF HIS RESIDENCE ON BOARD H.M.S. *BELLEROPHON*, WITH A DETAIL OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS THAT OCCURRED IN THAT SHIP BETWEEN THE 24TH MAY AND THE 8TH AUGUST, 1815.

By Rear-Admiral SIR FREDERICK LEWIS MAITLAND, K.C.B. A New Edition. Edited, with a Memoir of the Author, by William Kirk Dickson. William Blackwood & Sons. Edinburgh and London. MCMIV. Price 15*s*.

THE naval career of Admiral Maitland is of itself sufficiently interesting to command the attention of all who are accustomed to read for pleasure or profit the achievements of our gallant sailors; but the memoir of even so distinguished an officer must necessarily be of secondary importance to the narrative prepared by himself, in which he furnishes the details of Napoleon's sojourn on board the *Bellerophon* during the voyage from the Basque Roads to Torbay, and whilst the British Government was finally deciding the fate of the captured Emperor.

In spite of some evidence that might have led him to a different conclusion, the captain of the *Bellerophon* firmly adhered to the opinion that Napoleon would attempt his escape *viâ* Rochefort, and his vigilance was rewarded by the arrival of a flag of truce, under which General Savary and Las Cases came to ascertain whether passage to the United States would be opposed. To such a question there could, of course, be but one reply, pending the decision of superior authority, and eventually, without awaiting that decision, Napoleon came on board the *Bellerophon*. Las Cases, with his usual disregard for facts, subsequently attempted to claim that Captain Maitland had promised the Emperor a favourable reception in England, and consequently that the exile to St. Helena involved a breach of faith. It is, however, abundantly clear from the correspondence that the only undertaking made had reference to the "Household," to whom it was promised that they should not be handed over to the French Government.

Napoleon appears to have made a favourable impression upon Captain Maitland, whose treatment of his illustrious prisoner was irreproachable, and fully appreciated and acknowledged by the latter. The Emperor wished to present Maitland with a valuable snuff-box; but this being courteously declined, there was substituted for it a glass tumbler, engraved with the crown and initial of the Empress Josephine, and which is preserved at Lindores, the home of the family.

The entire narrative is of exceptional interest, and amongst other items it affords an evidence as to the height of the Emperor, regarding which there was some controversy a short while ago. Captain Maitland credits Napoleon with five feet seven inches, and he certainly had full opportunity to form a correct estimate. There are eight portraits and illustrations, including the tumbler already mentioned. Finally, and by no means least, there are a number of notes made by Sir Walter Scott upon the MS. of the original narrative, which has most unfortunately been lost. Altogether this book is one not only to be read but also to be bought.

'THE STORY OF RUSSIA (WAR EDITION).'

By W. R. MORFIT, M.A., F.B.A., Professor of Russian and other Slavonic Languages in the University of Oxford. Fifth Edition, revised to date, and with Supplementary Chapters, Additional Illustrations, and Special War Map. London: Fisher Unwin, Paternoster Square. 1904. Price 5*s*.

THE present time is obviously opportune for the publication of such a book as this. The history of Russia in its every aspect is traced from the origin of the nation to the present day, and in addition to a number of interesting portraits and other illustrations there are very useful maps and chronological tables. The result is an historical work of exceptional merit as such, and, moreover, very pleasant reading indeed. A portrait of Peter the Great naturally stands for the frontispiece. Quite apart from the fact that the war with Japan specially directs attention to both countries, Professor Morfit's 'Russia' would at any time have commended itself—purely on its actual merits.

'THE STORY OF JAPAN.'

By DAVID MURRAY, Ph.D., LL.D., Late Adviser to the Japanese Minister of Education. Fifth Edition, revised to date, with New Illustrations, a Special War Map, and a Supplementary Chapter. By JOSEPH LONGFORD, sometime British Consul at Nagasaki. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Paternoster Square. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. MCMIV.

EVEN more interesting than the 'Story of Russia' is that of her opponent, which is carried from its mythological foundations, around

which there clings a mantle of tradition, relative to the origin and works of deities, far exceeding in richness the whole volume of Grecian and Roman legends. The antiquity of the East is wonderful, and has charms of its own beside which the mythical as well as the authentic histories of Western races seem puny as well as prosaic. Finally, in the case of Japan, there is the truly marvellous development of the last forty years, the real basis of which was the revolution whereby the power of the Emperor was restored, and that of the Shogan extinguished, under conditions that do honour to the disinterested patriotism of the Japanese aristocracy. From a collection of semi-independent principalities there has been formed a powerful, because fully united, State, a factor in world-politics of now immense importance. There is not a page in this history that is not delightful and instructive; but perhaps, so far as ancient history is concerned, the partly authentic and partly legendary records of the Empress Jingo who invaded Korea in A.D. 202, and of the long-lived Prime Minister Take-no-uchi, are the most fascinating.

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

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many portraits of notable celebrities, some of which are reproductions from the cartoons published in *Vanity Fair*. Amongst the latter, Lord Hawke is naturally included; and not the least attraction of the book is the preface contributed by the noble captain of the Yorkshire club.

'THE COLONEL.'

A MILITARY ROMANCE.

By Captain OLIVIERI SANGIACOMO. Translated from the Italian by E. SPENDER. London: David Nutt, 57-59, Long Acre. 1904. Price 6*s*.

THIS is a tale of a worthless youth who runs "amok" with his rifle, and kills or wounds over a score of officers, N.C.O.'s, and men. He is then tried by court-martial; and the tragic element of the story is the fact that the President of the Court is apprised, previously to its assembly, by the mother of the culprit, that he is being compelled to adjudicate the case of his own illegitimate son. The Colonel dies of heart failure after recording the death penalty, and the criminal, chiefly knave, but partly fool and partly anarchist, is duly shot. Needless to say, the torch that had actually lighted the insensate fury of the wretched Garulli was jealousy—the cause being one Rosina.

THE following correspondence is published by request of Messrs. Graham, Morton & Co.:—

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES,
Marlborough House, London.

Leeds,
March 28th, 1904.

SIR,

In a memorable speech some months ago you warned the engineers and manufacturers of this country to "wake up," complaining, and justly so, that many of us were sadly lacking in enterprise at that time.

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I have the honour to remain,
Your obedient servant,
(*Signed*) MAURICE GRAHAM.

Marlborough House,
29th March, 1904.

SIR,

The Prince of Wales desires me to thank you for the copy of the souvenir illustrating what has been done by your firm in the design and construction of new engineering works, built on the most modern and up-to-date principles, which you have been good enough to send for His Royal Highness's acceptance. His Royal Highness has read your letter of the 28th inst. with much interest, and desires me to congratulate you in his name on the great rapidity with which your undertaking was carried out.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
ARTHUR BIGGE.

Maurice Graham, Esq.,
Pepper Road, Hunslet, Leeds.

IN the new issue (being the 41st) of the *Statesman's Year Book*, edited for Messrs. Macmillan & Co. by Dr. J. Scott Keltie and Mr. J. A. Renwick, a series of statistical tables and diagrams has been brought together illustrative of the conditions of British trade and shipping from 1860 to the present date. Besides this compilation, so necessary for students of the fiscal question, may be mentioned a diagram showing the extent to which Belleville boilers are employed in the various fleets. In the general revision to which the book has been subjected, as usual, may be noted the first appearance of a section devoted to Panama as an independent State.

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The FIELD, August 8, 1903, *writing an account of the New Aitchison Prism Binocular, says:—*

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The ENGLISH MECHANIC, August 14, 1903, *says:—*

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The ILLUSTRATED SPORTING AND DRAMATIC NEWS, October 10, 1903, *says:—*

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JUNE, 1904.

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HARVARD COLLEGE
NOV 12 1936

THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 907.—JUNE, 1904.

"The Glorious First of June."

REMEMBER "The Glorious First of June!"
Sing of Lord Howe in a rousing tune,
With British cheers for the brave old man
Who was sixty-eight when he led the van
And thrust in the thick of that nameless fight,
On "The First of June," in the morning light.

They were gallant foes he met that day,
Yet through their line he broke his way;
And then as the crash of her broadsides shook
His ship, he shut up his signal book;
"No need for signalling now," said he,
"They can see where I am; let 'em follow me!"

It has not a name that glorious fight,
Fought on the ocean no land in sight;
But what of that?—By whatever name,
The grand result had been just the same;
For the prize of that splendid victory
Sea-Power was, in supremacy!

Remember Lord Howe and his fighting men
And the place they won for England then,
Still ours to hold let come who may
From the corners four of the world to-day;
Not one nor many shall make us rue,
Heart of Great Britain, if thou art true!

A. W. A. POLLOCK.

BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS.

By L. G. Carr Laughton.

International law is a living and growing organism, and makes its most rapid developments in time of war. Every controversial point that arises during the course of hostilities helps either to consolidate or to modify the existing law. Further, the greater the powers involved, the greater is the value of the precedents. "The action of minor powers may often indicate the direction which it would be well that progress should take, but they can never declare actual law with so much authority as those done by the States to whom the moulding of the law has been committed by the force of irresistible circumstance." Whence it follows that the lessons of the present struggle are of the first importance.

The war is rich in anomalies, arising out of the peculiar political conditions which brought the opposing powers into conflict. The anomalies, therefore, are not merely incidental, they are vital; and, just as they have had an important bearing on the inception of the struggle, so they are bound to influence its course, and to be taken into account at the settlement.

In its ordinary meaning, the term "invasion," implies the invasion by one belligerent of territory belonging to the other. If the invading power is successful, it acquires, and may retain, sovereignty over the invaded territory. In any case, whether ultimately successful or not, it acquires, by the mere fact of temporary occupation, certain definable rights over the population of the invaded territory for so long a period as the invasion lasts.

But in the present war the term "invasion" can have no such simple and well-defined meaning, as regarding the invasion of either Korea or Manchuria by Japan. In the former case the violation of Korean neutrality was subsequently condoned by the agreement entered into between Korea and Japan. Although the position of Korea, with regard to the struggle, is far from being rendered normal, yet it has been considerably simplified by the agreement. But, as regards Manchuria, there is no dominant factor, save

Note.—Passages in inverted commas are quoted from the 5th edition of W. E. Hall's 'International Law,' Clarendon Press, 1904.

the somewhat doubtful neutrality of China, and the Japanese undertaking to respect the integrity of that Empire. The present position in law is, that Manchuria, the property of China, is occupied by Russia, a power friendly to China. Japan, also friendly to China, but not in alliance with it, is credited with a desire to expel the occupier from the territory in dispute. If Japan succeeds, to whom does Manchuria belong? If Russia is victorious and can drive the Japanese out of Manchuria, how does this affect her position?

To take the latter question first. On behalf of Russia it would be claimed that her position in Manchuria is the result of pacific penetration, undertaken for the safeguarding of undoubted interests. It is an axiom of international law that a State has the right to take measures to secure its existence. If it could be proved that the non-occupation of Manchuria would be fatal to the continued existence of Russia as a State, the Russian occupation would be justified. This being the Russian contention which led to the war, it is inevitable that Russia, if victorious, would continue to rely upon it, and the absorption of Manchuria would be a foregone conclusion. Her position, therefore, would not be altered. She would have gained by war what she had hoped to gain without a breach of the peace. Nor does the Anglo-Japanese alliance modify the nature of Russia's position. Its legal aspect is the same as if no such alliance existed; and the interest of the alliance lies rather in the moral support which it gives to the one combatant, and the discouragement which it must bring to the other, owing to the improbability of the success of Russia being acquiesced in by this country.

But there is the alternative supposition, that Japan may succeed in driving Russia out of Manchuria. There does not appear to be any exact historic precedent of such an event. In 1814, Great Britain, acting independently of Genoa, cleared Genoese territory of its French invaders. The analogy is close, but there are important differences. For instance, the French occupation had not been "pacific"; no territory belonging to the Genoese State was left unoccupied, so that, during the Anglo-French hostilities, the previous owners of the territory were directly interested, and could not, like the Chinese Empire now, stand aside with a profession of neutrality. However, the instance is worth recalling. In this case it was argued, on the one hand, that "Genoa ought to have been regarded as a friendly State, oppressed for a time by the common enemy, and entitled to reassume the exercise of her sovereign rights as soon as the enemy was driven from her territory by a friendly force." On the other hand, it was argued

that, although the liberators could not dispose of the country wholly without reference to the native population, yet a State which was unable, in the first instance, to resist invasion, and could not afterwards free itself from the invaders, had forfeited its right to exist as a State. For this reason, as well as on account of the sacrifices he had made, the interests of the liberator ought to be consulted in arriving at a settlement.

At first sight the arguments seem to be irreconcilable. The reason for this is that they are based on different conceptions of the occupation which had taken place. The former argument regarded it as temporary, and liable to overthrow; the latter considered that it had been so far consolidated that it amounted to conquest. The practice is that, if the occupation has not amounted to conquest, the State automatically recovers its existence as soon as it is relieved of the presence of the invader; but if there is doubt as to the nature of the occupation, the point is determined by the liberator. Such determination, however, would not be likely to occur, inasmuch as the liberating power, by its professions at the beginning of hostilities, foreshadows its own action in the event of success. Such is the case in the present instance. Japan has professed her intention to respect the integrity of the Chinese Empire, so that, in the event of the victory of Japan, the sovereignty over Manchuria will revert to China.

A curious consequence of this state of affairs is pointed out in the *Contemporary Review* for April. Suppose the Japanese forces to succeed in clearing lower Manchuria of Russians; then, as they advance north, it would be perfectly consistent for them to restore immediately to China the sovereignty in the recovered districts in their rear. China, by re-occupying them, would not only be committing no breach of her neutrality, but would be vindicating it. In May such a condition was already possible at Newchwang; but China seemed to be unwilling to accept it.

From the first outbreak of hostilities, points for discussion began to arise. For instance, how far was Japan responsible for the war by her unwillingness to resort to arbitration? It is clear from a letter written to the *Times*, 7th April, and quoting the words of Professor Martens, that Russia made overtures to Japan in December, 1903, urging that the points at dispute should be submitted to the arbitration of the Hague tribunal. This course, which was suggested by Professor Martens himself, was very favourably spoken of in influential Russian circles. But Japan, the Russian jurist complains, by her treacherous action, spoilt the whole plan. The indictment against Japan would be heavy were it not remembered that arbitration is a measure resorted to for

the settlement of minor and incidental differences only, and not of differences which are vital to the life of the nations concerned. The mere fact that influential Russian opinion favoured the plan, goes far to show that Russia's aims in the Far East were not vital to her existence; and, on the contrary, its decided rejection by Japan proves conclusively that that power was inspired by the firm belief that her vital interests were threatened. Viewed in this light, the tendency of the argument is to shift the blame from Japan to the shoulders of Russia.

Again, the "treacherous action" of Japan refers, of course, to the sudden inception of hostilities. But formal declarations of war are long out of fashion; the practice of dispensing with them is more than two centuries old, and it was largely confirmed by the custom followed by England itself throughout the wars of the eighteenth century. "When a cause of war has arisen, and when the duty of endeavouring to preserve peace by all reasonable means has been satisfied . . . an act of hostility, unless it be done in the urgency of self-preservation or by way of reprisal, is in itself a full declaration of intention. Any sort of previous declaration, therefore, is an empty formality, unless an enemy must be given time and opportunity to put himself in a state of defence, and it is needless to say that no one asserts that such quixotism is obligatory." Such is the case as between belligerents. But between belligerents and neutrals the case stands differently. The duties of neutrals in time of war are so onerous that it is due to them, as a matter of courtesy, that "a belligerent shall not allow them to find out incidentally, and, perhaps, with uncertainty, that war has commenced. As a matter of law they can only be saddled with duties and exposed to liabilities from the time at which they have been affected with a knowledge of the existence of war. Hence it has long been a common practice to address a manifesto to neutral States, the date of which serves to fix the moment at which war begins. A belligerent cannot expect States to take up the attitude of neutrality contemporaneously with the outbreak of hostilities." As between belligerents the first hostile act marks the beginning of war; but as between belligerents and neutrals the beginning dates from the formal intimation made to neutrals by the conflicting powers.

Nevertheless, there are cases in which States become affected by the non-neutral action of their subjects who are engaged, knowingly or even ignorantly, in carrying out a naval or military operation for an intending belligerent. It is under this heading that the false report as to British action at Wei-hai-wei comes on for discussion. However ignorant the intention of the neutral may

be, there are occasions on which his action is of real help to a power intending to undertake hostilities, and consequently gravely prejudicial to the power against which it intends to operate. Usage, therefore, grants the threatened power a large measure of freedom of action with regard to such action by a third power. For instance, it allows him to anticipate the right conferred by a state of war and to board the ships of the third power at sea. The sinking of the *Kowshing* in 1894 for resisting this right of visit comes under this category. But, supposing that at the outset of the present war Wei-hai-wei had been used, as was pretended, by Japan, the case would not have been similar, for no Russian investigation of what was taking place there could have been made without a flagrant breach of British neutrality. The case falls rather under the heading of illegal expeditions, with regard to which it is necessary to prove consciousness on the part of the third power that an expedition was intended. A State can only be held responsible for such acts as it may reasonably be expected to have knowledge of and to prevent. "If the acts done are of common notoriety, as, for instance, was the Fenian raid into Canada in 1866, the State is obviously responsible for not using proper means to repress them. If, however, attempts are made to disguise the true character of noxious acts, what amount of care to obtain knowledge of them beforehand and to prevent them may reasonably be expected? If a government honestly gives so much care as may seem to be proportioned to the state of things existing at the time, it does all that it can be asked to do." In the present case, it will be remembered, any hostile intention, so far from being of common notoriety was entirely unknown and came as a complete surprise; so that even had Japanese ships issued from Wei-hai-wei for the attack on Port Arthur this country's complicity could not have been postulated, and the burden of proving it would have lain with Russia.

It has been observed that, with the lapse of time, the tendency of States is to put on a stricter interpretation on their duties as neutrals. This war marks no exception with regard to Great Britain, whose declaration of neutrality is most stringent. The right which neutrals guard most jealously is the immunity of their territorial waters from hostile operations, and akin to this right is their duty to see that their ports are not used as bases by the enemy. The only violation of neutrality that has taken place is in respect of Korea; but Korea, as was noticed at the beginning of this article, was in an exceptional position. Both combatants violated her neutrality, in the knowledge that she was unable to vindicate it. Since the outbreak of war many Russian ships, but

no Japanese, have put into neutral ports. The ships that were on their way from Europe to the Far East, in February, caused great anxiety for a time, as it was claimed that they were using a neutral port as a base, and blockading the Red Sea. It does not appear that such was the case, and the belief may have arisen owing to the fact that the practice of England in limiting the stay of foreign men-of-war in her ports to twenty-four hours is not common to all other nations. That Russian ships exercised their right of visit and capture of neutral ships in the Red Sea is undoubted; but it is also noteworthy that such prizes, as were made, were not brought through the Suez Canal for condemnation at the Prize Court, established at Nicolaieff. It has not been publicly stated why this course was adopted by Russia, but presumably it was followed because prizes could not be brought through the canal without violating its neutrality. A prize taken from a neutral, until condemned by a Prize Court, is not the property of the captor. It is only conditionally his, and from this it might be argued that the actual act of capture is in progress up to the moment of the condemnation of the prize, so that to take it into neutral waters, unless driven in by accident or by stress of weather, would be to violate the neutrality of those waters.

Both belligerents in this war have included coal among articles declared contraband. Coal has for some time been regarded as provisionally contraband, and is now far on the road to being considered absolutely so. The additional precedent will be of importance in fixing its status for the future. As regards loans to a belligerent, modern opinion has advanced in an opposite direction, and although loans are being floated in neutral countries for both belligerents, there has been no outcry against it. It appears to be now recognised that such action constitutes no breach of neutrality. The reason for this is that "money is an article of commerce in the fullest sense of the word. To throw upon neutral governments the obligation of controlling dealings in it taking place within their territories, would be to set up a solitary exception to the fundamental rule that States are not responsible for the commercial acts of their subjects. Also it would burden States with a responsibility which they would be wholly unable to meet. Money is a merchandise, the transmission of which would elude all supervision. Payment might be made in bills, not one of which might enter the neutral country in which the contract is made."

The law as regards the sale of ships to belligerents is in a state of transition, and, as was to be expected, the most severe restrictions in this respect are placed upon British shipbuilders and

owners. Recently the state of the law was summed up as follows, "An international usage prohibiting the construction and outfit of vessels of war is in course of growth, but it is not yet old enough, or quite wide enough, to have become compulsory on those nations which have not yet signified their voluntary adherence to it." The difficulty with regard to ships not built primarily as men-of-war lies in the fact that few fast steamers are altogether unfitted to receive an armament of some kind. The extremes of practice with regard to Russia and Japan are to be found in the action of Great Britain and Germany. This country, having men-of-war under construction for Japan, has publicly announced in her declaration of neutrality that no ships will be allowed to be delivered until after the war. Germany, on the other hand, has sold to Russia one of the large and fast mail steamers of the Hamburg-American line, a ship fitted by her construction to be used as an "auxiliary" cruiser, as well as other ships of less importance.

With regard to the destruction by the Russians of merchant steamers taken from the Japanese, it may be said that such action is unusual but not illegal. "It is the practice for belligerents to guard the interests of neutrals, by requiring captors, as a general rule, to bring their prizes into port for adjudication whether the captured vessel and its cargo are in fact wholly, or only in part, the property of the enemy. Though the right of a belligerent to the free disposal of enemy property taken by him is in no way touched by the existence of this practice, it is not usual to permit captors to destroy or ransom prizes, however undoubted may be their ownership, except when their retention is difficult or inconvenient."

In another instance, Russia's action is on a similar footing. She has armed, or is reported to have armed, bodies of convicts. Now, if she uses such troops for the ordinary purposes of warfare, her action is harsh and retrograde, though it is not illegal so long as the men are properly organised and commanded. But when employing a convict militia for the local defence of Sakhalin, Russia can, of course, plead the pressure of necessity and the absence of other means of defence.

No events have occurred to bring questions of cable cutting to the fore, so that the state of the law in that respect has not attracted attention. But, inasmuch as the United States have, so recently as the 4th February last, withdrawn their Naval War Code, and thereby removed one authoritative pronouncement on the subject, it may be well to refer to the decisions arrived at by the Institute of International Law in September, 1902. In accordance

with these a cable between two belligerent territories may be cut anywhere, save where it may happen to pass through neutral waters. A cable between a belligerent and a neutral territory may be cut, (1) In the territorial waters of the belligerent; (2) On the high seas within the limits of an effective blockade, subject to an obligation to re-establish the connexion.

The Russian threat to confiscate steamers having on board correspondents using wireless telegraphy, and to treat the correspondents as spies, has excited much indignation. The claim to capture these correspondents seems to be based on a determination to regard them as being so far in the service of Japan as to have become invested with an enemy character. The laws of contraband do not apply to their case. Also the claim to consider them as spies is irregular, even if the enemy character postulated for them be granted. They do not fall under the military definition of a spy, for there is no secrecy in their method of acquiring information. The real complaint against them, as it was against balloonists in the Franco-Prussian war, is that their information is forwarded in a manner beyond control. But it was decided definitely at the Hague that for the future balloonists, when taken, are to be treated as prisoners of war. In this instance, therefore, Russia is proposing to act with harshness similar to that which she has shown in stopping and searching the English mail steamer *Osiris* for Japanese despatches. All nations save Russia have long recognised the non-contraband character of the despatches of diplomatic agents, and it is hard to see what others can have been sought on board the *Osiris*. The incident will have its use if it helps to secure the confirmation of the law affecting this matter.

A point remains which is of vast importance. It is that which regards the amount of coal which a belligerent ship may take on board in a neutral port. The question, which concerns violation of neutrality and has no direct reference to the contraband nature of coal, threatened early in the war to become acute, but lapsed owing to the recall of the Russian ships which were on their way to the Pacific. If a further attempt is made by Russia to reinforce her Far Eastern fleet the question will again arise. It is to be hoped that the present war may result in the adoption of some new and more suitable ruling on this point. The present rule is hopelessly obsolete and unsuited to conditions of modern warfare.

L. G. CARR LAUGHTON.

THE DUTIES OF THE ROYAL GARRISON ARTILLERY.

By "Garrison Gunner."

The exact position of the Royal Garrison Artillery in the military forces of his Majesty's Empire is a subject which, as a rule, seems to be little understood by the other branches of his Majesty's Service. The officers of the Royal Navy seem more especially inclined to fall into error on this subject, and considering the fact that the Royal Navy and the Royal Garrison Artillery will have to co-operate in time of war, this is a great pity. It would be well to have the position clearly defined.

The Royal Garrison Artillery comprises the Mountain Division, Siege Train Companies, Heavy Batteries, and Coast Defence Companies. The Mountain Artillery, the Siege Train Companies, and the Heavy Batteries belong to the Field Army, and their *rôle* is fairly clear; but it is as regards the Coast Defence Companies that misconception is most common, and it is quite common to hear officers of other branches of the Service saying that these are useless, because immobile and locked up in forts which no enemy would ever think of attacking. While granting that Coast Defence Companies are immobile from the very nature of their duty, it should be borne in mind that they are auxiliary to the first line of defence, namely, the Royal Navy, and that their training and efficiency are of paramount importance to the nation.

Without the Coast Defence Companies the local defence of our harbours and dockyards would be left entirely to the Auxiliary Forces.

Even at the present, according to the Inspector-General of Garrison Artillery, 70 per cent. of the men required to man the Coast Defences of Great Britain on mobilisation, are to be drawn from the Militia and Volunteer Artillery.

Under modern conditions, as clearly exemplified in the Russo-Japanese War, torpedo raids may be expected even before the formal declaration of war, and unless Coast Defence Companies exist, and are thoroughly alert, our ships repairing or preparing

for sea in our harbours and dockyards, would be liable at the commencement of war, and possibly also later, to be treated by an enemy in the same way as the Russian ships at Port Arthur were treated by the Japanese.

While granting that owing to the immobility of the Coast Defence Companies, it is well that a large proportion of the men required to man Coast Defences should be drawn from the auxiliaries, to carry that argument to the extent of saying that Coast Defence Companies are practically useless is fallacious, and as absurd as to expect an army in the field to do without supply depôts. The Navy must have harbours and dockyards in which to coal and refit, and these lose half their value if not safe from the fear of successful torpedo-boat raids.

A certain part of the Coast gunner's work is very simple, and can be learnt in a very short time by men who have not been specially trained: as an instance of this, in certain Coast fortresses abroad, Infantry are trained in Artillery work, and very soon pick it up. But gun-layers, range-finding specialists, telephonists, district gunners, gun-captains, gun-group commanders, and, above all, battery commanders, cannot under any circumstances be improvised, and for this reason a fairly large nucleus of Regular Coast Defence gunners must be maintained.

It may be argued that all the above can be supplied by the Militia and Volunteer Artillery; but while fully appreciating the value of these forces, it would not be safe to trust to their knowledge of the Q.F. guns required for use against a torpedo-boat raid, until they have received more systematic training than is possible under the existing regulations.

The auxiliaries might, with advantage, be used for manning old type heavy guns, and also might well be used as ammunition numbers; but the gunner in the Auxiliary Forces cannot, as a rule, get sufficient practice at laying to use automatic sights with advantage. Further, only in a few instances can the Volunteer Artillery become so thoroughly acquainted with the works, which they would have to man, as to be able to dispense with the services of a fair proportion of Regular district gunners, at any rate during the first few, and, therefore, the most critical days of a mobilisation.

Then, again, few of the officers of the Militia and Volunteer Artillery get sufficient practice as battery commanders, and gun-group commanders, to be able to carry out these duties satisfactorily, without the assistance of a fair proportion of R.G.A. officers.

The intention of the foregoing remarks is not in any way to belittle the services and valuable work done by many of the Militia and Volunteer Artillery, but to point out the need for the Coast

Defence Companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery to those who are prone to think they are unnecessary.

Few, who have not had practical experience of Coast D f work, realise what a strain the defence of a Coa: to attack, would involve on all ranks, and how eas fire on a friendly vessel, or to allow a hostile boat There is little or no question that surprise attack be attempted at night, dawn, or during foggy w fact, of course, demands intense vigilance if the frustrated.

The old saying, that the rest of troops in c depends on the alertness of the outposts, might follows: The safety of a ship or fleet in harbou alertness of those manning the Coast Defences. pears that the training and efficiency of those wh Coast Defences of the Empire, are of vital impo line of defence. For this reason co-operation be Defences and the ships afloat should be complet hoped that the better understanding which appear recently between those in the Coast works and the tinue. It is within the last five years that Naval into a friendly port, during mobilisation and na without making a signal of any kind, and thus pla commanders in a very awkward position. It is wi trying to prevent the recurrence of this sort of thin is in progress that the foregoing remarks have bee

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: ROYAL ARTILLERY.

›R A COMMON-SENSE ORGANISATION.

CAPTAIN L. L. HEPPER, R.A.

:mine upon a suitable organisation for our ›sary to rid ourselves of all preconceived notions, ›urselves in the position of a country starting an *ovo*, and wishing to obtain a sound organisation ıd common-sense principles. That the growth ınd the complicated natures of ordnance and dered cumbersome and unwieldy a system rs were called upon to serve indiscriminately ; recognised some years ago, when the Artillery e mounted and dismounted branches. It was › separate those branches in which horseman- from those in which riding was not of much d the separation been to form two branches, batteries serving with an army in the field, and se those for service in coast fortresses against division would have been more practical and

ı, however, to the desire for active service, chief inducements to following the profession ıtain Artillery was given to the dismounted the anomaly of the largest and smallest guns ficers of the same corps. This compromise was ıises, doomed to failure. It was an attempt to ıter a corps needing high scientific attainments, ıny chance of service except in a European War, and ... without giving them the only reasonable compensation, namely, a satisfactory wage. I am not concerned here with the popularity or otherwise of the corps; but the large number of junior officers of the R.G.A., who have lately gone to the Indian Army, may well give pause for reflection. Another development not forseen at the time of the separation was the introduction of Heavy Batteries, which were found to be necessary during the South African War. These batteries were improvised for the occasion from Coast Defence

and Siege Companies at home. Logically, one would have supposed that if it were necessary to have a more powerful gun than the 15-pounder with an army in the field, a certain number of field batteries would have been re-armed after the war with the heavier gun in exchange for the lighter weapon, or that new batteries would have been formed. A distinguished officer of the regiment who propounded the question, "Is Field Artillery necessary?" had, perhaps, in mind two natures of ordnance for field work, one a light and mobile Q.F. gun for Horse Artillery, such as a 6-pounder, and a heavy and powerful piece for the field, such as a 30-pounder, and had, I am sure, no wish to see the Field Artillery abolished. Instead, however, of this course being adopted, viz. making some Field Batteries into Heavy Batteries, it was decided to train some Garrison and Siege Companies as Heavy Batteries, and in the craze for economy, a Mountain Battery was converted into one.

Presumably then, in war, Heavy Batteries and Mountain Batteries also if required, would be formed from Garrison Companies. Even if we had a sufficient number of the latter for Coast Defence, we might well question the wisdom of converting them in time of war into batteries for use with a field army, where the tactics and fire-discipline must be so different. The separation, then, though sound in principle and a move in the right direction, has resulted in Horse and Field Artillery on the one side, and Siege, Heavy, Mountain, and Coast Batteries on the other; and the scientific *rôle* of Coast Defence suffers from the old disability, namely, the risk of unqualified officers and men having to fight a fortress against attack by sea, which I think most officers will agree is a function which requires a special and continuous study. The importance of providing an efficient defence for our dockyards and coaling stations, and a sound system of organisation for our Mobile Artillery must be my excuse for discussing what may perhaps be considered a *chose jugée*. Only remarking that all upheavals must come from below, I proceed to sketch in merest outline what might be an improvement on the present organisation.

There are two separate and distinct purposes for which guns are necessary in the land service. One is to accompany a field army and assist in the defeat of an enemy by attacking his troops, or reducing his forts and entrenchments, and the other is to defend our coast forts from attacks by hostile ships. For the former, Mobile Artillery is required; for the latter, the guns are fixtures in the forts and are not intended to be moved outside; I will deal with the latter first.

Coast Defence comprises the use of the heaviest guns against armoured ships, the use of light Q.F. guns against torpedo-boats

and lighter craft, the knowledge and use of mines, booms, search-lights, and electrical apparatus generally, and the working of position and depression range-finders. Neither in the system of fire-discipline or tactics is there any connection with the methods used in what I may call Mobile Artillery, or the Artillery of a field army.

The Coast Defence gunner should be in close touch with the Navy; he should know all about foreign ships, the extent and thickness of their armour, and should be able to recognise the different classes. He should be hand-in-glove with the submarine miners. Surely, then, one would expect this to be a branch apart. Make a regiment of Coast Artillery, make it a *corps d'élite*, where the brains and mechanical skill of the R.A. will gravitate; if necessary, give them the pay which brains can always command, and I do not think that any difficulty will be found in getting officers to enter it. With regard to its duties, I would suggest that the Coast Artillery should be made entirely responsible for the defence of our dock-yards and coaling stations. In war time the Navy will presumably be occupied in protecting our commerce and harrying the enemy's fleets, and when our ships put in to repair and refit they should be guaranteed entire immunity from attack, and not expected to assist in the defence of the port.

Turning now to the Mobile Artillery, what do we require? We want Horse Artillery, capable of acting with Cavalry, and where a high degree of horsemanship is essential; we want Field Artillery, which will primarily act with Infantry, and yet be capable of more rapid movement on occasion, and where a lesser degree of horsemanship is required. We want next the heaviest gun that can manœuvre across country at a walk, we want Siege Artillery for the reduction of field works, and we want Pack Artillery for countries unsuitable for wheeled traffic. For the three last, which only move at a walk, a slight knowledge of horsemanship is all that is required.

Let us, then, have two regiments, a regiment of Field Artillery to furnish Horse and Field Batteries, and a regiment of Foot Artillery to furnish Heavy, Siege, and Mountain. I do not say that this is a perfect organisation. Some might prefer to have regiments of Field, Foot, and Coast Artillery to comprise a certain number of batteries and companies each, as is the custom in Continental armies.

This is a detail, however, and the main thing is to keep the three branches separate. It may be objected that the difficulty of dividing the two lists of officers into three would be an effectual bar to any re-organisation such as is here proposed. I do not

apprehend any insuperable difficulty about this, and I think it could be carried out without any hardship to officers. The present Mounted list would become the Regiment of Field Artillery; all the officers now serving with Heavy, Siege, and Mountain would be placed on the list of the Foot Artillery, and those serving with Coast Defence companies would form the regiment of Coast Artillery. For some years free interchange between the Foot and Coast Artillery should be allowed, until officers had settled down in the branch they preferred. Armament pay would only be drawn by the Coast Artillery, but I think there would be a sufficient number of candidates for the Foot Artillery. Officers on first appointments would be sent to the regiments for which they were most fitted, and one exchange or transfer might be allowed in the first three years of service. I venture to predict that a re-organisation on these lines would conduce to increased zeal, efficiency, and *esprit de corps.*

L. L. HEPPER.

OUR MILITARY FORCES BEFORE 1820.

By Arthur G. Burney.

After the conquest, the constitutional military force of England consisted of the feudal troops (the persons who held lands immediately of the Crown, or their vassals) and the *posse comitatus*, which included every free man above the age of fifteen and under that of sixty.

In the reigns of Richard II., Henry VII., and Henry VIII., four military bodies were instituted, three of which are still existing—the Sergeants-at-Arms, the Yeoman of the Guard, and the Artillery Company. The first has retained nothing of its ancient military character, and the Yeomen of the Guard and the Artillery Company very little of it.

It was an axiom with our ancestors that a standing Army was inconsistent with the liberties of the people, and this idea remained in full force until the middle ages.

It was thought that the existence of a standing Army was inseparable from a military Government.

Even so late as the latter part of the last century, we find Burke writing: "An armed disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society." The English Parliaments persisted through the long wars between the Houses of York and Lancaster in refusing to grant standing armies, declaring it to be of less importance to protect the Crown from its opponents than to keep the Crown dependent upon the people.

King Henry VII.'s small body-guard of some fifty archers was regarded, even in those disturbed times, as a dangerous innovation, and one incompatible with the constitution of the country. The same ideas prevailed in Ancient Rome whose armies were disbanded at the close of campaigns. Our ancestors had an instinctive dread that a standing army, once established, would become a permanent institution, and their fears were not diminished by the argument that once every year Parliament would have the whole question under its consideration, and would vary the size of the Army according to the state of affairs both at home and abroad.

When trained armies began to take the field, it soon became apparent that militias were no match for them. It needed the reverses of the first two years of the second Punic War to teach the Romans that trained and disciplined forces could only be overcome by troops similarly prepared, and fourteen weary years of conflict had to be undergone before they were enabled to drive Hannibal out of Italy.

So long as the discipline of their troops was maintained, they were everywhere victorious, but when it was relaxed, they succumbed to the Saracens, who, in their turn, paid the penalty of neglect, and were overcome by the Turks.

One of the greatest dangers that ever assailed this country found her without a standing Army.

At the time of the despatch of the Spanish Armada, the English Army was only the Militia. Queen Elizabeth, inquiring of one of her generals as to the efficiency of the Army, was answered that its bravery was undoubted, as every man hoped the Spaniards would effect a landing, and he alone feared the result, doubting, not the courage, but the rawness of the troops.

Then, and up to a much later date, it used to be urged that the existence of our Navy rendered it unnecessary for us to have an Army at all. That the Navy was not always to be depended upon for guarding us against surprise was proved by the fact that during the reign of Queen Anne the French shipped 7000 soldiers in eleven frigates, of which we knew nothing until shortly before they put to sea. Had they been fast vessels, they might easily have landed the troops before our Navy could have interfered. In those times might was right, and the doctrine is far from being extinct to-day.

There is still much force in the reply which King Henry IV., of France, is reported to have given to the Venetian Ambassador, who, endeavouring to accommodate some differences, pleaded the wisdom of the Republic.

"True," said the king, "you have a hundred wise senators, but if I should send twenty thousand of my blockheads against them, I should not much fear their wisdom."

It was in the reign of Charles I. that the Army, which was still only the Militia, first gained influence in the realm, and became a third power in the State. On the accession of that monarch the law imposed on every citizen the obligation of bearing arms either in the County force or in the trained bands of his town or city. One of the great struggles between Charles I. and the Parliament arose from his claiming to have exclusive control over the Militia. Apart from the Militia, no army existed in this

country before the Civil War. Cromwell kept the Army on foot, and used it as a means of his own advancement, making it turn out the very Parliament that had raised it, as soon as he saw that both could not exist together.

The military system of feudal tenure was not wholly abolished in England until the time of Charles II. No existing Corps can trace its direct pedigree beyond the reign of that monarch.

One of the first acts of Charles II. after his restoration was, with the full assent of Parliament, to disband the Army. It was forthwith disbanded *en masse*, a few regiments only being excepted, one of which was the Coldstreams. These the king retained for service about his person, and shortly after increased their number to five thousand.

Thus the Guards of the Sovereign constituted the whole Army, and no remonstrances of the Parliament could move the king from that position.

James II., not content with the supreme control of five thousand troops, gradually increased their number, so that at last the force paid from the civil list amounted to thirty thousand men. This sealed his fate, and at the Revolution the Army was disbanded, and the Mutiny Bill passed.

The 15th Article of the Bill of Rights had declared the illegality of a standing Army, and the Mutiny Act commenced with a recital of that Article—"The raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law."

The Revolution has been cited as an instance of the protection that standing armies have often afforded to the liberties of nations. For had the Army been as true to the King as they were to their country, the Prince of Orange would not have met with so easy a success. Again, during the last four years of the reign of Queen Anne, nothing contributed so much to keep the Ministry in check as the unswerving honesty of the Army. The Jacobite party used every effort to persuade its most influential officers to place the Pretender on the throne, and, failing of success, disbanded the Army, that they might do without them that which they could not accomplish with them.

It was not, therefore, until the reign of William III. that Parliament, by means of the Mutiny Bill, obtained control of the Army. Provisions for its pay and discipline had thenceforth to be submitted every year to Parliament. The conclusion of the treaty of Ryswick revived all the old antipathy to a standing army. In addition to this the Exchequer was exhausted, and everything seemed to point to the necessity of a rigorous economy. So it came to pass that in

the first session after the Peace, Parliament voted that all troops raised since 1680 should be disbanded, reducing the forces to 7000 men. The Commons reluctantly consented to increase the number to 10,000.

So great was the King's dissatisfaction with this that, on setting out for Holland, he left sealed orders that 16,000 men should be kept up, and this, in defiance of the resolution of Parliament, was carried out. This was not, however, to last long, as in the next session, which was the first of a new Parliament, the number of 7000 was again resolved upon, and this time adhered to. It was, morever, entirely to be composed of natives of the British dominions, which, to the King's great mortification, necessitated the dismissal of the Dutch Guards and French refugees. Mr. Hallam, in his 'Constitutional History of England,' thus expressed his disapproval of the reduction:—"The messages that passed between the King and the Parliament bear witness how deeply he felt, and how fruitlessly he deprecated, this act of unkindness and ingratitude so strikingly in contrast with the deference that Parliament has generally shown to the humours and prejudices of the Crown in matters of far higher moment. The foreign troops were too numerous, and it would have been politic to conciliate the nationality of the multitude by reducing their number; yet they had claims which a grateful and generous people should not have forgotten; they were, many of them, the chivalry of protestantism, the Huguenot gentlemen who had lost all but their swords in a cause which we deemed our own; they were the men who had terrified James from Whitehall, and brought about a deliverance which, to speak plainly, we had neither sense nor courage to achieve for ourselves, or which at least we never could have achieved without enduring the convulsive throes of anarchy." The disbanding the Army emboldened Louis XIV. to renounce his treaties. He declared the Pretender, set his grandson on the throne of Spain, and involved us in the long war of the Spanish Succession. The brilliant success of our arms tended in a great measure to increase the popularity of the Army as a profession, and did much to reconcile the public to the sight of a large body of troops kept continuously on foot. The prevailing uncertainty of affairs on the Continent seemed to render it hazardous to reduce their numbers, so that during the early years of George I. Parliament acquiesced in a vote for 17,000 men, independent of those on the Irish establishment, but including the garrisons of Minorca and Gibraltar.

In the early years of the reign of George II. there was considerable discussion about the reduction of the standing Army, the King having promised in his speech from the throne in 1732 that

the forces should be reduced as soon as the interests of the Kingdom would allow it.

In the debate in the House of Lords in 1733 on the Mutiny Bill, an attempt was made to persuade the Government to reduce the Army. This was strongly opposed by the Duke of Newcastle, who asserted that we had never made any reduction in our Army without encouraging our enemies, both at home and abroad, to make attempts to disturb the peace of the country.

In 1740 the total of the land forces and marines in Great Britain was 35,804; in Ireland, 11,639; in the Plantations, 3,402; in Gibraltar, 4,075; in Minorca, 4,075, making a grand total of 58,995. In 1762 the total in Great Britain and Germany was 67,776, and in the Plantations and abroad 37,397. After the peace in the following year these numbers were reduced to 17,536 in Great Britain, and 28,406 in the plantations and garrisons abroad. In 1778 the forces in Great Britain numbered 20,057 men. The American War, however, largely increased the Army, and in 1780 we find the estimates providing for a total of 179,500 men. This included 42,000 Militia and Fencibles, an increase of 15,000 on the previous year. At the conclusion of the American War the Army was reduced to about 40,000 men.

In the spring of 1803 the British Government resolved upon a renewal of hostilities against the French Republic. They incorporated the Militia to the number of 83,840, and raised an Army of Reserve amounting to 34,162 men. The total force of Volunteers amounted to 474,627. These formed the defensive forces, making a total of 592,629. If to those figures we add the 150,000 of the regular Army, the 100,094 of sailors and marines, and the 160,000 forming the Army of the East Indies, we get a total of 1,002,723 of the forces of the United Kingdom in December, 1803. From that date the increase of the regular forces was constant and progressive until 1815, when the gradual reduction commenced. In 1818, after the withdrawal from the occupation of Paris, our troops numbered 80,479. The number of soldiers for every million of inhabitants in Great Britain in 1789 was 1,240, and in 1819 it was 1658. In Ireland it was 4000 for every million in 1789 and 4,083 in 1819.

To the adoption of standing armies is attributed the necessity of having recourse to a national debt. At the death of William III. the debt was £16,394,702, of which above three millions were to expire in 1710. During the reign of Queen Anne the national debt rose to £54,145,363. The whole expenses of the War of the Grand Alliance were estimated at £65,853,799. During the reign of George III. the national debt rose from £88,000,000 to

£226,000,000 at the end of the American War, to £451,000,000 in 1800, owing to the war of 1793, and to £900,000,000 at the end of the Peninsular War in 1817, when the British and Irish Exchequers were consolidated.

Conscription has never found favour in this country. An attempt was, indeed, made during the War of the Grand Alliance in 1704 to recruit the Army by a forced conscription of men from each parish, but it was abandoned as unconstitutional. In 1707 it was tried again with no better success. Recourse was then had to a temporary Act enabling a sufficient number of troops to be raised by parish officers amongst such persons as had no lawful calling or employment. The Act was renewed several times during the war and again in 1757, but has never been resorted to since.

In 1647 daily pay in the English Army stood as follows:—Lord General £10, Major-General £2, Quarter-Master-General £1, Adjutant-General £1, Lieut.-Colonel 15*s.*, Major 9*s.*, Captain 5*s.*, Lieutenant 4*s.*, Ensign 3*s.*, Sergeant 1*s.* 6*d.*, foot soldier 8*d.* Cromwell, anxious to curry favour with the Army, made considerable increases to these figures. The pay of officers and privates fixed by William III. after the Revolution remained without alteration until the end of the next century. Meanwhile, the price of many articles of necessity had greatly increased. Shortly after the outbreak of the American War, the pay of the infantry private was raised to 10*d.* In 1797 the division of officer's pay into subsistence and arrears was abolished, and the deduction of 5 per cent. for hospitals and agency from the pay of all officers below the rank of captain was remitted. At the same time, the pay of the private was raised to 1*s.* a day. The changes in connection with officer's pay greatly simplified the accounts of the Army. In that year infantry pay was settled as follows:—Colonel £1 2*s.* 6*d.*, Lieut.-Colonel 17*s.*, Major 16*s.*, Captain 10*s.* 6*d.*, Lieutenant 6*s.* 6*d.*, Lieutenant, after seven years' service, 7*s.* 6*d.*, Second Lieutenant 5*s.* 3*d.*, Sergeant- and Corporal-Majors 3*s.*, Sergeants 1*s.* 10*d.*, Corporal 1*s.* 4*d.*, Private 1*s.* To the pay of colonels must be added an allowance equal to the pay of as many men as there were companies in the regiment. In order to afford greater encouragement to corporals and privates to remain in the Service, the Government in 1806 granted an increase of a 1*d.* to their daily pay at the end of ten years' service and of 2*d.* at the end of seventeen years. On comparing the rate of pay in 1858 in the English and French Armies, it was found that our non-commissioned officers received an average rate of £37 12*s.*, and the French £24, our privates £20 5*s.*, the French £9 10*s.*

The purchase system was established in the reign of Charles II.

Half pay being only temporary, it was necessary to permit retiring officers to make some provision for themselves. Hence arose the sale of commissions. Under this system the pay and allowances of an infantry lieut.-colonel in command amounted to £365 a year, while the interest on sums paid for commissions and other deductions for regimental expenses amounted to £380 12*s.* 11*d.* a year, so that he not only served for nothing, but paid some £15 a year for the privilege of commanding his regiment.

From the time of Henry VI. to about the middle of the last century the soldier's clothing was provided by the commanding officers or captains of companies, and considerable profits were derived from the practice. Distinguishing uniforms in the Army were first introduced in the reign of Henry VIII., and their colour was either white and green or white and russet. In 1599 an officer's outfit was reckoned at £4 0*s.* 10*d.* From the votes of the House of Commons in the 30th of King Charles II., 1678, the cost of the clothing of the Army appears to have been: foot £2 13*s.*, Dragoons £6 10*s.*, Horse Grenadiers £8.

The Committee of the House of Commons appointed in the reign of George II. to enquire into the state of the Army found that upwards of £578 had been saved by a colonel after clothing his regiment.

The nomination of chaplains also used to belong to the colonels of regiments, who sold the appointments. When this system was abolished, colonels of cavalry received a compensation of £700 and colonels of infantry of £500. In 1806 the total expense of the enlistment of a trooper was £13 13*s.*, of a foot soldier, intended for general service, £17 1*s.*, and of youths under sixteen years of age £10 15*s.* These sums included the reward of the recruiting party, the charge for surgical inspection, and the purchase of a trifling equipment necessary for the recruit.

In 1807 bounty became a direct transaction between the State and the recruit. The highest amount to which the bounty ever rose was during the Peninsular War, when for men it stood at £23 17*s.* 6*d.* if for life, and at £18 12*s.* 6*d.* if for a limited time. The recruit did not actually receive these amounts, as every expense connected with enlistment, clothing and necessaries had to come out of it. The bounty continued to fluctuate according to circumstances; thus in 1856, before peace was declared, it was £7, and only £2 in the following year. These figures were, however, exclusive of recruiting expenses, kit and equipment.

It was during the reign of Charles II. that the office of Secretary at War was created, and all the Army patronage was assigned to him. This continued until the growth of the Army necessitated

placing the patronage in the hands of a non-political officer, the Commander-in-Chief. In 1768 the Secretaryship of State for War and the Colonies was instituted. In 1819 the charges for these combined departments only amounted to £27,852. They were separated during the Crimean War. A fourth Secretaryship was created, and was conferred upon the Duke of Newcastle.

With regard to the expenditure of the Commander-in-Chief's department, that distinguished Frenchman, M. Dupin, declared in 1820 that the public administration of Great Britain, from being the most economical had become the most expensive in Europe. He pointed out that when Lord Amherst was Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, his military secretary was only a head clerk with a salary of 10*s*. a day or £182 a year. In 1813, in lieu of this clerk, the Commander-in-Chief had for military secretary a lieut.-colonel in receipt of £2500 a year. In 1794 the total expense of the Commander-in-Chief's office in salaries and contingencies, amounted only to £1029 for the year, while in 1814 the aggregate of charges was £9761. Thus in the lapse of only twenty years, the expenses of a single department had increased tenfold. In 1805 a Commission of Military Enquiry had been instituted by Act of Parliament for the purpose of examining into the expenses, and controlling the operations of military departments. The work of the Commissioners commenced in August, 1805, and continued without intermission until 1812. During its session, nineteen reports were successively presented to the House of Commons, and the whole labours of the committee were subsequently contained in six folio volumes. Though it has met at different times with very adverse criticism, it brought to light, if not all, yet many flagrant abuses. One item of wasteful expenditure was the system of purchasing horses which was exposed by the Committee in their sixteenth report. In 1803 a contract had been made, without public advertisement, for the supply of horses. So disadvantageous to the Government was it, that they found themselves obliged, after purchasing from the contractor all the horses he had collected, to pay him £35,000 to induce him to cancel the contract. A further examination revealed the fact that if the Government had availed themselves of a clause in the contract which fixed the price to be paid for every horse dying in the Service at £21, and had killed all the horses, they would have cost £45,000 less than the contractor actually received for them. In spite of this, the same contractor was employed on several subsequent occasions, and new sources of profit were rapidly developed. One of these was the reduction of the allowance of forage, the horses being fed by the contractor. So stinted was the allowance, that the horses became

unable to do their work, and the Engineers at Dover, finding they could not be used for heavy transport work, were obliged to hire others in the neighbourhood. In 1816 the Government commenced to purchase horses for themselves.

The investigations of the Committee revealed the great increase that had taken place in the expenditure of the barrack department. In 1797 the total expenditure for buildings and furniture amounted to £722,465, whilst in 1804 it had grown to £1,700,613. Barrack-masters at first bought the greater part of the furniture, and made large profits by their transactions. In 1795 they were succeeded by one contractor for all barrack furniture, and in 1804 the right of contracting for the supply of barrack furniture was resigned to the Commissariat. The excess of Army expenditure over the supplies granted appears to have prevailed for a very long period. In 1705 the excess was £152,402, in 1706 £299,760, and in 1707 £135,242. The Navy contracted a debt of £606,806 by issuing supplies to the Army from 1701 to 1708. By a comparative statement of the expenses in 1792 and 1817, it appeared that at the latter of these periods, the troops quartered in Great Britain, and not encamped, cost for their subsistence £5 sterling per man per annum above the pay fixed by regulation.

In the early part of the last century, one of the most fruitful sources of extravagance lay in the large sums which were demanded for "expenses unprovided for." Had these been expenses which were not and could not have been foreseen, no objection could have been raised. *Necessitas non habet legem.* But they included many items which might easily have been calculated beforehand. The ordnance department was a great offender in this respect, so much so that in the four years preceding 1810, the after charges for expenses unprovided for amounted to nearly £11,000,000 sterling. In 1818, the annual finance Committee appointed by the House of Commons thus expressed themselves in their ninth report—

"Your Committee having understood that strict orders were given by the Board of Ordnance, that the estimated sums should on no account be exceeded, consider these instances worthy of being laid before the House, for the purpose of showing how essential it is, not only to limit the particular sums originally allowed to specific Services, but to exact a strict compliance with such orders, by making something more than mere disapprobation, where any considerable excess has been incurred."

The attention thus drawn to the subject was soon productive of good effects, for in 1819 the charges for expenses unprovided for amounted to only £20,000.

ARTHUR G. BURNEY.

THE ANCIENT OBLIGATION OF NATIONAL MILITARY SERVICE IN SCOTLAND.

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At a time when the requisites of a stable and sufficient system of national defence are being canvassed of new, when some advocate the simple British constitutional expedient of resort to the Militia ballot, and others a modification of Swiss models, it is not uninteresting, and may be instructive, to recall the ideas and practice of our ancestors in reference to the military duty of the individual to the State. The example of Scotland is specially illustrative, because it was a small country which had always to contemplate the probability of invasion by a neighbour able to put vastly superior forces into the field. There is a popular delusion that the whole burden of military service was originally borne, and afterwards shuffled off, by the landed proprietors of the country, but this conception is very far from the truth. On the contrary, from the earliest times it would appear that liability to at least a modified form of military duty attached to every freeman. This varied in character, as it was imposed by the old Celtic institutions, by the strict specialties of the feudal tenure, and by the special constitution of the burghs. But whether it took the form of what was called "Scottish service," or of "knight service," or of the obligation of "watching and warding," it involved the duty on the part of every able-bodied freeman to bear his part in the defence of the realm.

The oldest and most characteristic form of this national obligation north of the Tweed was the form of service known as "Scottish service," which was probably the only form in existence before the introduction of feudal institutions, existed alongside of them, and can be traced, blended with and affected by the feudal ideas and jurisdictions, down to the time when these were finally abolished after the last Jacobite insurrection.

It seems to have been associated with the old Celtic land measure called the *davoch*, which consisted of 416 acres, and included sixteen of the areas known as a husbandland (26 acres), and

which Dr. Skene identifies as equivalent to the "twenty houses," or homesteads, in reference to which the earliest Scottish forces in Scotland were numbered. In the ancient Irish 'Tract on the Men of Alban,' in treating of the armed strength of the Scots in Kintyre and Cowal, it is said, "Twice seven benches to each twenty houses their sea muster."

Among the obligations enforced in early Celtic times, which can be traced in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, were those known among the Scottish Gael as "feacht" and "sluaged."

"The feacht and sluaged (*expeditio* and *exercitus*)," says Skene in his 'Celtic Scotland,' "consisted of a general obligation originally upon the members of the tribe, and afterwards upon the possessors and occupiers of what had been tribe territory, to follow their superiors and chiefs, as well as the 'Ardri,' or sovereign, in his expeditions and wars. They are usually termed 'expedition' and 'hosting,' and in Scotland the burden was apportioned upon the davoch of land. . . . These obligations seem to have constituted what is called in charters Scottish service (*servitium Scotticanum*), and were of two kinds, internal and external, the one representing the feacht, or expedition, and the other the sluaged, or hosting."

The feacht answered to the Welsh llwyd yn wlad, or hosting within the borders, and the sluagh or sluaged to the llwyd yn orwlad, or hosting beyond the borders. Thus we find lands granted "free from all exaction and service, internal and external" (*sine omni exactione et servitio instrinseco et forinseco*); or on condition of "rendering the external service only which pertains to five davochs of land," or free of "every service except the external Scottish service of our lord the king," or subject to the obligation of "rendering the external service in the army which pertains to the said lands." The class of the lesser gentry, known in the old Scots laws as Ogethearns, or Ochierns, translated in Latin as "libere tenentes" and in English as "freeholders," were "bound to yield certain services as suit and service in the court of the overlord and Scottish service to the King."

In the period immediately preceding the War of Independence, "the National Army was," says Robertson, in 'Scotland under her Early Kings,' "made up of all who held their lands by knight service, and of the great body of the people who were bound to Scottish service." Those bound to knight service were the feudal chivalry, of whom the Marischal of Scotland was specially the leader. They consisted of those holding lands which had been completely feudalised and were held by the strict feudal tenure of ward holding. They were bound to be fully provided with defensive as well as offensive armour, and by that time were probably universally mounted. They formed the force of cavalry which,

under Sir Robert Keith, the knight-marischal, acted opportunely and with great effect against the English archers at Bannockburn.

"All the feudal tenantry (*i.e.* proprietors)," says Robertson, "in Scotland whose property reached a certain value, were bound either to furnish a force of this description or to serve in person as members of such an army; but the great majority of the nation still held only by Scottish service, and rallied round the standard of their sovereign, armed with little more than the usual weapons of offence. The lowest member of this class seems to have been the tenant of a husbandland, who served as an archer or a spearman; though within a few years Robert Bruce, probably from the exigencies of the period, obliged 'every man with a cow'—every *bordarius* or free labourer with a cottage and a few acres of land—to serve in the royal army as a spearman, or an archer, with a bow and a sheaf of four and twenty arrows."

He points out that the custom of Scottish service, which bound every freeman to attend the "hosting across the frontier" once every year in arms, swelled the ranks of King David's army at the Battle of the Standard with—

"a body of men fierce and warlike indeed, and endued with that self-willed and reckless courage which has on more than one occasion been their bane, but often indifferently armed, and as undisciplined as they were unruly,"

that they gloried in fighting without defensive armour, like Earl Malise of Strathearn, and that the muster of the Highland clan in later times, including "native men," as well as "Duine Vasal," answered to the old sluagh.

"The arms," he says, "required for Scottish service, were probably those with which the clans fought on the North Inch of Perth—bows, axes, swords, and daggers, with the addition of the long Scottish spear."

The obligation of Scottish service must have applied to the whole country, to the mass of the Highlands, and also to the Lowlands, except in so far in both cases as the tenure had been converted into a strict feudal holding, and the property was explicitly held by knight service, which, in an Act of King Robert I., is explained as "service of ward and relief." Especially on the lands of the thanages, and in the Crown domains generally, the class of proprietors known as freeholders were numerous.

The enactment of King Robert I. as to "armour for warfare" would appear to be applicable rather to the general levy of Scotland than to the feudal baronage and men-at-arms, who would by the conditions of their tenure be fully provided with complete armour. What the soldier king considered absolutely necessary for the defensive infantry of the realm, and useful for light-armed auxiliaries, is thus expressed—

"It is statute, that induring the time of weir, that ilk laik landed man haveand ten punds in gudes and geir sall have for his bodie, and for defence of the realme, ane sufficient acton, ane basnet, and ane glove of plate, with ane speare

and sword. Qhua has not ane acton and basnet, he sall have ane gude habirgeon, and ane gude iron jak for his bodie, and ane iron knapiskay, and gloves of plate. . . . Mairover the king commands that ilk man haveand the value of ane kow in gudes, sall have ane bow with ane schaife of arrows, that is, twentie-foure arrowes, or ane speare."

A state of things closely analogous to, and probably the direct survival of the Scottish service of early days, is found as late as the eighteenth century, in what is probably the most purely Scottish district of Scotland, and from which sprang the last of her original Celtic dynasties, the house of Duncan, Malcolm Canmore, and Alexander III. In the 'Chronicles of the Atholl and Tulliebardine families,' the present Duke of Atholl has included a 'Roll of the Heritors, their Men and Weapons and Armour of 1638,' the—

"hunting rolls of the names of ffewars, vassalls, woodsetters, and tennents within the Earldome off Atholl and Lordschipe of Balquidder being charged to attend the person of ane noble Lord, John, Erle of Atholl, at his hunting within the forest of Atholl, beginning the second day of Sept., 1667, viz. the fewar, vassall, woodsetter, and principall tennent himself in proper persone, with a sufficient able man, weell armed, out of ilk foortie-shilling land, and that by and attour the baggage men,"

and the 'Rolls of the Duke of Atholl's Fencible Men' of 1705 and 1706.

One example from the Roll of 1638 will indicate how both the obligation to produce men according to the number allocated upon the land, and the character of the weapons possessed, had remained the same or similar during hundreds of years.

"William Fergussone, of Bellezucone, himself and the men of his lands within the said parochin of Mulling, are in number . . . four. His awin weapons is ane swird and ane tairge, four gunes, twa pistols, ane bow and sheaffis of arrowis, with ane haberschone, and ane of his men hes ane gun, ane swird, ane tairge, and the other twa hes bot swirds."

The "sufficient able man well armed out of each forty-shilling land" represented four men from each davoch, a forty-shilling or three-merk land being the same as a ploughgate, four of which constituted a davoch, and this proportion seems to be carried out; while the fact that the man is armed, or the extent of the deficiency in his arms, is also noted in the rolls of 1705 and 1706. In 1703 an Atholl proprietor was summoned to attend the funeral of the Marquis of Atholl, "bringing alongst with you a pretty man out of each two-merk land, with his best arms and cloaths."

The legislation of 1748, in abolishing not only tenure by ward-holding and the heritable jurisdictions, but also forbidding the stipulating for services used and wont in leases to tenants or tacksmen, not only broke the power of the chiefs and baronage,

but incidentally removed the ancient obligation of all ranks of Scottish freemen to personally defend their native land.

The Scottish warrior for many generations was not only expected to appear with a certain equipment, but to provide his own food and commissariat for forty days. The early Scottish armies were habituated to privation and fatigue, and the staple of the provision that each man carried with him was oatmeal, which, with the assistance, no doubt, of living on the country when the hosting across the frontier was into England, sufficed to sustain them as rice now does the soldiers of Japan.

In the treaty of 1363, which contemplated the succession of the King of England to the throne of Scotland, it was specially stipulated that no exactions should be made on the realm of Scotland other than those levied "in the time of the good kings of Scotland passed away," and that—

"he should not send the people of Scotland to labour in the wars otherwise than was the custom before, and that beyond the forty days for which they are bound to serve at their own expense, he should give them sufficient pay according to the estate of the persons and the quantity and manner of their labour."

James I. returned from his captivity in England impressed with the military value of the English archery, and of the necessity for constant preparation, while the national passion for football and other games, then as now, presented a substantial obstacle in securing sufficient attention to the serious business of national defence. In his first Parliament, "it is statute, and the king forbiddes that na man play at the fute-ball," and enacted that "all men busk them to be archers fra they be twelve yeir of age, and that in ilk £10 worth of land their be maid bow markes;" and in his second Parliament it was ordained that "in ilk sheriffdome of the realme be made weapon-shawinges four times in the yeir." In 1425 every gentleman with £10 worth of land was required to be armed with basnet, whole leg harness, sword, spear, and dagger, and gentlemen of less means "at their gudlie power, after the discretion of the Sheriffs," all other yeomen between sixteen and sixty years of age to be sufficiently bowed and shafted with sword and buckler and knife, and all burgesses and indwellers within burgh towns to be armed in like manner.

In 1429 it was enacted that every man who could spend yearly £20, or had £100 in movable goods, should be "well horsed and wholly armed as a gentleman ought to be," and that those of simpler condition, of £10 of rent, or £50 in goods, should have hat, gorget, or pesane, with rerebrace, vambrace, and glove of plate, breastplate, pans, and leg-splents—"at the least or better if he

liked;" that every yeoman of £20 in goods should have a good doublet of fence or an habergeon, an iron hat, with bow and sheaf, sword, buckler, and knife; and other yeomen of £10 in goods, bow and sheaf, sword, buckler, and knife; that every yeoman who "was no archer" should have a good "sure" hat for his head, and a doublet of fence, with sword and buckler, or else "a brogit staff;" and that every burgess having £50 of goods should be wholly armed as a gentleman ought to be, and the yeoman of lower degree and burghers of £20, with a hat and doublet, habergeon, sword, buckler, bow, sheaf, and knife.

In 1455 burgesses were required to follow the host as it passes, and in 1456 it was enacted that—

"all manner of men between sixty and sixteen, should be ready on their best wise to come to the border for the defence of the land when any knowledge comes of the incoming of a great English host, and no poor man 'unbodin' (*i.e.* unarmed with defensive armour) should be charged to come to any raid in England."

Every man with goods to the value of twenty marks was required to be "bodyn at the least" with a jack with sleeves to the hand, or else a pair of splents, a sellat or a "prikit hat," a sword and a buckler, a bow and a sheaf of arrows, or, "if he could not shoot," an axe and a targe of leather, or of fir wood, with two bands on the back.

In 1457 it was again decreed that the weapon-schawings should be held four times a year, "and that the football and golf be utterly cried down and not to be used."

In 1481 it was again ordained that all our sovereign lord's lieges, "baith to burgh and to land" (*i.e.* both in town and country), should be ready to come to our sovereign lord, "bodin in their best wise, with bows, spears, axes, and other abulziements of war," on eight days' warning, or sooner if need be, and with victuals to endure for at least twenty days after arrival; that no spear should be shorter than five ells and a half, or at least five ells "before the bur," that the jacks should reach to the knee where leg-harness was not worn, or to cover the top of the leg-harness, and that every axeman without spear or bow should have a targe of wood or leather according to pattern. Similar warning as to assembly was given in 1483.

In 1471 six ells had been prescribed for the spear, and every yeoman who was not an archer required to have a good axe and a targe of leather, "to resist the shot of England."

From time to time enactments as to the holding of weapon-schaws and the arms to be carried were repeated, "honest yeomen" that could afford it being in 1491 authorised to equip themselves as

"men of arms," while it was again laid down that "in na place of the Realm there be used futeball, golf, or other sik unprofitable sportes for the common gude of the Realm and defense thereof."

In 1528 orders for assembly were given to all fencible persons in Lothian and the eastern borders to attend King James V. in a tour "for ordering of matters concerning the commonweal and pacifying of the country," and in 1549, under Queen Mary, the old obligation of every man between sixty and sixteen years to be ready, "weill bodin in feir of weir," to join the host on eight days' warning, and with forty days' victuals, "for resisting of the said auld enemies, defence of this realm, and liberty thereof," was again insisted on, and this notwithstanding an act made before for raising one "furnished man" from every seven-mark land for two months, which was discharged.

In 1574 the Parliament of James VI., proceeding on the wise principle and preamble, "Forsameikle as it is maist requisite that in time of peace provision be made and care taken for the war, when at God's pleasure it may happen," and referring to "diverse good and loveable Acts of Parliament" previously made for that purpose, ordained two weaponschaws to be held every year on the 20th July and the 10th October, and ordered the weapons and equipment to be as follows :—

"Every nobleman, sic as earl, knight, and baron, and every landed man, having three hundred merk of yearly rent or above, be armed in harness, light or heavy, as they please, and horsed according to their honour and estate. And all others of lower rent and degree have brigantines, jacks, steel bonnets, sleeves of plate or mail, swords, pikes or spears of six ells long, culverins, halberts or two-handed swords, and in the highlands haberschons, steel bonnets, hektons, swords, bows and dorlochs, or culverins."

In 1598 and 1600, more explicit directions were given as to the armour to be worn by noblemen and gentlemen, and the number of stands to be provided for their households by Earls lords and barons of different rentals, the arms to be worn by burgesses, and the proportion of muskets to pikes and corselets. The change in military conditions is shown by the appearance of the light corselet and pike instead of the old Scottish spear, and of the "muskat with forcat bendrole" (bandolier). Yet side by side with these more modern ideas remained the obligation in certain charters, such as that in the Ratification in 1617 to Sir Gideon Murray, of—

"finding for every ten pound land of his lands of Ballincrief two horsemen, the one with lance and the other 'with a carirge horse' to do service to his Highness's wars and armies when lawfully required."

In the troublous times of the Civil Wars, both sides, in addition to raising special regiments of a more or less regular

character, generally on the territorial system, for the maintenance and pay of which special contributions were demanded and exactions imposed, claimed general service under the old constitutional obligation of the Scottish people. Thus the Marquis of Huntly, as the king's lieutenant in the north, and the Marquis of Montrose later on, raised the Royal Standard at Inverurie and in Atholl respectively, and levied very considerable forces. The weakness of the Royal armies in Scotland was probably largely due to the feeling that the obligations attaching either to knight's service or to Scottish service were fulfilled by forty days' attendance with the king's host, for both the mounted baronage of the House of Gordon, and other gentlemen of the northern lowlands, and the Highland clans, showed a tendency to melt away after a victory, the former on some point of jealousy or precedence, and the latter to carry the spoils of battle home to their glens.

The appearance of these levies, and the twofold character of the inherited conditions under which they came to the field, is quaintly illustrated in a satirical poem written on the Earl of Glencairn's Royalist rising in 1653—

"Huntley I also do require
On highest pains with Cross of Fire,
To bring the Gordons of his clan,
And all his followers, every man,
Mounted on horse and armed weell,
With backe, and breast, and helm of steel,
And that compleate and cleanly dight,
To guard young Donald in the fight.

. . . . . .

"And all the clans that's under Heaven,
I charge you in young Donell's name,
To come in all the haste you can,
Compleately armed every man,
Mut him's bowe, him's dorloche, and him's durke,
Him's shorthose and him's two cleane shirte,
Him's sworde, him's targe, and him's shortegoune,
Him's kilted plaide and him's powder horne,
Him's black bonnett, and him's bullet bagge,
And him's twa good streagarters about him's legge,
Him's bodomless breiks and him's single shoone,
Open beneathe and close aboyne,
And twentie dayes meate and drinke."

The Covenanting Parliament made an equally comprehensive claim. Thus in 1643 we find an Act ordering that—

"all the fensible persons within this kingdom between sixty and sixteen, of whatsoever quality, rank, or degree, shall provide themselves with forty days' provision, with ammunition, arms, and other warlike provision of all sort in the most substantious manner for horse and foot, with tents and all other furnishing requisite, and that the horsemen be armed with pistols, broadswords, and steel caps, and where these arms cannot be had, that they provide jacks or secrets,

lances, and steel bonnets or swords. And that the footmen be armed with musket and sword, or pike and sword, and where these cannot be had, that they be furnished with halbert, Lochaber axes, or Jedburgh staffs and swords."

Upon Cromwell's invasion in 1650, the Estates limited the levy, in these terms—

"Considering . . . that according to the law of God and nations, and the continued Acts and practices of the nation, all fensible persons betwixt sixty and sixteen are bound to rise in arms to defend the king and kingdom from invasion, yet the Estates of Parliament being desirous to avoid the confusion by the arming together of all fensible persons, have rather thought fit that a select number of horse and foot be in every shire put in companies, troops, and regiments."

With the Restoration the Militia system was introduced, and in 1663 the Estates made—

"humble and hearty offer to his Majesty of 20,000 footmen and 2000 horsemen, sufficiently armed, and furnished with forty days' provision, to be raised from the several shires" in proportion, and to "be in readiness as they shall be called for by his Majesty to march to any part of his dominions of Scotland, England, or Ireland for suppressing of any foreign invasion, intestine trouble, or insurrection, or for any other service wherein his Majesty's honour, authority, or greatness may be concerned, . . . and the Estates of Parliament do declare that if his Majesty shall have further use of their services, this kingdom will be ready, every man between sixty and sixteen, to give and hazard their lives and fortunes as they shall be called for by his Majesty."

Subsequently to this, there was "constituted and settled a Militia of horse and foot in many shires" by the King, with advice of the Privy Council—horse being substituted for foot in some cases—and their constitution was ratified by an Act of Parliament in 1669, which provided that there should be allowed to every footman six shillings Scots, and to every horseman eighteen shillings Scots every day of the rendezvous, to be paid to the heritors and refunded to them by "the men tenants and servants for whom the footmen are put out and who are not listed in the Militia." Another Act relating to the Militia was passed in 1672, but in 1685 the musterings of the Militia were abandoned on the plea that "it may contribute for the ease of the people to have the ordinary rendzvouses of Militia discharged."

In the year 1695, King William and Queen Mary, the Patent granted to the surgeons and apothecaries of Edinburgh, gave them a special exemption from military service, declaring "*eam comprehendere omnes militias et evocationes* (*quae verba nunc valent usu*) *aeq. ac Exercitus Equitatus convocationes armilustria aliaque.*" After the Revolution the military strength of the country had been organised by the formation of regiments, more or less raised by noblemen and gentlemen in different localities, some of which were retained in service and passed to the wars in Flanders. But an

indication of the ancient underlying obligation is found in an Act of 1696, which provided for the recruiting of the regular regiments by a resort to the machinery of the Act of 1663, ordering 1000 men to be levied yearly as recruits, according to the proportions of the levy of 20,000 foot specified in 1663. The Commissioners of Supply, sheriffs, and magistrates of burghs were ordered "to first design and cause to be given the idle, loose, and vagabond persons liable by former Acts of Parliament to be seized by the sheriffs." The remainder were to be found according to the proportions of the shire—

"and heritors," the Act proceeded, "shall have power, and are hereby empowered, to design and make choice of such young fencible men living within their respective bounds, and not having wife or children, and who earn their living by daily wages or termly hire, as shall satisfy for their part of the levy, or otherwise the tenants and fencible men shall have their option to offer and pay down for each of the said men that may fall to be put out by them the sum of £24 Scots, so that the district shall either deliver a good man effectually or pay the said £24."

In the famous Act of Security of 1704, in which Scotland resolved that its Parliament should not be dissolved by the death of Queen Anne, and asserted its voice as to the conditions of succession to the Realm of Scotland, there is a distinct echo of the old conception of national duty—

"And for a further security of the kingdom, her Majesty, with advice and consent foresaid, statutes and enacts that the whole Protestant heritors, and all the burghs within the same, shall forthwith provide themselves with firearms for all the fencible men who are Protestants within their respective bounds, and those of the bore proportioned to a bullet of fourteen drop running; and the said heritors and burghs are hereby impowered and ordained to discipline and exercise their said fencible men once in the month at least."

The Act of Security, with its distinct intimation of the determination of the Scottish people, and significant indication of future possibilities, made the question of an incorporating union a clamant one, and stimulated the statesmen of the age to carry through the Act of 1707 on lines beneficial to both kingdoms, and honourable to the smaller but proud and independent northern nation.

The old obligations of feudal and Scottish service remained, and contributed to swell the Jacobite armies in 1715 and 1745, until in 1746 they were abolished. The old Scottish term of "fencible men," however, survived in the "fencible regiments," which were a main feature of home defence in the latter part of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century,—over twenty-five being raised in the Highlands alone—but were recruited by voluntary enlistment. The Militia had disappeared after the statute of James VII. discharging the rendezvouses, and about the time of the Seven Years' War an active controversy raged as to

the propriety of its restoration. Ultimately it was revived in 1797, and an Act passed on the lines of the English Acts, providing for the raising of 6000 men and introducing the ballot system.

For over 1200 years, from the landing of the historic Fergus on the shores of Argyll down at least to the union of the Parliaments, if not to Culloden, the conception of national military service, rendered in a mode befitting his degree and capacity by every man of fit age, remained part of the institutions of Scotland. Down to the union of the Crowns it was a stern reality, and in later years it was brought forth as an ancient weapon from the armoury in times of civil strife. Less than fifty years passed between the abolition of the feudal military tenure and the introduction of the Militia ballot. Less than two hundred years have passed since the Act of Security more than hinted at the potential claim on all fencible persons. Rifle clubs and municipal rifle ranges would in Scotland be just the application to modern conditions of the precedent set by the Jameses, in their efforts that football and golf should allow time for archery, and their careful provision for archery butts at every parish kirk. Physical and military training in schools was foreshadowed by the instruction that "all men busk themselves to be archers from twelve years of age," and Militia trainings and Volunteer inspections and camps represent the "weapon-schawings" of the national army and the "renderwouses" of the Militia. The military spirit bred in the people was evidenced by the raising of fifty regular battalions and some twenty-seven fencible regiments in the Highlands alone between 1740 and 1804, not to speak of Militia and Volunteers. There is no Scotsman who may not feel that—

> "His blood is fetched from fathers of warproof,
> Fathers that, like so many Alexanders,
> Have in these parts from morn to even fought."

Surely to a people with such traditions, and with such an inheritance of national service, rendered alike by peer and peasant, by burgher and yeoman, we may look for no unwilling response to an appeal judiciously made, with due regard to the conditions and convenience in their civil avocations of different sections and ages of the community, for such measure of Volunteer service as may be required to place at least home defence on a solid and satisfactory basis, while the offer of the Scots Estates to Charles II. to find a force for service anywhere in his Majesty's dominions of England and Ireland as well as Scotland, may provide a precedent for still wider arrangements of voluntary service in view of great national emergencies.

JAMES FERGUSON.

THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE.

By Captain N. Bellairs, R.G.A.

"Educate, or govern, they are one and the same word. Education does not mean teaching people to know what they do not know. It means teaching them to behave as they do not behave. And the true 'compulsory education' which the people now ask of you is not catechism, but drill. It is not teaching the youth of England the shapes of letters and the tricks of numbers, and then leaving them to turn their arithmetic to roguery, and their literature to lust. It is, on the contrary, training them into the perfect exercise and kingly continence of their bodies and souls."

So wrote Ruskin forty years ago in 'The Crown of Wild Olive.' Since then the British nation has stepped far along the road to ruin in a wild debauch of so-called freedom. It is time to call a halt: to point out what lies beyond: to inculcate the value of discipline and the duty of handing down to our posterity this our British Empire, not only sustained but strengthened, since its standstill is to retrograde.*

How is this to be done? Have we the means of enforcing peace on a Continental nation? Is the former spirit of the nation which bred our knights of old—those days of heroic acts, and not for lucre—still burning as of yore? To the last question I answer unhesitatingly no; ten thousand times no. How is it to be expected. The manly qualities—courage, justice, and the like—deteriorate with the physical. Mental and physical deformity hunt

* The strength of an Empire lies not in the size or wealth of its territories, but in the manly vigour of its citizens and in the efficiency of its warlike preparations. Nations, like plants, must either grow and develop or wither and die. Expansions of sovereignty and a virile policy sometimes result in war; but weakness constantly invites encroachment or attack, and is, therefore, more dangerous. In Great Britain, the voices of her few Statesman fall upon deaf ears; the nation hearkens chiefly to "politicians"—self-seeking rogues and vestry-minded lunatics. "Freedom" is a frequent watchword of the Briton, especially when he is drunk—be it with liquor or eloquence. This vaunted freedom will shortly be in jeopardy; because shouting and singing about it take the place of patriotic readiness to defend it. The apotheosis of the shadow has endangered the security of the substance.—Ed. U. S. M.

in couples. But you will say that it is not a fact that the nation is deteriorating physically. Then you judge against the weight of evidence, and in this connection, at the risk of being accused of generalising on insufficient data, I quote from a letter to the *Times*. It is written by a correspondent, who claims to have examined more than 100,000 factory children in the course of his career.

"The poor district Board School boy, at twelve, averages to-day 3 inches less in stature, and 2 pound less in weight, than did the factory boy of the same age thirty years ago."

And of these boys, when they grow up, the best become railway porters, postmen, etc., whose numbers have enormously increased; and for purposes of defence the Army chooses from the failures, where formerly she got the pick. So it comes about that an unnecessary condition arises, and for our Army we have to compete in the open market, as to wages, for our men, and pay them higher on account of the moral stigma of being reckoned a ne'er-do-well—one who has sold himself to the devil.

We are fast approaching the condition of China; self-absorbed we see no use for an Army, except to police cheaply the Empire at large, and have forgotten the world's history so far that we do not now recognise that all great nations were warrior nations. China was not always so. It was to the interest of the corrupt mandarins, for their own personal ends, to cry down warlike pursuits, and it was done through the schools only too successfully. Ruskin regrettingly wrote as follows:—

"We talk of peace and learning, and of peace and plenty, and of peace and civilisation, but I found that these were not the words which the Muse of History coupled together: that, on her lips, the words were—peace and sensuality—peace and selfishness—peace and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word, and strength of thought, in war: that they were nourished in war, and wasted by peace, taught by war, and deceived by peace, trained by war, and betrayed by peace;—in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace." How true those words: "born in war." Peaceful pursuits were not sufficient to admit Japan within the comity of nations; it required a successful war with China, and a display of the military virtues, second to none of the European troops engaged in the march to Pekin, to bring this about.

When one reads in the Royal Speech at the opening of the Houses of Parliament that the burdens imposed on the resources of the country by the necessities of naval and military defence are undoubtedly serious, and that the possibility of diminishing the burden is being carefully considered, one recognises that the

electorate—the ultimate arbiters—must learn to consider main issues in the selection of candidates to whom they entrust their votes: to see that vivisection and such like questions are really of very minor importance; in short, to think imperially.

The remedy, before it is too late, is to discipline the nation by imposing compulsory military service upon its youth, between certain ages; and pay the boys the wages of boys, for home service only, and more with a view to educate them than for purposes of defence. In time it would become a reflection in the eyes of the women of the country not to have passed through the mill. Class prejudices would become less marked. The hard-working poor man would learn to look less at the luxurious and idle rich one—the distorted image—and occasionally see that there were also hard-working rich men—the correct representation. And *vice versâ*. He would learn to take more interest in foreign affairs; the value and necessity of markets, to provide regular employment and the wherewithal. In this connection also how Colonies give us the sinews of war, now a matter of history, and the need for drawing closer the bonds of mutual self-interest. He would become thus reconciled to the doctrines ventilated by Mr. Chamberlain, so necessary to provide the funds for carrying out this proposition by broadening the basis of taxation. In truth, he would be a better citizen, which from a State point of view is the desired consummation:—my interpretation to Ruskin's definition of education—

"You are to spend on National Education, not to be spent for it, and to make by it, not more money, but better men;—to get into the British Island the greatest possible number of good and brave Englishmen. They are to be your money's worth."

At the present moment all eyes are fixed on Japan. We are bewildered with her wonderful progress—an advance which has no parallel in history. It seems worth my reader's while to endeavour to fathom this success of an Oriental Power, this assimilation of civilisation recognised by ourselves in a treaty of alliance.

Here the Constitution is nothing. There are five electors to every hundred males, whereas with us there are sixty-five. And when it comes to a crisis, as lately, when a vote of censure was passed on the Government for not declaring war with sufficient expedition to satisfy it, the House of Representatives is prorogued. It has not been a success.

We are dealing here with a despotism. Petrie Watson, in 'Japan—its Aspects and Destinies,' says: "Japan was a despotism before her Revolution, she is a despotism after it. She has but changed masters; but whereas she had a man for tyrant, she now has Reason." Therein her power lies.

A Japanese writer, J. Hitomi, gives us his ideas in 'Le Japan. Essai sur les moeurs et les Institutions, 1901." He says: "In the view of the ruling classes, religion is a secondary affair. The important thing is to conserve the national morality which inculcates love of country, loyalty to the sovereign, etc."

This is a mere matter of education, and Japan which is a group of islands like Great Britain, and presumably no more requires it than we ourselves, has conscription.

Education must be practical. Let us take this as our canon, and remember, with Baron Sone, the Japanese Chancellor of the Exchequer, that "The fate of nations is not dependent on a supply of philosophers."

The Empire may be considered in the light of a modern fortress, to which foreign nations are laying siege by peaceful strategy (the zig-zag approaches and mining of warfare). The answer must be countermining by the defenders. This is Reason—the Japanese despot.

In a national emergency men constantly ask how they can be of use. We must teach them. We must go back to the seventeenth century, to quote from Lord Bacon, who truly saw on what our future destiny depended.

"Walled towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horses, artillery, and the like; all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike. Above all, for Empire and greatness, it importeth most that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study, and occupation." Bacon was no Chauvinist, but a philosopher.

Within the memory of some now living, the natives of Madras were a spirited race; to-day they have so far lost all aptitude for war that their regiments have lately been disbanded. Madras has not survived the peace conditions which prevail in that presidency.

"England expects that every man will do his duty." So signalled Nelson before the Battle of Trafalgar. Sir John Moore had such a high sense of duty that it was written of him that "as all the services one renders to a mistress are pleasant, he enjoys discomforts." And to return to our example of Japan; Bennet Burleigh, who has been watching the transition from peace to war in that country, and has possibly unique experience, is so alarmed that he writes to the *Daily Telegraph*, in a letter from Nagasaki, dated 18th February, 1904, saying—

"Their pride of race and courage are great, and it all means that we of the West must always prepare ourselves to be able to do likewise, and still 'go one better' to justify our traditions, ourselves and our fathers. Organisation and devotion to duty

must be more than mere catchwords if the West is to keep the lead of the East."

This essay is based on a different standpoint than invasion, about which readers may have their own opinion. We may, however, mention two new factors which have not been dealt with by the experts. First, that submarines may render impossible the close blockade of the enemy's harbours on which all our naval strategy is based; and second, the recent declaration of the United States in connection with the Russo-Japanese War, that under no circumstances would she allow food to be considered contraband of war. Also let us remember that within the last twelve years Germany has become a "world-power," a word coined by the present Kaiser, and that it is inevitable that, as the years roll on, her interests will clash more and more with ours, till they become vital, with the usual result—war. Already the Emperor William, in the course of a speech, is reported as having said: "Nothing must be done anywhere on the globe without the sanction of Germany's ruler." In the memorandum accompanying the German Navy Act occurs the following paragraph:—"Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war even against the mightiest naval Power would involve such risks as to threaten the supremacy of that Power."

Germany has become a commercial Power. She, like ourselves, would starve if her foreign commerce were cut off. Modern Germans are very matter of fact, strict utilitarians. Education has taught them to be ruled by the head, and not by the heart. Already she has the second largest mercantile marine, and one can reckon on one's fingers the number of years when her battle fleet will be in the same position. Her policy is not merely ambitious; it is necessary. She is setting to work on her fleet in the same calculating, methodical, and earnest manner that for many years she had devoted to the army before the war with France, and all with that object in view. When ready, a quarrel was sought and the neutrality of England obtained in a very dubious manner. France was made to appear in the wrong by diplomatic means. Similarly in time she will defy England. Germany is responsible for modern conscript service.

And who will say that the same has had nothing to do with her success. Wolf von Scherbrand, in 'Germany,' writes:—"Those habits of discipline, that sturdy and powerful digestion, that sense of order and cleanliness of person which distinguish the modern German of every class are in large measure due to his military training at the period of early manhood."

Germany is being drawn to Russia. The holding of German

capitalists in Russian securities already amounts to twice the indemnity France paid her after the war. With her present system her naval *personnel* costs her a third of what ours does and is abundant. We have already reached our limit. Ships without men are useless.

Even Adam Smith acknowledged that "the necessity for defence was greater than opulence." But what economists fail to recognise is that it is "the man behind the gun" that counts. Under Germany's system, the Army holds the first place in the affections of every German family—socialists and agrarian alike. To-morrow their navy will be raised on the same pedestal. Are we mesmerised? It is openly debated in the reviews whether we have not lost the art of Government. Voluntary Service on the Continent had to give way before compulsory, and now the seas are invaded by it the same will follow there. But systems are not changed in the hour of stress to any purpose, and it is only by demonstrating the hopelessness of her task that we can destroy Germany's dream of becoming a world-power, which can only be at our expense; then she will unwillingly accept the situation and view, sullenly perhaps, her emigrants flock to the United States and to British Colonies as heretofore. Stay; she has one other alternative. There are large settlements of Germans in South America; the Republics of that Continent are notoriously ill-governed; to raise an "Uitlander question" would be easy. Finding Great Britain prepared, she may—following the line of least resistance—brave the Monroe doctrine and defy the United States. The latter's policy notoriously outruns her preparations, and, to her, all I have written applies in an even greater degree; but that is not our affair.

Awake, England, awake and let us wage war no more with warped and untipped cues. Further, let me not be misunderstood. I am no Jingo. The issue of peace or war may not rest with us. The fact is that in the midst of peace we are at war, and, when self-preservation demands it, the weapons will be changed. Peace strategy is a preliminary to that of war. If the former is bad the latter is handicapped, perhaps fatally. The Boer War still lives in our memories—notoriously short. In that day it will not avail us that our cause is just when might is right. A house divided against itself inevitably falls. Unity is strength. *Bene est tentare.*

N. BELLAIRS.

THE DOUBLE COMPANY SYSTEM FOR BRITISH INFANTRY.

By Major J. L. J. Clarke, East Yorkshire Regiment, D.A.A.G., 3rd Army Corps.

Much has been written of late about the want of initiative displayed by the British officer both on service and at peace manœuvres, and this has been applied more particularly to infantry officers. That these accusations are to a certain extent true, I think the majority of us will admit; but at the same time, in justice to the British regimental officer, it is only reasonable to try and convince the general public that the fault lies with the system rather than with the individual. And the reasons are not far to seek. What is the system complained of, and what is the experience of the average infantry regimental officer under this system?

I think it is in the interior organisation of the infantry battalion that the fault chiefly lies. The battalion, at an establishment varying from 880 to 1030 all ranks in round numbers, is divided into eight companies, the war strength of each of which is 116 all ranks. Now the company in our service is not an administrative unit; it is merely a component part of a battalion, and cannot be considered in any way as a self-contained or self-supporting unit. It has no fixed scale of transport, the consequence being that on service, companies or detachments of several companies, find themselves very much "at sea" if sent off away from the headquarters of their battalions. In the artillery and cavalry this difficulty is not nearly so much felt—with the former the battery has been for many years an independent and self-supporting administrative unit, and has been so organised and trained in peace that a section of two guns can at any time be detached and sent off on independent duty with ease.

In the cavalry too, since the introduction of the squadron system, marked improvement in this direction is noticeable. It is easy to understand that this capability of independent existence and action in peace time as well as on service must be beneficial in its effects on the powers of command and initiative of battery and squadron officers. Is it to be wondered at, then, that company

officers who do not enjoy similar advantages should sometimes be found lacking in these respects? Then, again, with our present system a young infantry officer, more especially should he join a battalion on foreign service, will probably find himself in permanent command of a company before he has two years' service, and while he sticks to regimental duty, this will be his sphere of work and interest for probably another twenty years, by which time, if he is lucky and has successfully passed all examinations and avoided an unfavourable confidential report, he will be appointed second in command of a battalion—not a very encouraging outlook for any man to whom soldiering is really a profession, to find himself after twenty years or more of service doing exactly the same work, exercising the same command, and with no wider responsibilities (save, indeed, for undesirable financial ones in connection with regimental institutions) than he had twenty years ago—and his emoluments (out of India) in that period will have risen from £100 to £300 per annum!

A system in which one company of a battalion may be commanded by Major A., with over twenty years' service, and another alongside, in barracks and in the field, by Lieutenant B., with under two, would appear on the face of it to have something wrong with it. This state of affairs will, I think, be admitted to be the rule rather than the exception, and, moreover, it is not calculated to inspire confidence and respect in the rank and file, who might be inclined in the one case to despise the senior for not having a higher position after so much service, and in the other to mistrust a system that places their military training in the hands of one so young.

So much then for the drawbacks of our present infantry organisation. The question now arises: what is, or what are, the remedies? I think the introduction of a double company system would meet some of the requirements, and would at all events tend to mitigate the evils of the want of initiative and resource complained of.

In a former paper I put forward some arguments in favour of dividing, for purposes of field organisation, all units by three, and I propose to stick to this plan and show how it could be adapted in the case of the smaller infantry units. Working on this premise an infantry battalion would be divided into three companies, and each company subdivided as follows:—

3 sections in a company.
3 subsections in a section.
3 groups in a subsection.
6 men (three in front and three in the rear rank) in each group.

This would give a strength of private soldiers of—

6 × 3 × 3 × 32		162
Then as regards non-commissioned officers I would have—		
1 corporal or lance-corporal as group-leader to each group	27	
1 sergeant or lance-sergeant to each subsection ...	9	
1 company sergeant-major } for the comp. staff	2	
1 company quarter-master-sergeant }		
	——	38
For supernumeraries—		
1 drummer } 1 signaller } 1 pioneer } to each section		9
For machine-gun, company ammunition reserve, and transport, a section consisting of—		
1 sergeant } 1 corporal } 8 men }		10
As to officers, there would be—		
1 major, commanding } 1 captain, second in command } 3 lieutenants * (each commanding a section) } ...		5
Total of all ranks ...		224

This organisation would, I am of opinion, provide a very handy unit for work in the field, and with a mounted officer in command, should not be too large for one man to control, even with the great extension and dispersion necessitated by the conditions of modern warfare. The colonel commanding a battalion would only have three units to supervise and give orders to instead of eight—an obvious advantage and one which would be much appreciated by the battalion adjutant!

Similarly in the company, the field officer in command would have, as a rule, an experienced officer to assist him in the captain, and would have three units commanded by officers to handle. I maintain this is preferable to the present system of half companies and sections, where the subalterns on the one hand seldom have opportunity to exercise their half companies independently, and where experienced section leaders are more often conspicuous by their absence than the reverse. As regards non-commissioned officers, it may be contended that the proportion indicated for the double company, viz. 40 for a total of 180 privates, or slightly over 22 per cent., is excessive compared with the present establishment of 5 sergeants and 6 lance-corporals to 95 privates, *i.e.* 17 per cent., but I am sure the extra advantages of greater control, more

* Second lieutenants on probation could be attached for instruction in number as might be required.

personal supervision, and increased efficiency in training and instruction that would be gained by the additional 5 per cent. of non-commissioned officers, would more than compensate for the extra expense involved. Has not every company commander in our service suffered at times in the training of his company from paucity of non-commissioned officers and had to resort to the selection of old soldiers, etc., for the command of groups, scouts, patrols, etc., thus thinning the ranks, possibly already depleted by sickness, garrison, or regimental employ, etc., and consequently lessening the "fire power" of his command.

Another distinct advantage, and a most important one of the double company system, is the provision of senior non-commissioned officers for the company staff. In lieu of the present much overworked and harassed colour-sergeant there would be the following :—

(*a*) A company sergeant-major to assist the company commander in the training and instruction of the company in drill, field work, musketry, and to supervise the discipline in barracks and in the field.

(*b*) A company quartermaster-sergeant to act as pay-sergeant, and be responsible for the welfare of the company as regards clothing, rations, barracks, tents, etc. On service and in the field this non-commissioned officer might be placed in charge of the company transport.

(*c*) A sergeant to be in charge of the company machine-gun, and of the company ammunition reserve.

(*d*) A corporal to assist the company quartermaster-sergeant generally, and with especial regard to the company transport.

I do not think it would be necessary to have non-commissioned officers in the double company to take charge of signallers, pioneers, and drummers—these would be found on the battalion staff.

Let us now consider briefly how the introduction of the double company system would affect the battalion, and what changes in the present organisation would be involved.

1. I think the formation of a fourth, or reserve, company would be a necessity. It could be commanded by a captain, and would be composed of the band, regimental and garrison employed men, such as police, cooks, orderlies, etc., and the members of the battalion staff would be attached. The reserve company would accompany the battalion on active service, and form a base depôt. In peace time it would not accompany the battalion at manœuvres, nor receive any training other than musketry. At peace manœuvres the members of the battalion staff might be divided amongst the three service companies for purposes of discipline, rations, and accommodation.

2. Owing to the decentralisation attained by the double company system, the position and work of the lieutenant-colonel

commanding would be more akin to that of a lieutenant-colonel commanding an artillery brigade. His position would be enhanced, and at the same time he would be relieved of a vast amount of responsibility and routine duties which at present absorb so much of an infantry commanding officer's time. In fact, to carry out conscientiously all the duties imposed on an infantry commanding officer by the existing regulations and instructions is almost a physical impossibility.

3. The appointment of second-in-command might well be dispensed with, but the establishment of three majors as company commanders should be rigidly adhered to, and the anomaly of not allowing majors to be seconded for extra regimental employment, but of replacing them by extra captains should disappear.

4. The work of both adjutant and quartermaster would be much less—the former would be relieved of all instruction of recruits (now to be done entirely in the company), and might also be relieved of pay duties. The latter would have a great portion of his present work done in the companies by the company quartermaster-sergeant. Upon the other hand, those regimental institutions and shops, etc., that must be kept up, might be in charge of the adjutant and quartermaster respectively. The former officer would have charge of the band, and in fact his work and duties would be (*a*) in the field, that of orderly officer and galloper, (*b*) in the office, that of staff officer to his colonel.

5. The battalion staff would consist of:—

Battalion sergeant-major	Sergeant-drummer
Bandmaster	Armourer-sergeant
Battalion quartermaster-sergeant	Signaller-sergeant
Pioneer-sergeant	Transport-sergeant
Sergeant-cook	Orderly-room-sergeant
Sergeant-master tailor	Provost-sergeant
Band-sergeant	

6. In order to avoid the three service companies of a battalion on home service becoming mere training schools for recruits, and the time and energies of the company commander, his officers and non-commissioned officers being too much occupied on the barrack square and in elementary instruction, I would advocate that the period spent by a recruit at the depôt be considerably lengthened, and his instruction proportionately increased. If it could be arranged for a recruit to be instructed at the depôt for periods of not less than four months,* with liability to be kept there for eight or

* My own experience with recruits at the depôt, led me to the conclusion that the regulation twelve weeks represents as long a period as can be profitably spent in so elementary a school. I found that recruits who just missed one draft did not advance

twelve months, and then sent to join the service battalion in batches three times a year, it would be possible to greatly minimise these disadvantages. Each service company would then get a batch of recruits once a year only, and it might be arranged also for time expired men to leave the colours in batches at stated periods instead of by driblets as at present.

7. Lastly, I would put in a plea for increase of pay to the regimental officer serving at home or in the colonies. Under the double company system the work and responsibility of the company commander will be greatly increased, and, therefore, it seems only fair that his emoluments should be correspondingly raised. By the abolition of the second-in-command and the reduction in the number of captains from six to three, no great extra expense would be involved by giving each of the three field officers in command of companies the higher rate of pay quoted in paragraph 218 of the Royal Warrant, viz. 16*s*. per diem, plus command pay at 1*s*. per diem, this latter to be drawn by the captain for periods of absence of the major for any cause exceeding one month (as now in vogue in India). But even this slight increase of pay only means an income (exclusive of allowances) of slightly over £300 per annum, which can hardly be considered a handsome remuneration for an officer who has given the best twenty years of his life to the service of the State.

J. L. J. CLARKE.

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much beyond the usual twelve weeks' standard during the interval before the departure of the draft that followed. For improvement beyond a certain stage, the recruit requires to be exercised with fully trained soldiers. The real difficulty is that, as a rule, recruits are very badly instructed at the depôts; they are rarely taught anything but *drill*—and even that most imperfectly.—ED. U. S. M.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN STRATEGY.

By Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E.

VIII.

The Campaign of Ulm, 1805 (*continued*).

Returning to the concentration of the Grand Army, which may be considered as complete on the 26th September. The rapid marching had told on all the troops. There had been much desertion coming through France, and the Cavalry and mounted arms not being able to forage, as in an enemy's country, had lost condition materially.

Marmont's Corps, coming from Holland down the Rhine, had started short of horses, and though contracts had been entered into for supplying them along the line of march, the contractors were not very punctual in the carrying out of their engagements.

Boots had been worn to pieces over the four hundred miles of country already traversed, and the new ones ordered to be in readiness at the frontiers had not yet arrived. Great-coats and other clothing were also deficient, and, as already mentioned, only six out of thirty brigades of transport were on hand.

By the side of the whole list of deficiencies, the position of the French in almost the same districts, in 1870, seems comparatively luxurious, for each division then had more transport than one of Napoleon's Corps; but the energy which compels obedience was lacking, with results familiar to all, and surely this energy, which overcomes all difficulties, gives a higher title to our admiration than the intellectual ability needed to solve war's very simple problems. "Im Kriege ist alles einfach—aber das einfache is schwer," wrote Clausewitz, which merely means that the wise commander adopts the simplest plan for the attainment of his purpose, because even then the difficulties of execution will tax his energy to the utmost.

The condition of the Austrian Army at the outbreak of hostilities deserves more than a passing reference. Though her men had fought bravely enough, and fully justified the methods

of their training regimentally, ten years of warfare with the balance very decidedly against them had seriously undermined the confidence of all ranks, and completely destroyed it as regards the civilian ministers. Every one was clamouring for reform, of course, on French lines, just as in England at the present moment the public are looking for salvation to the Boer methods; and, alike in both cases, no attention whatever is, or was, paid to the advice of experienced soldiers who recognised the absence of the essential "driving force," which alone conditioned Boer or French successes.

As I have already shown, "mobility" was the key-note of French efficiency. This mobility was derived from an almost entire absence of supply arrangements; and this want of organised supply brought in its train a whole host of evils, even in an army having in its ranks a far higher average of intelligence and patriotism than were obtainable under the existing conditions of enrolment in any country in Europe.

The civilians saw only the success; the soldiers, who had done the fighting, alone realised the price at which it was bought, and were able to appreciate the consequences which blind imitation might bring in its train. Since, however, reform there had to be, they cast about for some one to carry it through. And to find such a man, they had to go outside the charmed circle of hereditary caste influence; which in Austria, as elsewhere, taken as a whole, was conservative to the verge of imbecility. The Archduke Charles, though undoubtedly a man of conspicuous ability, was after all a creature of his time, and sought salvation mainly in the strategic shibboleths in which he had been trained; though to do him justice, he could generally throw them overboard when the time came for decisive action; and, of course, his followers, without his ability, were many times more narrow-minded than he. Good men of action, they had all been taught to fear, not accept, responsibility; and with such men as leaders, not even Napoleon could have guaranteed success.

The need for action was, however, imperative. Russia, backed by England, was clamouring for her decision, and since the Archduke refused to write anything but most despondent memoirs, the civilian ministers fixed their eyes upon a man whose previous career, extraordinary diligence, and apparent disregard of difficulties gave promise, to them, of brilliant success. But diligence is not synomymous with ability; and a disregard of difficulties, even when united with undeniable personal courage in face of the enemy as a young man, does not necessarily imply indomitable strength of character in riper years when in chief command.

This man, whom they destined to be the country's saviour, was the unfortunate "Mack," upon whose unlucky shoulders it is still the custom to fasten the burden of the sins of omission accumulated by a whole previous generation, too careless and pleasure loving to view war as it really was, and is—the struggle for the survival of the fittest.

He had risen from the ranks, and made a most brilliant career, all the more remarkable when we consider the intense caste spirit of the Austrian nobility. But his industry and fatal facility of the pen had attracted the attention of the Emperor, and when it was found that he was ready to recast the whole army, almost in face of the enemy, his services were eagerly accepted.

It must be admitted that his ideas were not bad. The needs of the moment were mobility, Artillery, and Corps commands. To secure mobility, he laid down that troops must live on the country, like the French, then they could dispense with at least one half of their trains, and the horses thus set free could be handed over to the Artillery. His idea of Corps commands was less satisfactory, for, as the event proved, he did not in the least understand what a Corps was, or what decentralisation means. To make a Corps or divisional command efficient, you must first have a staff trained to accept responsibility; to invert the process, is merely to make confusion worse confounded. But there were no officers in Austria trained to responsibility, and hence Army Headquarters still had to issue detailed orders to every battalion—the system which had cost them, as previously explained, the defeats of 1796 and 1800 in Italy.

The evil of the recourse to requisitions lay in this, that you cannot alter the spirit of a whole army merely by the publication of a general order—a point too frequently forgotten. It was all very well to tell the men to steal and rob, for that is, of course, what it comes to in the end; but the same men had been brought up to an altogether exaggerated conception of the rights of private property in the field, and needed a senior officer to stand over them, and tell them both when and what to steal, and how to find it.

With the French, plunder had become an instinct of self-preservation. Like Sikhs in an Afghan village, they knew exactly where to look and how to persuade; they could suck more nutriment out of a square mile of ground than any other troops in Europe, and they had as little sympathy with the poor Bavarian, or German, as the Afghan for the Hindoo. But the bulk of the Austrians were of German extraction, and, as such, more inclined to pity than to beat the unfortunate villagers upon whom they were directed to batten.

Ultimately things were brought into train. The Archduke was almost compelled to take a more hopeful view, and a plan of operations was mutually agreed to by Russia and Austria, according to which the former agreed to join the latter with 100,000 men on the river Inn about the middle of October; and the Austrians undertook to operate with their main army south of the Alps, under the Archduke, and with a smaller force of 80,000 men between the Alps and Danube. A further army was to be mobilised by Russia, primarily to bring diplomatic pressure on Prussia to join the coalition, but ultimately to advance through Bohemia into the north of Bavaria, and it was the news of this concentration, somewhat distorted in transmission, that led Napoleon at the very outset of his movement (*i.e.* on the 26th August) to direct his troops from Boulogne and the Netherlands further north than orginally intended, towards Wurzburg. Generally, the plan may be described as an advance in echelon of armies from the left.

Mack was appointed what we should now call "Chief of the Staff"* to the Army of the Centre, responsible directly to the Emperor, and the Archduke Ferdinand, aged twenty-five, was sent with him, practically as the Emperor's representative, though nominally in chief command. It having been determined that the army was to live by requisition, it became necessary to assign it a district, other than their own country, upon which to live, and this, together with the desire to secure the support of the Bavarian Army, led to the premature advance towards the Iller. But, as already stated, the Bavarian Army escaped, and the Austrians did not take naturally to requisitioning, and thus from the very beginning an excessive strain was thrown on such transport as existed, which rapidly broke down under the strain of the terrible weather, from which both armies suffered. Hence the mobility of the Austrians fell off to an unusual extent, whilst similar sufferings from hunger were inspiring their enemy with almost wolf-like energy and celerity. The French knew from experience that forward movement could alone supply their necessities; the Austrians from experience looked backward for their supply columns. This contrast must be borne in mind in judging the almost unexampled slowness of the Austrian manœuvres.

Reverting now to the actual course of the campaign, Napoleon's progress, from the date his Cavalry patrols picked up contact with the enemy, followed naturally and logically from the reports he received. Finding his right opposed whilst his left was clear, he checked the pace of the former and let the latter swing round,

* His title then was "Quartermaster-General."

closing them to meet resistance, extending them again for subsistence; but only regulating their marches as far in advance as it was safe to do so—precisely as all modern authorities advise—and not till the information received made it perfectly clear that the Russians could not interfere, did he conceive the idea of crossing the Danube and interposing between the separated portions of his enemy's front.

He certainly did not foresee Mack's continued inaction, for he was quite unaware of the motives which dictated it, and as these have never to my knowledge been presented in an English garb, it may not be amiss to enlarge upon them, as they certainly place Mack's conduct in a far better aspect than it has hitherto been regarded.

Mack, it appears, had been seriously misled by the accounts of the Austrian secret agents in France, who had represented the whole condition of the country far more unfavourably than turned out to be the case; and in particular, had underrated the strength of the Grand Army by nearly one half; and since the French had generally disseminated false information on this head before, he had no reason to doubt the statement he received.

Further, he had been led by his own Government to believe that England meditated an immediate diversion, both naval and military, on Boulogne; and he actually received information very early in October that this attack had been successfully undertaken. Since England had been foremost in urging on the war, and such a diversion was obviously sound in principle, he, as a soldier, may be pardoned if he failed to fathom the depths of fatuous imbecility of which a civilian ministry is capable. Gordon was not the first, and will not be the last, brave man to be betrayed by his confidence in ministerial honour.

Lastly, when the news of the violation of Prussian neutrality, by the passage of French troops through the territory of Ansbach, reached him, as it did in a very few hours after the event, he believed, and very naturally, that the Lord had really delivered his enemy into his hands. He knew the temper of the Prussian Army well, and was aware that every officer's hands were itching to draw their swords, and since even the King of Prussia's own wife failed to grasp the full extent of poltroonery that unfortunate monarch was capable of, he can hardly be blamed for a similar error of judgment.

Now let us reconstruct the strategical problem as it appeared to him at the moment when Napoleon's left wing and centre were sweeping down on the Danube on his rear.

His rear was the Russian front, and the Russian Army was to

be about 100,000 strong, and due on the Inn, only eighty miles away, about the 20th October.

If the Russians advanced whilst he, Mack, stood still, he became the anvil on which the Russian hammer would crush the Grand Army. And as it happened, he had to stand still, because he had eaten up all the supplies in the district he had traversed, as the French were soon to discover to their cost, and could not have retreated even had he desired to do so.

He had, however, under-estimated several points. First, he had not allowed for the extraordinary marching power the French actually developed, nor on their peculiar talents for extracting nutriment out of places where his own men had starved; and finally, he had counted on the punctual arrival of the Russians, as of course, he had every right to do.

These were his military external miscalculations; but others, social and internal to the Army, were still to come and were rapidly developing. The Army, accustomed to regular magazine supply, felt the hardships requisitioning entailed very severely—far more so than the French, who were used to the system, and knew too well the futility of complaint. The men grumbled to their officers, the officers took the part of the men, and finally the generals carried all their woes to the Archduke's *entourage*, who, in turn, were only too glad to have a handle of offence against the underbred ranker upstart, and under these influences the Archduke began to turn restive. To put a stop to these evils, which threatened to make command impossible. Mack determined to reorganise the Army, redistributing the regiments amongst all the corps, and rearranging these to get the controlling power into better hands. In referring to this reorganisation, M. Colin is hardly fair to the general, for he represents the step as merely taken as an idle whim, to gratify Mack's imaginary passion for interference; and throughout he takes the part of the young Prince, who, to my mind, appears to have played the part of an intractable young prig, lending a ready ear to all Mack's detractors, and ignoring the responsibilities which the Emperor had imposed on the latter, together with the respect undoubtedly due to his riper experience. The situation was, in fact, closely analogous to, though even more difficult, than Bazaine's position *vis-à-vis* with the Imperial Staff in Metz, and it seems astonishing that M. Colin can have overlooked the resemblance.

This reorganisation consumed very nearly a week of very precious time, and meanwhile reports were pouring in that left no room for doubt as to Napoleon's crushing numerical preponderance, or of its almost inexplicably rapid approach. The position of

anvil to the Russian hammer was clearly no longer tenable; but Mack still thought, very much as Nelson had done at sea during his long continued chases of Villeneuve, that, however great the odds, he would still be able to inflict sufficient punishment on his adversary to keep him quiet for the remainder of the season, and calculated that under all circumstances—of supply, dissatisfaction in the Army, etc.—he would be able to hit harder with a force recuperated by rest, than with one exhausted by hard marching and scanty food, and it might have been well had he stuck to this decision. At the last moment, however, the French gave him an opening he would have been almost more than human to have resisted. They left the whole of the north bank of the Danube bare, and there was nothing to prevent Mack's retreat right across their lines of communication towards Bohemia and the Saxon frontier, where he might well count, not only on the support of the second Russian Army, but on a most friendly reception from the whole of the north Germans including Prussia, whose orders for mobilisation were, in fact, already issued.*

This opening arose from a misconception on the part of Napoleon of his adversary's position and frame of mind, quite as much at variance with the real facts, as any of which the unfortunate Mack was guilty. He had formed a fixed idea, almost from the moment of his passage of the Danube, that the Austrians would try and escape by marching south towards lake Constanz and the Tyrol, and was urging on Soult by forced marches to intercept this line of retreat.

Actually, though a small force under Jellachich did make its escape, not without heavy losses, by this route, the idea of taking the whole Army out by this way had never entered Mack's head, who knew only too well the want of resources in that district. But curiously, the news of the fighting in which Jellachich's force became engaged, served only to confirm him in his decision to march out to the north-east. The idea sprang quite naturally from the false information he had already received, and deserves, to my mind, far more serious consideration than has been accorded to it.

Though Mack by this time knew that the strength of the Grand Army had been falsely reported to him, he still firmly believed in the British diversion at Boulogne and rumoured risings in France. When, therefore, he learnt of the French movement towards the west—Soult, of course, had attacked from the east—he pictured to himself Napoleon in full retreat back to France, by the only line on

* I cannot trace whether this was actually known to Mack at the time; but there was free communication with Ulm and the Prussian frontier, which was not more than a day's ride distant, and hence may well have been the case.

which he could hope to find adequate subsistence, for his devastation of the country to the north was by this time common knowledge to all south Germany.

With his own Army in its semi-mutinous plight (*i.e.* as regards its commanders), he could not hope to oppose successfully the onset of the whole French Army, and hence his resolution to move towards Prussia was strengthened, not shaken, by the rapidity of Soult's movements. He issued a general order to his troops in which he stated that the French were in full retreat for their own country, and whilst still maintaining secrecy as to his proposed movement, led them to understand that stirring events were toward, and arranged for a general concentration around Ulm. Read by the light of subsequent events, the order appears bombastic; but I have little doubt that had success crowned his efforts, we should now be as lost in admiration of his skilful concealment of his intentions and soldierlike appeal to raise the drooping spirits of his men, as we are taught to be over Napoleon's infinitely exaggerated bulletins announcing victory to his troops before the battle. Compare, for instance, the orders issued on the nights preceding Austerlitz and Jena, and think how these would have been held up to ridicule had not the events justified the prediction.

Historians always forget that secrecy is the very essence of a successful stratagem, and that no word of despondency or retreat should be allowed to leak out in preliminary orders. A small Army confronted by a larger one, must always be at a great disadvantage if defeated, and the confidence the leader shows in the fighting spirit of his Army is simply a measure of the strength of his character. Rewrite Napoleon's pre-Jena order of the day in accordance with the facts as we now know them. "Soldiers, during the last three days I have lost the Prussian Army and found part of it again where I did not expect it; where the other part may be, or how large a fraction it is of the whole, I know as little as you do. But of the following facts I am absolutely certain. There is a hostile barren and mountainous frontier ten miles behind us, and our only possible retreat lies through some 500 miles of country which we have stripped bare of every resource, and whose inhabitants will cut up every single straggler they can possibly lay hands on. The issue of the battle lies in your courage and determination, and if you do not do your duty better than I have done mine, 'we shall never see our darlings any more.'" Such an order would, I take it, hardly have conduced to victory, yet that is about what Mack's critics, after the event, would have had him produce before it.

Ultimately, on the 10th October, the decision was taken to march north on the following day, and the troops moved out next morning; but the terrible weather had rendered roads, normally reliable, almost entirely impracticable. A whole stretch overhanging the Danube gave way under the passage of the guns, and a number, with their teams and limbers, crashed over into the swollen river beneath. The fields were almost swamps, and hours were consumed in covering distances which usually might have been traversed in minutes. At length the right wing fell suddenly upon Dupont's Division, peacefully encamped near Albeck, and, apparently, completely surprised it. Something like a stampede resulted; but the Austrians were in too great disorder, owing to the lengthening of their columns, to take advantage of it, and a remnant of the French being rallied, still held on to some ground in the vicinity when night put an end to the struggle, thus enabling Dupont, who had not studied the art of despatch writing under his great master for nothing, to claim a victory. The Austrians, leaving a few outposts in observation, fell back about halfway to Ulm.

Then followed, on the part of the French, a series of Staff* blunders and miscalculations as to the time of the delivery of orders, far too intricate to unravel in the space at my disposal, but the upshot of which was to leave the Austrians in undisputed possession of the north bank for the two following days. Unfortunately for them, they were in no case to profit by the opportunity.

On the 14th, the French had corrected their errors, and Ney was marching in all haste with his whole corps for Elchingen. The place was weakly held by the Austrians at the moment, and by a most brilliant piece of daring, the bridge was captured and troops poured over it before the Austrians, already on their way since early morning, could arrive. A very obstinate fight ensued, ending, as usual, in the defeat of the Austrians—a defeat directly traceable to the growing spirit of mutiny amongst the leaders.

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* It is usual to seek to fasten the responsibility for these failures either on Ney or Murat, according to the writer's sympathies; to me it seems merely a case of indifferent staff training and want of proper precautions—sending one officer to deliver several orders and the like. Actually, the important order had only about five miles to traverse, and the steeple of the village where it should have been delivered was clearly visible from the point of despatch, the intervening country being perfectly practicable; but the officer by whom it was despatched, not being informed of its contents and having several others to deliver as well, chose to take it on his way back, lost his way in the Danube morass in the dark, and ultimately found himself within three miles of his destination at daybreak, but unable to get there without going back to his starting-point and making the road he should have taken the first time.

Mack, in his defence, states that, on news of the attack being received, the Archduke left headquarters without giving him notice, taking with him the bulk of the Staff, and obstinately kept at a distance of a couple of leagues from him all day, giving orders and interfering in the details of the fight. Nevertheless, though locally defeated at Elchingen, one half the Army only had been engaged, and the remainder, under Werneck, halted outside the radius of French observation, continuing its movement towards Neresheim next morning, and there would seem still to have been a good chance for the bulk of the Army at least to withdraw. But at this point the strength of men and horses gave out. Though there was still food in Ulm, only about seven miles distant, it was as impossible to get at it, as it was for our troops on the Plateau of the Crimea to traverse the two miles of mud which lay between them and their ships in Balaclava. Moreover, intrigue and dissension in the higher ranks had done its work, and all discipline above the company commands had disappeared.

Werneck still struggled on for two days further, and was joined by some Cuirassiers with the young Archduke by the way; these latter succeeded in making good their escape, but the Infantry, worn out by hunger and pursued by Murat with his usual relentless energy, ultimately allowed themselves to be deceived by the false statements of French *Parlémentaires*, and laid down their arms to a force they believed to be overwhelming, but which actually consisted only, as has been already stated, of the stragglers of the dismounted dragoons left behind to protect the convoys on the lines of communication.

We need not pursue the fate of the garrison of Ulm and its unfortunate commander further, it is sufficiently well known in its outlines to every one. The only points calling for attention are the persistent faith in Russian promises, revealed in Mack's effort to secure fourteen days' delay in the actual surrender, and the treachery by which this clause, after being admitted, was finally evaded by the conqueror. All may be fair in love and war, but such acts of perfidy leave an unpleasant savour after all.

The point on which to fix one's attention is, after all, the bearing of these events on the general principles of war as taught in our schools, and from this standpoint I fail to perceive any foundation for the deductions so freely drawn. That 200,000 men under a brilliant leader, trusted by his men as no commander before or since, should beat 80,000 under an average man, who started with the feeling of his Army against him, seems to me a foregone conclusion. Why then drag in theories as to angular bases, the line of the Main, and so forth, to account for the obvious?

But the fact that in spite of all adverse circumstances these 80,000 very nearly did escape from the toils of the 200,000, seems to me conclusive proof of the superiority of troops bred up in tradition of hereditary and regimental discipline over the looser organisation of revolutionary France.

F. N. MAUDE.

(*To be continued.*)

THE PROTECTION OF SMALL COLUMNS IN CAMP AND ON THE MARCH.

By Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., late Sherwood Foresters.

I am aware that in restricting myself to "small columns," I am terribly out of the fashion: from the days when I was a boy of eighteen at Sandhurst up to the present time, anybody who has tried in any way to instruct officers always deals with Army Corps, but I thought it would be more interesting if I dealt with nothing larger than a brigade—such a force as certainly any field officer might at any time, through the fortune of war, be called upon to command.

I propose, then, first to ask the reader to accompany the 1st Brigade of the Tirah Field Force in a week's excursion into the Bazar Valley. The starting-point is Jumrood, at the mouth of the Khyber Pass, about ten miles west from Peshawar. The composition of the brigade—some 3650 fighting men in all—is as follows:—

2 Battalions British Infantry.
2 Regiments Native Infantry.
1 Native Mountain Battery Royal Artillery.
1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1 Battalion Madras Pioneers.
1 British Field Hospital.
1 Native Field Hospital.

Seven days' rations were taken by the brigade and, in addition, three days' rations were in regimental charge.

There is a cart-road from Jumrood to Ali Musjid—about ten miles within the Khyber—but from thence onwards the brigade could only move by the merest tracks, consequently only pack transport could be taken. Generally speaking, only two classes of transport animals are used on the Indian Frontier—the mule and the camel. Of these I suppose all of us who have had anything to do with either will agree with me that nothing can beat that grand little animal-of-all-work—the mule; in spite of the fact that his load is a small one, and that he has to carry his own rations as well as those of the fighting men. The brigade was altogether

equipped with mule transport; but when you remember that a battalion of British infantry—one unit of the brigade—requires nearly 400 mules to itself; that the total number of pack animals on charge of the brigade would amount to something like 4000; when you realise that, in addition to the large number of ordinary followers, there is one driver to every three mules, or a rough total of 2500 followers; and when you understand that all this long and ever lengthening line of transport and unarmed men has to be guarded throughout its march on a narrow track from camp to camp in an enemy's country, one begins to have some conception of the enormous difficulties and anxieties which beset a column commander on the Indian Frontier.

Fortunately for the brigade, its difficulties did not begin at once; between Jumrood and Ali Musjid the road was picquetted by other troops, and by those of the Khyber Rifles whom self-interest or tribal jealousies had kept faithful when their fellow-tribesmen broke out. Christmas Eve 1897, the brigade spent in bivouac in the bed of the Khyber stream under Fort Ali Musjid (which was then again permanently held by us) and consequently only a very few insignificant picquets were necessary on the neighbouring heights. Even then, however, the sniper was not to be denied his usual evening amusement, and one of them managed to creep through our picquets and shoot a man of the Sussex Regiment through that portion of his body which it is considered equally indecorous to present either to a friend or an enemy!

The next day's march was believed to be quite a short one, but the road was little known. The path led over the low spurs and under-features of the very steep, lofty, and, in many places, precipitous heights which flanked it on the right for the first six miles up to a village called Alachi. But few of the tribesmen had modern rifles—perhaps 40 per cent. of the fighting men were thus armed—and the crest of the line of heights must have been at least 2000 yards from the path along which the column moved; but these heights had to be picquetted and held by a battalion while the column moved below. On the left of our advance were the low foothills and broken ground fringing on the Peshawar Valley, and here, too, any points commanding the path had to be picquetted and held. Until the *nearer* at least of these picquets were in position, it was manifestly useless, or at least unwise, for the bulk of the transport—viz. that *not* in charge of units—to make a start. It may be taken as a good general rule—which I make a present of to anybody who cares to note such details—that it takes roughly one hour for 500 pack animals to get out of a camp or to pass a given point on a hill path; so that no very

elaborate calculation is necessary to see that the bulk of the transport, its escort, and the rear-guard could not possibly reach their intended destination before dark.

As a matter of fact, the head of the column *was* delayed by a little desultory opposition in the village of Alachi and again on arriving at its bivouac at a place called Karamna; so the O.C. battalion of Gurkhas, which was guarding the baggage, made up his mind early in the afternoon that he would not attempt to push on to camp. Accordingly, about 4 P.M., he called a halt, closed up and parked his transport, put out picquets and settled down for the night, having only reached a distance of little more than two miles from the previous night's bivouac! As far as I can remember, this party was quite unmolested during the night, whereas had it struggled on to camp in the dark, the tribesmen would have been offered such an opportunity as they most delight in. It is an axiom on the frontier that night marches—particularly with convoys—should very rarely be undertaken, and that if a commander finds himself in any degree likely to be overtaken by darkness on the march, he should halt early and make himself snug before night comes on. There are innumerable instances in border warfare where a neglect of this rule has led to disaster, while over and over again even quite small parties have successfully and without much loss held out for the night in isolated positions,* merely from having decided during daylight upon the posts they meant to occupy and the dispositions necessary for their defence.

Early next morning four British and four Native infantry companies were sent back to picquet the hills and help in the transport with its escort: these all reached camp by midday.

I must now give some description of the bivouac of the brigade and of the dispositions which were made for its protection. The place was a large open valley, its greatest length 2½ miles, its greatest width perhaps 3000 yards. It was necessary to find no fewer than ten strong picquets—hardly one of less strength than a half company—and some of these were 1800 yards distant from camp and 600 feet or more above it. These picquets were necessarily terribly isolated, and from their situation it follows that it was practically impossible to support or reinforce them. Strict orders were given that all picquets were to make themselves

* Lieut.-Colonel Haughton's action during the retirement from the Waran Valley on the 16th November, 1897; and Major Downman's stand, three miles from camp, with 350 rifles of the Gordons, Dorsets, 2nd Gurkhas, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, composing the rear-guard of the 2nd Division in the Bara Valley on the 11th of the following month.

absolutely secure against any rush, and all perfectly well understood that whatever happened they had to "stick it out." I cannot call to mind any single instance in modern border warfare of a picquet being overwhelmed, while the question of "surrender" does not of course admit of any consideration, when its one possible result would be instant death, followed—or possibly preceded—by a horrible mutilation.

There is a matter connected with the increased distance at which picquets must now be placed from the force they are protecting, and that is in reference to the responsibilities of "the field officer of the day" as to their posting and visiting. The duties of the field officer of the day have in these respects become, I submit, very greatly narrowed. I do not think that it is any longer always possible for the field officer personally to see and correct the positions of all the various picquets. I do not believe it to be practicable, under modern conditions, for him to go round them systematically by day, and I am certain that it is not possible and that it is in every way undesirable that he should visit them by night. It should, I submit, be understood that anybody who without notice approaches a picquet by night is an enemy, and he should be shot down without challenge.

The march of the 26th December was only three miles to a place called Burg: the distance was of course absurd, but the road was awful: it led the whole way through a rocky defile, with only just room for the stream and a narrow boulder-strewn path between the high walls of rock which rose up precipitously on either hand. All the Sappers and the Pioneer Battalion had gone forward by daylight to picquet the pass and to make the road at least passable for the mules. At midday—when, as I have mentioned, the last of the convoy was coming into camp—the road was reported fit for pack animals, and a start was made to pass them along. It was 7.30 P.M. before the last of the transport had entered the defile and 10 P.M. before the rear-guard reached Burg. The ten picquets all round the camp were left out until the baggage was clear, and their withdrawal was anything but an easy task, when you remember that it had to be done in the dark; that the picquets were all so placed as to support each other; and that some of them took upwards of an hour to reach the valley from their positions.

Burg, where the brigade remained two days, was an easier place to picquet, in that the valley was not so wide and the surrounding hills rose more steeply from the level, but the number and strength of the picquets did not admit of much reduction in the numbers of the men employed.

Soon after daybreak on the 28th the brigade began to retrace its steps, and at once the enemy became lively. The rear end of the Burg defile had been seized by us before day broke, and four mountain-guns with a company of infantry placed on a hill which commanded the greater part of the pass. Directly the Burg picquets began to retire, the enemy opened fire from all commanding positions and followed persistently the rear-guard, which only got in at 4 P.M.

The greater part of the baggage which had come in early was sent on back to Alachi with a suitable escort and one company of Sappers; the idea being to relieve the burden of transport on the next day's march back to Ali Musjid and to enable work to be started early on the road.

Rain fell heavily all the afternoon and night of the 28th and was still falling on the morning of the 29th; the hilltops were hidden in mist and some of the higher-placed picquets were concealed from view all the morning, making their withdrawal a delicate operation in the presence of a watchful enemy. The rear-guard consisted of a mountain battery and a British battalion; these took up a position on hills to the east of the valley to cover the retirement of the baggage and the withdrawal of the picquets, not one of the latter being called in until the tail of the column was well on its road to Alachi. As a picquet withdrew, its place was at once taken by the enemy, while as we retired from the valley the tribesmen skirmished boldly across the open and tried—with some success—to work round on either flank.

As the picquets came in they were at once passed through the rear-guard and directed to take up fresh positions in rear. All surplus men, too, were sent back, since it is almost better in a closely pressed rear-guard action to have too few rather than too many men. On arriving at Alachi there was found to be a block of transport, and the heights had to be held for some hours longer, the final retirement being covered at the last by only a very few rifles. The rear-guard got in at 6 P.M.

The casualties of the brigade in these six days, during which fighting took place daily, were only eight killed and thirty-six wounded, a number which might easily have been infinitely heavier had not all ranks already learnt the lessons of this frontier warfare in the previous four months' fighting.

(It is perhaps worthy of notice that it was just about this period that volley-firing was practically given up and individual firing was nearly always employed.)

I would just briefly recapitulate what we learnt: that no onward movement should ever take place until the heights in

front and on the flanks have been occupied, and that these latter positions should never be given up until the last of the rear-guard has passed through. As these picquets withdraw they take their place in advance of the rear-guard, fresh troops, as a rule, being detailed from the column for fresh picqueting. In a retirement, the fewer men you have the better—of course within limits; if hard pressed, nothing pays so well against a Pathan as a resolute and sudden offensive. But above all, there is no procedure so fraught with danger on the frontier as for the main column to go on into camp leaving the rear-guard to "come on." On the border, and especially in a retirement, a rear-guard is not safe *until it is actually within range of the camp picquets;* it is within a mile or two of camp that the tribesmen press on most resolutely: every man of the rear-guard who falls requires at least three others to bring him in—for wounded men cannot be left to the tender mercies of the enemy; evening is coming on, and the infantry of the rear-guard have probably been on their feet since long before dawn. Fresh troops should always, when possible, be posted some mile or two out of camp to help in the rear-guard, touch with which should never be lost; this is a small precaution, but its disregard has frequently led to great and unnecessary loss of life and, not infrequently, to disaster.

In camp the picquets must be strong and numerous: they must entrench themselves to the utmost and expect no assistance from camp. Their withdrawal is always a difficult and sometimes a dangerous operation: the signal for individual recall must be simple and clear, since the premature retirement of one picquet may involve others in serious difficulties, while the withdrawal once begun should be carried through with the greatest possible expedition.

I now propose to deal with a much smaller force, composed, however, of the three arms, in the Western Transvaal in the spring of 1901. We had been operating for some time with a tolerably large force, as columns went, consisting of about 1200 mounted men, four guns of one field battery, two of another, a howitzer, a pompom, and some 400 British Infantry. The G.O.C. then decided to move off with all his mounted men and most of his guns to co-operate with two other columns which were in the neighbourhood, and directed that the infantry, two guns, a maxim, and fifty Imperial Yeomanry, should escort his empty waggons into Ventersdorp—about twenty-six miles off—fill up there, and then rejoin him at a spot some thirty-five miles on the other side of Ventersdorp. No orders were issued until long after midday, and it was not until 2 P.M. that the two columns marched off in opposite

directions. The transport with the smaller force consisted of about fifteen mule waggons and sixty ox waggons. Now, with a small escort and especially with so small a number of mounted men—and the Yeomanry, I may mention, though keen enough were quite new to the game—it is of course impossible to move your mule and ox waggons separately, furnishing an escort for each, while it is equally impossible to make them march together, the mules moving so very much more quickly than the oxen. I think the only possible plan is to put the mule waggons in front, lay down some maximum distance to be maintained between the rear of the mule-convoy and the head of the ox-transport, and have constant halts to permit of closing up. I have always tried, but with, I admit, singularly ill-success and serious loss of temper, to make the transport move on a broad front of four to six waggons abreast. This is nearly always possible on the veldt; it, of course, immensely decreases the depth of the column; while it renders you far less vulnerable. I never, however, had the good fortune to "trek" with a transport officer who held the same views on this subject as I did, with the result that the smallest column always occupied a terrible length of road. Perhaps some officer of the A.S.C. could tell me whether he thinks that the small increase of traction strain involved in moving on the veldt, and the time lost in returning to single file at drifts, etc., is not more than compensated for by the increased security due to this curtailing of the depth of column.

Both mules and oxen can move on for many hours without halting, but it seems to do oxen more harm than mules to halt in the yoke, so the mode of progression adopted admitted of the oxen moving steadily on at their own pace, while the mules only were subjected to the constant halts required for "closing up."

The distance to Ventersdorp was some twenty-six miles of a bad road—a large column had passed along it during wet weather, the veldt surface had been much cut up and the big ruts had dried hard. It was, of course, impossible, starting at 2 in the afternoon, to reach our destination that day, so the length of our first march was decided for us, happily enough, by the question of water, there being only one spot, and that eight miles distant, where water was to be found in the whole twenty-six miles. The mounted men—whom we managed to make up to something over sixty by mounting grooms and others on spare horses—were far out in front and on the flanks: the bulk of the infantry remained with the waggons and supplied a strong rear-guard, with a maxim, some half-mile or more behind the column. The difficulty at first with the Imperial Yeomanry was to induce them to keep far enough out: they remained within a half-mile or 1000 yards of the waggons, and it

was long before they realised how absolutely necessary it was (in the open, rolling downs we were passing over) that they should be well away—at least 1500–2000 yards—from the column. The reason, which when explained they soon grasped, was that if they were close in, the attack would be on us before due dispositions could be made to meet it; whereas by keeping the mounted men well out and the infantry close at hand, such timely warning would be received as would admit of the slow-moving infantry being brought up to the point threatened.

The guns always moved with, and near the head of, the main column with a very small infantry escort. At one time, in deference to the idea of separating guns, one gun had almost invariably—no matter what the size of the column—been detailed to accompany the rear-guard. It was found, however, by experience, that rear-guard commanders—who cannot under all conditions be specially selected men—were apt to find that a gun added very considerably to their anxieties, and that on the rare occasions when the rear-guard was in any way *pressed*, the commander was inclined to think more of keeping the gun out of danger than of so employing it as to reap all the advantages of its presence. But with a small column there is no doubt that its few guns are better with the main body: they can reach the point of attack quite quickly enough for all ordinary purposes, and are less liable to be called upon to come into action at a disadvantage, as must often happen with the guns of the rear-guard.

We did not reach camp that night until long after dark, and then settled down on the banks of the "vlei," or pond: we could spare but few men for picquets, so our camp and transport were closed in as compactly as possible; the infantry bivouacked on three sides, the Imperial Yeomanry on the other; while four picquets, each of half a company, were put out one on each flank of the camp and at a distance from it of 1000 yards. This was not an ideal disposition by any means; but nowadays the smaller the force the more difficult does it seem to become adequately to protect it, unless, of course, the camp happens to be in some peculiarly favoured position. These picquets would not perhaps have kept off an attack, but at least they would have given timely warning of one. Here, again, as nearly always in South Africa and on the Indian frontier, it was impossible for any one responsible officer to select the position for every one of these picquets; but each picquet had an officer, each was in signalling communication with the camp, each had the strictest orders as to entrenching, and every man of every picquet perfectly well understood that whoever came near his picquet was an enemy.

South Africa was different to the Indian frontier in that there were not a few instances of picquets being overwhelmed often with disastrous result to the forces they were covering. It would be interesting to know whether the artificial strengthening of picquet posts was always insisted upon. I am inclined to think it was *not*, and that this most necessary precaution was not made a point of, especially in many irregular corps.

We started next morning as soon as it was light, and moving in the same formation halted at 9 for two or three hours to let the cattle graze, while infantry and mounted picquets on the rising ground looked out for any enemy. None appeared; but if he had, it would, I fear, have taken some time, and led, perhaps, to considerable confusion and some loss, to drive in the oxen to the shelter of their waggons. Cattle always seem to make a point of grazing as widely as possible; the transport conductors were nearly all civilians, while the men actually in charge of the teams were Kaffirs, and it seems impossible to make such people realise that it is *not* desirable, from a military point of view, to permit the cattle to roam and graze right up to the distant picquets.

We reached Ventersdorp that afternoon, and camped that night and the following day within the town picquets; filled up our waggons and prepared to start to rejoin our column. Now while it was seldom worth the enemy's while to attack an empty convoy, the capture of a full one was quite a desirable achievement; so while our empty waggons with their small escort had been fairly safe on the road into Ventersdorp, it by no means followed that we should be equally unmolested when travelling with the same force, escorting that which would be of immense value to the Boers, while its loss would render our G.O.C. quite unable to play his part in the general scheme of operations. Nobody in Ventersdorp knew our road, but a very indifferent map showed *two:* on the more southerly road there was water all the way, but it passed close to a native "stadt," the attitude of whose chief was uncertain: it appeared, however, to be the better road of the two. The other one had drinking water only at one place—a farm called Wildfontein—about twenty miles from Ventersdorp, but there was *believed* to be water fit for animals at about eleven miles. This information was given us by the local butcher, a tame Burgher, who admitted he had passed that way many years before during the rainy season, so this was not much of a guarantee that we should find water there in May. However, he was ordered to come with us—much to his distress—and I never expected to see him at the rendezvous next morning in the dark—nor was I disappointed. Consequently we set out to find the way ourselves. I confess I

was anxious about water, for our loads were very heavy; it was impossible to do the full twenty miles before dark unless we were able to outspan halfway for water and grazing; and I dreaded the idea of being benighted on an unknown road, in the middle of the veldt, without water for man or beast. We adopted the same procedure on this march as before, and came along at a very promising pace before the sun got hot. About 10 o'clock, to my great relief, we came upon the water—a group of two or three reed-grown ponds—and here we decided to outspan till 1 P.M. (I know that this is not as long as transport officers consider necessary, for the ox is an annoying beast: not only does he take a long time to graze, but he wastes so much time over it: he will never begin at once, but when released from the yoke, he sits down and *thinks* for quite a long time before he begins to feed. However, three hours was all we could spare if we were to reach our proposed bivouac before dusk.) The scene of our "outspan" was anything but an ideal military position; it was well enough on the left, where a convenient low ridge of rock covered the "outspan" and afforded a clear field of view to our picquets; in rear the view was unobscured for miles; but in front and on the right the ground was rather nasty. In our immediate front was quite a large wood, irregular in shape, perhaps a mile in extent each way, and full of bushy trees and a certain amount of undergrowth. Our onward road ran right through the very heart of it. From a high mound on the outskirts of the wood our signallers opened communication with those of our G.O.C. some sixteen miles off, who told us "to be on the look-out for Boers!"

The wood was of course thoroughly searched and mounted vedettes, supported by infantry, placed along the outer or further fringe.

Our right was equally objectionable, for it was covered at a short distance by several patches of Kaffir-corn, which grows to a height of four to five feet, effectually concealing the advance of an enemy. These patches, too, were of considerable depth, and it was necessary to push a few mounted men a very long way out on this flank with a company of infantry in fairly close support.

I was not sorry when we inspanned again, and our convoy was safely through the wood and out once more in the open country.

It was getting on for 5 o'clock before the mounted men of our advance-guard topped the last ridge and saw the farm buildings of Wildfontein in the hollow before them. They saw something more at the same time; for at the open doors of the farm was quite a number of saddled horses, whose riders were inside.

Our Yeomanry, as I have said, were inexperienced, and instead of galloping straight at the horses, they dismounted where they were and opened a long range and ineffectual fire. The Boers—there were not more than about forty of them—were out and off and firing from the far side of the little valley in no time. Of course they did not stay, and all we got were a few of their spare horses. This camp was a difficult one to guard. The farm buildings, with fields of Indian corn, stretched for nearly three-quarters of a mile along the banks of a little stream away to the left, while on the left rear was a very large wood, a salient from which ran down to within about 1500 yards of the farm lands. The front and right were fairly open, but the right rear was a little awkward, the ground sloping upwards to one of those South African hills which seem to have *no* top. We were able to manage with the usual three picquets on the front, right, and rear, but on the left two were necessary, so placed as to command both sides of the little valley at a spot where it suddenly narrowed; the picquet on the left rear was drawn fairly close in so as to be well clear of the large wood. I am glad that no attack was made upon us that night, for I think that we should have had some difficulty in beating it off, although we could easily have held out among the farm buildings till our G.O.C. could have come to our assistance.

Our march next day was through a more sticky bit of country, but we completed it unmolested (though our Yeomanry got once into touch with a Boer patrol), and late in the afternoon the convoy reached the column quite safely.

The two examples I have quoted of the measures taken to safeguard a small force in Tirah and in South Africa, are, of course, quite different, but the *principles* are, I submit, much the same. In neither case could absolute safety be guaranteed and *some* risks must always be run, for what is laid down in text-books cannot invariably be carried out; and so long as the C.O. has honestly tried to think out all *probable* eventualities, has drawn up and issued careful orders, and is supported by officers who may be trusted to carry them out, he will—should the worst happen—at least be spared the thought that his own neglect has contributed to the misfortunes of his command.

H. C. WYLLY.

THE DECISIVE RANGE.

BY "SOLDADO."

"ALL movements on the battlefield have but one end in view, the development of fire in greater volume and more effectively directed than that of the opposing force . . . it is superiority of fire that decides the conflict" (Combined Training, Section 3 (i.)).

"Success is only to be obtained by fire at decisive range" (Infantry Training, Section 213 (i.)).

Terms applied to ranges.	Rifle.
	Yards.
Distant	3000 to 2000
Long	2000 ,, 1400
Effective	1400 ,, 600
Decisive	600 and under.

[Infantry Training, Section 215. Combined Training, Section 2.]

In the continuous advance of thought and method that is absolutely necessary for a nation to keep abreast of the world's progress, thinkers constantly express new opinions which differ from or go further than accepted principles. This is an inevitable and vivid sign of national vigour. Many experienced and thoughtful soldiers hold an opinion on the subject of this paper which differs from the description of ranges quoted above. This opinion is that battles will in the future be won and lost at far more than 600 yards, or, that decisive ranges are much extended by the weapons of to-day.

The third section of our text is the outcome of the latest conflict fought between opponents armed equally with modern weapons. The first and second sections contain no new tactical principles. The discharge of missiles by infantry established its value at Creçy. The main principles of tactics never change. Modern science merely demands their suitable application to existing conditions. The great problem is, how to obtain superiority of fire at the decisive point.

There are four main conditions that lead to fire superiority: numbers, fire-discipline, surprise, and direction, *e.g.*, enfilade

and reverse. Fire superiority, therefore, may be physical or moral. The end of its development is almost invariably moral. The defeat of an army is followed, as a rule, by its retreat or surrender. Seldom does a force in civilised war continue fighting until every man is *hors de combat*. That would be the result of physical superiority of fire pure and simple, which had, however, never succeeded in establishing moral superiority. Hence, moral superiority of fire is, generally speaking, the direct cause of victory or of defeat. The question remains as to when it becomes decisive; at what stage the battle is won or lost.

Decisive ranges are those ranges at which the end of an action is reached, objectives, whether intermediate or final, are won or lost, phases of the battle are determined. Those ranges, that is, at which the establishment of superiority of fire settles once and for all which side dominates the field, or any portion of the field, can assume the initiative for further action, and can dictate to the opponent his future moves in the struggle. Our text-books tell us that those ranges are 600 yards and under. Our late Commander-in-Chief, fresh from battlefields where Lee-Enfield answered Mauser, says, "It is by snap-shooting at the closest ranges that battles of the future will be won." On what grounds can be founded the theory that a foe can be repulsed, a position won, when half a mile or more divides the combatants?

The following are, perhaps, the three chief arguments. Firstly, we deliberately throw away much of the great power and value of the modern rifle by basing our tactical ideas on the premise that its decisive range is not more than 600 yards. With its flat trajectory the rifle shoots so accurately that we should, having established superiority of fire, crush our enemy at longer ranges. The defence should allow no attacker to approach the position over a reasonably good field of fire. The attack should shoot the defenders out of their position or into surrender.

Secondly, the advantages of superior fire-discipline and good marksmanship, which belong to a highly trained Army like ours, are lost at ranges where mere numbers, noise, and volume of lead decide the day.

Thirdly, we must, whatever else seems desirable, learn to win battles at longer ranges, because our men are few and valuable; close-range fighting is costly in blood, and we are bound, for political, financial, and national reasons, to economise life, and to win our campaigns with the fewest possible casualties.

Let us examine these arguments in turn.

The power of the modern rifle has certainly extended the dangerous zone beyond those of the classic wars of 1870–71 and

1877. Combined Training, Section 3 (3), shows this clearly. But will any good troops own themselves beaten because they are feeling the fire of an enemy whom they can hardly see? They may admit that their opponents have obtained superiority of fire at certain points for the time being, but they will only do so by changing their dispositions accordingly, occupying more commanding or better sheltered ground, or gaining respite and relief by hurling themselves on their foes, as the French Turcos charged from the Niederwald the Prussians. But that they will break in flight or raise the white flag we can not believe. In an attack, resolute troops will not be repulsed by fire only at half to three-quarters of a mile, for the defender's fire will seldom sweep an unbroken glacis of over 600 yards in width. Comparatively sheltered and practicable lines of approach exist in front or on the flanks of any position; the nature of the earth's surface makes this a constant factor. And troops that understand the construction and use of cover should never be shot out of their position or into surrender. Fire alone would not have driven the Turks from Plevna. Infantry Training, Section 213 (i.), says, "The fire of attacking troops beyond that (the decisive) range can have very little effect on a well covered enemy." This must always be so.

The loss of the advantage of fire-discipline at short ranges occurs only when the better trained force has not established superiority of fire. In this case the development of the enemy's fire-power is in the nature of a surprise, a condition that makes for superiority of fire. Hence that superiority lies with the enemy. The South African War furnishes instances of this. At Magersfontein the Boers opened fire on the Highland Brigade at 200 yards. Our men had approached the Boer position by night, and had no notion of the enemy's proximity. At Stormberg our troops marched, again by night, into a valley commanded on all sides at 400 yards. At dawn the Boers opened fire from the heights into our closed and tired ranks. At Sannah's Post our force marched into an ambush in full day, and was caught on an open plain by a smaller Boer force concealed in a donga across our line of march. The Boer fire opened at from a few yards to 500, from front and flanks.

Such instances, however, do not prove that the advantage of short range lies, as a rule, with the worse trained, even if stronger, side. We gained no considerable action in South Africa without getting to close quarters. At Paardeberg we maintained a superiority of fire for nine days, but it was only on the approach of our trenches to within a hundred yards of his that Cronje surrendered. At Diamond Hill the advance of the Guards' Brigade against the

Boer's left centre ended a fire fight that had lasted three days. At Belfast it took four days, and the charge of the Rifle Brigade at Bergendal, to dislodge the Boers. The latter stages of the war teem with instances of hand-to-hand fighting at the closest ranges. If discipline and training are ever valuable, it is in the tumult and confusion of close quarters.

The problem of how to save and when to sacrifice men bristles with difficulties. Decisive results can seldom be achieved without loss, but when the supply of men is limited, it seems rather like drawing on our capital to lose them. Our soldiers are costly luxuries, and we increase their value by a careful system of high training. Our leaders realise the men's value and handle them accordingly, seeking to lose as few as is compatible with the object to be gained. From the purely military point of view this is wrong. To crush your foe, it is said, you must face heavy losses. The Continental Powers can, perhaps, afford to lavish their conscripts on each victory, as Grant could afford to lose more men in beating Lee than there were men in Lee's whole army. But we must undoubtedly count the cost before we lose a man. We shall not, however, win battles, though we may save men, by keeping at a respectful distance from the enemy. We must solve the problem by training our men to such a pitch of discipline, self-reliance, and mobility that by sheer power of manœuvre we shall obtain superiority of fire when and where we wish. If with inferior numbers we can learn by fire-discipline, surprise, rapidity and secrecy of movement, or staying power, to establish superiority of fire at the decisive point, then, on the happy days when we have the big battalions, we can rely on possessing physically at the outset what we have known how to acquire morally at the end. And when the occasion demands loss, we must not hesitate to suffer it.

But whether we aim at making the most of our infantry weapon and fire-discipline, or at keeping down the casualty list, we cannot doubt that in a struggle between troops of nearly equal quality, armament and *morale*, the result will be fought out at close quarters, and often decided by the bayonet. We cannot draw general conclusions from the abnormal clearness of atmosphere and openness of *terrain* of South Africa, nor from our wide experience of warfare in desert, hills, and jungle. The highest test of tactical skill is applied on European battlefields, in a close and intersected theatre where view and field of fire are limited. Fire at much over 600 yards will not shake the *morale* of modern soldiery. The bullets are not thick enough, the noise is inconsiderable, and cover from view and fire is freely to be found. It

is when the troops approach to charging distance, when a sheet of lead sweeps the open ground, when the roar of musketry and artillery prevents an order being heard and dulls the acuteness of every faculty, that the nerve tension nears the breaking strain. This decisive moment the greater leader will seize to throw in the straw that will snap his opponent's quivering nerves.

But this will be at short range. To whatever distance the rifle of to-morrow may reach, the decisive range will be limited by the same conditions as to-day and yesterday—the field of fire and sight, and the resolution and training of the troops.

Nor does this apply only to carrying out and beating off real attacks, but to other phases of fighting, such as containing and delaying actions. We shall not hold an enemy to his ground by merely firing at him at "long" or even "effective" ranges, nor will such fire delay a foe whose object is not to be delayed. We can annoy our opponent and force him to deploy, or, if he is on the defence, to develop his strength and dispositions, as soon as we can reach him with our fire; but we must always be ready to close with him to be finally successful.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ANNUAL COURSE OF MUSKETRY.

By "K."

In an Army Order, published in October, 1902, Lord Roberts called attention to the importance of musketry, and pointed out that the first object in the training of a soldier is, or should be, to make him a good shot; since that date other Army Orders and circular letters have been issued with the same object.

The annual musketry course has twice been altered during the last four years, and another course for the new rifle has been compiled and issued in Army Orders. Each of these alterations has been made for the purpose of improving, in the most practical manner, the shooting of the individual soldier, and consequently of the whole Army, and this object each of these changes undoubtedly effects.

The day has now quite gone by when the officer at the firing-point brought down with him to the range, as a necessary part of his equipment, an easy-chair and a novel,* and the officer in the butts if he also hadn't a novel went to sleep; when good shots fired on the targets of bad shots, or actually fired in their places. Greater interest is now shown by everybody, especially by the private soldier, and the keenness displayed by all ranks is as great as could be desired.

At the same time the weather, at any rate in this country, greatly militates against a satisfactory course of musketry. Musketry usually commences about the first week in February,

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* During my experience, extending over thirty years, I have never met with a case such as that suggested. The presence of an officer in the butts during individual practices is, by the way, a comparatively recent innovation, dating from long since the days when slackness at musketry was tolerated even in cavalry regiments. From "slackness" we have now gone to the opposite extreme, and introduced so much "worry" and interference that efficiency is rather hindered than assisted. Some day we shall perhaps learn that the way to get the best work from a good man is to let him do it, so far as possible, his own way; and that no amount of "worry" will make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Those who stand in need of much supervision are not worth keeping and should be got rid of. To begin with, however, we could well spare a few of the supervisors—to, for example, the House of Commons, or some such noisy assembly of notable nonentities.—Ed. U. S. M.

when the leave season is over, and though the musketry regulations lay down that "the range practices will not be fired in cold or otherwise unfavourable weather," it is impossible to choose favourable days to shoot on when the weather continues bad week after week. Thirty-six days are allowed for company training, and this number of days has to include the annual course of musketry. Now, in the last two years, how many days in February and March can be said to have been really good, or even fair, for musketry?—the writer of this article knows by the bitter experience of both this year and last. It is only when one finds one's self standing on a range for some time that one is able to appreciate the coldness of our climate during those two months.

As much as possible is done to prevent men from having to wait any length of time on the range. They are brought to the firing-point one or two sections at a time, and are sent away as soon as they have fired. But when the ranges are some distance from barracks, it is impossible to regulate the arrival of the men so that they need only wait a short time before their turn to fire comes. Any one who wishes to appreciate the difficulties of firing or of taking a great interest in musketry can do so by standing still on any day in February and March for half an hour or so. It will be found that there is considerable difficulty in firing when the fingers are numb with cold; and a good score is out of the question. This is bad enough for the private, but for the unfortunate section commander, or the still more unfortunate officer who has to stop on the range for three or four hours at a time coaching the bad and indifferent shots, it is a good deal worse. Fortunately the standard of qualification for the new "service pay" is very low, or the ill-luck of having to fire during February and March would be greater than it is. It would not seem a very difficult task to arrange that company field training, independently of musketry, should be completed by the whole battalion first (four companies are usually struck off at a time), and the musketry taken at a later period of the year, when, at least, standing on the range for any length of time would not be such a bitter penance.

The writer feels it would be presumption on his part to suggest any alteration in a course of musketry which has been arranged after (we hope) much thought and experience by experts; but it strikes even a casual observer that a system by which a soldier fires most of his rounds in a fortnight at the beginning of a year, and the remainder in a week at the end of it, is capable of being improved upon.

Theoretically, of course, musketry instruction goes on continually throughout the year. This it does to a certain extent, but though

during company and battalion field training, field days, etc., the men are continually watched to see that they adjust their sights properly, etc., it is impossible for the officers, or section commanders, to be passing down the ranks extended to ten paces when advancing to an attack, to ascertain if a man has accurately, or even approximately, judged the distance correctly. The individual soldier has to be relied on to do his best to improve his shooting by the correct use of his rifle on field days, because, though it may be possible to ensure that his sights are adjusted to the correct distance, it is quite impossible to be certain that he is taking a correct aim, or taking any aim at all. Fortunately one can rely on the majority to do this; but weeks of such practice will not do as much to improve the shooting powers of any individual as one day on the range will.

It does not appear to be a very difficult task to devise some scheme by which the annual course of musketry might be split up to cover a larger portion of the year than the present one. And yet there must be great objections, as no scheme has yet been devised, though it must have occurred to a great many. It would be easy enough to arrange that companies should fire for a certain number of days in each month.

The course of musketry published for use with the new rifle, working progressively as it does, lends itself in a particular manner to such an expansion. It is not intended to go into minute details in this paper, and only one or two practices will be taken as examples to illustrate the method, because it is felt that the working up of such a scheme is essentially the task of an expert, which the writer in no sense professes to be.

Take, for example, the first three practices of the new course. All three are at two hundred yards, and the position for all of them is lying. No. 1 is independent, No. 2 independent behind cover, No. 3 rapid independent, with a time limit of thirty seconds. Suppose Nos. 1 and 2 to have been fired, *entre autres*, in one month, and No. 3 left for the next month. The first two practices should have taught the soldier the sighting of his rifle at two hundred yards, and one sighting shot should enable him to correct any allowance for light or wind. According to the present regulations no sighting shot is allowed before firing any practice; but most of those who have to put any number of men annually through courses of musketry, are agreed that it ought to be allowed, especially as it is not always possible to arrange that deliberate and rapid practices for any particular range shall be fired on the same day. When these practices are not fired on the same day it is quite possible to fire all seven shots, in the rapid practice, and score either nothing

at all, or only a few points, owing to the difference of elevation required for a dull and bright day, or an error in judgment of the exact strength of the wind. And it must be allowed that it is very disheartening, especially to a young soldier, to find that his chance of making a good score has been spoilt by an error in judgment, to which even the best shots are liable. For one of the hardest points in musketry, and one which requires a large amount of experience, is accurate judgment of the strength of the wind. It may be objected that before firing rapid practices, and the previous remarks refer more to those carried out at longer ranges, the strength of wind is ascertained by the officer in charge, or an instructor. This is true, and theoretically should be sufficient; but it is one thing to lie down and fire, say, five shots in twenty-five seconds, allowing two feet for wind and a little more elevation than the previous day, and quite another to find the exact amount required by experiment. By the aid of the scoring book kept by each individual soldier now, one sighting shot should be sufficient. The three practices, mentioned above, should be sufficient to demonstrate the scheme, and no more will be given for the reasons stated before.

The authorities have come to the conclusion that it is better to disperse gymnastic training throughout the year (two hours per week have to be spent on it), and have given up the old twelve day annual course, and perhaps it would not be too much to hope that the same system may some day be adopted with musketry. Whatever else it might do it would certainly tend to increase the interest in the individual soldier; because finding, for example, he was not shooting well in his first month, with the thought of his diminished service pay, it is very likely he would spend a certain amount of his spare time before the second month in practice,* and once a man has had his faults pointed out to him nothing is so likely to improve his shooting powers as constant practice. The result the writer confidently expects would be the increased efficiency of any unit.

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* I have long held that the musketry course should be divided into monthly parts, for a variety of reasons, and to the number of these I think that "K" has here added another of considerable importance.—ED. U. S. M.

A REFORMER OF 1781.

By Captain C. S. Collison, 2nd W.I. Regiment.

At a time when so much attention is being devoted to reforms and alterations in the drill and discipline of the Army, a few extracts from a book on 'Tacticks,' by William Dalrymple, Lieut.-Colonel of the Queen's Royal Regiment of Foot, and published in 1781, are of interest as showing that in those days, too, the need for reform was engaging the attention of thinking officers.

The book from which I quote was dedicated to the King, and the author, in the course of his dedication, expresses the hope that "this attempt to improve the discipline of the Army may merit your Majesty's most gracious acceptance."

In his introductory chapter, Colonel Dalrymple says, "The British Army, like others, has increased to an enormous extent, but has not made an equal progress in its regulations and tacticks;" in explanation of which he points out that "There are not two regiments that form column from line and line from column in the same way." He concludes, "The mode of training, I advocate, has been practised with success in the Queen's Regiment, which I have the honour to command."

After enlarging upon the advantages of having a regularly constituted chain of responsibility from the general to the private soldier, he starts on his first proposed reform, which is no less than the abolishment of the Light and Grenadier Companies, for the following reasons:—

"A Light Infantryman can only be a marksman; every soldier thus armed ought to be the same; as to dress, if a man can march better and is more at his ease in a jacket than a coat, why should he be encumbered with the latter? If a cap be more useful than a hat, why should not every man wear one? . . . In short, our whole infantry, if properly clothed and disciplined, ought to be equally useful in every situation." Coming to the Grenadier Companies he says, "The tallest and most useful men, when formed for service, are separated from their own corps and placed under accidental commanders, totally unacquainted with them."

When we remember that Light and Grenadier Companies were

in existence until comparatively recent years, one can imagine the ridicule a reform of this far-reaching effect must have caused at the time of its publication.

On the subject of dress he maintains that the hair should be cut short, and advocates a round hat, white for hot countries and black for cold, condemning in no measured terms the cocked hat of the line, the Light Infantry helmet, and the Grenadier busby, "and such trumpery."

"Leather gaiters," he says, "when wet are very uncomfortable, and turn hard by use. Woollen spatterdashes appear to me to be the best." Thereby probably being the first to raise his voice in favour of the puttie.

Dealing with arms, he recommends a reform which actually comes into force 120 years later, as follows: "To affirm that officers would not attend to their men if armed with fusils (or carbines) only marks a great defect in discipline. The officers by having firearms may prove advantageous by increasing the quantity of fire; I am therefore of opinion that officers and sergeants should be armed like the men with fusils and bayonets. The caliber of the fusil to be the same with the firelock of the men." He adds, however, "That the colonel, the majors, the adjutant, the quartermaster, sergeant-major, and drummers should carry swords only." As regards the clothing of the officers, "it should be similar to that of the men," though each should have a badge according to his rank.

Colonel Dalrymple's idea of the "Stand at Ease" during drills and parades appears to me a most sensible one, although in these days, when the soldier airs his grievances in the public Press, I question whether its adoption would not be at the expense of discipline. On the command "Stand at Ease," he says, "he is then to stand at ease, without quitting his post or talking."

Turning to the right, left, and to the right-about are practically identical with those in use to-day, viz. "Face to the right upon the right heel, raising the left foot a little off the ground, at the same time bring the left heel in a line with the right." Turnings to the left and to the right-about were arranged on the same principle.

Coming to the "March of Route," he goes at some length into the importance of this part of a soldier's training, and fixes the length of a pace at thirty-two inches, the rate of the "quick step" at 120 paces per minute, and the "charging pace," or double, at 150 paces per minute.

With regard to the manual exercises he is in accord with the Military Authorities of our times in reducing these exercises to a minimum. "The fewer they are the better," he says. "Principally

he (*i.e.* the recruit) should learn to prime and load, present and fire. As soon as he can go through these motions, he should be taught to fire ball at a target."

I do not propose to follow Colonel Dalrymple in his attempts to simplify and improve the laborious and complicated motions of priming, loading, and firing, for with all his good intentions he does not succeed in reducing to less than twelve motions this important part of the soldier's education; but the stress, he lays throughout, on the necessity of establishing a systematic and progressive form of individual instruction, combined with the importance of imparting such instruction so as to accustom the recruit to think and act with intelligence, proves that he was far from satisfied with the pedantic and machine-like methods of the barrack square drill of the period.

There are many other points worthy of notice in this book, but I have selected only those that I considered to be of particular interest. I have not the means at hand by which I might trace the subsequent career of this practical officer, but I think that few will underestimate the worth and honesty of his ideas, or can help feeling some regret that this "attempt to improve the discipline of the Army" should have met with so little success.

C. S. COLLISON.

INDIA TO ENGLAND *VIÂ* JAPAN AND CANADA.

BY "E. A. S."

CIRCULARS from tourist agents and innumerable guide-books and pamphlets, issued by railway and steamship companies, describing the scenery and other attractions of this route home from India, must be familiar to almost everybody; but a short account from the traveller's point of view, without entering into any elaborate descriptions of the sights and other matters fully dealt with in these books, may be useful to any one contemplating the trip, and interesting to all.

First as regards finances. A through ticket issued in Bombay for the complete journey, steamer and rail first-class, costs a little over £80. In addition to this, say, £20 may be taken in gold, and £100 in circular notes or letters of credit to provide for the usual extra expenses of travelling, sleeping berths, hotels, purchase of curios, etc., making a total of £200, which will suffice to do the journey with every comfort, but without extravagance. Of course incidental expenses may be reduced to one-half of this with economy and roughing it. On the other hand, one can spend any amount of money on the beautiful artistic things to be purchased in China and Japan.

Next as regard season of year. Spring and autumn are the best, and in some parts the only times to travel. Hong Kong is pleasantly cool up to April, when it begins to get muggy, and is not at all agreeable again till October. In Japan the cherry blossom is at its best about the beginning of April, but this is apt to be a rainy month; May is warmer, and the wisteria is out. In Canada, the Rocky Mountain hotels only open after the middle of May, and there is still a good deal of snow then on the higher ground, so it is not advisable to arrive there before that date, if it is desired to spend a few days among the Rockies. Some people prefer both Canada and Japan in the autumn, when the maple leaf changes colour and gives most gorgeous effects.

Lastly as to time. About three months from Bombay to London may be taken as a fair average period in which to see

sufficient without uncomfortably hurrying. It might be done in about two months by going straight through, and if time is no object, another month or two might easily be spent.

I left Bombay by P. and O. China mail towards the middle of March, and after a rather hot three days arrived at Colombo, where the P. and O. from London to Australia met us and transferred her China passengers. Here the ships always coal, and coaling in this steamy climate is more than usually disagreeable; they generally take nearly twenty-four hours transferring passengers, mails, and cargo, so every one goes on shore to dine at the various hotels in Colombo or at Mount Lavinia, a pleasant resort about seven miles by rail or road down the coast. As a rule there is hardly time even to get up to Kandy, the pretty and interesting old capital, but an afternoon easily passes driving round the place in rickshaws, then out to the gardens with their wonderful tropical vegetation, followed by a tour of the shops and curio dealers' stalls. Ceylon is famous for its precious stones, though it is necessary to be a judge of these things if buying, all the best being, of course, brought up by experts.

Leaving Colombo with a rather crowded ship, after five days we reached Penang, a small uninteresting place with few European inhabitants, where a very short stay of only an hour or two is made, and the ship goes on to Singapore, rather over twenty-four hours distant. Singapore is a prosperous commercial centre, with a large European community; the surroundings and harbour are beautiful, and the climate, though warm, moist, and rainy, is quite tolerable, as the nights are cool. The stay here just gives time to get up to the town, dine, and spend a night on shore. Singapore to Hong Kong is a five-day run, and the cool breezes of the China Sea were a relief after the hot Straits, especially as the ship was much over-crowded. Unusual numbers of people were travelling owing, it was said, to the Delhi Durbar; many visitors there returning to England and America this way.

At Hong Kong it was necessary to wait five days, as there is a change here from the P. and O. to C.P.R. (Canadian Pacific Railway) Empress boats for Vancouver *viâ* Japan; this time can be very pleasantly spent. Hong Kong is an extremely pretty place, with a large amount of shipping, and being an important station of the Royal Navy there are always numbers of warships of every sort here, not only British, but foreign; the American squadron from the Philippines comes frequently. It is also said to hold the record for steam-launches, every one seems to keep one, and the place swarms with them. The Peak rises abruptly almost from the quays, and is more often than not wreathed in white

mists; it is easy to ascend by a few minutes' run in the funicular railway, and many of the residents have houses at the top for sake of coolness; but it is not an unmixed blessing, for the damp mists seem to cling all round and penetrate even inside the houses, saturating everything; on a fine day the view is very fine. One of the prettiest views of the place is from a ship in the harbour at night, the town brilliantly lighted by electric light rising tier upon tier up the steep slopes of the Peak. There are several large and well-conducted hotels, and an excellent club, where it is possible to become an honorary member. A small racecourse is in the Happy Valley, on the northern outskirts of the town, where successful meetings are held; I heard that these are chiefly limited now to Chinese ponies, though at one time mostly Australians and Arabs ran. Polo, football, and some good sailing constitute the general amusements. Canton is reached from Hong Kong in a few hours by a daily service of comfortable steamers; it is worth seeing as a typical dirty Chinese city, in which Europeans are not regarded with much favour.

I left for Japan in a C.P.R. steamer; they are usually called "Empress" boats, and are handsome, well-arranged, and well-managed ships, 6000 tons, twin screw, with a possible speed of eighteen to nineteen knots; at sea they usually do about fifteen knots. They are most comfortable in every way; all the stewards are Chinamen, who do very well in this capacity. Shanghai is the first port of call, or rather Woosung, for most ships lie off there some miles down the river, and a steam-launch took us up to the Bund of the Foreign Settlement, where we had an hour or two for a hurried drive round. The ship left the same afternoon for Nagasaki, our first Japanese port, about twenty-seven hours' steam, so we only anchored in the harbour there after dark. The whole of the next day was spent at this place, so it was possible to have a long day on shore, seeing the town and curio shops, and then taking rickshaws and driving over the wooded hills at the back, down to a little seaside resort on the other side, famous for its fish luncheons. The scenery was charming, cherry blossom and fresh green leaves everywhere, and the lunch very creditable, served at a superior Japanese tea-house in European style.

Nagasaki to Kobe through the Inland Sea takes a little over a day, and in fine weather is well worth seeing. Many people think the entrance to Vancouver finer. On arrival at Kobe, we found a large Japanese fleet of some fifty vessels ready for review by the Mikado; Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States being also each represented by one or two warships. I left the Empress boat, which went on next day to Yokahama for Vancouver,

and went to the principal hotel. There are plenty of good hotels in Japan, a few owned or managed by Europeans, others by Japanese, but run on the European system, fitted with electric light and every convenience; the charges vary from six to ten yen a day for everything (a yen = 2*s.* 1*d.*). The Japanese inns are also available; they are kept scrupulously clean, have few, if any, European conveniences, and cost one to three yen per diem.

The Mikado's review of the fleet caused Kobe to be very full at this time. He arrived by train and drove down to the landing-stage with a cavalry escort, through streets lined with troops and decorated with triumphal arches; we followed him out to the fleet in a steam-launch, he went on board a first-class cruiser, which then got under weigh and moved slowly along the lines, then anchored again, and all the commanders went on board to pay their respects. The Japanese ships closely resemble the British in general appearance and also in a good deal of detail; they looked smart and effective. That evening the fleet and town were illuminated; the land illuminations were most effectively carried out with thousands of paper lanterns. Torchlight processions pervaded the streets, headed by brass bands playing European airs rather discordantly. The crowds were dense, but Japanese crowds are the best behaved in the world, and a few odd policemen here and there were more than sufficient to preserve order.

The Osaka Exhibition had just opened at this time, and I spent one day there; it closely resembled an ordinary European exhibition with the exception of the art section, which was unique, most magnificent specimens of lacquer, bronze, cloisonné, satsuma embroideries, etc., being on view, and besides the ordinary class of picture, paintings on silk and cut velvet. Owing to the exhibition, the railways were densely crowded; the people, however, were very courteous and well behaved. Railway travelling in Japan is quite comfortable, though a little slow; the scenery sometimes most attractive with hills, woods, lakes, and streams, sometimes flat, uninteresting stretches of paddy. The up-to-date Jap, plants boards along the route, bearing huge advertising posters. English-speaking guides can be engaged from the Guides' Society; their pay is yen 2 a day, increased in proportion to the size of the party they conduct. Many people do without a guide at all. So much English is spoken in Japan that it is easy enough to get along. In railway stations and other public places notices are generally in two languages, Japanese and English. In fact English is their second language; all their naval officers are taught it.

Kioto, an ancient capital, is most picturesquely situated among wood-covered hills; here are seen Imperial palaces and numbers of

fine temples. Beautiful modern cloisonné, bronzes, and other artistic things can be bought; there are also plenty of antiquities for sale, but Japan has now been cleared of so many old things that it is well to be cautious about buying. The development of art in Japan is of recent date; it has gradually been brought in from China, where it has flourished for centuries. There are many excursions in this neighbourhood, notably to Lake Bliva, returning in a boat by torchlight on a canal tunnelled through the hills. Some rapids can be shot where a river passes through a gorge in the hills; these are small, and are navigated in flat-bottomed boats of very light draught. The boatmen show great skill, as the boat swept along by the boiling surf, grazes great boulders, and follows the sharp twists of the river-bed. The scenery, too, is very pretty.

Space prevents more than a passing reference to a few of the many places worth visiting. At Nagoya is a most perfect specimen of an old feudal castle, which gives an excellent idea of the ancient architecture and defences of the country. No troops occupy it now, but outside the castle outworks are the barracks of a division of Infantry, and close by some Cavalry lines, with large open parade-grounds, riding schools, etc. The sturdy Japanese Infantryman reminds one of our Goorkhas, though he is a bit bigger and rounder looking, they are full of pluck and dash, hardy, inured to heat and cold, and all the ration they want is a little tea and rice. The Artillery is also good, the Cavalry weak—the Japs are not a nation of horsemen; they are mounted on rough vicious ponies, which, however, look as if they could go for ever and live on nothing; and, although the men don't look like fighting in the saddle, they would probably make formidable Mounted Infantry. Compared with the Cossacks in the Far East, the latter have undoubtedly a great advantage as regards horsemanship and purely Cavalry work—in mounts and hardiness they are about equal; the Japs have the best of it in pluck and intelligence, and a great point with them is their intense patriotism. The equipment and organisation of every branch of the Japanese Army has been thought out to the smallest detail, and whatever was considered best in any European Army was at once adopted. It is important to remember that the Japanese Government foresees probabilities, and quietly and steadily prepares to meet them, this was proved in the war with China, and without doubt the possibility of a struggle with Russia has been carefully thought out and prepared for during several years past.

A good view of the celebrated Fuji-Yama, with its snow-capped cone, can be had on the way from Nagoya to Tokio, as the railway

circles round its base; in clear weather it is visible for miles. Tokio, the present capital, can be seen most conveniently on the way up north to Nikko; the chief Imperial palace is here and all the foreign legations; distances are great as the native city is very large. Nikko, about six hours by rail further north, is one of the most beautiful places in Japan, rivalling Miyanoshita in the hills near Yokahama, and has the magnificent shrines of the Shognus. It is situated high up among thickly wooded hills, with rushing streams and many fine waterfalls all about it; miles of paved avenues, lined with gigantic trees, lead up to the principal shrine. The famous red lacquer bridge was recently washed away in a flood, and has not been replaced. A very pretty excursion from here is to Lake Chuzenzi, about seven miles into the mountains from Nikko, and over 1000 feet higher. A footpath, rough but passable for rickshaws, leads up a river-bed for some distance, entering a wild and picturesque gorge in the hills, the sides of which are covered in April with the pink blossoms of the wild azalea, then climbing by steep zigzag paths to the top of a small pass, from which a slight descent leads to the lake; this is very pretty with clear blue waters surrounded on all sides by woods and snow-covered hills rising steeply from its shores. There is a good hotel here, and the place is a favourite summer resort for the legation people; the lake has been well stocked with all sorts of trout, including salmon trout, and the fishing is said to be very good. Some people consider it a good walk here from Nikko, but it is pleasantest to ride it on a pony. Returning to Yokahama to catch the C.P.R. steamer for Vancouver, I had a few days at this, the chief foreign port of Japan; though of great commercial importance, the large foreign element makes it less interesting to the traveller. Curio dealers abound here, and there are large nurseries for the cultivation of the famous miniature trees, of which most extraordinary specimens may be seen, hundreds of years old and about two feet high; this result is said to be obtained by careful pruning of the roots and application of saki, the native liquor.

Before leaving Japan a word must be said about the geishas. The most celebrated geisha entertainment is the cherry blossom dance, at Kisto, every spring, in which over fifty geishas take part, half of whom play stringed instruments and small hand drums, the remainder dance. Four scenes are shown, first a summer scene, with good effects of running streams and fire-flies darting about, then autumn, winter with snow and an ice-bound river, and finally the cherry blossom scene in which everything, including the dancers, are a mass of blossom. The dancing rather recalls the Indian nautch, as it consists chiefly of slow movements and gestures;

in the singing some peculiar notes come in repeatedly a little suggestive of cats.

From Yokahama to the American Continent there is a choice of routes; one *viâ.* Honolulu to San Francisco, thence across the States; the weather is warmer and sea passage smoother this way. The alternative is the northerly passage by the C.P.R Empress boats to Vancouver, then across Canada by the Canadian Pacific Railway, a cold sea voyage of about twelve days without sighting land. These boats are excellent, and there is no ice, as Behring Strait is too shallow to allow of it drifting south; the scenery of the Canadian Rockies is much finer than in the States, and it is a British railway and territory the whole way.

It is well known that, when travelling, the days are never exactly twenty-four hours, but a few minutes more or less, according to whether the direction is to the west or east. This gain or loss has to be rectified somewhere, so there is an international line at longitude 180 degrees in the middle of the Pacific, at which a day is either added or dropped according to whether the vessel is travelling east or west. As we were going east, we had, therefore, an extra day without date, called Antipodes Day.

The entrance to Vancouver is considered very fine scenery; on the Canadian coast dense pine woods come right down to the shore, and on the United States side are great lines of snow-clad mountains, covered on their lower slopes with dark pines. The climate is mild, and has none of the intense cold of Eastern Canada. The steamer stops for an hour at Victoria, the seat of Government of British Columbia, with the naval station of Esquimault close by, then proceeds to Vancouver, the terminus of the voyage. Vancouver is a very rising town, fine brick and stone edifices are rapidly replacing the last of the wooden houses of which the place was first composed, and which were repeatedly destroyed by fire. In the Stanley Park here, a portion of the primeval forest has been kept quite untouched, and shows what difficulties the early settlers must have had in clearing the ground; an almost impenetrable mass of growing pines is closely interlaced with dead and fallen trees; some of them are of gigantic size.

The terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, or C.P.R., is at Vancouver, and once a day a train leaves for its run of nearly five days across the Continent to Montreal. This famous railway is splendidly managed, and it also owns first-class hotels at various places on the line, those at Banff in the Rockies, and at Quebec, being especially good. The train is made of three classes; tourists cars corresponding to third class, for which the passengers bring their own food, and can cook it, if necessary, as each car is provided with

a small kitchen; first class for holders of ordinary tickets, and lastly parlour and sleeping-cars, for which extra tickets are required. These cars have numbered sections, which by day are arranged into two seats facing one another, and by night into two berths, upper and lower, screened by curtains hanging from the roof; each car has also a smoking-room, and there is a conductor, generally a negro, in charge. Refreshment-cars are always attached, except in the mountains, where the train stops for meals at certain stations, thus avoiding the necessity of an extra car on the steep gradients.

Briefly the trip across Canada is as follows: Leaving Vancouver about 2 P.M., the train proceeds up the right bank of the Frazer river, crosses the Cascade and Selkirk ranges and then the Rockies, reaching the prairie on the eastern slopes in about forty hours, and crossing to Winnipeg, soon after which the lake district begins, and Montreal is reached on the morning of the fifth day. The scenery of the first forty hours has rightly been described as some of the grandest in the world; it is one endless succession of snowy mountains, precipices, rocky gorges, foaming torrents, and pine forests, which latter seem to suffer much from forest pines. Miles of wooden sheds protect the line from snow-drifts and avalanches; without these it would be often impossible to run trains in winter. The steepest gradient is just before reaching the watershed of the Rockies, where four powerful engines on a full train only move it at a foot's pace. The line reaches an altitude of 5400 feet at a place called the "Great Divide;" here may be seen a stream flowing under an arch, and then dividing into two branches, one of which goes to the Atlantic, the other to the Pacific.

Banff hot springs, about thirty hours from Vancouver, is on the eastern slope about 500 feet lower than the Great Divide: here is the Canadian National Park, a sanctuary for all wild animals; in a corral is a herd of some thirty buffalo, a few survivors of their now almost extinct race. Wapiti, caribon, moose, bear, big horn and wild goat can still be got in various districts; the game laws are very strict, and vary in the different States; only in the autumn months may deer of any species be shot: a license costs £10, and the number of heads is limited to two. Best sport with the gun is afforded by duck and prairie chicken.

There is nothing much to be seen on the prairies now, though buffalo trails and wallows everywhere tell of former days: travelling across them soon gets monotonous. As far as the eye can reach, low, undulating ridges stretch out in unbroken succession in every direction. On entering the lake district, the scenery again becomes interesting and attractive. A few Indians are occasionally seen along the line near their reservations; they sell curios, such as bead

pouches and polished buffalo horns; as a rule they wear some sort of European clothes, and have a great taste for gorgeously coloured blankets.

At Fort William the train may be exchanged for the steamer on Lake Superior, and twenty-four hours' run on this Inland Sea, where nothing is to be seen but an occasional mirage, bring the voyager to the two towns, one Canadian, the other American, both called Sante Ste. Marie. Huge locks here take the vessel down to Lake Huron, which it crosses to Owen Sound, whence there is a short railway journey to Toronto.

From Toronto a whole day may well be devoted to a visit to Niagara, easily reached by steamer across Lake Ontario, thence by electric railway passing the whirlpool and rapids to the Falls. Both Canadian and American sides and Goat Island are now laid out in ornamental gardens and parks; and as, when looking at the Falls, the suspension and railway bridges and factory chimneys on the American side are behind, they do not detract from the magnificent effect. One of the best views is to be had from a little steamer called *The Maid of the Mist*, which makes trips close under the foot of the Falls, all the passengers being clad in oil-skins, as a protection against the blinding spray, which is thrown up again higher than the Falls themselves, and often blown a quarter of a mile down the river. In the museum here is shown the barrel in which a lady successfully went over the Falls. From Toronto to Montreal it is possible to travel by train; a night's journey in a sleeping-car, or by river steamer down the St. Lawrence, through the thousand isles and rapids, which takes two days.

At Montreal the French Canadians are first met with in any numbers; they enjoy great freedom of laws and language, and if they are not content and loyal they ought to be.

Between all Canadians and Americans is keen rivalry; they have a great deal of intercourse, and are always competing against each other in all kinds of sports; but the Canadians never show the slightest desire that Canada should join the States. On the contrary, though they have acquired or adopted many of the American customs, they strongly object if mistaken for Americans; and on the other hand, Americans dislike to be mistaken for Canadians.

The volunteer drill-hall and armoury at Montreal consists of a very fine large central hall, from the sides and galleries of which open a number of rooms belonging to the various regiments, among which are Highlander and French Canadian corps. Each regiment has a room for arms and accoutrements, a mess-room for N.C.O.'s, and another for officers. All ranks are very keen and smart, and

any night up to ten o'clock some of them may be seen drilling on the Champs de Mars. Quebec, an afternoon's train journey from Montreal, is one of the most fascinating old places in the world; it is built on a steep slope rising from the St. Lawrence to the Heights of Abraham. The ancient citadel now garrisoned by Artillery Militia of the "Permanent Forces," with numbers of old French mediæval houses, and the statues of such men as Champlain, Frontignac, Wolfe and Montcalm recall many historic memories.* The Senate house of the State of Quebec, a fine modern building, has rows of niches along its front in which are placed statues of all famous men in the history of the place, and the motto, "Je m'en souviens" is here inscribed. In the foreground of the principal entrance is a most artistic group in bronze of Indians.

Walking over the plains of Abraham a good idea can still be formed of how the great battle was fought there; just under the last ridge, the capture of which would give the assailants command of the citadel, is a plain stone obelisk inscribed, "Here died Wolfe, victorious." Besides this there are many other things of historical interest to be seen.

To cross the Atlantic the traveller may either go to New York, and choose one of the lines from there to Liverpool or Southampton; or take a Canadian line from Montreal or Quebec in summer, Halifax in winter. The latter way there is not so much chance of being crowded up, and the Allan Line have most comfortable boats leaving Montreal once a week for Liverpool *viâ* Moville on Lough Foyle; they take practically the same time as the average New York boats, and in some ways are much preferable; they can be joined at Quebec. Crossing the Atlantic in the beginning of June, it was much pleasanter than the Pacific a month previous. At this time of year the ice is drifting south, and off the Newfoundland banks we met with many large icebergs, they are a very pretty sight, but dangerous at night, especially when nearly submerged; extra care is always taken till the vessel meets the Gulf stream, when all danger from ice is over. The first land sighted in the British Isles is Malin Head in the North of Ireland, and the Allan steamer enters Lough Foyle and, after landing the mails and a few passengers, proceeds at once to Liverpool, whence special trains are always ready to start for London.

* Major W. Wood's valuable book, 'The Fight for Canada,' is reviewed in this number.—Ed. U. S. M.

SUNDRIES.

I.

THE *Engineer* reports a revolutionary change in the *Warrior* class of British cruisers. The ten 6-inch guns mounted in the main deck battery, 14 feet above the water-line, all disappear, and their places will be taken by four 7·5-inch guns, which, however, will be mounted on the upper deck between the amidship 9·2-inch turrets. This gives a height of 22 feet above the water-line, which, in turn, entails increased command, range, and ability to fight in all weathers. But the result is heavy rolling. The French, however, place the guns in their latest vessels 28 feet or so above the water.

II.

The annual course of ballooning in Austria-Hungary commenced on the 1st May, and will continue till the 30th September. It is being followed by 17 officers, lieutenants or sub-lieutenants, 11 of whom belong to the infantry, 1 to the pioneers, 3 to the artillery, and 2 to the navy; 45 men from the fortress artillery, 40 from the pioneers, 5 from the railway regiment, 44 artillery drivers with 2 non-commissioned officers, and 82 saddle or draft-horses have been placed at the disposal of the staff of the School of Ballooning for this course. Two manœuvres with troops, which may last for 14 days, will take place at the camp at Bruck on the Leitha during the course, with a view of exercising pupil officers in observing the movements of troops.

III.

The Technical Military Academy, which has been for some time stationed at Vienna, and where a large proportion of the Austro-Hungarian officers of the artillery and the engineers are trained, will be transferred, at the commencement of the scholastic year 1904–5, to Mödling, some kilometres distant from the capital.

IV.

The French Grand Manœuvres, which will take place this year in the Côte d'Or, under the direction of General Brugère, will consist:—

1st Division Manœuvres on the 5th and 6th September. The 7th will be a day of rest.

2nd Army Corps Manœuvres from the 8th to the 13th September, with 1 day for rest.

3rd Army Manœuvres against a skeleton enemy, finishing with a review in the neighbourhood of Dijon, on the 14th and 15th September.

V.

The *France Militaire* in a very readable article draws attention to an error which obtains not only abroad but also in France itself, viz. that when speaking of the so-called Alpine troops, as a rule only the Alpine battalions are understood. That a portion of the French infantry is also to be reckoned amongst the Alpine troops is but little understood. There are, nevertheless, in the XIVth and XVth Army Corps a great many battalions which are trained on precisely similar lines as the Alpine Chasseur battalions for mountain service in the Alps, and assist the latter for nearly half the year in garrisoning mountain posts, and frequently experience very great hardships during their winter service in those regions. Such battalions are to be found with the 30th, 55th, 58th, 97th, 111th, 112th, 140th, 157th, and 159th regiments. That belonging to the 97th regiment is especially similar to the Alpine Chasseurs raised for service in the Alps, for the men not only wear similar clothing, but the waggons are also drawn by mules. In short, all the infantry Alpine troops are clothed like the Alpine Chasseur battalions, even to their red breeches, the peculiar caps or *barrette* the wading stockings, Alpine-stock, the woollen putties, skis, and protections against the snow.

VI.

At present the horse artillery brigade division usually attached to the cavalry division in Germany (divisions of 3 brigades are formed every year for manœuvres) consists of 2 batteries of 6 guns, or 12 guns per division. In the February number of that excellent journal, the *Jahrbüchr für die deutsche Armee and Marine*, General Rohne, studying the new organisation to be given to artillery, proposes to transform this brigade division of 2 batteries of 6 guns into one of 3 batteries of 4 guns each. He is of opinion that thus considerable progress would be made, without the addition of a single man, gun, or waggon, to the artillery of the cavalry division, for the ammunition waggons now belonging to the 2 batteries of 6 guns would be equally distributed amongst the 3 batteries of 4 guns, and the latter would be better officered and more easily handled, which is a most important factor in cavalry actions.

This organisation of the brigade division would also permit of the attachment of a battery to a cavalry brigade that was temporarily detached, without cutting the divisional artillery in two, as is the case at present. The General considers it unnecessary to increase the present number of ammunition waggons with the horse artillery brigade divisions, because during its strategic *rôle* cavalry requires the expenditure of relatively little ammunition. Should it intervene in a battle, it would be in the proximity of Army Corps, and its batteries could then be supplied from the ammunition columns of the nearest Army Corps without any difficulty.

VII.

The *Neue Militärische Blätter* announces that the Naval Autumn Manœuvres will commence this year on the 15th August. They will consist of combined manœuvres with the Regular Army,

very probably in combination with the Imperial Manœuvres. These combined manœuvres will take place in the neighbourhood of the Bay of Neustadt. Should this intelligence be confirmed, it will be a further proof, if one were needed, of the importance attached in Germany to combined naval and military operations, and affords an example of what we would do well to emulate in Great Britain.

VIII.

In addition to the usual district autumn manœuvres, and a grand ride of the General Staff and Cavalry, the following special manœuvres have been ordered in Italy, viz. Manœuvres in the Alps in the district of the Vth (Verona) Army Corps, from the 1st to the 8th September, in which the following troops will take part: 3 mixed infantry brigades, the 5th, 6th, and 7th Alpine Regiments, each strengthened by 2 companies of Mobile Militia, 2 Alpine Mobile Militia battalions, and the Venetian Mountain Artillery Brigade. A landing manœuvre will be carried out in the district of the Xth (Naples) Army Corps, from the 1st to the 10th September, in which the following troops will take part, viz. the troops of the Xth Army Corps, strengthened by reservists of 1878, and part of the Territorial Militia (those being specially called out who have been trained in the Coast Defence Companies). A reconnaissance manœuvre will be carried out between Stradella and Cuneo, from the 26th August to the 4th September, in which the following troops will take part, viz. the Milan and the Victor Emanuel II. Lancer Regiments, and the Alessandria and Rome Cavalry Regiments, altogether 24 squadrons.

IX.

The Moltke of Japan, a man "whose name is rarely heard, whose face is never seen, and whose web is spinning on all sides of the Russian forces, as was that of the illustrious Danish strategist when he locked Napoleon in Sedan." Such, says the *Army and Navy Journal*, is General Fuskushima, as described by Mr. Poultney Bigelow, in an interesting article in a recent number of *Harper's Weekly*. Mr. Bigelow met General Fuskushima when the latter was military attaché at the German Court, a few years before the Chino-Japanese War, and he tells several anecdotes illustrating the shrewdness of the Japanese General, who, while purposely passing himself off as of feeble mental capacity, was keenly observant of Western military methods and principles, which he was supposed to be incapable of understanding. Although, says Mr. Bigelow, he spoke seven languages, he never allowed any one to suspect that he knew anything but a few scraps of German.

Russia also despised his intellect, for he was permitted to ride unmolested across Siberia, from Moscow to the Manchurian coast, counting telegraph poles, and taking notes of the position of bridges, wells, farms, and everything that would prove interesting to Japanese visitors who might come after him.

X.

A writer in the *New York Evening Mail* mentions the fact that the Japanese are excellent hand-to-hand fighters, and this has been amply confirmed by the account of the desperate gallantry of the Japanese troops at the battle of the Yalu. The courage that promotes this species of warfare they inherit from the Samurai, who fought with their formidable two-handed swords in the days of junks and of bows and arrows. The Japanese soldiers of to-day dispense with the heavy old weapons, but their officers and troopers carry the sabre. The blade of these sabres is of Japanese workmanship, handed down from former times, and excels even that of Damascus. Skill in bayonet fighting is another thing that the Japanese infantry have attained in a remarkable degree. The strongest point of the Japanese Army, however, lies in the readiness and eagerness of the infantry to charge. In no battle other than that fought by Japanese, has been shown so much recklessness and daring spirit in the *tokkau* (rush or rally), and no commander other than the Japanese resorts to these tactics so frequently.

XI.

The Swiss recruiting operations last year dealt with 42,010 men, of whom rather more than 48 per cent. were found fit for service. The number of recruits called out amounted to 15,969 men, of whom 15,664 were actually exercised. Of these 11,340 were sent to the infantry, 580 to the cavalry, and 1710 to the artillery and transport. The effective strength of the Army on the 1st January, 1904, amounted to 147,861 men in the Regular Army, 63,094 in the 1st Levy of the Landwehr, 25,476 in the 2nd Levy of the Landwehr. Total 236,431 men.

It should be observed that 40,797 men of the 1st Levy of the Landwehr belong to the field troops, whose total strength amounts, consequently, to 188,658 men. The men obliged to serve in the combatant branch of the Landsturm amount to 45,864, and in the non-combatant branch to 248,524 men.

XII.

The Swiss Federal Chambers have recently adopted the new reorganisation scheme recommended by the Federal Council in consequence of the adoption of new Q.F. *matériel;* 72 batteries of 4 guns each will be formed in place of the present 56 batteries of 6 guns each, or 18 batteries more, but 48 guns less; 2 to 3 batteries will form a brigade division; 2 to 3 brigade divisions will form a field artillery regiment. According to arrangements, brigade divisions of 3 batteries will be the rule; as regards the composition of the regiment, it will be adapted to the organisation of the large units; the question with regard to the abolition of corps artillery remains an open one.

Effectives of batteries, brigade divisions, and regiments will be fixed provisionally by decrees of the Federal Council. The allowance of ammunition is fixed at 800 rounds per gun, instead of 500 as at present; the battery will thus be supplied with 3200,

instead of with 3000 rounds. The total number of waggons remains as formerly; but the new battery consists of 4 guns, 10 ammunition waggons, 1 six-horse waggon with forge and kitchen, 1 six-horse van, and 2 two-horse provision waggons. Each battery will, in addition, have 8 ammunition waggons parked.

XIII.

The Bishop of St. Albans presided over the annual meeting of The Missions to Seamen held in the Church House, Westminster, on Tuesday, May 10th. This Society makes spiritual provision for sailors and fishermen, lightshipmen and bargemen of many nationalities and creeds, in fifty-six harbours at home and twenty abroad. The total income for the year 1903 amounted to £49,701, or more than six times what it was thirty years ago. Still in many ports abroad the shipping are destitute of religious ministrations. The additional contributions given for that purpose have not yet sufficed to make up the £200 a year required for each chaplaincy, and so to enable the Society to respond to the invitations of the Bishops of Melbourne, Rangoon, and Falkland Islands to send out chaplains to serve the British shipping in their harbours. Appeals are made for increased funds to employ additional chaplains and readers to serve our shipping when in ports abroad, and to strengthen the work in harbours at home. Contributions may be sent to the Lay Secretary, Commander W. Dawson, R.N., The Missions to Seamen, 11, Buckingham Street, Strand, London, W.C.

REVIEWS.

'PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF THE FIRST DUKE OF WELLINGTON.'

WITH SKETCHES OF SOME OF HIS GUESTS AND CONTEMPORARIES.

By the late GEORGE ROBERT GLEIG, M.A., Chaplain-General to her Majesty's Forces, &c. Author of 'The Subaltern.' Edited by his daughter, MARY E. GLEIG. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. MCMIV. Price 15*s*. net.

MISS GLEIG claims for her father that, although verging upon his ninetieth year, his mind was as clear and his pen as vigorous when he wrote his reminiscences as at any period of his life; and it is possible that in making this statement she may have been not entirely impartial. But if that be so, then the conclusion to which the reader must be led is that the late chaplain-general has been admirably served by an extremely capable editor, whose

labours have not only been inspired by natural affection, but also aided by rare ability for the task.

It will be a surprise to many to find that the soldier-chaplain, whose name is so familiar to us, adds but little in this volume to our knowledge of the Duke of Wellington from the military point of view. In Spain Mr. Gleig saw the Duke only twice, and has not much of any importance to relate in connection with these meetings. It is of the Duke as a man that we are invited to think; and although Mr. Gleig denies any intention to speak of him as a soldier or as a statesman, politics run through the whole book, and altogether monopolise the greater part of it. The admiration and respect entertained by Mr. Gleig for the great man, with whom for many years he lived upon terms of close friendship, were boundless; the Duke's life was the life of a statesman, and, consequently, matters of State were too intimately connected with his every thought and action to admit of their being placed otherwise than in the foreground of so detailed a sketch. It would be untrue to say that Mr. Gleig agreed always with the Duke's opinions, but it is very certain that he served him, and aided him too, with a loyalty and devotion that was beyond all praise. Mr. Gleig had a real genius for political diplomacy, and by his tact as well as sound common sense, he frequently succeeded in smoothing over the difficulties that obstructed the relations of the Duke with various members of his party. He had a full mastery of the issues involved in all their bearings, from the greatest to the most trivial items, and obstinate as the Duke undeniably was, Mr. Gleig was sometimes successful in convincing him of the necessity to make reasonable compromises.

Unlike some of his contemporaries, and also of his successors in the arena of Party Government, the Duke was immovable upon any matter in which he conceived that his own honour or that of his sovereign was involved, and in such cases it would have been useless for Mr. Gleig or any one else to approach him, even if it had been desired to do so. Yet, obstinate as he might be, and in some cases prejudiced, he was open to conviction. For example: as we all know, the Duke regarded the "Brown Bess" as the queen of victory; yet, when actually shown the performances of the "Minié" by Sir George Brown, he was converted—to his own regret. He hated the change, but recognised the necessity. Nor were his objections without reason; his view was, as it is now the opinion of Lord Roberts, that the fire-fight at short ranges must usually furnish the real decision. The Brown Bess could be fired nearly three times as quickly as the Minié, and this, he thought, counter-balanced the greater range of the latter. But when he saw with his own eyes how accuracy was combined with long range in the case of the rifle, he yielded.

From the political point of view, the most interesting chapters are those relating to the days of the great riots and of the Reform Bill; but of little less interest are the word portraits and remarks made by Mr. Gleig of the statesmen and others who were the Duke's guests. Of the Arbuthnots, too, a good deal is said, and Mr. Gleig totally denies the truth of the insinuations that have so frequently

been made. One excellent reason given against the more usual opinion is that, with his extremely fine sense of honour, the Duke himself could not have tolerated Mr. Arbuthnot if the latter had been content to act the complacent part assigned to him by rumour.

The Duke's opinions of various politicians are deeply interesting; but for the soldier-reader his remarks upon Marlborough, Moore, Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and others, will naturally have especial attraction; though even more than these references to individuals, will his detailed criticism of Napoleon's Russian campaign, which is given as an appendix. There are very many officers who have never previously had an opportunity of reading this careful examination of all the proceedings of the Emperor, of his opponents and of his subordinates, that contributed towards so mighty a disaster.

It is very interesting to note that, according to Mr. Gleig, the Duke, in his political contests, "fought for the Crown as the head, not of the United Kingdom only, but of the great British Empire." This is the sentiment that should prevail more generally to-day; for it is by the influence of loyalty to the common sovereign that the links of our Empire are maintained, and can alone be strengthened. "Fiscal Policy," and the like, will influence those whom it may suit to adopt them; but it is only for the sake of their loyalty to the Throne that people at home and in the Colonies will nerve themselves to do their duty to the Empire.

Mr. Gleig's task has been admirably performed. The voluminous correspondence with the Duke, and the accounts of conversations with him, upon all sorts of subjects, give the character of the man in a clear light. The book is altogether excellent from every point of view, and is one that will often be taken up again, however carefully it may have at first been read.

'LORD CARDWELL AT THE WAR OFFICE.'

A History of his Administration, 1868–1874.

By General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. With a Portrait. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W. 1904. Price 9s. net.

The Crimean war demonstrated the rottenness of the British military system, and the steps taken to remedy the mischief having been hastily conceived by ignorant people out of their own conceit, consequently rendered the last state worse than the first. It was reserved for Lord Cardwell to execute a root and branch reform, which presents no really serious defects at the present day except the fact that it has never been completely applied. "Squeezed lemons," provisional battalions, and such-like inefficient absurdities never entered into the philosophy of Lord Cardwell, nor into that of Sir Garnet Wolseley by whom all the best of Mr.

Cardwell's reforms were inspired, but to whom Sir Robert Biddulph does not assign the credit for them that is his due.

The qualifications required for the civilian head of the Army are brains, courage, common sense, and "strength." Mr. Cardwell had all these qualities in a very high degree, and it is because of this that he stands a head and shoulders above all others who have occupied the same position; not really so much because of his undeniably greater achievements as upon account of his entire fitness for the office. What Mr. Cardwell thoroughly understood, and what was the secret of his success, was the art of using other people's brains and yet reserving to himself the decision upon the matter in reference to which advice was asked or tendered. More than this, however, Mr. Cardwell was himself a man of ideas, and in all cases where the statesman's views are as good if not better than the mere soldier's, he was ever equal to the occasion; he was in favour of compulsory service for the militia, and as long ago as 1868 he wrote a memorandum in which he advocated what we now regard as quite a new idea; namely, putting the Navy and the Army under a single "Minister of Defence." The objection to this proposal, of course, is that the Prime Minister being, under the Crown, the final authority, it is better that his influence should be directly brought to bear, and this has now been provided for under the Esher scheme, by which the Defence Committee, with the Prime Minister as chairman, is placed in strategical control of both the Services.

The greatest achievements of Mr. Cardwell were the creation of the Army Reserve by the introduction of short service, and the abolition of purchase; but a very noteworthy feature of his administration was his success in reconciling efficiency with economy. Efficiency nothing would induce him to abandon, and, when pressed by Mr. Gladstone, he made it clear at once that his resignation was the alternative to compliance with the demands he considered necessary. By similar firmness he also overcame the Treasury, of whose methods in dealing with the Army he had a poor opinion. He found that efficiency and economy were at war, and that "the whole military administration of Great Britain had been organised on a system of want of trust," just, in fact, the situation exposed by the Esher Committee—and which Lord Halliburton, Sir Ralph Knox, and others would perpetuate.

Sir Robert Biddulph's interesting volume contains a wealth of facts and figures connected with the history of Army administration during the twenty years from 1854 to 1874; and in a great measure is also brought up to date by frequent references to the conditions of to-day. With the exception of one regrettable omission, already referred to, the book appears to be one of which few will be found to say anything but what is good. The Army was fortunate in having Lord Cardwell as Secretary of State, and Lord Cardwell has now been fortunate in having Sir Robert Biddulph for his biographer. No member of Parliament who has not carefully studied this book should presume to open his mouth upon Army questions.

'GUNPOWDER AND AMMUNITION.'

By Lieut.-Colonel W. L. HIME. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1904. Price 9s.

THE Army gladly welcomes this book. It will be interesting to chemists and scientific men, it will be exhilarating to soldiers, and it is to be trusted that it will also be disconcerting to the foreign pedants who delight in ridiculing British officers, and with Teutonic elegance deride the efforts, past and present, of our artillery. But chiefly will many rejoice to find Colonel Hime again at work, and placing the results of his great knowledge and research at the disposal of his brother officers. The man who thirty years ago proved that our reliance on voluntary service must fail, and advocated conscription in that brilliant essay which gained the gold medal of the Royal United Institution, would, it is safe to say, in any other army have found a place high in honour and usefulness. It seemed otherwise to the potentates who controlled the destinies of our officers in the seventies; it will appear inexplicable to those who read these pages in these latter days when intellect and industry are supposed to have come by their own at last. Here is a man who, as these pages attest, possesses a knowledge of history and general literature probably not only unsurpassed, but unrivalled amongst the students of military science of our race. He picks up his pen once more to set an English searcher after scientific truth firmly on the pedestal whence an effort has been made to oust him, and to vindicate the claim of an English gunner against the detractors who have ventured to belittle him in Germany. In brief, he launches forth to prove that Roger Bacon was the discoverer of gunpowder, and that Shrapnel was the one and only begetter of that projectile which has added a new word to language, and made his name famous throughout the world. Step by step, with patience illimitable, with knowledge profound, in words so moderate and convincing as to become invested with a judicial flavour, is the argument as to the achievement of Roger Bacon built up. The performances of the Greeks, the Arabs, the Chinese, and the Hindus in the art of manufacturing incendiary, and so-called explosive compositions are examined. A *precis* of a whole library of learning is exhibited in the investigation, such as will stagger those who would have us believe that our officers are all stupid, and that education was almost in vain to be sought for amongst them in the past. From Sanscrit to French, almost every language with any pretence to a literature, is here cited at first hand. From Froissart to Moossom, every writer on military subjects is subpœnaed, every action bearing on the subject from the siege of Syracuse to that of Charleston is discussed. The writer shows himself as familiar with Syriac as with German, and establishes the fact that the qualities of saltpetre were unknown until the second quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Then comes his great *coup*. Colonel Hime has succeeded in elucidating a steganogram of Bacon's, which when he lifts the veil shows us plainly how that man of genius placed the secret of

gunpowder on record for the benefit of the illuminati. Wrapped under swathings of apparent nonsense the recipe has lain for centuries; but it is open to us all to read now, and it is doubtful whether any man will rise from the perusal of Chapter VIII. without a sensation of absolute conviction. On this point no more need be said. To follow the shrewd reasoning which bit by bit piles up the argument, and finally clinches it with so brilliant a flash, is a real pleasure of which it is to be hoped that many will avail themselves, and from which it would be a sin to detract by any piecemeal revelations here. Then Colonel Hime turns upon those Germans who have presumed to question Shrapnel's claim to the invention of the shell that has revolutionised modern warfare. They betray an elementary ignorance in their effort to establish a rival in his field. Zimmermann wanted to put a bursting charge *at a maximum* in his suggested shell. In these enlightened days no doubt every half-lieutenant is aware that the essence of Shrapnel's system was to make the bursting charge a *minimum*. Zimmermann intended, it is clear, not only that his bursting charge should open the case, but that it should accelerate the velocity of the bullets. That, the same half-lieutenant will be aware, is not the reason why Shrapnel shells contain bursting charges, and he will recognise at once that Zimmermann was groping about blindly for that projectile which the British gunner, Shrapnel, found in 1784. Gladly do we concede all honour to Zimmermann as an artillerist in advance of his age, but it is not to be wondered at that an effort to give him the credit for the great invention that belongs to our countryman should be resented by so representative a gunner as Colonel Hime. It may be added that much unprofitable controversy would have been prevented had foreign critics taken pains to make themselves acquainted with the nature of Shrapnel's spherical case before discussing the history of the projectile he has given his name to.

Per contra there is cause for satisfaction and congratulation that their action has drawn from his tent so very redoubtable a champion as the author whose invaluable pages form the subject of these remarks.

'THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS SINCE 1866.'

By T. MILLER MAGUIRE, LL.D., Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall, S.W. 1904. Price 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

THE authorities, with characteristic light-heartedness, have ruled that the History and Development of the Tactics of the Three Arms since 1866 shall be one of the subjects for future examinations, but without troubling themselves about the absence of a text-book. Dr. Maguire has supplied what was wanting; and it is needless to say that the task could not have been placed in better hands. The lack of official sanction is of no great importance,

except, perhaps, in reference to the sale of the book, and candidates who take the trouble to study intelligently what Dr. Maguire has provided for them need be under no apprehension as to being imperfectly prepared for any questions that can be set before them.

Changes of weapons involve modifications in the application of tactical principles; it has been said that such modifications are required every ten years. But the fundamental principles of tactics have never and can never be altered—except in the imaginations of the foolish. War is too old a science to admit of any fresh discoveries in the methods of making it successfully. The only differences between the sling, with which David slew Goliath, and a magazine rifle, are that the latter has a longer range, is more weighty and cumbersome to carry, and needs ammunition that cannot be picked out of a gravel pit or from the bed of a brook. David denied to his foe the opportunity of using his sword and spear, and secured for himself all the advantages of the missile weapon with which he was armed. To obtain similar advantages against an equally well-armed adversary the secret lies in the cunning "use of ground." It has ever been so; and what applies to single combat applies also to the shock of armies. But the British Army is always deaf and blind; the teachings of history are invariably lost upon it, and hence the rush to extremes that has resulted from the so-called "lessons of the Boer war." With all these Dr. Maguire deals, giving a wealth of quotations from the Boer war itself as well as from others.

Commencing with a general introduction of the whole subject of war and the influences brought to bear upon it, Dr. Maguire gives details of armaments, reviews the tactical effects of the various weapons, and presents a summary of the tactical changes that have resulted from great campaigns. Chapter IV. contains "General Remarks upon the Tactics of To-day," and then follow, in Chapter V., "Some Examples of Modern Battles," commencing with Königgrätz and ending with Elandslaagte. In the appendix, the author says that after reading the German account of the Boer War, he sees no reason to modify any of the views that he has expressed, and also quotes from the very able standing orders issued by General Kelly Kenny to the Sixth Infantry Division. Such are the contents of the volume.

Just one thing Dr. Maguire has omitted that would have been of great value to the young officers; he has not given, in brief, the particular lesson of a general character that is taught by each of the several battles that he quotes as examples. For instance, in the case of Königgrätz, it might have been pointed out that it is not well to await the attack of hostile forces converging upon the battlefield, instead of striking hard at one of them; and, secondly, that it is an error to dispose troops in such depth that the army can be beaten though a large proportion of it has been unable to come into action. Then, again, there is the general lesson from the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-German wars that the man and his leader, not the weapons, decide the fate of battles. The superiority of the needle-gun no doubt aided the Prussians against the Austrians, but the superiority of the Chassepot failed to give

victory to the French. The army that is the better trained and handled will win, in spite of any inferiority of weapons, unless the numerical odds against it are altogether over-powering. The savages, whom we are accustomed to defeat in little wars, might more often turn the tables against us were it not that they usually play our game for us, by charging over a fair field of fire, in place of waiting patiently for their opportunity to fall upon us in the bush or on broken ground. There are lessons in everything done and left undone in war, just as there are lessons for the reader, be he general or subaltern, in every page of Dr. Maguire's admirable little book.

'THE FIGHT FOR CANADA.'

A NAVAL AND MILITARY SKETCH FROM THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT IMPERIAL WAR.

By WILLIAM WOOD, Major, 8th Royal Rifles, Canadian Militia, Secretary Quebec Branch of the Navy League, President Literary and Historical Society of Quebec. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 2, Whitehall Gardens. 1904. Price 21*s*. net.

THE names of Wolfe and Montcalm are familiar to every schoolboy, and also the result of the historic fight on the Plains of Abraham, during which the equally gallant and skilful commanders of the French and English Armies both received their mortal wounds. But only a comparatively small number of people know more about the action than that Wolfe's force gained the heights, by surprise, during the night, and defeated the French in the morning. Not only is there a general ignorance of details; of the difficulties opposed to Montcalm by the arrogance, malignity, dishonesty, and foolishness of Vaudreuil the governor-general; or of the niggardly procrastination of the British Government in providing the needful funds and supplies for Wolfe; but in addition to this, the part played by the Navy—in short, the influence of sea-power upon the campaign—is practically ignored. In actual fact, it was the supremacy of the Navy on the ocean, and the assistance rendered in the St. Lawrence itself, that enabled Wolfe to bring his operations to a successful issue, and eventually saved Quebec from recapture by the French, whose attempt under Lévis had almost proved victorious, when the return of the British fleet compelled him to abandon the enterprise.

The story of the entire campaign, so ably narrated by Major Wood, is intensely interesting, not only to naval and military, but also to civilian readers. Thanks to the facilities placed at his disposal by Mr. Doughty, and to his own local knowledge and researches, Major Wood has been placed in a position to deal exhaustively with the most minute details, from the commencement of the campaign to the surrender of Montreal and the cession of the Dominion.

The baneful influence of Vaudreiul, and of the even more infamous Bigot and Cadet, undoubtedly contributed far more than the skill and gallantry of Wolfe to the loss of Canada by France. Montcalm was at least equal to Wolfe as a general, and the forces nominally at the disposal of the former were considerably superior in numbers though inferior in quality to those of the latter; but all Montcalm's generalship was counterbalanced by the ignorant interference of the rascally Vaudreiul, who even after Wolfe had effected his landing, still denied to Montcalm the power to dispose the available troops for battle, and even neglected to supply the early information that had been brought to himself. That Wolfe's landing was unopposed, was, moreover, due to the fact that Vaudreiul had taken upon himself to remove the troops that had been placed by Montcalm to meet any possible attempt in the locality where it took place. As Major Wood says in his preface, "The famous definition of dirt, as 'matter in the wrong place,' was never more admirably exemplified than by those intermeddling politicians who, like their successors in the present day, are always out of place in naval and military affairs." Major Wood, however, was not in this sentence referring especially to Vaudreiul, but to the equally corrupt politicians who were, at the time, a curse to the mother countries of England and France. Party politics are, in the United Kingdom at this very day, just as they were a hundred and fifty years ago, as antagonistic to patriotism as oil to water. The Bastard Fauconbridge prophesied immunity from danger for England, even in face of the "four corners of the world in arms," provided "England to itself do rest but true." That England has been mercifully preserved, in spite of the fact that the prescribed condition of her safety has never been complied with for one single day, is the only real "wonder of the world." Vaudreiul and his base confederates, Bigot and Cadet, indeed ruined Canada, in order to enrich themselves, but these were mere rogues—common thieves—and as such deserving of the gallows, no whit more than the hypocritical politicians who, from their high places in England, have fought against her with lying lips—for what? *Office; at any cost to their country!*

'The Fight for Canada' is a most facinating book that must itself be read in order to be fully appreciated as it deserves. To detail its virtues, be it as history or as a critical narrative of combined naval and military operations, would need many pages of this Magazine; but its faults can be told in a very few words: (1) A general map would have been a convenience, and the map of Quebec itself is clumsy—it would have been better in parts facing the text. (2) The famous Sir Thomas Byam Martin, the heroic captain of the *Implacable*, is erroneously described as "Sir Theodore." Thus we have one alleged imperfection and one obvious inaccuracy to represent all that can be complained of in 363 pages of history, bibliography, and index. This should furnish sufficient proof of rather exceptional merit.

'NOTES ON STRATEGY AND MILITARY HISTORY.'

FOR PROMOTION EXAMINATIONS, MILITIA ENTRANCE, VOLUNTEER CLASSES, ETC., ETC.

Compiled by Captain H. T. RUSSELL, Royal Artillery. Author of 'The Employment of Artillery in the Field' and 'Practical Gunnery.' London: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 2, Amen Corner, E.C. Price 4s. net. post free.

THE author of this admirable little work has been far too modest in his dedication of it to the use of candidates for promotion, Militia entrance, and Volunteer classes; Captain Russell's "notes" fully deserve the most careful study by every officer of whatever rank. The subject is carried from its root, National policy, to all its branches; and the teachings of military history are ably applied in order to fortify the opinions given. Strategy, as Captain Russell so truly says, is not only the business of generals, but also of statesmen; "for the impulse to preparation for war must, during peace, be given by the statesman." Great Britain has never had a strategical policy, because the politicians who, with us, pass for statesmen have always regarded even international politics solely as means whereby to retain or obtain office. An unpatriotic people is ruled by such as it deserves to have—unpatriotic ministers. No exponent of a straightforward "right or wrong my country" policy can possibly secure the support of a united British nation. Thus, when we have, as the result of "masterly inactivity," drifted into war, the soldier has always been expected to make good the initial disadvantages that have resulted from the absence of strategical preparation. As Captain Russell very aptly remarks, "Tactics is the handmaid of strategy, carrying out the orders of the latter. This being so, strategy must not demand more than tactics can perform." But this is just what always occurs under the policy of "muddle through."

In this book, intended for British officers, the author has naturally treated his subject, not only comprehensively, but also in reference to "small wars." For example, whilst pointing out the general advantages of invasion by interior lines in the case of a great war, it is pointed out that, in the case of a small war, a savage enemy is likely to be more impressed by the advance of several widely separated columns, and would seldom be sufficiently astute to concentrate against one of them, whilst ignoring the rest. The value of the "initiative," and the influence of sea-power receive the attention they deserve, and also the disasters that have so often resulted from the strategical mistakes of meddling politicians—for example, Sedan. In reference to "Sea-Power," Captain Russell takes care to remind us that even after having swept the navy of a Continental opponent completely from the seas, Great Britain, without an army, cannot count upon extorting favourable terms of

peace. The Sultan of Turkey put all this in a nutshell when he remarked, "Iron-clads cannot climb hills." A condition of "stale mate" would suit Great Britain even less than any of her possible adversaries; and she must, therefore, if she is wise, create an Army capable of carrying on the war from the point at which the Navy has been compelled to arrest its victorious career on the sea.

Space does not permit any attempt to follow the author throughout his very instructive, as well as interesting chapters; and it must now suffice to conclude with the assertion that so much excellent matter has very seldom been collected within such small compass. A number of blank pages, for notes, will be found at the end of the volume. A word of praise must be added for the definitions. For example, "The objective" is summarised as "a bull's-eye marked upon the theatre of war." Too many generals as well as so-called "statesmen" have constantly failed to realise this truth; and not only missed the bull's-eye, but wasted their shots on the wrong target.

NAVAL DEVELOPMENT.

'The Naval Development of the Century.' By SIR N. BARNABY, K.C.B. The Nineteenth Century Series. Chambers. 1904. Price 5*s*. net.

THE chief fault to be found with this book is that it does not fulfil the promise of its title. The preface, indeed, gives warning that the subject is treated of from a shipbuilder's point of view, but even this notice is not strictly accurate. There are included, for instance, two chapters dealing with the legal and moral aspects of naval war, chapters which are interesting indeed when regarded from a political standpoint, but which are not immediately concerned with the art and progress of shipbuilding. The book, however, does bear out the preface in leaving questions of *personnel* severely alone; and, seeing that changes in the entry and training of both men and officers have been of as revolutionary a character as the developments of *matériel*, it is to be regretted that the author has confined himself to merely one half of the subject. The book is written for the general reader, and would, therefore, be all the better if it treated the subject comprehensively. As it is it deals sketchily with the early part of the century, and far more completely with the introduction of steam and armour-plated ships. With this period, of course, the author was intimately connected, especially the years 1870 to 1885, and his detailed examination of progress in those years has a special value of its own. The last fifteen years of the century, again, are not fully treated, and in respect of them the author's accuracy is at times at fault on minor points. The manuscript was completed two years ago, and the narrative runs only to the end of the nineteenth century.

U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE.

Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute. March, 1904. No. 109. Vol. xxx. No. 1.

INCLUDED in the current issue is the Essay which has won the Institute's gold medal for the year. The author is Lieutenant S. P. Fullinwider, who deals with the *matériel* and *personnel* of the Navy. Beginning with a consideration of what would be a desirable organisation for the existing fleet, he passes on to a demand for certain additions to the active strength of the Navy. It is to be noticed that in this respect the author is not revolutionary. The types for which he asks are battleships, big armoured cruisers, scouts similar to those now building in England, and destroyers. Also he shows a due appreciation of the value of fleet auxiliaries. The latter part of this essay deals with the entry and training of men, and from it one is led to the conclusion that the Americans think that by our recent reforms we have stolen a long march on them. The recent British reforms are not directly mentioned, but the author is profoundly dissatisfied with the existing state of things, and suggests changes which point to an appreciation of what has been done in this country. The essay which receives honourable mention is by Medical Inspector H. E. Ames, and deals entirely with the *personnel*, advocating a higher physical, moral, and intellectual standard for the Navy. The remaining papers which will attract most attention are, one on cable cutting by Captain C. F. Goodrich, the other entitled 'The Movable Base,' by Civil Engineer A. C. Cunningham. Captain Goodrich deals entirely with the mechanical side of the question, and the experience he had of this work in the late war gives his notes an extra value. The 'movable base' is to consist of a floating dock, in which the author has great faith, and of numerous fleet auxiliaries, gathered together at such a point as strategy may indicate. The Professional Notes are as welcome as usual.

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By Captain C. B. SIMONDS, Royal Garrison Artillery. London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 23, Cockspur Street, S.W. 1904. Price 1s.

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By Major S. T. BANNING, 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, P.S.C., etc. Second Edition, revised. London: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 2, Amen Corner, Paternoster Row. Price 4*s.* 6*d.* net. Post free to any part of the world.

THE decidedly favourable opinion expressed of the first edition of this book in the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE has on a front page of the present edition been ascribed to an imaginary publication named the 'United States Magazine.' Lest, therefore, in now repeating a few words of what he had already said, the writer might be suspected of stealing the ideas of other people he thinks it well to call attention to the above error upon the part of the printers. In the previous review, given in the U.S.M., it was stated that "this is not a cram book, but honestly tries to teach the student what to learn and how to learn it." The writer holds the same opinion still, and most willingly repeats it.

'THE JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION.'

(UNITED STATES) MARCH—APRIL, 1904.

THE current number is of exceptional interest to ourselves in consequence of its including copious extracts from the 'Journal of Major André,' together with *facsimile* sketches and letters. The original journal is in the possession of the "Bibliophile Society," to whose courtesy the Institution is indebted for the "exclusive privilege" of representing and reproducing these remarkable relics.

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THIS little book would have been improved by more careful proofreading; but otherwise it deserves nothing but praise as a very useful

attempt to supply a long-standing want. The average militia captain requires something to guide him, more especially because the time at his disposal is too short to allow of the course of instruction including anything beyond quite elementary essentials. Indeed it is very doubtful whether, even including some efforts made to combine training with drill at the depôt, it will be found possible to give the militiaman the benefit of more than a moiety of what Captain Sprague himself has written. At all events, if every militia company could be taken at a standard represented by having merely half-digested the educational nutriment that this little book can supply, the military value of the militia would have been raised not less than fifty per cent.

The Unlucky Golfer and *Fanny Haire her Dream* are two little books of verses by Maurice C. Hime, M.A., LL.D., and published by Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Co. Price 6*d.* each. The first is a complete guide to golfing, teaching how to play the game by ridiculing the common errors; and the second describes how the master and husband of an unpleasant female were both of them greatly benefited by the effects of an awful dream, from which the said female awoke to a consciousness of her own imperfections. Dr. Hime writes capital good sense, very amusingly, and in excellent verses.

The Log Series published by the Westminster Press (Gerrards, Ltd.), 411A, Harrow Road, W., has just had three additions made to the number of "Logs." The commissions of H.M. ships *Archer*, *Glory*, and *Amphion*, which furnish the subjects for the ninth, tenth, and eleventh volumes, are as interesting as their predecessors. The 'Log Series' should be found in every public library. The price is 4*s.*

The Principles of Home Defence are discussed by "Promptus" in a somewhat disappointing fashion; since all that he actually achieves is a mobilisation scheme, for that wretched imposture "Home Defence," which, although fairly sound in itself, is unlikely to be substituted for the scheme already lying in the War Office pigeon holes. "Promptus" realises that a home army is required in order to sustain public confidence when the strategical situation compels the absence of the Navy from our shores; but he ignores the fact that such an army is of little use unless it can be employed for service abroad after naval supremacy has been obtained. We need to be placed in a position to wring favourable terms of peace from any adversary whom we may have defeated at sea; and this, without a numerous army, we cannot do. But having the army we might secure peace without being obliged to use it. This book is published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*

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A Monthly Review of all National Questions.

JULY, 1904.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 908.—JULY, 1904.

THE PRECEDENT OF LOUISIANA.

BY ARNOLD WHITE.

THE Anglo-French agreements, signed by Lord Lansdowne on the 8th April, 1904, are documents with which, in their spirit, any Foreign Minister may be proud to associate his name. What their effect will be is another matter. Almost by common consent the declarations relating to Newfoundland, West Africa, Egypt, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides are regarded as a final settlement of all our long-standing differences with France. On the barren field of prophecy all men are equal, and hence the lamp of history is the only light that can effectively illuminate the path into which Lord Lansdowne has led us.

Differing from the majority of my fellow-countrymen as to the value of the "concessions" we have obtained from France, there is one omission from the agreements that is of so vital a character—*i.e.* the retention by France of Miquelon and St. Pierre—that I venture to recall in some detail the facts relating to the sale of Louisiana, a century ago, by Spain to France, and by France to the United States of America, in order to show that the agreement just signed with France settles nothing, leaves the door open for strife the next time France and England are at variance, and whenever the Quai D'Orsay desires once again *embêter les Anglais.* The retention by France of St. Pierre and Miquelon gives her the power at any time of embroiling England, not only with Canada, but with the American Republic, by selling to the latter Power the islands, which ought never to have known any flag but that of England. The history of the transactions about to be related throws a clear light on the omission of our Foreign Office to make our agreement with France a reality and a settlement, and not the

superficial expression of the pleasant frame of mind that for the nonce possesses the two nations, rather as the result of consummate diplomacy by the King of England, than as the consequence of any fundamental change in our international relations with our neighbours across the Channel.

The Treaty of St. Ildephonso, concluded on the 1st October, 1800, between the French Republic and Spain, had given back Louisiana to France.

The territorial extent of Louisiana was vast and ill-defined. It was commonly held to extend to the sources of the Mississippi, and to comprise all the territories north of Mexico, and west of the great river.

Louisiana, after having been granted at first to Antoni Crozax, and then to John Law, reverted to the French Crown in 1732. But, on the 3rd November, 1762, the Colony was transferred to Spain by a secret treaty. It is only on the 18th August, 1769, however, that the Spaniards took possession of it. The Colonies wished to remain French, resisted, and appealed to Versailles. The Spanish General O'Reilly landed at New Orleans with 3000 men, and a cruel repression ensued; six French officers were shot. The treaty of 1783, by which England placed the United States in possession of the eastern bank of the Mississippi, did not, of course, affect the status of Louisiana. And it is only in 1800 that Bonaparte, through his brother Lucien, prevailed upon the all-powerful Godoy, Prince of the Peace, to cede back the Colony to France. It may be said, however, that already in 1795 Carnot had thought of retaking Louisiana, with the view to the establishment of a Republic there.

As France was still at war with England, Bonaparte carefully avoided making public the cession granted by the Treaty of St. Ildephonso. He had another reason for keeping silent on the subject. The relations of France with the United States were still strained. The misunderstanding between the two Republics dated from the period of the Terror, when Gouverneur Morris, the American Minister in Paris, had shown himself openly hostile to the new French institutions. He had been recalled upon the request of the French Government, and Washington had commissioned in his place, on the 28th May, 1794, James Monroe, senator of Virginia. Monroe was a fierce opponent of the Federalist Administration, of which Washington was the head; but his appointment, it was hoped, would be welcomed by the French and Republican party in America.

Monroe reached Paris a few days after the fall of Robespierre. He was soon received by the Convention, and he expressed his

sympathy with the French Republic in such an enthusiastic way that he became very popular. Washington, it is true, thought that the Ambassador's language was little in keeping with the United States' neutral policy. Meanwhile, John Jay, the American Minister in London, had negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce with England; and the Directory, furious in the belief that the earlier treaty of 1778 was violated by this, was inclined to resort to extreme measures. It was with difficulty that Monroe induced the Directory not to declare war. He vehemently protested against the treaty concluded by Jay, and called it "a most shameful transaction." Washington recalled him on the 22nd August, 1796. Still, Monroe did not leave France before the 30th December.

The Directory refused to receive his successor, General C. Pinckney, whom they considered to be an aristocrat. It offended the United States Government in many other ways; provocation followed provocation; American ships were seized in the French ports, their crews were imprisoned, their cargoes confiscated. The Congress, nevertheless, wished to avoid resort to violent means. And Talleyrand having become Minister for Foreign Affairs, and expressing an earnest intention of settling in a friendly way all pending difficulties, three American Commissioners with *pleins pouvoirs* were sent to France (Oct. 1797).

They were soon surrounded, to their dismay, by intrigue under all its forms. "The most shameful cupidity showed itself unmasked in Paris, and expressed great surprise at not finding the Americans ready buyers of its favours," writes Barbé-Marbois. They were even reproached with "being more particular with the French than with the Redskins, whose tributaries they were." Talleyrand offered to settle the difficulties if 1,200,000 francs were paid to him. The honest Americans refused to entertain the proposal, and negotiations, after having dragged on for about six months, were broken. The animosity between the two Republics grew more and more. In the beginning of 1799 the Congress declared all friendly relations at an end. Hostilities at sea followed; American merchant ships were captured by French corsairs. After a while, however, negotiations were resumed; they assumed a serious character when Bonaparte became Consul. A convention was signed on the 30th September, 1800 (just the day preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of St. Ildephonso). According to one of the stipulations of this convention, indemnities were to be paid to the United States for all illegal seizures of ships (*pour toutes prises indûment faites*). The American Minister at Paris, Livingston (generally known as Chancellor Livingston), had

then to press his country's claims. He did so, but unsuccessfully. He experienced failure upon failure. On the 11th December, 1802, he wrote a threatening (*menaçoire*) letter to Talleyrand. The Minister for Foreign Relations made no reply at the time; but on the 12th March, 1803, he communicated with Livingston, leading him to expect that a satisfactory settlement was not far off.

Livingston was not *persona grata* in France. He was undoubtedly a man of mediocre intellect; he belonged, moreover, to the Federalist party, the American party which was anti-French and, accordingly, pro-English. Since the establishment of the Republic, two systems of government had divided the American statesmen: the first was supported by the advocates of strong democratic principles, desirous to restrict the power of the superior government and to fortify the authority of each of the thirteen States; this party (Republican or Democratic) could boast of having at its service the most able men of the United States. It was precisely devoted neither to France nor to England, but esteemed England, and saw in the friendship of France a guarantee of independence.

The second system was defended by men of conservative tendencies, who formed, with Washington at their head, the Federalist party. This party professed a deep admiration for British institutions; it would have liked to strengthen the superior government, to restrict the power of the independent States, and to ensure a life tenure of his post to the President. Washington had his livery, a State coach, a sort of royal dress, etc. His wife was to be called Lady Washington. The Federalists did not deem it possible to place the United States under the sceptre of the King of England; but they thought that they could give to England, over their own country, an influence which would have all the political advantages of direct domination. They hated France. They attempted to separate from the Union the five Northern States. "The interests of the Northern States," they said, "must eternally clash with those of the Southern and Western States." The Governors of Canada had for long excited the Federalists; if a cession had taken place the British Cabinet would have become the unavoidable umpire. The democratic instinct of the great masses of the people ranged them on the side of the Republicans. The strongholds of the Federalists were in the north-east.

When Monroe was recalled from Paris in 1795 the conflict between the two parties was bitter. He reached America full of wrath; but he was enthusiastically welcomed by the Opposition. He at once published his celebrated 'View,' a long and violent pamphlet which vindicated his conduct in France, and vehemently

attacked Washington's government. Party feelings were ablaze. A terrible war of pamphlets and newspapers raged between, to use Jefferson's words, "the advocates of republican and those of kingly government." Monroe became Governor of Virginia, and he continued his opposition to the Federalists during Adams' presidency.

New events were about to render more acute the quarrel between the two parties. In 1801 a rumour reached the United States that Spain had ceded to France her rights to Louisiana. The Peace of Amiens having been signed in the beginning of 1802, and Bonaparte having no longer reason to keep secret the transfer of the Colony to France, the rumour was confirmed. The excitement was great in the United States. The Federalists tried to make capital out of the agitation; and the Republicans themselves, although doing their best to quiet down the public mind, were alive to the gravity of the situation. Their feelings can be best represented by the quotation of a despatch sent by President Jefferson to Livingston, and dated 18th April, 1802—

"France is our natural friend, one with whom we could never have an occasion of difference; but there is one spot on the globe, the possessor of which is our natural enemy. That spot is New Orleans. France, placing herself in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."

In spite of Jefferson's endeavours, the alarm was great in all the establishments of the West. The population on the eastern bank of the Mississippi numbered at least 800,000. These people wanted to have the free navigation of the river. They threatened to secede from the Union if the other States did not protect them; they feared that the neighbourhood of France might deprive them of all security. Their apprehensions found a powerful echo in the Congress; and, notwithstanding a letter of Livingston, giving assurance that the treaties concluded between France and the United States would be faithfully executed, the irritation did not abate. An unexpected event added fuel to the flame.

In October, 1802, the Spanish Intendant (who had not yet handed over the Colony to France) declared the lower Mississippi closed to the vessels of the United States. It was surmised that he had acted at the instigation of France. There was a general outcry. Even for the most determined advocates of the *status quo* one thing was now clear; that the free navigation of the river, and accordingly New Orleans, its key, had to be secured by the United States. The only question was to know whether peaceful or warlike means would be resorted to. The Federalists were the Jingoes. The Republicans were for peace. Among them Monroe

made himself noticeable for his energy and clear-sightedness. In a pamphlet, published under a *nom de plume*, he shows that it would be an easy matter indeed to capture New Orleans; that—

"The rascal rabble, the motley crew whom the Spaniards honour with the name of soldiers, would be frightened into prostration by the gleaming of a dozen bayonets, the waving of a single banner.

"But," he adds, "there is no law, no pretence on which we can found a claim to the dominion of the province. We claim the passage of the river, and, that being secured to us, we can legally and equitably claim no more. To go to war would deprive us of all excuse for retaining possession. We are not tyrants who rob their neighbours without provocation or remorse. We boast of our enlightened and pacific principles. The expenses of an expedition and of occupation would be greater than purchase. Better to treat, because if the French come, quarrels with them will be unavoidable, and much more serious than with Spain. What a ridiculous and fatal scheme for facilitating the purchase, and reducing the price, is that of taking previous possession! Who, but an idiot, would ever dream of winning the French to compliance by this means? Look at them, meditate the character of their present ruler! They (the Federalists) place their hopes in England? England has not wasted even a little paper and a few words in opposition to the cession."

It was true. England, neither at the time of the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens nor since, had made the slightest allusion to the transfer of Louisiana. Had she not seen what an opportunity it was for her just at a time when all the energies of the pro-English party in the United States were wound up to force her politics upon America? Had she not seen that she could then try with all chances of success, and perhaps through diplomatic means only, what she was to attempt in vain ten years later?

But, after all, was it absolutely exact to say that England had not wasted even a few words in opposition to the cession? No, not quite. The words had been wasted; and just in the only place where, being given the circumstances, all reference to Louisiana was uncalled for: in Parliament. M.P.'s had spoken against the transfer of the Colony. "The cession," they said, "is wholly contrary to the interests of England. It will be the means of giving to the French a great ascendency over the United States which will, sooner or later, force this Republic into an alliance against England's supremacy. New Orleans is the key to Mexico." Lord Hawkesbury defended the cession; then explained it; then said that the French had never drawn any benefit from the possession of Louisiana; and he wound up his clever speech with a well-contrived sentence—"We have concluded only an experimental peace."

Bonaparte appears to have had an inkling of the fact. Maybe that he, on his part, was only making an experiment too. But it was not quite certain; his love of peace might have

been sincere. At any rate, a little more reserve would have served better the interests of the British Cabinet; a little more perspicacity also. It was clear that Bonaparte had not succeeded in getting rid of his Oriental dreams; he was still under the spell of the East. Was it an impossible thing cleverly to direct his ambition towards the coast of Africa, for instance? and to get in exchange a free hand in America? An understanding of France with England, then, for the partition of a portion of the world? And why not? The First Consul himself had proposed it to Lord Whitworth. "See," he had said, "what a power we should exercise over the world if we could continue to *rapprocher* the two nations. You are the masters of the sea; I am the master on land. Let us think, then, rather of uniting than of fighting. All will become possible. We shall rule or will the destinies of the world."

Lord Whitworth did not understand. He was a straightforward man, but stiff and unbending; "not genial," says Mr. Rose; and he adds, as an exculpation, that England had already tried geniality with Cornwallis. And why not try it again?

The situation was no longer that of 1801. Besides, it was not necessary to work up to the proposals of Bonaparte. It would have been sufficient to see in what way they could have been turned to a profit. Was it utterly impossible to find a *modus vivendi* about Malta? And was not Bonaparte's obdurate, sentimental anxiety concerning the fate of that nerve centre of Empire, a simple proof of the potency of the spell exercised over him by the East? Was it not practicable to give another and fixed direction to his vague longings? For example, to induce him to attempt the conquest of the Barbary States? He had himself thought of it. The missions of Sebastian and others only prove that Bonaparte's imagination was roaming over the coasts of Asia Minor and Africa; it would have been an easy matter to fix it. He could have experienced, before Algiers, the fate of Charles V.; and a failure there would have been a deadly blow at his prestige and power in France and elsewhere. If he had been successful, England would have had nothing to lose. The conquest of what is now Algiers would have occupied his energies for a considerable time; and in any case, owing to England's supremacy at sea, the conquered land would have been but a pledge, pawned (so to speak) to Britannia.

Anyhow, something could be attempted. The great question for the British Cabinet ought to have been this: Is it possible for England to recover her position in North America? Does not the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, mainly in view of the

state of mind of the divided United States people, and also of the sheer impossibility for France to keep the Colony, offer a golden chance to England?

We shall see what the British Cabinet thought of it—when it was too late—and that it did not think fit to move when it was time to do so, in spite of the warnings of an English agent in Paris, and in spite of the fact that it would easily have found in the entourage of the Consul powerful help. It was not without reason that Sheridan described the Addington Administration as the fag-end of Mr. Pitt's, "who had remained so long on the Treasury Bench that, like Nicias in the fable, he had left the sitting-part of the man behind him."

The fact is, that Bonaparte had never known what to do with Louisiana. Why, then, had he ever thought of getting it back at St. Ildephonso?

It is highly probable that such was indeed Bonaparte's intention in October, 1800. The will of the Consul was powerful; but continually shifting, if not its aim, at least the means proposed for enforcing it. The Consul was a schemer much more than ever was the Emperor, whose politics were simplified by England's policy. It may be asserted that during 1802 and the earlier part of 1803 Bonaparte's mind was in a perpetual state of flux. The most contradictory plans were incessantly unfurling themselves in his brain. In fact, he was staring vacantly into the future, catching an occasional glimpse of some reality, but not knowing in what direction to throw the weight of his potential energy. Had England tapped him gently on the shoulder and pointed out a goal, he might gladly have accepted the hint.

The reconstitution of the French colonial power in America, then, had very probably been the foremost intention of the Consul in 1800. But very soon events had occurred which had certainly gone far to change his mind. The most important had been the revolt of St. Dominique. The rising of the blacks had been a terrible warning against the possibility of a colonial empire in the West. The Consul had done his best to repress this revolt. The expedition had left France in December, 1801, as soon as the preliminaries of the peace signed in London on the 1st October, 1801, had opened the sea to the French ships. But failure had followed upon failure; the army had been decimated; in the end of 1802 news reached France of the death of Ludovic, the Consul's brother-in-law; and it could be seen that no hope was left of subjugating the island.

Bonaparte was heard more than once, while the conflict raged between whites and blacks, to rant against *ces colonies à esclaves*,

and to declare that nothing could be expected from countries where labour was to be exclusively performed by negroes. It is at least probable that in speaking thus he associated in his mind Louisiana with St. Dominique. One fact at least is certain: he was in no hurry to take possession of Louisiana; we shall see that this taking of possession was carried out only formally, and this on the very day when the Colony was handed over to the United States.

Bonaparte's plan at first had been this: the army sent to St. Dominique, after having crushed the rebellion of the blacks, was to land at New Orleans, and a part of its troops would occupy Louisiana. The Consul wished to give the Governorship of the Colony to General Bernadotte, but this Bernadotte was not eager to accept. He said that he would not go to Louisiana unless he were provided with at least 3000 soldiers, 3000 agriculturists, a great number of women, and a quantity of implements, stores, etc., of all kinds, in the eventuality of the communications with France being interrupted for a long time. The Consul refused to entertain this proposal; and he created Governor-General Victor, who hastened to Helvoett Sluyss in Holland to prepare his expedition. This happened in 1802. But quite at the beginning of 1803 disastrous news from St. Dominique induced the Consul again to alter his plan.

He resolved to send Bernadotte to the United States as plenipotentiary minister. The purpose of this intended embassy for Bernadotte is scarcely known; and more obscure still is the mission with which he was to be entrusted. It has been said that he had to negotiate the cession of a part of Louisiana to the United States. But while it must be admitted that the Consul had come then to consider the Colony but as a trump in his hand, as a possession to be parted with for a consideration (whatever it might be), it is difficult to understand why he would have sent a special ambassador, a man like Bernadotte, simply to carry out a transaction which could have easily been conducted in Paris. Livingston was there; unofficial American emissaries like Daniel Clarke also; and the United States would have been only too glad to send to Paris (as they did shortly afterwards) special commissioners. But it was not of a cession of territory only that Bonaparte had thought.

The mission of Bernadotte was this: he had to conclude with the United States Government an alliance, offensive and defensive. In the event of war breaking out between England and France, St. Dominique would be evacuated by the French troops, which would be transported to New Orleans (practically the whole of the French fleet was then cruising in the waters of St. Dominique).

France would cede to the United States her rights over the totality of Louisiana, and the French Army, commanded by Bernadotte and reinforced by United States troops, would reconquer Canada. The state of the political parties in America, the Republicans being in power and the Federalists losing ground every day, rendered this plan practicable.

Bernadotte left Paris for La Rochelle, where a frigate was waiting for him. He went on board, and he was about to start when, for some reason (very likely a communication received from Talleyrand, who had designs of his own concerning Louisiana), he landed. He came back to Paris without authorisation, and declared to Bonaparte, dumfounded, that he refused to leave France because a war with England was imminent. A quarrel ensued, and an estrangement between the Consul and the general.

Meanwhile General Victor at Helvoett Sluyss had had 4000 men embarked on transports for the occupation of Louisiana; he had even bought a quantity of things that he intended to use as "gifts to the savages." However, he could not get an order of departure; perhaps his expedition (or rather the preparation of it) had only been a blind unknown to him, a tactical move, destined to mask the real and ill-fated plan of the Consul and to deceive the English Cabinet. Victor, not knowing what to do, quarrelled with M. Lausset, the newly-created *prefèt* of New Orleans; and this official started alone, intent upon trying to induce the Spanish authorities to hand him over the Colony.

The fate of Louisiana, anyhow, was to be decided before long. In the United States the agitation caused by the restrictions imposed upon the free navigation of the Mississippi was growing from day to day. In the first days of 1803 it had reached its climax. The Federalist party, finding there was an excellent opportunity of recuperating its lost power, was clamouring more and more loudly for a resort to arms. Jefferson saw that the only remedy to the situation was to try to obtain from France, peacefully, the outlet to the Gulf of Mexico. Accordingly, on the 10th January, 1803, he wrote to Governor Monroe—

"I have but a moment to inform you that the fever into which the Western mind is thrown by the affair at New Orleans, stimulated by the mercantile and generally the Federal interest, threatens to overbear our peace. In this situation we are obliged to call on you for a temporary sacrifice of yourself to prevent this greatest of evils. I shall to-morrow nominate you to the Senate for an extraordinary mission to France. The whole public hopes will be rested on you."

And three days afterwards he informed Monroe that he was sent to France "as Minister Extraordinary to be joined with the Ordinary one, with discretionary powers." He added, "You

possess the unlimited confidence of the Administration and of the Western people. All eyes are now fixed on you. On the event of this mission depend the future destinies of this Republic."

Monroe, who lived then in Richmond, was not in good health. A few days before, on the 7th January, he had written to Jefferson that he intended visiting the West, but durst not, on account of his weakness, go to New York and to Washington. He did not hesitate, however, to accept this mission. He had to negotiate the purchase of New Orleans and of the territory embracing the mouth of the Mississippi. The Congress had appropriated two million dollars for the purpose.

A letter of his to J. Madison, Secretary of State, dated the 22nd February, 1803, announces his arrival in New York. He was much overcome with the fatigue of the journey, and could not take a ship that had been engaged for him. "It is said here," he writes, "that a new constitution is formed or forming in France whereby Bonaparte is Emperor of the Gauls."

The news was premature; but truer news he could learn, which showed him how timely was his mission to France. A prominent Federalist, Mr. Ross, Senator of Pennsylvania, had presented to the Congress a resolution requiring the Government at once to take New Orleans by armed force. The sitting grew so tumultuous that the public were turned out. After two sittings with closed doors, it was resolved that Mr. Ross's resolution would be discussed publicly. Gouverneur Morris, rabidly pro-English, said that the arrival of the French had to be prevented at any cost, that their troops were already at sea, etc., etc.

Jefferson continued to temporise with wisdom and great cleverness. The situation was highly dangerous. It was impossible for the United States to attack France without ranging themselves on the side of England; without consequently giving to Great Britain a new and perhaps definitive entry into their politics. There was no doubt that Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Ross were in correspondence with Livingston, the U.S. Minister to Paris, who was exasperated by his persistent failure to draw from the French Government the promised compensations for *prises indûment faites*, a failure with which he was bitterly reproached by American shipowners. Dangerous as it was for the Republicans, the situation might have offered some chances to the English Cabinet.

On the 7th March Monroe wrote to Jefferson that he would sail from New York on the morrow in the ship *Richmond*, of about 400 tons burden. He was taking his family with him. He adds, "The resolution of Mr. Ross proves that the Federal party will stick at nothing to embarrass the Administration and recover their

lost power. If the negotiation succeeds, the Federalists will be overwhelmed completely."

The *Richmond* was bound to Hamburg, but landed Monroe at Havre on the 8th April. Monroe was received with particular attention. On the 10th he left Havre for Paris; and having left his wife and daughter at St. Germain, he reached the French capital, accompanied by Colonel John Mercer, on the 12th April.

It is certain that the idea of sacrificing Louisiana, considered as an hypothesis or a contingency, was a new one neither in the minds of many French officials nor in the mind of Bonaparte himself. Many people had always thought that the only value of the Colony for France was in the possibility of using it for a barter. But until the arrival of Monroe at Havre the Consul had taken no absolute decision on the point.

The maintenance of peace between England and France, it is true, was increasingly imperilled. The King's message to Parliament on the 8th March had shown that the war party in England was about to triumph; the little expedition for Louisiana prepared by Victor at Helvoett Sluyss (two ships, two frigates, and 4000 men) had been represented as an enormous armament directed against Great Britain. The Consul had been irritated beyond measure. His well-known reception of Lord Whitworth on the 13th March shows what was his frame of mind. He had given orders to engineers and officers to inspect the coasts of France; he had made preparations to invade the kingdom of Naples; he had ordered Victor to land his 4000 men, who were to form part of the corps placed in Holland under Mortier's orders. Still he was not sure that the peace would be broken. And, in fact, it lasted for two months more.

It is why no importance is to be attached to a story to be found in the wretched 'Memoires de Lucien Bonaparte,' and of which no mention would be made here were it not for the fact that it is regularly trotted out every time that the cession of Louisiana is discussed. According to this childish tale, Bonaparte's brothers, Lucien and Joseph, had earnestly protested, on the 7th April, against the sale of the Colony. The truth is, that at that date the Consul had not made up his mind to sell; that Lucien had long known that the Colony would not be kept by France, happen what might; and that Joseph—but let us hear Monroe himself—

"Joseph Bonaparte," he says, "had invited me to an interview immediately after my arrival in Paris, and gave me assurance of his good offices." And he kept his promises, adds Monroe. Really, Joseph Bonaparte does not appear here in the light of a conscientious objector.

It is during the evening of the 10th April that the Consul resolved to arrive at an irrevocable decision concerning Louisiana. We have seen that already, on the 24th March, Talleyrand had, after a long silence, communicated in a friendly way with Livingston; he even paid him a visit in the beginning of April. Livingston, in a letter to Madison, speaks of "M. Talleyrand calling on me, previous to the arrival of Mr. Monroe, for a proposal for the whole of Louisiana; of his afterwards trifling with me and telling me that what he said was unauthorised." As a matter of fact, Talleyrand had asked Livingston if the United States wished for the whole of Louisiana. The answer had been—"No; but that it would be politic in France to give it up." One understands Talleyrand's trifling.

His visit had led Livingston to believe that the First Consul had renounced his intention to sell any part of Louisiana. Just what Talleyrand wanted. What game was he playing? Surely a pacific game. Talleyrand was, at the bottom, a man of peace. What was at the time his advice to the Consul? We have it in the words of Bonaparte himself: "If I were to believe M. de Talleyrand, France would limit her ambition to the left bank of the Rhine, and would go to war only to befriend the weak, and to protect herself against dismemberment." Noble feelings, which, after all, were sincere. Peace had well served Talleyrand's interests. To say that he was not over scrupulous, is not to calumniate his memory. The reorganisation of Germany, for instance, had brought him large sums; it was even rumoured that the Concordat had contributed to his welfare. Talleyrand, in short, would have given something, and received more, to prevent war.

Now, what does man want to make war for? Money; three times money. It was the burden of Bonaparte's song. "I want money!—Do you understand," said he to Barbé-Marbois, who was objecting to the sale of the souls of the Colonies of Louisiana, "do you understand that I want money to make war against the richest nation in the world?" Talleyrand, man of peace, wished to prevent Bonaparte from getting money, and principally money which could be used against England. Then, since Louisiana was to be ceded, why not cede it to England instead of America? War is unprofitable, would be averted, and it would be possible to do business. Talleyrand communicated with the British Cabinet, tentatively through the channels of an English agent living in Paris—and not, of course, through Lord Whitworth.

Talleyrand's visit had completely disheartened Livingston, who was not a prodigy of intellect. On the 10th April, hearing of the arrival of Monroe at Havre, Livingston sent him the following letter:—

"I congratulate you on your safe arrival. We have long and anxiously waited for you. God grant that your mission may answer yours and the public expectation. War may do something for us; nothing else would. I have paved the way for you, and if you could add to my memoirs an assurance that we were now in possession of New Orleans we should do well."

The tone of despondency is very marked. Having disposed of the first American, Talleyrand was lying in wait for the second. But Bonaparte forestalled him.

In the evening of the 10th April, in St. Cloud, it is not Talleyrand whom he called to him. He wanted to know the opinion of two men who knew America, and whose honesty he trusted. The first was M. de Barbé-Marbois, Minister of the Treasury; the second, Admiral Decrès, Secretary for the Navy. Bonaparte explained to them the reasons which induced him to sell Louisiana: war with England could not be avoided; the Colony could be easily taken by the English; would it not be better to sell the whole of it to the United States, instead of the territory of New Orleans, for which they solely ask?

Barbé-Marbois was the first to speak. He said that one must not hesitate to sacrifice a thing that one has not the power to defend. France had not a single soldier in Louisiana, and there was no possibility of sending troops. Besides, the fate of the European Colonies in America was extremely uncertain. "Those people will free themselves as soon as they have the power to do so. Louisiana is a *colonie à esclaves;* it will accordingly be the cause of money expenses, and bring little profit. A prohibitive system cannot be carried out there, near the United States which enjoy freedom. Colonies are to-day played out; commercial establishments are to be preferred to them; and in the absence of *comptoirs* let trade do for itself."

Decrès said in substance:—

"We must not abandon Louisiana. We are not yet at war with England. We shall perhaps be able to defend the Colony. Suppose that peace is maintained: how shall we explain the cession? Colonies are useful to a nation. No navy without Colonies; no Colonies without a powerful navy. Let us suppose that England take Louisiana; we take Hanover; and England will have to give back the Colony. Louisiana can indemnify us for the loss of India. There is not, perhaps, on the globe a spot which can become as important as New Orleans. Think of the canal which will one day cut the isthmus of Panama, and join one ocean to the other. What an inestimable value will Louisiana have then! We must keep the Colony."

It was late when the conference came to an end. The Consul did not disclose his intentions. The ministers slept at St. Cloud. On the morrow, at dawn, Bonaparte called to him Barbé-Marbois; he showed him despatches just at hand from the French Ambassador

in London; they gave information about the extensive preparations made for war. Bonaparte said in substance—

"You see that no understanding is possible with England. War is unavoidable. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I want to cede; it is all the Colony. It would be madness to try to keep it. I entrust you with the conduct of the negotiation. Do not wait even for M. Monroe's arrival; see M. Livingston to-day. But remember I want fifty million francs; for less I will not treat. I would rather make some desperate attempt. Tell frankly the American Ministers what I propose; recommend them the utmost secrecy. The British Cabinet is aware of the resolutions taken at Washington; but they cannot guess at those that I am taking. Acquaint me day by day with your progress, and keep M. Talleyrand informed."

A sentence written by Monroe may be quoted here, "His [Bonaparte's] motive for committing the negotiation to M. Marbois, and in a manner not to wound the feelings of M. Talleyrand, may be readily conceived." Yes.

Barbé-Marbois saw Livingston at once. The latter was full of diffidences; besides, he had not the necessary powers. Still, he declared that fifty millions of francs would be a very high sum to be paid for the whole of Louisiana.

Monroe arrived on the morrow. He had soon after an interview with Livingston, and Livingston deplored the fact that Mr. Ross's resolution had not been adopted. "We must take possession of New Orleans first," said he, "and negotiate afterwards." To this Monroe made no reply, but he heard with surprise of the readiness of the French Government to sell the whole Colony.

In the evening, as Monroe was having his dinner with Livingston and other Americans, Barbé-Marbois appeared; he had known Monroe for a long time in America. When the company had dispersed, he spoke about the cession with the two envoys, after which he invited Livingston (Monroe feeling very tired) to accompany him to his hotel. There the Colony was offered for one hundred million francs and the claims (French spoliation claims, as the Americans said). Livingston found the price an exorbitant one; but no conclusion could be reached without consulting Monroe. Without waiting to do so, nevertheless, Livingston, as soon as he got home, wrote and sent a long despatch to Madison, in which he narrated his interview with Barbé-Marbois; he added that, in his opinion, the purchase would be wise, although the price asked was too high. "However," he suggested, "the outlay may be reimbursed by the sale of the territory west of the Mississippi with the right of sovereignty, to some Power of Europe whose vicinity we should not fear." An extraordinary suggestion.

Monroe wished to be presented to the Consul as soon as

possible. But Talleyrand did not comply with this wish. "There is a plausible pretext for not presenting me to the Consul till the monthly audience," writes Monroe to Madison; and he at once suspects the hand of Talleyrand obstructively at work behind the scenes, upon which the ex-bishop himself takes good care not to appear.

The first conference between Monroe, Livingston, and Barbé-Marbois took place on the 14th April. Monroe, still under the influence of the apprehensions and diffidences of his colleague, heard with pleasure the frank proposals of Barbé-Marbois. The negotiation had three objects: (1) the cession of a territory; (2) the price to be paid for it; (3) the indemnity due by France to the American claimants.

On the first point, in spite of the absence of definite instructions (although some sort of understanding had been come to on the point between Jefferson and Monroe before his (Monroe's) leaving America), the American Ministers assumed the responsibility of undertaking the purchase of the entire territory of Louisiana. They agreed to take as a text for the conferences a project of treaty drawn by Barbé-Marbois, and they also agreed to this first declaration: "The Colony or province of Louisiana is ceded by France to the United States with all its rights and appurtenances." The question of delimitation was settled on the basis offered by the Treaty of St. Ildephonso. The Colony (it was Bonaparte's express wish) was to be incorporated in the Union as soon as possible.

As for the price, the two American representatives had to discuss the question. There was certainly between them a feeling of personal rivalry, if not of jealousy. Monroe considered, and justly so, Livingston to be rather a hindrance than a help. On the 15th April he wrote to Madison (endorsed private): "It is proper for me to mention to you in confidence some circumstances which I wish not to include in an official letter. I was informed on my arrival here that Mr. Livingston, mortified at my appointment, had done everything in his power . . ." and several accusations against Livingston follow. "In a private conversation he [Livingston] said that he regretted his misfortune in my arrival, since it took from him the credit of having brought everything to a proper conclusion by himself. You will perceive the dilemma in which I have been and am still placed by this course of proceeding." At last the two American envoys made up their minds to give fifty millions; but they resolved to offer at first forty millions only, one-half of which was to be returned to the American claimants.

On the 16th April, in a second congress, they accordingly offered

forty millions. Barbé-Marbois expressed his regret that they could not give more. He wished to consult the Consul, and went on purpose to St. Cloud. He came back saying that the business might be considered as no longer in his hands, so coolly had Bonaparte received their proposition. He advised that some pressure be brought to bear upon Talleyrand in order to secure the early presentation of Monroe. This was a hint that Monroe did not allow to be lost.

In the evening of the same day the American envoys were present at a dinner given by Cambacérès; Barbé-Marbois, who was there also, told them that if the Consul did not reopen the question, they might consider the plan relinquished. But, they asked, would fifty millions be accepted? Barbé-Marbois thought not. The negotiations had come to an end.

Monroe did everything in his power to reopen them. It was certain that some hidden influence was at work against him. Which? Monroe thought at first of England. But he soon learned that his suspicions were baseless. He writes: "The English Government had never made a question of Louisiana in its discussions with the Government of France at any period since the French possessed it. This information was obtained of Lord Whitworth on the application of Mr. Livingston on his and my part at a time when we deemed it important to know what interest that Power had taken in the affair, if any. Lord Whitworth's answer was, as I understand, frank and explicit to that effect." We have here a proof that England had, so far, taken "no interest in the affair." The British Cabinet had not seen the possibility of taking possession of Louisiana, either in a friendly way or otherwise, of re-establishing England's power in America, of taking *à revers* the United States; and it was placidly allowing France to help the revolted Colonies to build up the foundations of their future greatness.

Monroe then thought of Talleyrand. We are here reduced to conjecture. Did he, being well aware of the Minister's venality and being highly desirous of reaching his aim, attempt to bribe him? It is possible that he did; and even that a considerable sum passed from his hands into those of Talleyrand. One fact, anyhow, is certain: Monroe, during his short mission to France, spent an enormous sum of money. "My expenses at Paris," said he, "and in the negotiation have been considerable." He gives us details; but he was a spotless character, unostentatious and very thrifty, and was not a man to squander money. "From his mission," writes one of his countrymen, "Monroe returned burdened with debts, whose consequences bore heavily on him through life."

In 1826 some return was made by the Congress; but Monroe never accepted the amount granted by the Act of 1826 as a just reimbursement. All his property in Virginia was sold for the payment of the debts arising from his public services. Citizens petitioned the Congress on his behalf. On the 2nd March, 1831, the Congress made further reparation.

Did the bribery of the Minister, admitting that it took place, bring about any result? It is improbable. The situation for some days showed no sign of improvement; and on the 1st May, when Monroe was officially presented to the Consul, Talleyrand was, so to speak, conspicuous by his absence. But an event took place on the 26th April, of small importance in itself, but which had far-reaching consequences upon the cession of Louisiana. An English agent was secretly arrested in Paris; his papers were seized; some of them are still in existence. He was probably the man through whom Talleyrand was conveying to the British Cabinet, and apparently to small purpose, some hints of what could be done in America.

Bonaparte, at any rate, had some glimpse of the intrigues which were surrounding him. He did then what he was often doing; he took the bull by the horns. In the night of the 26th April he sent for Monroe. An interview took place during which the fate of Louisiana was in fact settled, and the Monroe doctrine revealed—to Monroe.

"It cannot be doubted," writes Monroe, "that there were a variety of causes which contributed to produce a change in the mind of the First Consul relative to Louisiana, and to facilitate the cession which I flatter myself our Government has been fortunate in obtaining." Monroe speaks there like a man who has experienced great difficulties in carrying out an undertaking, and to whom Fate, all of a sudden, has been kind.

We have seen that on the 18th April the negotiations had been completely broken. And suddenly, after eleven days, Barbé-Marbois reappears before the two American envoys with a treaty, drawn by Bonaparte himself, and which is accepted at once. Would not this be wonderful if nothing had taken place in the mean time? "M. Marbois came to my lodgings to-day at two o'clock," Monroe writes on the 27th April, "and, I being indisposed, it was agreed that I might repose as it suited me." Monroe, of course, had not got much rest during the previous night. He goes on, "M. Marbois opened the negotiations by presenting us with a project of treaty, given him by Bonaparte." The price proposed for Louisiana was eighty million francs, which was to include the sum requisite for the American claimants (twenty millions); these

twenty millions were to be paid to the claimants by the United States' Treasury. These figures were at once acceded to. In French money the sum to be paid by the United States was 81,300,000 francs.

The treaty, composed of three instruments, was definitively adopted on the 30th April; it bears this date, but, owing to the time required for the translation into English, it was signed only on the 3rd May. It was ratified at once by Bonaparte, and in October by the United States' Senate.

On the morrow of the signature of the treaty, Bonaparte sent to Lord Whitworth a note, in which he was asking that Malta be placed in the hands of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. "If this proposition be rejected," he said, "it will be manifest that England has never intended to execute the Treaty of Amiens." War was not far off. Monroe had been officially presented to the Consul on the 1st May. Talleyrand, who was to make the presentation, did not appear, and Livingston had to perform the function. "This augmentation of territory," said Bonaparte, "strengthens for ever the power of the United States. I have just given to England a maritime rival, that sooner or later will humble her pride."

As for the fifty millions which were to be paid to France, the payments were to be made by annuities; but the French Government being in need of money, advances were asked from French banks, which, owing to the general condition of affairs, refused. Then the English firms of Hove (Amsterdam) and Baring (London) proposed to make these advances; their offers were accepted, to the entire satisfaction, says Barbé-Marbois, of the English Government.

It was not only gold which was coming to France, on the eve of the war, from England. News came, too. The two American envoys, on the morrow of the conclusion of the Louisiana treaty, were informed by Mr. Rufus King, the American Minister in London, of a proposition which had just been made to him by Lord Hawkesbury. The British Cabinet proposed to the United States to allow England to undertake the conquest of Louisiana. They were perceiving at last that something could be done there. They had led Mr. King to understand that Louisiana could be retroceded to the United States at the end of the war which was on the point of breaking out.

Monroe, in reply, gave information of the cession of Louisiana to the British Government; and Mr. Rufus King received soon after a "satisfactory answer" of Lord Hawkesbury.

Monroe left Paris on the 12th July. He had been commissioned Minister to England in place of Mr. King. He writes on the 23rd

August, 1803: "In the morning I had a conversation with Lord Hawkesbury on the subject of our late treaty with France, in which he asked me what were the bounds of Louisiana." His lordship was apparently fond of learning, although somewhat late in the day. Monroe gave him the desired information, adding that West Florida was considered as a part of Louisiana. "He seemed to be struck with the remark, but not in a manner to excite a belief that he wished it were otherwise, for he immediately added that East Florida would soon become ours also." Was Monroe, who wr this, wrong, when he thought that England lost America, not 1783, but 1803?*

On the 23rd November, Monroe dined with Lord Hawkesb "in company with Lord Castlereagh, also of the Ministry, others. The question of Louisiana was introduced by those He told them the substance of the treaty with France. T admitted that it was just, and furnished England with no caus complaint." Castlereagh made this interesting discovery, " we had an alternative mode of obtaining the territory." Mo explained why Jefferson had rejected that alternative mode. concludes thus: "It appears that those in power here conside [the treaty] as the most glorious attainment of our country, effect of a masterly policy in its government."

But admiration, sincere or not, was soon to give place to o feelings. Monroe writes in the beginning of 1804: "Neither L nor Lady Hawkesbury have returned Mrs. Monroe's or my visits. We accepted their invitation to dinner, and repeated visit to Lady H., lest the first should have been misunderstood, without effect." And he is obliged, in a letter to Jefferson, to that he has been subjected to many other indignities.

After all, Lord Hawkesbury and the Addington Cabi generally were not without excuse. Their attention was wh engrossed, at the time, in the ignominious collapse of a gr scheme of theirs for the suppression of their foe, Bonaparte.

The Power that sold Louisiana may yet find a customer for th French islands on the coasts of Newfoundland.

ARNOLD WHITE.

* The length of their own noses has ever been the limit of vision for British Governments.—ED. U. S. M.

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NATIONAL INTERESTS.

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UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE,

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[illegible] Volunteer will only be too grateful to the Commission for frankly facing the problem in all its aspects, for telling the nation what they believe to be the truth, and for the valuable practical recommendations made on the basis of the Militia and Volunteers being maintained substantially on the existing lines. If an invasion in force by the picked troops of the

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Continent is probable, and the auxiliaries have to face it alone, inadequately and inefficiently trained, provided, and organised, the only result will be that their best regiments will be wiped out of existence in the first big battle, and will have given their time and their lives in vain. If, on the other hand, with a sufficient and flexible system of training, with the necessary equipment, properly organised in brigades and divisions, with the necessary complement of trained leaders and staff, they can be made reasonably equal to the task that may be fairly anticipated, the rejection of "the conscription proposals" necessarily carries with it the conclusion that the nation must take seriously to heart the welfare of both Militia and Volunteers, must, in return for a certain standard of quality, honour and encourage them, must supply them with the necessary essentials of modern military efficiency, must give them every facility for practising their work, and must, in the arrangements for that practice, endeavour, as far as possible, to consider and meet the varying conditions of their civil employments and occupations.

To many it may be a matter of regret that the Commission so summarily dismissed the suggestion for the enforcement of the Militia Ballot. In doing so they seem mainly to have been influenced by the considerations that the Ballot would be unequal in operation, and that it would result in filling the Volunteers with "slackers" instead of enthusiasts. This, it is thought by many, would not be the result, and the active revival of the old British constitutional system of home defence would at once reinvigorate the Militia, and considerably improve the position of the Volunteers. It is impossible to walk near the football fields or popular promenades of a large town without being struck by the quantity of splendid material of young men of various ranks and occupations, who would be invaluable in the Volunteer or Militia ranks, and would themselves be infinitely the better, morally and physically, for a little drill and discipline. With the Militia Ballot in force, the three great essentials and difficulties of an efficient Volunteer Force—standard of discipline (in which I include fire discipline and marksmanship), supply of officers, and camp attendance, would be wholly, or very nearly, met.

The establishment of the Volunteer Force would be fixed at a definite number; regiments would be able to pick recruits from the sort of men who would like to serve together. Enlistment could be made for five years, with a power of resignation after three years in the case of men emigrating to a British colony, and in all cases transfers to a Colonial force or another regiment could be granted. It would at once be possible to require a higher standard of attendance at drill, and a preliminary course on the range before

the firing of the classification course. Attendance for at least a fortnight in camp would come to be publicly recognised as a natural thing on the part of the majority of young men, and the business relations of the country would adjust themselves to it, as within the present generation they have adjusted themselves to a quantity of holidays at which bygone employers of the Cobden era would have lifted up their hands in horror. Some men might try to come to the Volunteers as the easiest mode of slipping through. But these inveterate "slackers" would probably—as Volunteer service would mean a good deal of work—take their chance of being missed in the Ballot. There would come to the Volunteers a large number of excellent young men, who now just hesitate whether to come or not, and finally decide not, because of football or golf; some who at present hang back on account of devotion to fitting themselves for their civil career, and many who would not like to give up a year or six months to the Militia, but could perfectly well put in the Volunteer requirements. Once in the ranks, they would all take on the military spirit, and the educative influence of discipline and tradition in a *corps d'elite*, which the Volunteer regiments would thus in a certain sense become, would raise the standard of all, and have its influence on the community at large. As things at present stand, one of the greatest disappointments to a Volunteer commanding officer is to see the number of fine young men, who have all the qualities in intelligence, social position, and otherwise, which would fit them to be spirited, active-minded, respected, and popular leaders of a fine Volunteer army, hanging back from the proper duty of the young gentlemen of the country, because they must have the time for games, or fear that volunteering will be the reverse of a help to them in their professions; or they cannot serve with comfort under seniors brought in, in the past, from the highways and hedges to fill the commissioned ranks anyhow. This evil, if not cured, would be much reduced if the principle were once publicly laid down and impressed on the public mind that it was the duty of every man, according to his capacity, to "give a harvest day's work for the king, my master."

The Government has announced that it does not intend to proceed on the lines of the compulsory service recommendation. While the declaration by the Secretary for War of the policy that is to be adopted will be anxiously awaited, it may be useful to examine, from the point of view of a Volunteer who served for many years in a scattered country battalion, and has subsequently served in a town corps, largely recruited from a professional and educated element of the population, the alternative recommendations of the Commission, and to indicate special application of them that would

ease the working, at all events, of Scottish volunteering. If the Home Defence Force is to continue on the voluntary principle, considerations of two kinds must ever be kept in view. The one must be material conditions of military training and finance, the other must be moral, recognising the spirit, the desires, and even to some extent the prejudices, of a free people. If all the population must perforce go through the mill of conscription, then an absolute uniformity can be enforced. Your whole army can be dressed in convict garb and cowboy hats, and nothing spent on any of those distinctions and encouragements which are valued by troops, whether Regular or Volunteer. But if you are depending on a voluntary force, while discipline must be absolutely enforced, while serviceable equipment and training are essential, it is also necessary to rely as far as possible on patriotic effort, stimulated by inducements; to cultivate *esprit de corps* as a great moral force, and to make the conditions of training as flexible and as suited to the avocations and convenience of the trained as efficiency admits.

The alternative recommendations of the Commission are practical, and will go a long way to remove existing difficulties and promote a higher standard. Their full effect does not appear from the text of the Report, unless this is read along with Schedule B.

Volunteer Department.—The first recommendation, that the Volunteers should be managed by a separate department at the War Office, the head of which should report direct to the Army Council, goes, perhaps, rather further than is needed, and possibly fails fully to appreciate the principles and effect of the recent reorganisation of the War Department. It is understood that the duties of the Adjutant-General will be far broader in scope and less concerned with detail than before, and that to him will fall the correlation of the duties to be performed by the Volunteers along with all the other branches of the King's forces; that under him there is now a Director and Department for the Volunteer Force, and that the Director will be called in with him to assist the Army Council, when questions relating to his department are under consideration. The Volunteer Force, it is thought, will therefore find that the substance of what it requires has been provided, and it is hoped that its practical wants may not be forgotten, in claims to be represented by some official, the *status* sought for whom would be inconsistent with the broad distribution of duties and reservation of general questions only for the highest officials, which is a feature of the recent reorganisation.

Organisation and Command.—It goes without saying that the force must be organised in war formation of brigades and divisions, with commanders and staffs, and that these should be responsible

for the general training, and for the mobilisation arrangements of their units. Whether, however, the annual inspection should necessarily be by these officers is another question. The recommendation that the post of brigadier, and all staff and other posts in the regimental cadres, should be open to Volunteer officers, requires to be taken with some qualification. If it is intended to include the regimental adjutancy, then it is objectionable. It is essential that the Volunteer commanding officer should have the assistance of a regular adjutant, who should set the example and tone to the Volunteer officers, to whom he should act the part of "guide, philosopher, and friend," who must be at the head of the permanent staff, and who can give that regular attendance and detailed attention to the routine work, correspondence, and general business of the regiment that cannot be expected from men who have their own civil business to look after in the first place. The appointment ought to be for five years, as recommended, instead of three, and the views of the battalion commanding officer, in the selection of a man suitable to the regiment, ought to receive most favourable consideration. Volunteer battalions differ greatly, and the relations of the adjutant to the other officers, and his tone towards and interest in the non-commissioned officers and men, are of the utmost importance in securing a good spirit in a Volunteer regiment.

As regards the higher staffs, while it may be quite desirable that appointments should be open to Volunteer officers—and there are exceptional cases—most Volunteer commanding officers would probably find things work more smoothly under a regular brigadier, and certainly with a regular brigade-major. The regular officer has probably been trained to staff work, and knows more or less instinctively the limits of his own sphere and those of the regimental commanders with whom he has to deal. A Volunteer staff is more apt to be fussy, to magnify its office, and under present conditions to grasp at making general arrangements for which the battalions have to pay by a general levy, which presses unequally on corps which may have special reasons for economy.

It is not reasonable to expect that men who take up soldiering as an addition to their daily work should know better, or as well, as those who have made it the business of their lives. The Army is more and more becoming a specialised profession, and it must be remembered that many officers now in the higher ranks have a practical knowledge of Volunteer conditions and limitations, gained as adjutants, which was not the case with the older generation. The attitude of mind of the regular officer towards the Volunteer has vastly changed in the last quarter of a century, and many

Volunteers appreciate most highly the courtesy, interest, and practical assistance they have received from their regimental district, from a regular brigade staff, and from line regiments which they have lain beside in camp. The recommendation that the permanent staff should be increased in the case of town battalions is most valuable. At present in the busy season they are hard pressed, and the amount of clerking work in connection with the keeping of books, returns, and correspondence is very large. The quartermaster-sergeant should belong to the permanent staff. Volunteers cannot be expected in their leisure hours to do for nothing dull clerking work, for which they would receive a clerk's salary in a business office.

Finance.—The recommendation that a large proportion of the annual Government allowance should take the form of a fixed grant is of the utmost practical value, and, if adopted, will relieve commanding officers from much anxiety, and place the finance of many regiments on a sound basis. Originally the Volunteer grants were inadequate, but the increases made some years ago were the greatest boon. In one case a heavy debt was gradually paid off, a country battalion completely reclothed, and the finance *with the old strength* put on a sound basis. In another case a regiment was raised, fully clothed, and equipped in the confidence that in the course of four or five years it would be possible, with strict economy and care, to more or less square accounts. It may be said that the grants were, prior to 1901, more or less proportionate to the general requirements. Of course, they would not pay for palatial drill-halls, and capital expenditure on buildings and ranges. But the new regulations, and especially compulsory camp, completely changed the situation. The candle has for three years been burnt at both ends. Increased stringency has led to resignations, and checked recruiting; while compulsory camp has deprived the commanding officer of his option of determining whether in the state of his finances it was safe to risk a camp. If bankruptcy was to be avoided, men must be made efficient; this could not be done without camp, and in many cases attendance at camp could only be secured by bribing men to come with camp pay. In any case, if the attendance fell below 300 (irrespective of the actual strength of the battalion), all camp allowances were forfeited after the whole expenditure had been perforce incurred. Government has thus really taken away the redress it formerly gave; increasing charges for services that were not contemplated when the ordinary allowances were fixed have, under compulsion, to be incurred, and though some regiments may plunge along for a year or two, by payments for camp found out of other funds, it is in the prospect of

adding yearly to debt instead of paying off, is merely staving off the evil day, and at the risk of an accelerated catastrophe, when attendance falls below 300 and no allowance is received.

The question of camp allowances and payments for camp should be dealt with quite apart from the ordinary allowances. The ordinary yearly allowances, which were previously just enough, should be absolutely guaranteed against having to make up for camp, for their devotion to camp pay or deficits only starves the corps in other respects. A proportion—say two-thirds—of their amount should be certain in the form of a fixed payment, proportioned according to establishment, and not to fluctuating numbers, and the remainder in the form of a capitation grant, as at present. The capitation grant might, however, with advantage be graduated according to efficiency. Thus, say that the fixed grant was £1 per head of maximum establishment, 25*s.* additional might be given for each efficient who had attended camp and was a marksman, £1 additional for each efficient who had attended camp, 15*s.* for each efficient who, not attending camp, had put in ten additional drills over the minimum, and 10*s.* for other efficients. This ought to have a good effect in stimulating regular and steady attendance, and enabling the commanding officer to homogeneously train his battalion.

Grants and allowances should certainly be given on the lines suggested in Schedule B, to encourage the passing of examinations in each subject, especially attendance at Hythe, and the general training of officers. If the general grants to the corps were made adequate in amount, the special grants for examinations should be so adjusted that they might be paid to the officer, and would be sufficient, as he passed in additional subjects, to recoup his normal annual expenditure as a subaltern and captain. A great deal can be done with Volunteer officers by encouragement and by inducements to attend courses. But most of them are busy men, constantly occupied, and with limited holidays. There is to some extent now a feeling that they are being more and more "sweated," and if the absolute conditions required are made too hard, men who might otherwise be induced gradually to work up to a higher standard may be frightened at the outset, and refuse to face a Volunteer Commission at all.

Training.—This should, of course, be concentrated on what is directly preparatory for the tasks of war. But the first and foremost preparation for war is discipline, and the second is musketry. The primary purpose of the existing Infantry Drill-Book and its general tone is to wake up the regular soldier, trained in the past on mechanical lines, and cultivate his independent intelligence and

adaptability. The Volunteer is already provided with independence of mind, and as a rule does not lack intelligence. He wants steadying to start with, and some practice in the habit of discipline. The amount of steady drill that could be compressed into his efficiency drills would never deaden his intelligence, and a certain amount of steady drill is the most effective means of laying the foundation of that steadiness and cohesion which enables men to hold together and follow their leaders through stress and loss. As to musketry, it is to be feared that record performances at Bisley are no true test of the shooting value for war purposes of the unit to which the riflemen belong. They must be tested by knowledge of the proportion which the prize-winners bear to the total strength of their corps, and by a comparison with the figure of merit of that and of other corps, as well as by a comparison of the standard of musketry training with that practised by other units in this country and abroad. One crying want is more ammunition, and facilities for preliminary practice before the classification course. But, even with more free ammunition, you may take your horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink, and only a certain number of men in a regiment are very keen on shooting. With facilities the taste can be encouraged; but one great problem is how, not merely to develop a special shooting ring in a regiment, but to raise the interest and standard of the mass.

The great essential of the training regulations of a Volunteer Force is that they should have some flexibility and be adaptable, with relaxation of hard-and-fast rules as to numbers, etc., where necessary, to the circumstances of each corps and the civil occupations of the men. The system of company training under the present regulations is most excellent for country battalions with scattered companies that cannot easily be got together, and which, without difficulty, can obtain ground for elementary company close-order drill and for tactical company training. In the case of a town Volunteer battalion, however, where the companies can easier be drilled together than apart, where ground can be got on a few occasions thoroughly suited to battalion drill, and where there is very little ground within reach suited for field manœuvre, and much competition for it, it is certainly matter for consideration, whether on a certain number of occasions, at least, the time might not be more usefully employed in steady battalion drill, which could be efficiently performed, and which would always be promoting—if not made wearisome and done too often—steadiness and the habit of discipline, than in a succession of unreal tactical exercises over inadequate ground, carried out under conditions absolutely impossible on service, which by repetition over the same

spot become as mechanical and listless as any close-order parade. Such a battalion should trust for the most of its manœuvre training to the annual camp, preceded by war games in winter for officers and non-commissioned officers, and should go into camp well steadied and pulled together by a limited number of thorough battalion drills, following on a course of company instruction, specially directed to wake up and keep active the subalterns and non-commissioned officers. The suggestion that ten preliminary drills is too few is sound, and the number should certainly be increased to from fifteen to twenty. Two drills can be put in in one evening.

Camp.—It is certainly desirable that the distinction in training and allowances between field-army and other battalions should disappear. When there are two classes, battalions which recruit the higher social *stratum* will always be disheartened and disgusted if they are compelled to remain in an inferior category. Such battalions, from the average intelligence of their men, would probably be most useful in a field force, while they are generally those whose men find most difficulty in getting away for more than a week. It is most desirable that all battalions should, if possible, go into camp for a fortnight; but if the present *minima* as regards numbers are maintained, this will in many cases be impossible. If, however, the minimum was made 50 per cent. of enrolled strength, with a provision that, where the G.O.C. recommended it, a battalion which had failed to secure its 50 per cent., and yet done good work, should receive its camp allowances, a great deal might be done, and much anxiety removed. The ordinary brigade allowance of 2*s.* 6*d.* per day is sufficient for ordinary camp expenses, including feeding of men, with the necessary additions to the ration that can be obtained on payment from Government, but this presumes care and a good attendance. But it is absolutely essential, if attendance is to be kept up, that there shall be an additional grant for the purpose of paying the men, or rather giving them some compensation for the time and wages sacrificed. The proposal of the Commission that this should be £1 per man for an attendance of twelve days is satisfactory, but, whether the payment be made as a lump sum per man, or graduated to each in proportion to rank, it ought to be clearly laid down that it is given as an allowance to the men themselves, that it is to be a uniform sum or rate for all battalions, and that the ordinary annual allowances and 2*s.* 6*d.* camp allowance are not to be used for the purpose of individual payment for camp. The practise of giving excessive rates of pay, which has prevailed in some battalions and caused some grumbling and jealousy in others, ought to be repressed, and all put in this

matter on the same footing. The £1 (proposed for the twelve days) roughly represents 1*s.* 6*d.* per day for a fortnight, and the half of that (10*s.*) ought to be allowed to the man who puts in a week's attendance.

This camp allowance is no infraction of the principle that volunteering represents unpaid service. Hitherto the Volunteer has only given his spare time at hours convenient to him and at his own free will in case of camp. Now he is compelled to go into camp as a condition of efficiency, his work or his short holiday is interfered with, and it is only reasonable that some allowance should be made to him as compensation. But circumstances have made it not only reasonable, but necessary. The 5*s.* allowance to field-army battalions of 500 has introduced the system of camp pay. Many country battalions have in desperation been driven to it for a week's camp, and other battalions, which would originally have gone cheerfully to camp without any claim at all, now consider it a grievance that they should not receive the same.

It is the natural consequence of insisting on camp as an essential part of annual battalion training—which under modern conditions it undoubtedly is—that camp should be made self-supporting, that it should not involve in any circumstances a drain on the general funds, but rather offer an inducement of a little over with good management, and that every commanding officer should be enabled to take his battalion under canvas in any strength possible, and remain for a fortnight with as many men as he can get to stay. Nothing less than the recommendation of the Commission is likely to secure this.

While camp every year is essential for the battalion, it may be questioned whether repeated camps are equally necessary for the individual Volunteer. Two in the first three years' service should be insisted on, and one more after an interval of not more than two years. But, apart from that, some relaxation might be given which would retain good men in the force. The present regulations, however, err on the side of laxity in requiring no compensating attendance from men who do not go to camp, and in all cases—at all events for five years—it is thought that every man not attending camp, except in one or two very exceptional cases, should be required to do ten additional drills. This would both improve the attendance at camp and at other drills, where the presence of a few more men is often of importance.

Ranges, etc.—Ranges and training grounds with travelling allowances should certainly be provided, and where possible, near large towns, the right to manœuvre over suitable ground that can be reached by a short rail journey on a Saturday afternoon should

be procured. Special capital expenditure on headquarters, and the improvement of existing ranges, should be further assisted. The capital expenditure on these has necessarily been very heavy.

Transport and Mobilisation Equipment.—This should be provided in all cases, the necessary retaining fees being authorised, if done on the present system.

The other recommendations, as to schools, allowances, and attendances, have already been dealt with, and it is clear that the whole series of suggestions made by the Commission would do much to increase the efficiency of the Volunteers. They embody or indicate most of the essentials that have to be kept in view.

There are, however, moral considerations that enormously affect the spirit and the welfare of the Volunteer Force. Some of these are concerned with the attitude of the Government and the military authorities, some with the action of local authorities and the British public, and some with the spirit and tone of the Volunteers themselves, and of their relations to the Regular Army.

The force has suffered greatly in the past, both morally and materially, from the extraordinary incapacity of the British public to realise the world in which it is living, and—in the absence of compulsory service—the debt it owes to the Militia and Volunteers, and the serious character of the work these forces are doing on its behalf. This obtuseness of mind is betrayed both by the reluctance of many employers to give the least concession, by the difficulty in obtaining ground to work on for a few hours in public parks, free from interruption, or in private grounds, and by the engrained habit of mind which holds that Volunteer drill conducted as a national duty is a tame form of personal amusement, which must play second fiddle to the football or cricket of gangs of "hooligans." Even where municipal authorities are most obliging, drill must sometimes be conducted in the middle of swarms of young barbarians at play, who rush in between the companies, shriek mimicry of the commands, and render their public service an intolerable nuisance to officers and men. The present writer has heard the commanding officer of an infantry battalion railed at in foul and blasphemous language because the deployment of a battalion of some hundreds delayed for a few minutes the progress of two or three golfers from one hole to another. The following incident is taken from the report within the last few days of an annual inspection of Royal Garrison Artillery, at which horsed batteries were present, with a *personnel* of 629 :—

"The garrison companies, on the return, marched past in column of companies, while the batteries deployed to the left, and, marching

back to their old position on the right of the line, got into firing order. The targets in the bay were obscured from the gunners by the esplanade, and the method of firing to be practised was that of clinometer elevation, one party of signallers being posted on the top of the Broadhill and another on board a tugboat in the bay. Greatly to the disappointment of the Volunteers, however, they were prevented from practising in consequence, first, of a number of golfers coming within the fire angle, and declining to give up their play, and secondly, by two fishing-boats which were anchored within the fire zone in the bay declining to get out of the way. After waiting for half an hour two shots were fired at an interval of eight minutes as a hint to the crews of the boats to shift, but they failed to take the suggestion, and—in the opinion of the artillerymen—discourteously remained in the position they had taken up. The intention of firing had consequently to be given up, greatly to the regret not only of the Volunteers, but also of the thousands who had assembled to witness what promised to be a fine spectacular display. Remarks indicating disappointment were heard on every side, the opinion being freely expressed that it was too bad of the occupants of the boats not to shift out of the line of fire, the more so as the annual inspection takes place only once a year, when it might naturally be supposed that one uninterrupted hour might have been granted to the artillerymen for the purpose of trying their field guns, which, by the way, are new, and of the 4·7 class which were used at Ladysmith. The number of the boat which was the greatest aggressor, it may be mentioned, was obtained."

This sort of thing ought to be impossible, and the Government should assert a claim upon all open public spaces to the extent necessary to drill in peace, on a certain number of days in the year, and for the hour or two for which alone the use is desired, the local defensive force of the nation. A very little uninterrupted use would make an enormous difference to the Volunteers, the quieter public would be provided with an interesting spectacle, volunteering would be given a proper *status* in the public mind, and the British Philistine might attain to some conception of the fitness of things. The matter should be arranged in the case of existing public parks with the local authority, and no Parliamentary powers should in future be given to any local authority without a clause requiring the use of all parks and open spaces for drill and training purposes, for a limited number of hours or a limited number of days in the year. Round some of our towns are a variety of excellent pieces of broken ground, suited for small tactical training, which one after another have been monopolised by the omnivorous

and exclusive golfer. It would do them no harm to be occasionally run over for an hour or two by the Volunteer infantry. The encouragement and recognition, apart from the practical training, would be most valuable, and is due to any of the forces of the Crown, both from the King's Government and the King's subjects.

In the relation of the Volunteer Force to the Military authorities and to the Army, much may be done by encouragement and example, but too hard-and-fast lines are to be deprecated. The present writer believes that the higher leading of divisions and brigades should almost invariably be by professional regular officers, and no worse service can be done both to Volunteers and to the Regular Army than to place them in opposite camps and set them up as rival claimants for public money and public commendation. The Volunteer infantry has made a wonderful advance from the original rifle corps, and has grown from bands of possible *franc tireurs* and amateur target sportsmen to be regarded as a disciplined force, more or less to be relied on to stand in line with regular troops in the hour of national emergency.

It has had its baptism of fire in the Service companies in South Africa; but it would be a *non sequitur*, although the rank and file of these companies were no better and no worse than most of their comrades, to argue from their performances, standing with their own regular battalions in the proportion of one to eight or ten, and sometimes with officers and non-commissioned officers exchanged, to the universal capacity of Volunteer commanding officers, company officers, non-commissioned officers, and battalions thrown on their own beam ends without sufficient previous organisation and preparation in a time of hurry and confusion. Equally erroneous would it be to treat the Volunteer battalions as simply reserves and feeders for the line, to be disorganised and sucked whenever an unprovided-for occasion made it convenient to appeal to the patriotism of the readiest, cheapest, and most haphazard reinforcement. There is the best material in the Volunteer ranks, good leadership, more or less developed in the officers, but to a certain extent regimental guidance and almost wholly brigade leadership should be afforded by men who have had some experience of practical soldiering. Year after year such men leave the Regular Army to settle down in private life; their civil interests qualify them to understand Volunteers, and it would be of the greatest value to the Volunteers if one field officer at least of each battalion were a man with some army experience.

The general linking of the Volunteer battalions to the territorial regiment of their locality has been of the greatest value, and there

has been noted in more than one quarter, with the adoption of the red-coat of the British Army, a substantial, though perhaps unconscious, advance in discipline and steadiness. The Volunteer has received a standard to work up to, and an example to follow, and experience has led the present writer to realise the essential wisdom of a remark made at the very beginning of the Volunteer movement by a relative old enough to remember the Volunteers of the great war with Napoleon. "Oh, they ought to have given them the red coat." Every volunteer—at least in populous places—in view of what is now required from him, ought to have two coats, one of a suitable colour and pattern for rough field work, and the other a smart uniform for special parades, and for wear on all these occasions, which do much to popularise and recruit the force. The general rule can best be afforded—and probably in all cases in country districts—by the local territorial regiment, but there is no rule without its exception, and the drift of country population to the towns, and the importance of utilising every current of sentiment that helps *esprit de corps*, requires such modification as is afforded by the Scottish battalions in England, and the Highland kilted battalions in Edinburgh and Glasgow. The force has lived long enough for battalions to have acquired a regimental character and tradition of their own, which is a most valuable asset, and ought not to be tampered with in deference to copying the latest irregular enemy, or fashionable continental exemplar of the moment. The great thing is that a Volunteer battalion should have a definite example, which it admires, and works up to in its own fashion. There may be one corps which prides itself on being rifles, on blowing bugles, on a sombre full dress, and on calling its two or three battalions a brigade. Another takes as its example a Highland regiment whose pipes, kilts, scarlet and tartan, express to it an ideal which is at all events a worthy one to follow. In a large centre, where men from all parts congregate, each of these appeals to men who would not otherwise be Volunteers, and who work with special pride and enthusiasm. Battalions, too, are proud of any little speciality in their titles, which cost nothing, gratify them, and all go to promote the spirit that inspires a voluntary army. A little concession to regimental wishes in uniform and titles, and a little consideration in brigading regiments, according to their character and relations with others, does a very great deal to produce that pride in the battalion, and determination to keep it up to the mark, which is an important factor in efficiency. To a Volunteer regiment these things, which appear of little moment in themselves, are of special value, for they all tend to help that sense of comradeship and cohesion which there is no

means of producing by constant companionship, and which is a bond of discipline and a stand-by in the hour of trial.

At present there is a certain sense of disparagement and "being put upon" in the Volunteer Force. It has been felt that regulations have been imposed upon it, framed by those whose ideas were trained under totally different conditions, and without consideration of the all-important fact that the members of the force had other things to do in life, with the first claim upon them, other than being Volunteers, and were not their own masters as to time and seasons. But, in spite of all, the force has patriotically faced the situation, and as yet come wonderfully well through the difficulties. The real crisis, however, comes in the winter of 1904, when the regulations of 1901, as modified in 1902, come into full force, unless superseded, or made workable for all by some financial concessions. The Government has decided against conscription; the Commission has recommended practical reforms. The country must make up its mind to fit the Army for its Imperial duties, and to realise and meet the obligation it is under to the auxiliary forces. For a comparatively small additional expenditure it will receive a vastly improved home defence force.

To-day, as a century ago, the principles which ought to regulate the auxiliary forces of the country are those expressed by the greatest of British ministers, upon whom, more than any other, great events forced the practical problem of National Defence, and whose own Volunteer battalion would have been one of the first engaged had Napoleon been able to carry out his schemes. "I was formerly, and still am, of opinion," said William Pitt, "that to a Regular Army alone, however superior, however excellent, that to the Regular Army, even aided by the Militia, we ought not solely to trust, but that . . . we ought to superadd to the Regular Army some permanent system of National Defence, either to a certain degree compulsory, or formed upon the ordinary zeal and patriotism of the country itself. This ought to be resorted to as the grand source of domestic security. The Army must be the rallying point. The Army must furnish example, must afford instruction, must give us the principles on which that national system of defence must be formed, and by which the Volunteer forces of this country, though in a military point of view inferior to the Regular Army, would, fighting on their own soil for everything dear to individuals and important to a State, be invincible."

THE NORFOLK COMMISSION.

VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT AND AN EFFECTIVE MILITIA.

BY COLONEL THOMAS INNES, C.V.O., late Lieut.-Colonel Commanding 3rd Battalion The Gordon Highlanders.

THE Committee charged with reporting on the auxiliary forces has made the discovery that the Militia is an ineffective force; that its nominal strength is made up by a considerable proportion of boys under nineteen years of age; that the training of its recruits and the annual exercise of its battalions are not sufficient; that its officers have no adequate knowledge of their ordinary duties, and no familiarity with service in the field; and, consequently, that the Militia is not fit to encounter the thoroughly trained and well-commanded troops which might invade us if we lost command of the sea.

This is, no doubt, a startling discovery, but what is most amazing about it is, that it has taken us more than half a century to make the discovery.

The existing Militia establishment was organised to meet the threat of French invasion in 1852. It was embodied to replace for home defence the regular forces required for service abroad in the Crimean War (1855) and in the Indian Mutiny (1859), and quite recently in the South African War. And, moreover, it was largely employed on these occasions to relieve the regular forces of garrison duty abroad; and, above all, it was called upon to furnish a large contingent to reinforce the regular forces in South Africa. And all this time we have been shutting our eyes to the fact that this large and costly establishment of, say, 120,000 men, which we were maintaining and employing, was, nevertheless, not to be depended on as a fighting force.

We are now, however, awakening to the folly of maintaining this large establishment without making it effective, and our eyes are opening to the explanation of this folly, which is, that, whatever may have been in contemplation when the present voluntarily enlisted Militia was established, it has all along been administered merely as a

convenient recruiting aid for the Regular Army, and has only been employed at a pinch for home defence and garrisons in the Mediterranean, and for guarding communications in South Africa, because it was not expected to have to do serious fighting in these employments, and so the special requirements for its training as a fighting force, and for providing qualified officers to command it, have met with very little attention.

There is a good deal of importance in a name, and for time immemorial that of "Militia" has been the designation of a force wanting in fighting qualities and incapable of acquiring them; and so the Militia has been left to muddle on as best it could—with boy recruits, and too few of them, and officered by gentlemen who are not professional soldiers.

Now, it is to be hoped, as we are putting our military house in order—and this serious miscarriage of so considerable a part of our establishment has been exposed—that some effectual measures will be adopted to remedy it.

To put it shortly, the miscarriage of the Militia to produce a reliable fighting force arises mainly from three causes—

1. The difficulty of maintaining its strength by voluntary enlistment.

2. The difficulty of training it sufficiently, on account of the expense of prolonged trainings, and also because prolonged training is supposed to be an obstacle to successful recruiting.

3. The difficulty of securing the services of competent officers, because the employment does not offer sufficient inducement to qualify for effective service.

Let us take these causes of failure separately, and first the recruiting difficulty. One must suppose that, when this voluntarily enlisted Militia was established, the possible failure of voluntary enlistment cannot have been altogether overlooked, but that this voluntary enlistment was adopted as an expedient to get over the greater difficulty of compulsory service; and so it was to be tried, with the ballot in the background in case of failure. It has failed, and compulsory service has been now and then ventilated, but little attention has been given to any question concerning the Militia. Now, however, at all events for the moment, public attention has been aroused by this Committee's report, because it virtually, if not quite explicitly, recommends compulsory service.

It would require a very great and imminent danger of invasion, such as that threatened by Napoleon at the beginning of last century, to reconcile the British people to compulsory service, and it would then be too late. The organising and training of a conscript force for defence would take much time, and with

modern means of transport the invasion, if possible, would be sudden. So compulsory service may be dismissed, and it is more profitable to examine the question more closely, and to make sure that we understand why voluntary enlistment for the Militia has failed. And, when one undertakes that examination of the question, it is surprising how simple it proves to be, and how incomprehensible it is that whoever framed this scheme of voluntary enlistment for the Militia should have overlooked the obstacle which he placed in the way of its success.

It is to be presumed that, for a reliable effective Militia, we require men of from twenty to thirty-five years of age, and that we must train them thoroughly. But thorough training takes time, and requires the withdrawal of the men from their ordinary civil employments. And the obvious and primary consideration in framing the scheme should have been, how to make this interruption of the man's civil employment compatible with his resumption of it as his means of livelihood when his training as a soldier is completed; otherwise it could not be expected that he would enlist. But this obvious primary consideration was entirely overlooked, and the Militiaman, on enlisting, was required to bind himself for six years to give up his civil employment for a month every year, and as that would, in the case of men having what may be termed fixed employments, involve the loss of their employments and means of living, that class of men which ought to have been regarded as the best and most reliable for the Service has been altogether excluded from it, and the ranks of the Militia are mainly filled with casual labourers, waifs and strays of all sorts, and boys waiting to grow big enough for approval as recruits for the Regular Army. These casual labourers, and waifs and strays, and boys, are not, however, to be despised. They provide material to fill the ranks of the battalion for the annual exercise, and to keep the machine in working order. But they cannot be relied on to be mustered for service, for they disappear as fast as they are enlisted by paying for their discharge, by transferring to the Regular Service, or by desertion, and the problem remains how to obviate the difficulty of requiring men with fixed employments to give enough of their time to train them thoroughly without sacrificing their employments. The solution of the problem, however, does not seem very difficult. We have two classes of men to deal with, the men with desultory, and the men with fixed employments. Why not enlist each of them on terms which suit them? The one will engage to come out for annual exercises of the battalion throughout his term of service. The other will engage to be trained as a recruit as long as may be required, but not to

come up for battalion exercise except that which immediately follows his training. Both classes, of course, would be equally liable to muster for embodiment service; but the second class would be the most reliable.

It may be taken for granted that an artisan or labourer in fixed employment, between twenty and thirty-five years of age, who contemplates enlisting, will not object to an engagement for, say, a year's training, provided that on its expiring he shall be free to earn his livelihood without the interruption and disadvantage of coming out for battalion exercises. Why, then, should not the possible Militia recruit of that class be allowed the option of enlisting on such terms—say to be trained thoroughly for a year and then to be dismissed, without liability to be called up for annual exercises of the battalion? There may be differences of opinion as to the sufficiency of such a training of the recruit without annual exercise, and as to the comparative merits of a prolonged recruit training compared with a short recruit training, supplemented by annual exercise with the battalion. But it is unnecessary to discuss these questions; they are not open ones. We cannot have either class of men except on the terms which are compatible with their means of livelihood. Even if compulsory service were to be seriously contemplated, this necessary condition would have to limit it.

By allowing this option the Militia would soon be recruited with men of the class required to secure effective battalions if embodied for service, and at the same time the enlistment would continue of the class which percolates through the Militia and is a valuable contingent to the recruiting for the Regular Service, and, meanwhile, contributes, along with the annual instalment of trained recruits, to form the strength of the Militia battalions for annual exercise.

We now come to the second difficulty—the expense of prolonged training of the Militia; and this the Committee simply ignores. It recommends longer training of recruits and longer exercises of battalions, and leaves to Parliament to find the money if it wants an effective force. But, even assuming that Parliament is prepared to pay for an effective Militia, it would certainly demand that the additional outlay is proved to be necessary, and that the outlay will secure the effective force required.

As has already been shown, we cannot have an effective Militia without allowing the proposed option on enlistment, and if the recruit adopts the alternative of a prolonged training instead of repeated calling out for battalion exercises, manifestly he will cost no more than if he took the other alternative. There would, on the contrary, be the saving of his travelling and other allowances

for repeated attendances at battalion exercises. And so, in a great measure, the difficulty would be solved of the expense of prolonged training of the recruit, and the prolongation of the battalion exercise would not be so requisite, if it were thus freed of completing the training of imperfectly drilled recruits. We should then have a proportion of the recruits under training throughout the year, and ready for one battalion exercise at the end of it; and another portion of recruits for a shorter training, and available for six battalion exercises. This would afford constant employment for the permanent staff, and leads to the discussion of a question which is a very essential one when considering the effective training of the Militia, irrespective of cost, and that is the necessity that the Militia battalion shall have the entire training of its recruits, if it is to be made reliable and effective.

As originally organised, when the battalion was called up for exercise, the recruits for the preceding eleven months, having been paid ten shillings on enlistment, were expected to assemble for training at the same time. This mixture of recruit drill and battalion exercise proved very impracticable, and experience led to the institution of "preliminary drill" for the recruits before the assembling of the battalion for exercise. This preliminary drill of recruits was conducted by the adjutant and permanent staff of the battalion, assisted by two or three company officers and some trained duty men, and so far as the time allowed, this recruit drill was satisfactory, and it was also an attractive recruiting agency for the battalion. But in an evil hour this drill of the recruits by the permanent staff of the battalion at its headquarters was superseded by the transference of the duty of drilling the recruits to the depôt of the regimental district. The Militia battalions had been incorporated with the line regiments, and it seemed naturally to follow that the recruits for the Militia should be taken for drill at the regimental depôt as they were enlisted, instead of getting a retaining bounty of ten shillings, with the obligation to appear at a future date for the drill of recruits at the Militia battalion headquarters. This change has worked very badly. It has damaged the recruiting for the Militia battalions, because it is not attractive to the class of men which should form the bulk of their recruits, that is, the men who do not contemplate transference to the line battalions. They do not feel at home at the line depôt. It is only attractive to those who enlist at a pinch for want of employment, and are ready to transfer to the line battalion at the end of their recruit drill if they have no prospect of employment; and it is attractive to young lads who are taken on to grow in the Militia until they can pass for the line. But neither of these increase the numbers of the Militia

battalion, because they percolate through it, and the waste is equal to the increase. But the training of the Militia recruits at the regimental depôt is objectionable on even a more serious ground than its adverse influence on the recruiting. It cuts out of the Militia organisation one of the most vital elements of a thoroughly effective force, that is, the complete amalgamation of all ranks of the battalion as a machine for combined action. It also deprives it of the attractive recruiting agency of its recruits when assembling for drill, bringing with them their friends and associates.

The training of its recruits is the only opportunity for the Militia battalion to thoroughly amalgamate them. If trained at the regimental depôt, they only come to their battalion for twenty-seven days' exercise, they know little of their comrades, and less of their officers, and their officers know nothing of them. Instead of this, the recruits should be assembled at the battalion headquarters, and drilled by the permanent staff, the proper drill-instructors of the battalion. The commanding officer, or second in command, should be always present, and responsible for the training of the recruits, and for the recruiting for the battalion. A due proportion of company officers should also be present by roster, and should actually superintend and be responsible for the drill and instruction of the recruits. It would also be desirable that the company sergeants, on promotion, should be obliged to attend recruit training; they would so acquire a more thorough knowledge of their duties, and gain confidence in the exercise of their authority, which is necessary to ensure respect for it.

Here, then, we should have collected at the headquarters of the battalion all the elements required to make it effective, its recruits thoroughly trained, and its whole machinery in working order, so that when the battalion is assembled for exercise it would be prepared to take advantage of all the opportunity and time which may be given it of practising its duties. There is no limit indeed to the perfection to which such a training of Militia could not be carried; it would be only a question of time and opportunity.

But we have still to deal with the difficulty, as alleged by the Committee, that the training of the officers is inadequate to fit them for their duties. This sweeping assertion is hardly justifiable. A considerable number of them are officers retired from the line battalion to serve a period with the Militia, and it is to be presumed that they are qualified for their duties. A good many more, though they have not the experience of having served in the line, have devoted much attention to their duties, and have qualified by passing examinations for promotion to the ranks they hold, and so their capacity for their duty cannot fairly be challenged.

No doubt there may be a residue of Militia officers who do not inspire confidence in their ability to render effective service, through inadequate training. But what is to be expected under the existing conditions of their service? It does not demand, under ordinary circumstances, more than the not very difficult routine of a battalion exercise once a year. Everything that is troublesome is done, or may be done, by the adjutant and permanent staff. It may be only an occupation for a month's idle time in a pleasant society. But if participation in the discharge of the whole duties of an officer, from the enlistment of the recruit to the command of the company and the battalion, were insisted upon and fairly remunerated, there is no reason to fear a shortcoming in the Militia officer more than in the Regular Service; and, independent of remuneration, the fulfilment of important duties would create a greater interest in his service, and stimulate him more to fit himself for them.

When we come to look at the Militia with a clear knowledge of its history, and of all the details of its organisation which have grown up in the past fifty years, it is not surprising that a Committee appointed to report upon it should find it defective. It could not well be otherwise. No effort has been made to remove the obstacles to its development as a reliable fighting force; rather the reverse—they have been added to. But it is surprising that such a Committee should suggest heroic remedies which are practically impossible, and overlook more modest and practicable measures which, if thoroughly carried out, would make the Militia a thoroughly reliable force, of which the country would be proud.

THOMAS INNES.

NOTE.—It is quite certain that the Militia is the key to the "Problem of the Army," and requires only to be put in proper order. The difficulty is to get the men. There are two ways of doing this: the one is to make it worth a man's while to serve voluntarily, and the other, to adopt compulsory service. We must make our choice without much further delay. The question of how to frame a system of sound training is a very important one indeed; but is of slight consequence in comparison with the immediately urgent need of filling the ranks with men who are worth having. Yet it must not be forgotten that the nature of the system of training which we may elect to follow must necessarily have its favourable or unfavourable effect upon recruiting—or upon the extent of the hardships involved by compulsory service. Conditions, moreover, that are suitable in one district may not be so in another.—ED. U. S. M.

ARMY RECRUITING.

By Colonel M. J. King-Harman.

The last General Annual Report on the British Army was compiled up to the end of September, 1903, which is the date now fixed as the termination of the official recruiting year, and it was issued on the 11th April 1904. In accordance with ancient custom, that Report was duly presented to both Houses of Parliament, and has doubtless been studied by each Member of those august assemblages with the same amount of unbiased patriotic care which is usually bestowed by our public-spirited legislators and representatives on all reports and other documents which are of special national importance. The vast majority of the intelligent reading public, outside the Army, have also, without doubt, done the same; and have probably satisfied themselves that there cannot possibly be any more "muddling through" the next time we are called on to fight, and that England has at last proved true to herself.

What an awful awakening it would be if we found ourselves forced into a war with a great Power during this year 1904. Why, there is scarcely a page in the whole 141 pages of the printed Report which does not point eloquently to the inefficiency of our land forces, to the physical degeneration of the inhabitants of Great Britain, to our suicidal national apathy, and to our absolute unreadiness for war with anybody. And this is no fancy-drawn statement by an ignorant pessimist, for it is clearly shown in the simple, significant words and figures now published to the world, which any one can read and understand if he is so minded.

It was the constant, careful study of similar reports which enabled the Boer leaders to know exactly when and how to strike us; but those astute observers had fortunately failed to make allowances for that splendid body of troops in India, which had been prepared for war by such men as Lord Roberts and Sir Edwin Collen, and which to them was an unknown quantity, as it is indeed to most Members of Parliament.

But the policy of the ostrich is ever dear to the British mind, non-official as well as official, although it never serves to save the ostrich.

What would the great Napoleon say if he could visit the world now and find that the nation he once so much feared had just had a most narrow escape from disastrous defeat at the hands of the smallest nationality in the civilised world; and that the head-quarters of the new "nation of shopkeepers" had been transferred to Berlin? What a contrast between the nation which waged such great wars in those days, and paid the enormous cost from her own resources, with the one we see to-day, drained of men and money, and obliged to borrow both from other places outside England, in order to maintain our position in South Africa. If we go on at that rate during the next hundred years, what will be the position of England among the nations of the world in 2004?

The first point that will probably strike the reader of the Report is the disinclination of eligible men to accept military service under *existing conditions;* and this applies equally to the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. Then, the enormous number of rejections (chiefly on physical grounds), must attract serious attention; for they amount to 31,286, out of a total of 60,861, medically inspected; and to that must be added 2624 more, who became non-effective within three months after enlistment (605 of whom were deserters). Then, if we examine the figures in Part VII., we see clearly that out of a total of 257,386 fighting men (excluding officers), we are employing and paying no less than 30,110—or the equivalent of 30 battalions—immature lads, who would not be accepted for service in France or Germany on account of their youth. And be it remembered that the half-starved town-bred English boy of even twenty-one cannot compare either physically or morally with the healthy, well-fed, fully developed, country-bred French or German lads of the same age. Further, it is a significant fact—which will not be found in the Report—that the average recruit of to-day is one inch less round the chest, a stone less in weight, and one inch less in height, than he was twenty-five years ago; so said that well-known authority, Sir James Sawyer, in a recent speech at Birmingham.

Moreover, it will not escape the notice of all who can read between the lines that 50 per cent. of the recruits enlisted during 1903 refused to join the territorial regiment of the district. Each one will have to work out the figures of Table I. for himself, as the results given in the Report are rather mystifying. Fortunately, neither the Cavalry nor the Guards were hampered by the "territorial" craze. The pitiful story of the recruiting in Ireland shows how little is known of the way in which clerical influence affects recruiting in that distracted island; but the old recruiting sergeants could tell the truth if they dared do so.

The figures given in Part III. do not tally with those in Table VII.,

Part X., but we may conclude that by the end of September last there had been 38,146 trained men transferred to the Reserve, of whom 25,118 obtained employment, thus leaving a balance of 13,028 able-bodied trained soldiers, who have been turned adrift on a pittance of sixpence a day, to swell the ever-increasing crowd of unfortunate, hopeless tramps, who are such a reproach and disgrace to our country. Surely, no man ever willingly places himself in the miserably degraded position of a tramp; nor can it by any possible stretch of imagination be considered a sign of healthy sagacious administration on the part of a State which enforces such a condition on its people every year.

Finally, the reporter expresses the oft-repeated pious hope, "that a better class of recruit will be attracted to the Service in large numbers," to which we will, one and all, say "Amen," as usual. And so this dangerous farce goes on, year after year.

Is there anything in all that which can be considered a matter of congratulation by the apathetic British public? How many of us will feel proud of our country when we think of the joy and eagerness with which such startling facts are perused and noted by all other nations? And lastly, how many of us will stir a hand, or even speak a word, in an honest attempt to apply the proper remedies for this alarming state of national weakness and decay, which is disclosed in the Report?

But there is nothing new in all this; for year after year we are supplied with similar Reports from the Inspector General, trying to report a hopeful state of affairs, and, for the sake of his own reputation, doing his utmost to make the best of matters. Lord Denman was well within the mark when addressing a public meeting in April last. He said that "all the expensive tinkering with the War Office had not added a single recruit to his Majesty's forces, and it was recruits that they wanted. If they excepted a few picked corps, the Regular Army consisted of derelicts and weeds, and even of these a diminishing number." And if he had gone on and told his audience of the deplorable but preventable shrinkage in the Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers, he would have startled them not a little.

What England requires, and what England must have if she intends to keep her place amongst the nations of the world, is a popular, efficient, national army, in the fullest sense of the terms, and ready at a moment's notice to enforce the nation's mandate, and to maintain the nation's honour in any part of the world. *That is what England is paying for* to-day: she is not paying for the purpose of being served by "derelicts and weeds," which must necessarily be put on one side directly war becomes imminent. . . .

If such an army was to be provided by means of "universal service," so as to be thoroughly representative of the true manhood of the nation, the methods of organisation would simply follow those which were long ago adopted by other European nations; but the great majority of the upper and middle classes are strangely averse to taking any active part in such matters, as an obligatory duty; so we must fain continue the antiquated methods which have served us so badly already, which will serve us worse and worse as time goes on (unless they are very much altered and improved), and which reduces our army to being an expensive plaything for Parliamentarians to experiment on, and for self-satisfied politicians to wrangle over.

The requirements of such an army would seem to be most easily met if it was composed of three separate and distinct lines, as of old. The first line must be full of *mature professional soldiers*; the second, of a half-trained *and contented* Yeomanry and Militia; and the third to include all the Volunteer corps and reserves.

In referring to the past history of the British Army, for the purposes of a short paper like this, it is not necessary, nor is it desirable, to go back further than the time when the late Lord Cardwell was Secretary of State for War; because it is from that date that the regeneration—or the degeneration—of our land forces has been, and must be, counted. The system then introduced gave us an army which looked very satisfactory on paper to the uninformed public, but which was unable to stand the test of war; inasmuch as there was not one single unit ready to take the field until all the unfit boys had been weeded out and replaced by men from the untrained Reserve, and until a sufficient number of suitable horses had been procured for the mounted corps. Thus the Reserve had been used up as substitutes before a shot had been fired, and were not forthcoming when they were sorely needed. Then everybody abused the War Office. But the War Office were not to blame; they did all that was possible under the circumstances, and their successors will do no better with the *personnel* and *matériel* now at their disposal, unless they alter the methods of procedure considerably. There has been a loud and bitter cry throughout the country for army reform; and there would be no great difficulty in bringing it about, if we could only emancipate ourselves from the thraldom of party politics and red tape, which seems to crush all power of individuality and initiative, and to make men afraid of doing that which they know to be honest and right by their country.

We are a boasting nation, and one of our favourite boasts is that our army is so good because it is recruited entirely on the voluntary system; but we wilfully shut our eyes to the fact that

the two most successful recruiting agents that have been known hitherto are Want and Necessity. So much for the voluntary system. Away with such cant and hypocrisy, and let us face the matter squarely, and make an honest, hearty endeavour to solve the problem fairly to both army and nation.

But in order to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, it is necessary to at once break away from all preconceived ideas, and to make a fresh start on the basis of the famous memorial from fifty-five members of the House of Commons, which was presented to the Prime Minister, and was afterwards considered in Committee on the 23rd July, 1897. In that memorial will be found the following words, which are as true to-day as they were then :—

"The battalions which are first for service are to a large extent composed of immature soldiers, deficient in the age and stamina necessary to enable them to endure the hardships of a campaign; and these battalions are incapable of taking the field without the addition of large drafts from other regiments, or the calling out of the Reserves."

There we have the whole case in the proverbial nutshell, and it is the bounden duty of every man, ay, and of every woman too, of the nation, to insist on having that helpless, disgraceful condition of the Army altered without any more delay.

We also boast, and with more justice this time, of our magnificent Navy, which the more timorous, short-sighted, and apathetic of our stay-at-home people fondly imagine will be able to keep us safe from invasion; but we are in danger of overlooking the fact that the efforts of the fleet will be seriously hampered by the knowledge that the Army, which ought to be behind them, is absolutely unready for war, and is unable to co-operate in any useful manner.

Having pointed out the present dangerous condition of our Army, and having endeavoured to clear away some of the many fallacies which have for long obscured the national vision, let us try to work out a scheme by which we can produce the most suitable army for our purposes, with the least disarrangement of existing institutions. And if any one can improve on the following suggestions—which are submitted with much diffidence—let him do so at once, so that the responsible authorities may learn the opinions of those who are outside the charmed circle of the Cabinet and the War Office. And let all such opinions be guided as far as possible by the rules of common sense and patriotism alone.

Querists often ask, what is a professional soldier? And the simplest answer to that appears to be, that he is a man who adopts

soldiering as his permanent means of livelihood. There will be found men in all professions who change their minds, and the Army will not be found exceptional in that respect; but, as a rule, it may safely be assumed that a man who likes his adopted profession well enough to stick to it for three years, will wish to remain in it, and will certainly not waste his time in trying one from which he is almost sure to be dismissed as soon as he becomes master of it, unless it happens that he has been forced to adopt it as a last means of saving himself from starvation; and even then he might possibly prefer to remain in it, rather than run the risk of having to face starvation a second time. That is human nature all the world over, and we must recognise that when dealing with the recruiting problem from a practical point of view. A professional army is a necessity of our national existence, and it can be easily maintained if we only throw theory and red tape to the winds, and adopt such measures as are suitable to human nature, as it exists in England to-day; remembering that the conditions under which the mass of the people now live are different to what they were fifty years ago. The abandonment of the land, and the consequent crowding into towns, is the chief cause of this difference, and it renders recruiting more difficult than it used to be; and the bad influence exercised by trade unionism is another, for which allowances must be made. But enough of that; we have not to deal here with the causes; we have to face the difficulties, and to find the best means of overcoming them. First let us see what alterations can be made in the existing conditions of Army service which will make such service more attractive to young men of the working classes.

The daily pay, food, clothing, and accommodation are all on a sufficiently liberal scale, and the new scale of additional service pay will no doubt be fully appreciated; but the man who selects the Army for his profession wants something more. He does not want his previous character to be closely inquired into; he does not want to be molly-coddled or put to sleep in those effeminate "ragging-traps" called cubicles; nor to be roused up constantly at nights by his rowdy undisciplined comrades coming back to barracks at any hour they please; and he does not like being dressed up in foreign-looking caps or clothes which make him the laughing-stock of his former companions; but he does want to be treated as a man, and dealt with in a straightforward way, as he would be if he belonged to the great railway army of porters and artisans; he wants strict but just discipline all round; and he wants his officers to be English gentlemen; but above all things, he wants a clear understanding that he may be allowed to serve on as

a soldier for as long as its suits him to do so, or until he becomes eligible for a pension. Is there anything unreasonable in those very human wants? or is there any valid objection to any one of them? If not, let them be all acceded to at once, so as to remove all visible stumbling-blocks as quickly as possible. Surely, the man who gives his services voluntarily ought, in common fairness, to be allowed to continue them in the same voluntary manner, so long as he proves himself capable of carrying on his work satisfactorily. That seems to be merely common-sense justice to the man. But there are always two sides to every bargain, and in these recruiting bargains the other side is occupied by the State, which incurs certain expenses in starting each man on his career, and it is necessary to safeguard the interests of the employer by imposing a limit of time, within which the man shall not be freed from his engagement without paying a forfeit. Let that be definitely fixed at three years, and let it be distinctly stated in the regulations that after that time every man of approved conduct may be free to stay on for as long as he is physically fit, until he is qualified for pension, or to join the Reserve at any time, provided that his troop or company is not more than 10 per cent. below strength; but that no man of indifferent conduct shall be allowed the privilege of joining the Reserve at all. It is more in accordance with the soldier's idea of justice to test his character after actual trial, rather than before; and, moreover, it is well known to all recruiters that many suitable-looking men have been lost to the Army owing to the recent stringent regulations regarding previous character. Good conduct and all soldierly qualities are fostered by means of strict discipline, without which a regiment becomes a mob. Our best regiments have ever been those in which the strictest barrack discipline prevailed, and any relaxation of those necessary bonds is seriously detrimental to the enlistment of well-conducted men, as well as to the retention of good soldiers, who would otherwise remain and do credit to the Service.

But, it may be asked, if all these concessions are granted, will they ensure an annual adequate supply of suitable recruits, so as to keep our regiments up to full strength and always ready for active service? the plain answer to which is, No; they will not do so of themselves until the universal distrust, suspicion, and discontent engendered and developed during the past thirty years and more have given place to a more healthy feeling on the part of those whom we should try to attract to the profession of arms. But the main cause which lies at the root of the recruiting difficulty is that *we are not a military nation.* The familiar words, "We

don't want to fight, but by Jingo if we do," give a fairly accurate though not a flattering description of what we are in a military sense; but we must draw the line there, because we have not got the men, and the money is very short.

But we need not despair yet, as there is still another course open to us, which, if tried, will certainly fill the ranks with professional soldiers, and which will prove a blessing to the country in other ways. The course now proposed is as follows: that Government should take to themselves powers to enlist every boy over school age (fourteen years) who is unemployed, unless such boy passes on direct from his elementary school to a recognised school, either secondary or technical, for further education, or joins one of the "continuation" classes, of which so many are to be found in our large towns; or becomes regularly apprenticed to some trade or calling other than those of selling newspapers, flowers, and suchlike things in the streets.

The State is directly interested in decreasing pauperism, idleness, and crime on the part of those who have been educated at the public expense, and whose unfortunate position in life is no fault of their own; therefore it follows as a necessary part of the scheme that all such boys shall be enlisted as permanent professional soldiers, to serve for a fixed period, say, up to forty years of age, in the Regulars or Militia, as may be considered desirable in each individual case, and then to receive a pension, and to be liable to serve for ten years longer in the Garrison Reserve without pay. No very marked results could be expected for the first three or four years, or until the older boys had attained the age of eighteen years of age; but after that there would be a continuous flow of splendid ready-made soldiers into the ranks every year, and we should soon have no difficulty in maintaining an army worthy of the nation, without the hardships of conscription.

The idea appears to be a novel one, and it certainly has never been tried before, but surely it is none the worse for that. No doubt it possesses some disadvantages which are not apparent at present; but it does seem to contain the elements of success, besides the possibility of paving the way for other schemes which may eventually prove useful to the country.

It is strange how dense and slow of comprehension some people are when one tries to reason with them about our public and social duties to our neighbours, about using our utmost endeavours to relieve the poor, or to relieve the country of the crushing burden of the poor generally, and that product of modern English civilisation, the unemployed poor, specially. They will tell you that all such is the duty of the State, as represented by Parliament; and so it

is to a great extent; but a certain share of those responsibilities attaches to each individual; and it is the bounden duty of all to assist the State to act wisely in such matters.

Now let us see in what manner the Army can render useful assistance in relieving distress, in improving the moral and physical condition of the people, in raising the standard all round, and in becoming a great power for good throughout Great Britain. We do not often give a thought to that side of the question, or to the enormous influence for good which is in the power of Army administration to bear on many important national questions. Business instincts are supposed to colour everything in England; why, then, cannot the military authorities be more business-like, and see that the more they help the country by giving suitable employment to the unemployed, the more the country will eventually help them by having a steadily increasing supply of healthy, stalwart youths to fill the ranks of Line and Militia as well as the Reserve. There is no difficulty in seeing that, if only they wish to do so; but the trouble is that up to now they have preferred to stick to the old beaten paths, which lead only to our accustomed inefficiency and national impotence, and have made matters worse by adopting a system which throws an annual contingent of homeless and hopeless tramps out of the only employment for which they are suited. In what way does that pay the country?

When H.R.H. the Prince of Wales called on the nation recently to wake up, he doubtless meant that we should shake off our old sleepy irrational methods, and rouse ourselves to combined and continuous strenuous efforts for the advancement of the country. The practical response of the Army to that call from the first gentleman in England has yet to come.

Most thinking people are aware of the urgent necessity for having an efficient Army, and are casting about for a means of supplying it; they are even anxious to meet it at a great cost, if they can only see a practical way which will be a real national gain, and not a sham. In these few pages they will find the suggestions of one humble military student; in the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE of February last the Editor gave an exceedingly practical solution of the question; and in the *Fortnightly Review* for April, 1903, they will find a splendidly written contribution from the pen of that fine writer, Mr. Sidney Low, which will show them a different way of arriving at the same end.

If none of these ideas meet with approval, some workable scheme will have to be evolved, and that right soon.

The first step necessary before collecting the boys will be to obtain returns from all the educational authorities in the kingdom

showing approximately the probable number of boys leaving elementary schools during the current year, and the probable number of those who are likely to be unemployed. The information could be obtained in a very short time, and would form a convenient basis on which to draw up all necessary calculations regarding the requisite arrangements for housing, feeding, and clothing the boys. The construction of barracks at convenient military centres, and all the details connected with the subsequent training and instruction, would not take long when once the final orders were passed, and the scheme could probably be got into working order within twelve months; but during the first two or three years there would have to be special extra arrangements made in order to provide for all the older boys who would be drafted in from the various industrial schools, reformatories, and refuges. No particular difficulties need be anticipated, because we have those grand institutions, the Duke of York's and the Royal Hibernian Schools, as worthy patterns to follow; and there seems no reason why the senior boys from those places should not also greatly assist in the work.

The two grand principles on which this suggestion is based are, first, the utilisation of all the sound boyhood of the nation which has hitherto been going to waste; and, secondly, the employment of the Army for that purpose, as a means of attaining to that great end, the permanent improvement of the moral and physical standard of the nation. Are those objects unworthy of our serious attention?

Unfortunately, the only way in which an obscure individual can bring his ideas to the notice of the public is through the kindness of those editors who will allow their columns to be used for that purpose; and even then the number of readers is a very small proportion of the mass of intellectual people who are really interested in the subject, and whose criticisms are of importance in determining the value of those ideas; and an additional difficulty is that nowadays there are not many who will interest themselves in a subject of a non-political nature like this, which will involve special legislation as well as a considerable expenditure of public money. Moreover, the perusal of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces, and the abortive conclusions arrived at therein, will probably prejudice people against reading any more suggested panaceas for army reform.

It has been already stated that we are not a military nation; and not only is that so, but there is amongst the people of England alone a distinct, though almost undefinable, feeling of antipathy to anything like militarism, or even the excessive display of military force in the country. It is a national sentiment which has been

handed down from generation to generation, and which must be recognised as a factor of great moral strength working against any amelioration of the state of the Army. Therefore, it seems needful that any steps proposed for army reform should be manifestly directed towards some object—other than war—dear to the hearts of all Englishmen of all shades of politics and religion ; otherwise, the public sympathy will be withheld. And this, notwithstanding that the revelations of the late war in South Africa have developed a feeling of insecurity which is not working for the good of England in any direction. But there is a steadily increasing number who are inclined to believe that the term "National Defence" does not only mean the defence of these islands, and the trade of them against foreign foes, but that it also includes defence against our own selves ; that is to say, against the many foes to law and order who are constantly at work in our midst. One step further on that line of reasoning will probably show them how easy it would be to use the energies of the latter in keeping off the former, and how dangerous it is to postpone doing so any longer.

Englishmen will not stand conscription, such as is known on the Continent, which holds nations in its iron grasp and adds some fifty per cent. to the labour and suffering of the world by directing human effort into unproductive and wasteful channels ; but there seems no reason why they should not welcome a form of militarism which will tend towards relief of distress, decrease of crime, reduction of taxation, and diminution of disease, whilst it improves both morals and physique, and gives us a sufficient and immediately efficient Army. The outside public know little of the great good that is being done now in the Army as a school of moral reform. But the fact that about one-fourth of the entire Army is enrolled in the ranks of the Royal Army Temperance Association is a proof of that, and shows the once much-maligned Army to be a grand national school for temperance.

But what will become of the Reserve, upon which we have been taught to rely when we are in any military difficulty ? Under the proposed scheme all men now in the Reserve would be re-enlisted in any corps they wished to join, as vacancies occurred, for further continuous voluntary service, and they would probably keep the ranks full until the first batch of boys were ready to join the ranks. And the existing Reserve, *which is not a real reserve,* will give place to the Militia as the second line. With the ranks full of full-grown men and efficient soldiers, who cost no more than the immature, unready lads now employed, there will no longer be any need to keep up sixty or seventy thousand substitutes. The term "reserve" implies expansion by means of additional force kept back in store for

this purpose, and differs entirely from the other term, "substitute." Let us therefore deal honestly by the nation in future, and so arrange that the next time a reserve is formed, it shall be a real [illegible] force; and further, let all such reservists be allowed the privilege of keeping up their professional knowledge by means of annual trainings on full pay, with the nearest regiment. It is well to bear in mind that it is the acknowledged incapacity of our present first line which necessitates the expensive upkeep of the present Reserves. If every taxpayer in the kingdom would only realise the significance of the fact, there would not be much more trouble in working out a practical scheme of reform; but if we obstinately refuse to profit by our past sad experiences, we shall be left the sole choice between radical enforcement in the near future and the much-dreaded universal conscription. Therefore, let Englishmen cease all useless bickerings and the tyranny of political party strife, and let them unite for once in forcing our rulers to give us such an Army as will suffice to keep the Empire intact.

After the exhaustive report by the Royal Commission, which has only just come to hand (5th May), it would be unseemly to make any remarks here regarding the Auxiliary Forces; unless it be to insist on the impossibility of making them efficient until every member of them is absolutely contented with his lot, and until the administration of their affairs is separated from that of the Line, and conducted in a totally different manner to what it is now. Discontent will ever produce inefficiency; and discontent has for years been rampant in those forces.

It must be considered providential—it cannot be purely accidental—that at such a critical period of our national life, and after such an exhibition of our military unreadiness as was revealed in South Africa, we should, for the first time since the days of Wellington, have at the head of our War Department a man of strong personality, who has proved himself to be proficient in military knowledge, and to be in deadly earnest in everything he undertakes; but he requires, and will surely receive, the unstinted support of the whole undivided nation in the gigantic task before him. Therefore, let us all join in hoping that the practical common-sense, grit, dogged determination, and far-seeing, honest patriotism which combined to produce such a magnificent Navy, will now be wisely directed to the formation of an equally good Army. Then, but not till then, shall we be able to say with our great poet—

> "Come the four corners of the world in arms,
> And we shall shock them. Naught shall make us rue,
> If England to herself do rest but true."

M. J. KING-HARMAN.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN STRATEGY.

By Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E.

IX.

The campaign of Ulm, dealt with in the two previous chapters, is of special interest because it marks the maximum of what could be attained by the Emperor's method of making war "without magazines," relying on the increased resources daily rendered available for the troops by the area swept over in their rapid marches.

As we have seen from the complaints of his marshals, he touched about the high-water mark of the attainable in the work he succeeded in getting out of his men. In the subsequent campaign of Austerlitz the same degree of mobility, combined with certainty in the execution of orders, could not be kept up, and though in his movements to Jena in good weather, and at the most favourable season of the year, the rate was momentarily exceeded up to the decisive collision, after which date he lived on the enemy's accumulations, he never again approached it when in command of approximately equal numbers.

Immediately after the occupation of Berlin his forces moved into Eastern Prussia; thence into Poland, and then the weak points of his system began to develop. Even before they had reached the Passarge it became evident to him that it was not enough to tell the troop commanders to provide themselves with four days' rations in order to ensure its being done. He had to turn his attention to the methods of the Frederician magazine and convoy system, but then he began to learn, as Mack had learnt in the preceding year, that it is one thing to order a system and quite another to educate an army to carry it out. As the Austrians, accustomed to magazines, could not take readily to requisitions, so the French, accustomed to requisitions, could not adjust themselves to magazines, and, least of all, to the convoy duty these entailed. The country was alternately either deep sand or deeper mud, made roads almost non-existent, and the French, being poor horse-masters, and altogether unaccustomed to the niceties of

baggage packing, where every pound counts, broke down the poor little horses of the country as fast as they captured them.

The Russians, however, were at home in these surroundings, and for once French mobility failed. They could not concentrate in adequate numbers at the decisive point, and at Eylau they only escaped disaster because their opponent had not the battlefield instinct of the Emperor. Practically both sides were beaten, only the Russians gave way in what for them should have been the moment of victory. During that winter campaign the sufferings of the French reached the limit of the endurable, and from that time forward the French armies began to wane.* Heilsberg was again a defeat, but then came to Napoleon a tactical inspiration which enabled him for years to command success on the battlefield, though he could no longer ensure it by the strategical direction of his troops.

This inspiration was the direct consequence of the appalling slaughter inflicted on Augereau's (VIIth) corps by the Russian case-fire from their massed batteries, an incident already referred to in my previous letters in these pages on the "Evolution of Infantry Tactics." Whether the idea originally emanated from Napoleon, or was suggested by Senarmont, is, I believe, still a matter of opinion; but after Heilsberg the French began to make a practice of massing their Artillery and galloping up to case-shot range to prepare the way for their Infantry, and Friedland, the final action of this campaign, was the first time in which the power of the new form of attack was thoroughly demonstrated. Of course case-shot had often been employed before, but only locally, and not as a comprehensive idea. At the outset of the Revolution the batteries were still far too deficient in mobility, and unaccustomed to combined manœuvres, and as, whilst the French Infantry developed their skirmishing tactics, their enemies widened their fronts to avoid being out-flanked, targets for the full development of artillery power were rarely met with until, all the old Regular Armies having disappeared, their places were taken by bodies of armed men who could no longer fight in line, but had to be brought forward in dense columns if they were to be used at all.

From this time forward battles assumed the stereotyped form so often referred to in these pages, and the last trace of "strategy" in its eighteenth-century significance vanished. Henceforward, omitting the campaign in Russia in 1812, as an exceptional case, armies marched straight for one another by the straightest

* See "The Napoleonic Conscription" in 'Cavalry *v.* Infantry,' by the author, published by Messrs. Hudson & Kimberley, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

roads on the broadest possible front for subsistence, on the narrowest for fighting, and communications were only threatened when a great excess of numbers enabled one to overlap the other without incurring danger of defeat.

Meanwhile in Spain and Portugal other forces were at work which conditioned the nature of the struggle. It is beyond all doubt now that Napoleon never really grasped the peculiarities either of the theatre of war or its inhabitants, nor had he taken to heart the lessons of 1807 in Poland. He could not bring himself to believe in the utter sterility of what was generally reputed a rich country, and his marshals found it entirely impossible to conform to his instructions to live on the country. To subsist they had to separate, and if forced to combine to fight, a few days of concentration brought them to the verge of starvation.

This was where the strength of our system, which was the old Frederician system, of convoys, open markets, and magazines, made itself felt. Once it had become adequately organised, and money enough was forthcoming to keep it going, it will be found that all the Duke of Wellington's great successes were based on an exact calculation of the time it would take the enemy to concentrate to interfere with his designs, and the admirable use he made of this time allowance.

Probably no leader in history has ever gone down to the bed-rock facts of the situation or seen more clearly all they implied. By a rapid approach he invested the fortress indispensable for his further movements, besieged it with all vigour to reduce its fire power and the distance without cover to be traversed, and then when the advance of the French relieving army was almost within striking distance, he assaulted the breaches, sparing no loss of life to succeed. For the rest he relied on the fighting power and discipline of his men, and even when out-manœuvred—as he frequently was—his tactical quickness and the perfect cohesion of his relatively well-fed forces always sufficed to cut through the enveloping net his antagonist strove to weave around him.

But just as our tactics drew no attention from the other armies, too busy with their own concerns to attend to ours, our strategy and its secrets remained unnoticed, and all eyes were centred on Napoleon's last great efforts to keep back the allies from Paris.

This penultimate effort of his, grand as it undoubtedly was, has never been subjected to the searching analysis it deserves in this country, partly because we have been content to take our information from contemporary French authorities, blinded by their devotion to their great leader's name, and quite unaware of the system of political intrigue which underlay all his calculations,

partly also because in considering the influence of the topography of the district in which it was fought, we have entirely overlooked the very considerable part played by the inhabitants in aiding the defence and hampering the attack, a part which it is submitted had far greater effect on the course of the struggle than the direction of the rivers as obstacles.

In fact, the conditions in 1814 bring us nearer to the Boer War, in its essence, than any other campaign ever fought in Europe. The French armies were small, and, being in their own country, were far more mobile than the invading hosts; for the friendly inhabitants facilitated their movements and concealed their whereabouts by every means in their power, whilst revealing and hampering those of the invader, who made also the fatal mistake of forgetting that it is not expedient to push the law of force to its utmost extremity. During the same year, where we in the south of France respected private property and paid ready money for supplies, thereby winning the inhabitants over to our side, the Cossacks and Prussians behaved like devils incarnate, with the result that no isolated riders or weak detachments were safe, and every vestige of food was buried or hidden in the forests the moment the enemy came in sight.

To this must be added, as Marwitz in his invaluable diary has so often pointed out, the fact that the Prussian Cavalry horses were so completely broken down and the men so indifferently trained that modern scouting was an absolute impossibility, and though the Cossacks could move, they were far too unintelligent to send in either useful or reliable information. And over all lay the dread of the Emperor's personality—if in 1813 his presence had been estimated as worth 40,000 additional men, in 1814 it was nearly double that figure. Whenever he appeared before the Austrians, the latter ran, and it was all that Blücher could do to prevent the Silesian army running too.

To prove that this was the case, it is only necessary to take the situations as given in 'Hamley'—almost any one will serve the the purpose—and analyse it as between troops of equal quality and equal mobility. It will be found that, in spite of all the obstacles the student of 'Hamley' is compelled to stumble over, a vigorous offensive must have immediately led to decisive results.

The situation at Bar sur Aube on the morning of the battle of Brienne will perhaps best serve our purpose (Hamley's 'Operations of War,' Chapter XIV.).

If in the above situation one eliminates the names Napoleon, Blücher, Schwarzenberg, and substitutes Red force *v.* Blue force, as in a war game, the odds are at least one hundred to one that

the orders issued by the numerically superior side would ensure the surrender or retreat of the weaker within a very few hours, and the same would be the case in almost any other situation the campaign discloses. But in practice the weaker was almost invariably successful, and it is only when one comes on the trail of political intrigues and personal jealousies by which the allied headquarters were riven that the explanation becomes apparent.

Blücher, for instance, was surprised and nearly captured by Napoleon on the night of the 10th February at Sezanne, not because the Silesian army did not understand outpost duties, but because the whole of Pahlen's Cossacks, some 10,000 in strength, assigned to Blücher, and entrusted by him with the special mission of guarding his exposed flank, had been withdrawn by Schwarzenberg some forty-eight hours earlier, and the notification of their withdrawal did not reach him till the moment of the attack itself.

Whenever, throughout the campaign, Napoleon felt himself in difficulties, he wrote a pitiful appeal to his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, who for obvious reasons did not wish the extreme humiliation of his daughter's husband, and if direct orders could not be given to relax the pressure, other influences and implements were always at hand to assist him in attaining his ends.

It was only when at length Blücher and Gneisenau took the bit between their teeth, and, neglecting every established rule of the game, safety of communications, and so forth, marched straight on Paris, confident in their power to overrun by sheer hard fighting any force that might be placed across their path, that the campaign was brought to the only conclusion which could satisfy the nations, though the situation was by no means pleasing to their rulers.

Yet out of this campaign there has been pieced together a marvellous theory of the value of obstacles, which has proved, I am inclined to think, the greatest stumbling-block in the path of rational military study; simply because the reasons alleged in support were so repugnant to common sense that the great majority refused to consider a science which could postulate such absurdities. I do not suggest that this refusal formulated itself in the average staff-college student's mind in quite such a direct form; had it done so, the evil would have minimised itself, but actually our average young officers are far too modest to trust their own judgment in such matters, and finding themselves in opposition to the views of the text-book, which by tradition had acquired the weight of revelation, they reasoned: "The book says it is so, and who am I that I should dispute the conclusions of such an able author? Since it is quite evident to me that I never shall be able to

understand his conclusions, I must be very stupid, and it will be mere waste of time for me to pursue the subject any further."

This, at any rate, was for many years my own attitude towards the subject, and dozens of my friends have owned up to it likewise. It was only when chance threw me amongst men who had never heard of 'Hamley,' but had marched and fought all over the ground and studied war under very different masters, that I was at length able to free myself from the chain of illusion and see things as they are, and not through a mist of misinformation.

As between equal forces, obstacles cut both ways. If a hundred men can defend, say, a bridge against a thousand for a given time, when facing in one direction, it can be held equally well against similar odds in the other. This is considering the bridge only. Taking it with its topographical surroundings, re-entrant angles, higher banks, etc., these alternate from side to side, so that on a strategical front they usually balance one another, and the net gain results to the side which can make the best use of the delay the passage of the obstacle must entail. This brings in the question of mobility or of greater numerical strength, which, if sufficient, can be substituted in the equation for mobility, and the practical solution of the problem is merely to turn the advantage of delay against the adversary, by holding him in front with the least possible force and turning his flank with the remainder, which brings us back to the old original formula of concentration on the decisive point, nothing more and nothing less.

Stated in this form, every average subaltern learns to solve it in a few weeks. I have tested the point of late years over and over again. I have taken some well-known military situation, eliminated the awe-inspiring names, and given it to my pupils to solve with just as much military information as was available to the actual combatants, and in at least 95 per cent. of cases the solution has invariably been that actually adopted when political considerations did not intervene.

After a few weeks' practice they have worked with the precision of machinery, their departure from the normal being merely the result of the spirit of the arm to which they happened to belong; but I do not suggest that I have made them "generals," or anything in the least approaching that ideal, but at least I have made the majority into rational subordinates, who, knowing the difficulties and limitations of those whose business it is to give orders, are prepared to obey readily, and not to oppose, even the passive resistance of their own opinions, to the realisation of their commander's intentions.

For this reason I welcome the new orders for the examination

of officers with all my heart, and see in it the surest promise of advance in efficiency that all the talk of reform has as yet brought with it.

In the old days, we are told, that blind obedience was the soldier's first duty, and actually was obtained under the old *régime;* but we may be permitted our doubts on the point, for I imagine human nature in the last three centuries has remained always a singularly constant factor, nor have those armies in which blind obedience was most strictly enforced always justified expectation. What was probably intended by the phrase was "blind confidence" in the leader, and that quality grew automatically in days when campaigns lasted seven years and upwards.

Our problem is to develop intelligent confidence in peace-time, so as to eliminate the internal friction which automatically develops in an army from the clash of conflicting points of view and varying standards, both of knowledge and intelligence. This is the special danger of the Volunteer Force, to which men bring what they believe to be their inherent right of private judgement, as can easily be seen if we endeavour to realise the mental attitude of the individual—say a company commander, detailed to occupy a portion of a line which in the interests of the many must occupy a certain general direction, but locally defective, and glaringly so, as must often be the case.

The only way to make that man realise that he has not been gratuitously sacrificed to the crass imbecility of an incompetent staff is to train him to understand the limitations under which that staff is by the nature of things compelled to work, and then, by filling his mind with the accumulated experience of others, *i.e.* with military history, enable him to see that his duty lies in the subordination of himself to the welfare of his comrades, and not in the display of his personal tactical ability.

You require to develop character, not to develop initiative. Of that there is generally enough and to spare, and it seems to me that by the present system of teaching men to understand their exact importance in the whole hierarchy and the difficulties by which the exercise of command is trammeled, we shall, when the emergency arises, find that the latent spirit of self-sacrifice and duty to which the nation unquestionably owes its greatness and triumphs in the past will sufficiently respond.

The mere acquisition of technical detail went all in the opposite direction—its mastery in any one case is always too obviously simple, the difficulty has always been to secure the co-ordination of many to varying circumstances, and that we shall only reach when we have shown the individual the whole secrets

of the machinery, and made it clear to him that in the interests of the whole it is often necessary to sacrifice a part.

The Waterloo campaign has been so widely discussed in this country that its details may be taken as common knowledge. There are, however, certain points of view bearing on my ruling contention which have hitherto not received the attention they deserve.

Broadly speaking, we may say that Napoleon, in this instance, failed because he designed a work which made demands on the strength and finish of his material beyond the power of the latter to supply. His staff had been so disorganised by recent political events that it failed conspicuously to transmit punctually to the troops the orders they should have received; and which, being received, must in all human probability have turned the scale in his favour.

But it was Napoleon himself who said that "war is essentially a calculation of probabilities," and from the lips of a mathematician the remark imports a great deal more than meets the layman's eye. He knew—no one better—that for a given staff there is the mathematical certainty of a certain percentage of failure to exactly interpret and execute the commander's intentions, due to the fallibility of the human material;* and his dicta that you can never be too strong at the decisive point, and that you should never risk a battle until you had ninety-nine chances out of a hundred in your favour, make it sufficiently clear that he habitually allowed for error in the execution of his plans, recognising that a certain percentage of such error was inevitable under the conditions which he knew to prevail in his staff service, and which he personally was powerless to prevent.

It seems to me, therefore, that in this instance he was misled in his calculations by the overwhelming confidence he had learnt to place in his own tactical genius on the battlefield. It was the fact that at that period no Continental army or leader had the remotest chance of success against the combined powers of the three arms, handled as Napoleon alone knew how to handle them.

His art lay in his consummate power of getting the utmost out of his men in the fighting-line, and thus retaining the largest possible fraction in reserve, and in this no one of his rivals could approach him. This gift literally was worth the 40,000 men his presence was usually considered to outweigh—and Ligny is the best possible proof in point.

* It is an axiom that orders and instructions must always be framed upon the assumption that their successful issue will depend upon the interpretation of them made by at least one idiot—probably by several.—ED. U. S. M.

But he had never had personal experience of Wellington and the Peninsular tactics, and to my mind this explains everything. On the 16th, at Ligny, within six hours he had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Prussians, and he counted on smashing Wellington in the same time, whilst he did not believe it physically possible for Blücher to make his presence effectually felt before that time expired. He expected to find the British troops drawn up like the Prussians, in heavy masses, on the exposed slope of their position, and seeing only the Belgians to the east of the Brussels Road, a line of guns to the west, and the château of Hougoumont with a few reserves behind it, he concluded Wellington was retreating, and he had only a weak rear-guard to deal with.

From this standpoint his indifference to the menace of the Prussians, or to the whereabouts of Grouchy, is seen to be entirely in keeping with the situation. The rear-guard could be pushed aside, and if Grouchy held, as he actually did, about 20 per cent. more than his own numbers, by his march on Wavre, then the Emperor had ample reserves in hand to deal with the army he had beaten forty-eight hours previously, and which we now know—thanks to the revelations of Grolman's biography—was in fact formed up, and watching the battle, undecided whether to join in or leave us to our fate, until, in Blücher's own presence, Grolman himself gave the order to advance.

To assume that Napoleon handled his troops as he did in the full knowledge we now possess as to their position at each hour in the day, is to make him out an irresponsible madman, which we certainly know he was not; but to view him as led away throughout the campaign by his overweening confidence in his power to compel the tactical decision in his own favour at the time and place of his own choosing, gives us a key to his thoughts, orders, and messages which unlocks the whole mystery which so long has shrouded this most dramatic event.

F. N. MAUDE.

(*To be continued.*)

THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT.

A Few Experiences in Field Defence for Detached Posts which may prove useful in our Next War.

By "Backsight Forethought."

"It was our own fault, and our very grave fault, and now we must turn it to use,
We have forty million reasons for failure, but not a single excuse!"

Kipling.

This tale of a dream is dedicated to the "gilded popinjays" and "hired assassins" of the British nation, especially those who are now knocking at the door, to wit the very junior. It embodies some recollections of things actually done and undone in South Africa, 1899–1902. It is hoped that its fantastic guise may really help to emphasise the necessity for the practical application of some very old principles, and assist to an appreciation of what may happen when they are not applied, even on small operations. This practical application has often been lost sight of in the stress of the moment, with dire results, quite unrealised until the horrible instant of actual experience. Should this tale, by arousing the imagination, assist to prevent in the future even one such case of disregard of principles, it will not have been written in vain. The dreams are not anticipations, but merely a record of petty experiences against one kind of enemy in one kind of country only, with certain deductions based thereupon. But from these, given the conditions, it is not difficult to deduce the variations suitable for other countries, or for those occasions when a different foe with different methods of fighting and different weapons has to be met.

Ἄμουσον ᾧδει Mauser *μοῦσά μοοβέλος.*

Prologue.

Upon an evening after a long and tiring trek, I arrived at Dreamdorp. The local atmosphere, combined with a heavy meal, are responsible for the following nightmare, consisting of a series of dreams. To make the sequence of the whole intelligible, it is necessary to explain that, though the scene of each vision was the same, yet by some curious mnemonic process I had no recollection


REGRET TABLE MOUNTAIN
INCIDENTAME
DUFFER'S DRIFT.
General Plan.
Drift
River
Billiaasvogel
Waschout Hill
Scale.

MAP I.

of the place whatsoever. In each dream the locality was totally new to me, and I had an entirely fresh detachment. Thus I had not the great advantage of working over familiar ground. One thing, and one only, was carried on from dream to dream, and that was the vivid recollection of the general lessons previously learnt. These finally produced success.

The whole series of dreams, however, remained in my memory as a connected whole when I awoke.

FIRST DREAM.

"Any fool can get into a hole."—*Old Chinese proverb.*
"If left to you, for defence make spades."—*Bridge Maxim.*

(See Maps 1 and 2.)

I felt lonely, and not a little sad, as I stood on the bank of the river near Duffer's Drift and watched the red dust haze, raised by the southward departing column in the distance, turn slowly into gold as it hung in the afternoon sunlight. It was just three o'clock, and here I was on the banks of the Silliaasvogel river, left behind by my column with a party of fifty N.C.O.'s and men to hold the drift. It was an important ford, because it was the only one across which wheeled traffic could pass for some miles up or down the river.

The river was a sluggish stream, not now in flood, crawling along at the very bottom of its bed between steep banks which were almost vertical, or at any rate too steep for waggons everywhere except at the drift itself. The banks from the river edge to their tops and some distance outwards were covered with dense thorn and other bushes, which formed a screen impenetrable to the sight. They were also broken by small ravines and holes, where the earth had been eaten away by the river when in flood, and were consequently very rough.

Some two thousand odd yards north of the drift was a flat-topped, rocky mountain, and about a mile to the north-east appeared the usual sugar-loaf kopje, covered with bushes and boulders—steep on the south, but gently falling to the north; this had a farm on the near side of it. About a thousand yards south of the drift was a convex and smooth hill, somewhat like an inverted basin, sparsely sown with small boulders, and with a Kaffir kraal, consisting of a few grass and mud huts on top. Between the river and the hills on the north the ground consisted of open and almost level veldt; on the south bank the veldt was more undulating, and equally open. The whole place was covered with ant-hills.

My orders were—to hold Duffer's Drift at all costs. That I should probably be visited by some column within three or four days' time. That I might possibly be attacked before that time,

but that this was very unlikely, as no enemy were known to be within a hundred miles. That the enemy had guns.

It all seemed plain enough except that the true inwardness of the last piece of information did not strike me at the time. Though in company with fifty "good men and true," it certainly made me feel somewhat lonely and marooned to be left out there comparatively alone on the boundless veldt; but the chance of an attack filled me and, I am quite sure, my men with martial ardour; and at last here was the chance I had so often longed for. This was my first "show," my first independent command, and I was determined to carry out my orders to the bitter end. I was young and inexperienced, it is true, but I had passed all my examinations with fair success; my men were a good willing lot, with the traditions of a glorious regiment to uphold, and would, I knew, do all I should require of them. We were also well supplied with ammunition and rations; and had a number of picks, shovels, and sandbags, etc., which I confess had been rather forced on me.

As I turned towards my gallant little detachment, visions of a bloody and desperate fight crossed my mind—a fight to the last cartridge, and then an appeal to cold steel, with ultimate victory—and—— But a discreet cough at my elbow brought me back to realities, and warned me that my colour-sergeant was waiting for orders.

After a moment's consideration, I decided to pitch my small camp on a spot just south of the drift, because it was slightly rising ground, which I knew should be chosen for a camp whenever possible. It was, moreover, quite close to the drift, which was also in its favour, for, as every one knows, if you are told off to guard anything, you mount a guard quite close to it, and place a sentry, if possible, standing on top of it. The place picked out by me also had the river circling round three sides of it in a regular horseshoe bend, which formed a kind of ditch, or, as the book says, "a natural obstacle." I was indeed lucky to have such an ideal place close at hand; nothing could have been more suitable.

I came to the conclusion that, as the enemy were not within a hundred miles, there would be no need to place the camp in a state of defence till the following day. Besides, the men were tired after their long trek, and it would be quite as much as they could do comfortably to arrange nice and shipshape all the stores and tools, which had been dumped down anyhow in a heap, pitch the camp, and get their teas before dark.

Between you and me, I was really relieved to be able to put off my defensive measures till the morrow, because I was a wee bit puzzled as to what to do. In fact, the more I thought, the more



MAP II.

puzzled I grew. The only "measures of defence" I could recall for the moment were, how to tie "a thumb or overhand knot," and how long it takes to cut down an apple tree of six inches' diameter. Unluckily neither of these useful facts seemed quite to apply. Now, if they had given me a job like fighting the battle of Waterloo, or Sedan, or Bull Run, I knew all about that, as I had crammed it up and been examined in it too. I also knew how to take up a position for a division, or even an army corps, but the stupid little subaltern's game of the defence of a drift with a small detachment was curiously enough most perplexing. I had never really considered such a thing. However, in the light of my habitual dealings with army corps, it would, no doubt, be child's-play after a little thought.

Having issued my immediate orders accordingly, I decided to explore the neighbourhood, but was for a moment puzzled as to which direction I should take; for, having no horse, I could not possibly get all round before dark. After a little thought, it flashed across my mind that obviously I should go to the north. The bulk of the enemy being away to the north, that of course must be the *front*. I knew naturally that there must be a front, because in all the schemes I had had to prepare, or the exams I had undergone, there was always a front, or—"the place where the enemies come from." How often, also, had I not had trouble in getting out of a dull sentry which his "front" and what his "beat" was. The north, then, being my front, the east and west were my flanks, where there might possibly be enemies, and the south was my *rear*, where naturally there were none.

I settled these knotty points to my satisfaction, and off I trudged, with my field-glasses, and, of course, my Kodak, directing my steps towards the Dutch farm, with gleaming white walls, nestling under the kopje to the north-east. It was quite a snug little farm for South Africa, surrounded by blue gums and fruit trees. About a quarter of a mile from the farm I was met by the owner, Mr. Andreas Brink, a tame or surrendered Boer farmer, and his two sons, Piet and Gert. Such a nice man too, with a pleasant face and long beard. He would insist on calling me "captain," and as any correction might have confused him, I did not think it worth while to make any, and after all I wasn't so very far from my "company." The three of them positively bristled with dog's-eared and dirty passes from every Provost Marshal in South Africa, which they insisted on showing me. I had not thought of asking for them, and was much impressed; to have so many they must be special men. They escorted me to the farm, where the guid wife and several daughters met us, and gave me a drink of milk, which was

most acceptable after my long and dusty trek. The whole family appeared either to speak or to understand English, and we had a very friendly chat, during the course of which I gathered that there were no Boer commandoes anywhere within miles, that the whole family cordially hoped that there never would be again, and that Brink was really a most loyal Briton, and had been much against the war, but had been forced to go on commando with his two sons. Their loyalty was evident, because there was an oleograph of the Queen on the wall, and one of the numerous flappers was playing our National Anthem on the harmonium as I entered.

The farmer and the boys took a great interest in all my personal gear, especially a brand-new pair of latest-pattern field-glasses, which they tried with much delight, and many exclamations of "Allermachtig." They evidently appreciated them extremely, but could not imagine any use for my Kodak in war-time, even after I had taken a family group. Funny, simple fellows! They asked and got permission from me to sell milk, eggs, and butter in the camp, and I strolled on my way, congratulating myself on the good turn I was thus able to do myself and detachment, none of whom had even smelt such luxuries for weeks.

After an uneventful round, I directed my steps back towards the thin blue threads of smoke, rising vertically in the still air, which alone showed the position of my little post, and as I walked the peacefulness of the whole scene impressed me. The landscape lay bathed in the warm light of the setting sun, whose parting rays tinged most strongly the various heights within view, and the hush of approaching evening was only broken by the distant lowing of oxen, and by the indistinct and cheerful hum of the camp, which gradually grew louder as I approached. I strolled along in quite a pleasant frame of mind, meditating over the rather curious names which Mr. Brink had given me for the surrounding features of the landscape. The kopje above his farm was called Incidentamba, the flat-topped mountain some two miles to the north was called Regret Table Mountain, and the gently rising hill close to the drift on the south of the river was called Waschout Hill. Everything was going on well, and the men were at their teas when I got back. The nice Dutchman, with his apostolic face, and the lanky Piet and Gert, were already there, surrounded by a swarm of men, to whom they were selling their wares at exorbitant rates. The three of them strolled about the camp, showing great interest in everything, asking most intelligent questions about the British forces and the general position of affairs, and seemed really relieved to have a strong British post near. They did not even take offence when some of the rougher men called them "blarsted

Dutchmen," and refused to converse with them, or buy their "skoff." About dusk they left, with many promises to return with a fresh supply on the morrow.

After writing out my orders for next day—one of which was for digging some trenches round the camp, an operation which I knew my men, as becomes good British soldiers, disliked very much, and regarded as fatigues—I saw the two guards mounted, one at the drift, and the other some little way down the river, each furnishing one sentry on the river bank.

When all had turned in, and the camp was quite silent, it was almost comforting to hear the half-hourly cry of the sentries—"Number one—all is well;" "Number two—all is well." By this sound I was able to locate them, and knew they were at their proper posts. On going round sentries about midnight, I was pleased to find that they were both alert, and that, as it was a cold night, each guard had built a bonfire, silhouetted in the cheerful blaze of which stood the sentry—a clear-cut monument to all round that here was a British sentry fully on the *qui-vive*. After impressing them with their orders, the extent of their "beat," and the direction of their "front," etc., I turned in. The fires they had built, besides being a comfort to themselves, were also useful to me, because twice during the night when I looked out I could, without leaving my tent, plainly see them at their posts. I finally fell asleep, and dreamt of being decorated with a crossbelt made of V.C.'s and D.S.O.'s, and of wearing red tabs all down my back.

* * * * * *

I was suddenly awoken, about the grey of dawn, by a hoarse cry—"Halt! who goes——" cut short by the unmistakable "plip-plop" of a Mauser rifle. Before I was off my valise, the reports of Mausers rang round the camp from every side, these, mingled with the smack of the bullets as they hit the ground and stripped the "zipzip" of the leaden hail through the tents, and the curses and groans of men who were hit as they lay or stumbled about trying to get out, made a hellish din. There was some wild shooting in return from my men, but it was all over in a moment, and as I managed to wriggle out of my tent the whole place was swarming with bearded men, shooting into the heaving canvas. At that moment I must have been clubbed on the head, for I knew no more until I found myself seated on an empty case having my head, which was dripping with blood, tied up by one of my men.

* * * * * *

Our losses were ten men killed, including both sentries, and twenty-one wounded; the Boers', one killed and two wounded.

* * * * * *

Later on, as, at the order of the not ill-natured but very frowzy Boer commandant, I was gloomily taking off the saucy warm spotted waistcoat knitted for me by my sister, I noticed our friends of the previous evening in very animated and friendly conversation with the burghers, and "Pappa" was, curiously enough, carrying a rifle and bandolier and my new field-glasses. He was laughing and pointing towards something lying on the ground, through which he finally put his foot. This, to my horror, I recognised as my unhappy camera. Here, I suppose, my mind must have slightly wandered, for I found myself repeating some Latin lines, once my favourite imposition, but forgotten since my school-days—

"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes—— "

when suddenly the voice of the field cornet broke into my musing with "Your breeches too, captain."

* * * * * *

Trekking all that day on foot, sockless, and in the boots of another, I had much to think of besides my throbbing head. The sight of the long Boer convoy with guns, which had succeeded so easily in crossing the drift *I* was to have held, was a continual reminder of my failure, and of my responsibility for the dreadful losses to my poor detachment. I gradually gathered from the Boers what I had already partially guessed, namely, that they had been fetched and guided all round our camp by friend Brink, had surrounded it in the dark, crawling about in the bush on the river bank, and had carefully marked down our two poor sentries. These they had at once shot on the alarm being given, and had then rushed the camp from the dense cover on three sides. Towards evening my head got worse, and its rhythmic throbbing seemed gradually to take a meaning, and hammered out the following lessons, the result of much pondering on my failure:—

1. Do not put off taking your measures of defence till the morrow, as this is more important than the comfort of your men or the shipshape arrangement of your camp. Choose the position of your camp mainly with reference to your defence.

2. Do not in war-time show stray men of the enemy's breed all over your camp, be they never so kind and full of butter, and do not be hypnotised, by numerous "passes," at once to confide in them.

3. Do not let your sentries advertise their position to the whole world, including the enemy, by standing in the full glare of a fire, and making much noise every half-hour.

4. Do not, if avoidable, be in tents when bullets are ripping through them; at such times a hole in the ground is worth many tents.



MAP III.

After these lessons had been dinned into my soul millions and millions of times, so that I could never forget them, a strange thing came to pass—there was a kaleidoscopic change—I had another dream.

SECOND DREAM.

"And what did ye look they should compass? Warcraft learnt in a breath,
Knowledge unto occasion at the first far view of Death?"

KIPLING.

(See Map 3.)

I suddenly found myself dumped down at Duffer's Drift with the same orders as already detailed, and an equal detachment composed of entirely different men. As before, and on every subsequent occasion, I had ample stores, ammunition, and tools. My position was precisely similar to my former one, with this important exception, running through my brain were *four* lessons.

As soon as I received my orders, therefore, I began to make out my plan of operations without wasting any time over the landscape, the setting sun, or the departing column, which, having off-loaded all our stores, soon vanished. I was determined to carry out all the lessons I had learnt as well as I knew how.

To prevent any strangers, friendly or otherwise, from coming into my position and spying out the elaborate defences I was going to make, I sent out at once two examining posts of one N.C.O. and three men each, one to the top of Waschout Hill, and the other some 1000 yards out on the veldt to the north of the drift. Their orders were to watch the surrounding country, and give the alarm in the event of the approach of any body of men whatever (Boers were, of course, improbable, but still just possible), and also to stop any individuals, friendly or not, from coming anywhere near camp, and to shoot at once on non-compliance with the order to halt. If the new-comers had any provisions to sell, these were to be sent in with a list by one of the guard, who would return with the money, but the strangers were not to be allowed nearer the camp on any account.

Having thus arranged a safeguard against spies, I proceeded to choose a camping-ground. I chose the site already described in my former dream, and for the same reasons, which still appealed to me. So long as I was entrenched, it appeared the best place around. We started making our trenches as soon as I had marked off a nice squarish little enclosure which would about contain our small camp. Though, of course, the north was the front, I thought, having a camp, it would be best to have an all-round defence as a sort of obstacle. The majority of the men were told off to dig,

which they did not relish, a few being detailed to pitch camp and prepare tea. As the length of trench was rather great for the available number of diggers, and the soil was hard, we were only able by dark, at which time the men were quite done up by their hard day, to make quite a low parapet and shallow trench. Still, we were 'entrenched,' which was the great thing, and the trench was all round our camp, so we were well prepared, even should we be attacked during the night or early next morning, which was out of the question.

During this time one or two strangers had approached the place in the night from a farm under Incidentamba. As they had eggs and butter, etc., to sell, these were brought in as arranged for. The man sent in with the stuff reported that the elder of the Dutchmen was a most pleasant man, and had sent me a present of a tin of butter and some eggs with his compliments, and would I allow him to come in and speak to me? However, not being such a fool as to allow him in my lines, I went out instead, in case he had any information. His only information was that there were no Boers anywhere near. He was an old man, but though he had a museum of 'passes' I was not to be chloroformed by them into confidence. As he seemed friendly, and possibly loyal, I walked part of the way back to his farm with him, in order to see where the two outlying posts came in, and two places were mounted close by the object I was to watch, namely, the drift on the same places as in my previous dream. This time, however, there was no half-hourly shouting, nor were there any fires, and the sentries had orders not to challenge but to shoot at sight, lest they might see outside camp at once. They were placed sitting down the river bank, just high enough to see over the bank and were thus not unnecessarily exposed. Teas had been eaten, and all fires put out at dusk, and after dark all turned in, but in the trenches instead of in tents. After going round sentries to see everything snug for the night, I lay down myself with a sense of having done my duty and neglected no possible precaution for our safety.

* * * * * *

Just before dawn much the same happened as already described in my first dream, except that the hail was started by a shot without challenge from one of our sentries at something moving among the bush, which resulted in close-range fire opening on to us from all sides. This time we were not rushed, but a perfect hail of bullets whistled in from every direction—from in front of each trench, along each trench, and from behind each trench, and over and through our parapet. It was sufficient to put a hand or head

up to have a dozen bullets through and all round it, and the strange part was, we saw no one. As the detachment wag plaintively remarked, we could have seen lots of Boers, "if wasn't for the bushes in between."

After vainly trying until bright daylight to see the enemy in order to do some damage in return, so many men were hit, and the position seemed so utterly hopeless, that I had to hoist the white flag. We had by then twenty-four men killed and six wounded. As soon as the white flag went up the Boers ceased firing at once, and stood up; every bush and ant-hill up to 100 yards' range seemed to have hid a Boer behind it. This close range explained the marvellous accuracy of their shooting, and the great proportion of our killed (who were nearly all shot through the head) to our wounded.

As we were collecting ourselves preparatory to marching off, there were one or two things which struck me; one was that the Dutchman who had presented me with eggs and butter was in earnest confabulation with the Boer commandant, who was calling him "Oom" most affectionately. I also noticed that all the male Kaffirs from the neighbouring kraal had been fetched and impressed to assist in getting the Boer guns and waggons across the drift and to load up our captured gear, and generally do odd and dirty jobs. These same Kaffirs did their work with amazing alacrity, and looked as if they enjoyed it; there was no "backchat" when an order was given—usually by friend "Oom."

Again, as I trudged with blistered feet that livelong day, did I think over my failure. It seemed so strange, I had done all I knew, and yet, here we were, ignominiously captured, twenty-four of us killed, and the Boers over the drift. "Ah, B.F., my boy," I thought, "there must be a few more lessons to be learnt besides those you already know," and in order to find out what these were, I pondered deeply over the details of the fight.

How the Boers must have known of our position, and how they had managed to get close up all round within snapshooting range without being discovered. What a tremendous advantage they had had in shooting from among the bushes on the bank, where they could not be seen, over us who had to show up over a parapet every time we looked for an enemy, and show up, moreover, just in the very place where every Boer expected us to, and was watching. This seemed to be some fault in the position. How the bullets seemed sometimes to come through the parapet, and how those that passed over one side hit the men defending the other side in the back. How on the whole that "natural obstacle," the river bed, seemed to be more of a disadvantage than a protection.

Eventually the following lessons framed themselves in my head —some of them quite new, some of them supplementing those four I had already learnt:—

5. With modern rifles, to guard a drift or locality does *not* necessitate sitting on top of it (as if it could be picked up and carried away), unless the locality is suitable to hold for other and defensive reasons. It may even be much better to take up your defensive position some way from the spot, and so away from concealed ground, which enables the enemy to crawl up to very close range, concealed and unperceived, and to fire from cover which hides them even when shooting. It would be better, if possible, to have the enemy in the open, or to have what is called a clear "field of fire."

A non-bullet-proof parapet or shelter which is visible serves merely to attract bullets instead of keeping them out—the proof-thickness can be easily tested practically.

When fired at by an enemy at close range from nearly all round, a low parapet and shallow trench are not of much use, as what bullets do not hit the defenders on one side hit those on another.

6. It is *not* enough to keep strange men of the enemy's breed away from your actual defences, letting them go free to warn their friends of your existence and whereabouts—even though they do not know the details of your defences. It would be very much better to gather in all such strangers and kindly, but firmly, to take care of them, so that they should not be under temptation to impart any knowledge they may have obtained. "Another way," as the cookery book says, more economical in lives, would be as follows: Gather and warmly greet a sufficiency of strangers. Stuff well with chestnuts as to the large force about to join you in a few hours; garnish with corroborative detail, and season according to taste with whiskey or tobacco. This will very likely be sufficient for the nearest commando. Probable cost—some heavy and glib lying, but no lives will be expended.

7. It is not business to allow lazy black men (even though they be brothers and neutrals) to sit and pick their teeth outside their kraals whilst tired white men are breaking their hearts trying to do heavy labour in short time. It is more the duty of a Christian soldier to teach the dusky neutral the dignity of labour, and to keep him under guard, to prevent his going away to talk about it.

By the time the above lessons had been well burnt into my brain, beyond all chance of forgetfulness, a strange thing happened —I had a fresh dream.



MAP IV.

THIRD DREAM.

"So when we take tea with a few guns, o' course you will know what to do—hoo! hoo!"
KIPLING.

(See Map 4.)

I was at Duffer's Drift on a similar sunny afternoon and under precisely similar conditions, except that I now had *seven* lessons running through my mind.

I at once sent out two patrols, each of one N.C.O. and three men, one to the north and one to the south. They were to visit all neighbouring farms and kraals and bring in all able-bodied Dutch men and boys and male Kaffirs—by persuasion if possible, but by force if necessary. This would prevent the news of our arrival being carried round to any adjacent commandoes, and would also assist to solve the labour question. A small guard was mounted on the top of Waschout Hill as a look-out.

I decided that as the drift could not get up and run away, it was not necessary to take up my post or position quite close to it, especially as such a position would be under close rifle fire from the river bank, to which the approaches were quite concealed, and which gave excellent cover. The very worst place for such a position seemed to be anywhere within the horseshoe bend of the river, as this would allow an enemy to practically surround it. My choice therefore fell on a spot to which the ground gently rose from the river bank, some 700 to 800 yards south of the drift. Here I arranged to dig a trench roughly facing the front (north), which thus would have about 800 yards clear ground on its front. We started to make a trench about fifty yards long for my fifty men, according to the usual rule.

Some little time after beginning, the patrols came in, having collected three Dutchmen and two boys, and about thirteen Kaffirs. The former, the leader of whom seemed a man of education and some importance, were at first inclined to protest when they were given tools to dig trenches for themselves, showed bundles of "passes," and talked very big about complaining to the General, and even as to a question in the "House" about our brutality. This momentarily staggered me, as I could not help wondering what might happen to poor B.F. if the member for Upper Tooting should raise the point; but Westminster was far away, and I hardened my heart. Finally they had the humour to see the force of the argument, that it was, after all, necessary for their own health, as they would otherwise be out in the open veldt, should the post be attacked.

The Kaffirs served as a welcome relief to my men as they got

tired. They also dug a separate hole for themselves on one side of and behind our trench, in a small ravine.

By evening we had quite a decent trench dug—the parapet was about two feet six inches thick at the top, and was quite bullet-proof, as I tested it. Our trench was not all in one straight line, but in two portions, broken back at a slight angle, so as to get a more divergent fire [rather cunning of me], though each half was of course as straight as I could get it.

It was astonishing what difficulty I had to get the men to dig in a nice straight line. I was particular as to this point, because I once heard a certain captain severely "told off" at manœuvres by a very senior officer for having his trenches "out of dressing." No one could tell whether some "brass hat" might not come round and inspect us next day, so it was as well to be prepared for anything.

At dusk the guard on Waschout Hill, for whom a trench had also been dug, was relieved and increased to six men, and after teas and giving out the orders for the next day, we all "turned in" in our trenches. The tents were not pitched, as we were not going to occupy them, and it was no good merely showing up our position. A guard was mounted over our prisoners, or rather "guests," and furnished one sentry to watch over them.

Before falling asleep I ran over my seven lessons, and it seemed to me I had left nothing undone which could possibly help towards success. We were entrenched, had a good bullet-proof defence, all our rations and ammunition close at hand in the trenches, and water-bottles filled. It was with a contented feeling of having done everything right and of being quite "the little white-haired boy" that I gradually dozed off.

Next morning dawned brightly and uneventfully, and we had about an hour's work improving details of our trenches before breakfasts were ready. Just as breakfast was over, the sentry on Waschout Hill reported a cloud of dust away to the north, by Regret Table Mountain. This was caused by a large party of mounted men with wheeled transport of some sort. They were most probably the enemy, and seemed to be trekking in all innocence of our presence for the drift.

What a "scoop," I thought, if they come on quite unsuspecting, and cross the drift in a lump without discerning our position. I shall lie low, let the advanced party go past without a shot, and wait until the main body gets over this side within close range, and then open magazine fire into the thick of them. Yes, it will be just when they reach that broken ant-hill about 400 yards away that I shall give the word "Fire!"

However, it was not to be. After a short time the enemy halted, apparently for consideration. The advanced men seemed to have a consultation, and then gradually approached Incidentamba farm with much caution. Two or three women ran out and waved, whereupon these men galloped up to the farm at once. What passed, of course we could not tell, but evidently the women gave information as to our arrival and position, because the effect was electrical. The advanced Boers split up into two main parties, one riding towards the river a long way to the east, and another going similarly to the west. One man galloped back with the information obtained to the main body, which became all bustle, and started off with their waggons behind Incidentamba, when they were lost to sight. Of course, they were all well out of range, and as we were quite ready, the only thing to do was to wait till they came out in the open within range, and then to shoot them down.

The minutes seemed to crawl—five, then ten minutes passed with no further sign of the enemy. Suddenly, "Beg pardon, sir; I think I see somethink on top of that kop-je on the fur side yonder." One of the men drew my attention to a few specks which looked like waggons moving about on the flattish shoulder of Incidentamba. Whilst I was focussing my glasses there was a "boom" from the hill, followed by a sharp report and a puff of smoke up in the air quite close by, then the sound as of heavy rain pattering down some two hundred feet in front of the trench, each drop raising its own little cloud of dust. This, of course, called forth the time-honoured remarks of "What ho, she bumps!" and "Now we shan't be long," which proved only too true. I was aghast—I had quite forgotten the possibility of guns being used against me, though, had I remembered their existence, I do not know, with my then knowledge, what difference it would have made to my defensive measures. As there was some little uneasiness among my men, I, quite cheerful in the security of our nice trench with the thick bullet-proof parapet, at once shouted out, "It's all right, men; keep under cover, and they can't touch us." A moment later there was a second boom, the shell whistled over our heads, and the hillside some way behind the trench was spattered with bullets.

By this time we were crouching as close as possible to the parapet, which, though it had seemed only quite a short time before so complete, now suddenly felt most woefully inadequate, with those beastly shells dropping their bullets down from the sky. Another boom. This time the shell burst well, and the whole ground in front of the trench was covered with bullets, one man being hit. At this moment rifle fire began on Waschout Hill, but

no bullets came our way. Almost immediately another shot followed which showered bullets all over us; a few more men were hit, whose groans were unpleasant to listen to. Tools were seized, and men began frantically to try and dig themselves deeper into the hard earth, as our trench seemed to give no more protection from the dropping bullets than a saucer would from a storm of rain—but it was too late. We could not sink into the earth fast enough. The Boers had got the range of the trench to a nicety, and the shells burst over us now with a horrible methodic precision. Several men were hit, and there was no reason why the enemy should cease to rain shrapnel over us until we were all killed. As we were absolutely powerless to do anything, I put up the white flag. All I could do was to thank Providence that the enemy had no quick-firing field guns, or, though "we had not been long," we should have been blotted out before we could have hoisted it.

As soon as the gun-fire ceased, I was greatly surprised to find that no party of Boers came down from their artillery position on Incidentamba to take our surrender, but within three minutes some fifty Boers galloped up from the river bank on the east and the west, and a few more came up from the south round Waschout Hill. The guard on Waschout Hill, which had done a certain amount of damage to the enemy, had two men wounded by rifle fire. Not a single shell had come near them, though they were close to the Kaffir huts, which were plain enough.

* * * * * *

What an anti-climax the reality had been from the pleasurable anticipations of the early morn, when I had first sighted the Boers.

Of course, the women on the farm had betrayed us, but it was difficult to make out why the Boers had at first halted and begun to be suspicious before they had seen the women at the farm. What could they have discovered? I failed entirely to solve this mystery.

During the day's trek the following lessons slowly evolved themselves, and were stored in my mind in addition to those already learnt:—

8. When collecting the friendly stranger and his sons in order to prevent their taking information to the enemy of your existence and whereabouts, if you are wishful for a "surprise packet," do not forget also to gather his wife and his daughter, his manservant and his maidservant (who also have tongues), and his ox and his ass (which may possibly serve the enemy). Of course, if they are very numerous or very far off, this is impossible; only do not then hope to surprise the enemy.

9. Do not forget that, if guns are going to be used against you,

a shallow trench with a low parapet some way from it is worse than useless, even though the parapet be bullet-proof ten times over. The trench gives the gunners an object to lay on, and gives no protection from shrapnel. Against well-aimed long-range artillery fire it would be better to scatter the defenders in the open, hidden in grass and bushes, or behind stones or ant-hills, than to keep them huddled in such a trench. With your men scattered around you can safely let the enemy fill your trench to the brim with shrapnel bullets.

10. Though to stop a shrapnel bullet much less actual thickness of earth is necessary than to stop a rifle bullet, yet this earth must be in the right place. For protection you must be able to get right close under the cover. As narrow a trench as possible, with the sides and inside of the parapet as steep as they will stand, will give you the best chance. To hollow out the bottom of the trench sides to give extra room will be even better, because the open top of the trench can be kept the less wide. The more like a mere slit the open top of the trench is, the fewer shrapnel bullets will get in. While chewing over these lessons learnt from bitter experience, I had yet another dream.

(*To be concluded.*)

CAVALRY TRAINING—CANADA, 1904.

By "Reiver."

It is impossible to know the good disposition of the Canadian contingents to South Africa for true Cavalry enterprise (not carried Infantry work), and not to regret that so little advantage is taken to animate them towards a higher training than that to which Lord Dundonald's 'Cavalry Training, 1904,' appears to lead.

This Cavalry manual throughout contemplates their having no higher ideal, in actual conflict, than an Infantry soldier's work, carried out, as the author says, "on exactly the same lines as Infantry."

Now, however much this may lighten the labours of the instructor and instructed in time of peace, is it a training which will make it easier for them or lessen their losses in a war, in which they may meet Cavalry, trained to seize every opportunity to get in at their opponents in a determined fashion, and supported by artillery and machine-gun fire?

Lord Dundonald sneers at the effect produced by sword and lance in modern war; surely he forgets that it is not the weapon carried but the moral factor of an apparently irresistible force, coming on at highest speed in spite of rifle fire, which affects the nerves and aim of the rapidly dismounted rifleman?

Though it probably prolonged the South African War to a great degree, the fact that the Boers had horses, on which they could get away, was one of the principal reasons for their making so few good defences except in prepared positions.

It is all very well to write of "coolly dismounting, forming up, and when the mounted enemy gets within range"—(Pray what is that—fifteen or fifteen hundred yards?)—"pouring in such a withering fire as will kill as many of the enemy as the same enemy with sword and lance would kill in five years of active service." But what happens in war? We have not yet forgotten Botha's charge at Bakenlaagte, and Kemp's charge in the Western Transvaal, both unsupported by artillery fire. What became of the coolness and accurate fire?

It is regrettable that Lord Dundonald has fallen into the same

error as nearly all those who did not see the two phases of the South African War.

This is apparent in the attack orders, which seem to take it for granted—

1. That the enemy are acting on the defensive, as the Boers did in the early part of the war.

2. That they will not vigorously counter-attack.

3. That they possess one or more vulnerable flanks.

4. That the brigadier has plenty of time to reconnoitre and make his dispositions for attack.

5. That the enemy does not possess any Cavalry, and will not act with promptitude against him whilst he is "considering."

What would General French have said if this sort of action had been taken, during the relief of Kimberley, at De Kiel's drift, and the whole column had been kept waiting under rifle and shell fire, whilst an elaborate programme of Infantry attack was being carried out?

One cannot help calling to mind an instance of the Canadians, in the general advance from Bloemfontein, dismounting and walking across an open plain to a bush-fringed river, and thus losing men and horses from the fire of a few Boers under cover, who mounted and made off long before the Canadians got near them.

Had the latter galloped at them in extended order, probably not a man or horse would have been hit, and the moral effect would have been infinitely better. Nor should it be forgotten that it requires infinitely more pluck to walk than to gallop at such a position. They acted so because they had been trained in peace to dismount and attack; their training did not recognise that the horse is best used to get men rapidly and suddenly within point-blank distance of their enemy.

From an Imperial point of view, it is most regrettable that two manuals for Cavalry, issued almost simultaneously, should contain such diametrically opposite views as those to which allusion is made above and the following (*vide* 'Cavalry Training, 1904,' p. 211):—

"The men are never to be dismounted in any position where mounted opposing Cavalry could attack them before they can remount to meet the attack."

The latter, however, rightly determines, in my opinion, the value of Cavalry or Mounted Infantry dismounted in the open.

In considering this question, it cannot fail to be interesting to turn to Sir E. Hutton's manual for mounted troops of the Australian Commonwealth, where we read, at p. 226—

"If an attack by Cavalry is imminent, mounted troops should,

[illegible] ammunition, galloping in cover or enclosed or broken ground, and hence repeat it and reiterate."

If time does not admit the alternative given is, "to form a square round the horses and fix bayonets."

How tremendously the shrapnel would rake that square, surely the enemy's Cavalry might consider it almost superfluous to charge home, though less than a quarter of the force would be all that could fire at them at any one side of the square!

Now let us put aside once for all the idea that large bodies of Mounted Infantry can oppose Cavalry on anything like equal terms in open country, unless the Cavalry are led by pusillanimous leaders who have no idea of getting to close quarters.

Our ancestors in the Navy, in Nelson's time, did not countermand the orders for closing with the enemy's ships and boarding them, because guns and pistols were improved.

A certain loss is inseparable from war; the degree of loss is almost immaterial so long as the *morale* of the troops and their desire to "charge home" is predominant.

Even one such successful charge, which compels or induces the enemy to retire, at the outset of a campaign, may establish a Cavalry superiority of inestimable value to the nation.

Before leaving the preface, I would remind Lord Dundonald that he is a little behind the times when he states that "the way is not open to Cavalry leaders for initiative and for the fullest enterprise and action;" since upwards of thirty years ago Von Schmidt wrote, in a much more enthusiastic spirit than is apparent in the book before us—

"It cannot too often be repeated that the main thing is to carry out the mission in hand at any price; if possible, this should be done mounted and with the *arme blanche*, but should that not be feasible, then we must dismount and force a road with the carbine."

At p. 202 of the 'Canadian Cavalry Training' we read: "If the enemy is in great force, and the brigadier decides to attack, he will issue instructions," etc.

But what will be the feelings of the brigadier who has assimilated the teaching of this manual with the enormous value claimed for the rifle in defence, when he remembers that his attack must be made on foot or crawling, and that, whilst this is being laboriously carried out, his led horses are liable to attack, the enemy may change his front from a false to a real front, or change his front, or reinforce his flanks, whilst his own troops, far from their horses, are committed to a certain line of advance?

The brigadier who fights on these lines promises to be very

"sticky," and will never score a success against a mobile enemy. Now, my contention, that this is much too low an ideal for our Canadian cousins, is founded on the belief that, far from being like our Mounted Infantry, only just able at first to ride, and very ignorant, necessarily, about the care of horses, there are thousands of first-rate horsemen in Canada who would form most valuable cavalry for the defence of the empire. It is at the commencement of a war that these have the greatest value. For we do not forget that, when our Mounted Infantry had had time to get confidence in their power to stick on, and their horse management was improved, their leaders were at length able to give vent to their desire to "get in at" the enemy, with the best results.

Lord Dundonald's manual gives no countenance to this higher field of Cavalry enterprise, and even discourages it by laying a mistaken stress on the power of the rifle. Surely first-rate horsemen might add to their power to fight on foot, in defence of a position or in retreat, the ability to fight on horseback, with whatever weapon is best, sword, lance, or revolver, in a galloping attack, and to ride at the enemy in close order?

No one will believe who has not witnessed the modern fight, with its long-range rifle fire and smokeless powder, how long it takes to dislodge an enemy by simply shooting at what little you can see of him, even when plenty of artillery is in support.

It is this which leads to delay and deadlocks, where the strategical situation often demands the utmost dash and decision.

Cavalry working ahead or on the flanks of an advancing army constantly meet with occasions where they must go ahead and chance a good deal. If the army is to advance rapidly, the advanced Cavalry must brush aside all trifling resistance. Under modern conditions it is most difficult to find out what there is behind a long ridge of rocks. Are the Cavalry to wait, dismount, and try to shoot the enemy out, or will they go and get to hand-grips with them? This depends on the training and the leading; with a spiritless leader they will do the former, with a Cavalry leader they will be "in at them."

Under these circumstances, would it not be wiser, in the Infantry manual, to inculcate in every way the power of the rifle in defence against charging Cavalry; but in the Cavalry manual to picture the situation invariably in such a manner as to encourage the most dashing leading? Nine times out of ten the latter is what is required for Cavalry, and, when it is combined with cunning, it actually indicates the safest and most effective course.

I ask those who have felt the elation of a successful charge, or who have known the despondency which attacks those who have

[illegible] by the horseman whom they have fired at in [illegible] magazine fire, which makes the shooting so erratic, [illegible] and much less easily controlled, and speeds the ammuni[illegible] has really so very much changed the conditions [illegible] years ago? Let them read Prince Kraft's 'Letters on Cavalry.' There we find a leader of troops and a writer, and such as one as Great Britain can rarely possess, since he had served with all three arms, and was quite unbiassed in favour of one or other, strongly upholding the power and value of Cavalry.

On the other hand, we see scores of writers, who have never studied and thought out the real use and *value* of Cavalry in war, [illegible] their reasons that Cavalry are of little use, because the lance [illegible] inflicted few deadly wounds in the war of 1870–1. They never seem to be able to picture any situation except one where masses of Cavalry advance against prepared positions swarming with Infantry and they shudder at the loss which must follow such madness. They forget that far in advance of the army or on the flanks of the opposing forces there are hundreds of Cavalry movements, all of which count in the score, and that there is a [illegible] scope of chances for the enterprising Cavalry leader.

A near-sighted mediocrity cannot discern these opportunities or will let them pass. Thus the number of indecisive fights increases, and with it the number of useless Cavalry leaders. Unfortunately the law of the survival of the fittest is inapplicable to Cavalry leaders.

To sum up this manual, it puts aside striking power and [illegible] on the defensive power of the rifle in true peace-time fashion.

Let our Cavalry leaders take for their motto the words—

> "He either fears his fate too much
> Or his desert are small—
> Who dares not put it to the touch
> To gain or lose it all."

THE BRITISH CAVALRY AND THE LESSONS OF 1899 TO 1902.

BY "A COLONIAL."

HAVING served in Irregular Corps throughout the late war, brigaded on several occasions with Regular Cavalry, I did not fail to notice, like many others, their shortcomings, especially in the early stages, whilst, of course, admiring their many good qualities. Their weak points may be roughly enumerated as follows:—

1. Indifferent knowledge of scouting.
2. Studied dislike to acting on foot with the rifle.
3. Lack of being able to utilise ground for taking cover, or concealing their movements.
4. Bad quality of their mounts.
5. Excessive weight carried by the horse.
6. Bad shooting.
7. Want of individuality, thus preventing men from making use of their own heads.

Many of these weaknesses were soon rectified, and some regiments, commanded by large-minded men, learnt by bitter experience to be nearly as good as their enemy.

Few Cavalry officers, I feel sure, will disagree with me over these points, so I hope, therefore, to give as briefly as possible my personal observations during the past nine months as to what steps are being taken to improve matters. Last summer, some fourteen months after peace, I rode down from Johannesburg to have a look at the Cavalry concentrated at Klip River Camp for drills. My arrival was a bit early for them, so saw men and horses in the lines. From a spectator's point of view, things looked very pretty, with white-washed stones marking the roads and the boundaries of regimental camps; but from a campaigner's point of view, from the small space allotted to regiments, and the way horses and men were crowded together, it appeared as if there was still a doubt whether the country was ours. I heard later it had been laid out by an Infantry officer. On learning that the Cavalry were shortly starting out for work, I off-saddled for a small feed. Soon the regiments, all of which had taken part in the war, filed past me on their way to a plain east of the railway and west of the Zuikerboosch Rand.

I overtook them later, and found them crowded together in what was called "preparatory formation." I watched a small squadron gallop to the front, and hoped to see how the scouting was carried out, but they never opened! I afterwards found it was the General and his staff.

Soon the mass began to trot, and after going about one and a half miles, I saw three lines of flags coming towards them. The Royal Horse Artillery came into action, and then there was a wonderful advance at a gallop, ending in a charge over ant-heaps and ant-bear holes into the flagged people. I remarked to a non-commissioned officer near that this flagged enemy did not attempt to manœuvre to outflank the Cavalry, and he replied, "Of course not, the General commands them also," and woe betide them if they don't carry out his orders to the letter of the law.

I rode away in disgust, I had seen enough; but knowing their General had not distinguished himself as a Cavalry leader in the war, but as a town commandant, I was not surprised; all Generals of distinction having gone home to occupy fat billets.

I saw later in the papers that the local Boers had been entertained at luncheon, and that they had expressed their pleasure at all they had seen. No wonder! for how they must have grinned from behind their kopjes at the easier task which the future seemed to have in store for them.

This spring I came to England, partly on business and partly on pleasure bound. Soon after my arrival in London I met several Cavalry officers whom I had met during the war, and I was surprised to learn from them "that if a squadron leader wished to get on now, spit and polish, knee-to-knee close drill, and a studious avoidance of useful dismounted work, was the way to do it. On the other hand, if he studied individuality, Boer tactics, mounted or dismounted, concealed outposts, common-sense ideas in combination with sufficient close Cavalry drill, he was at once classed as a — Mounted Infantryman, and thus a marked man."

I further gathered that the Cavalry was divided into two schools, the one, those who totally disregarded the lessons of the war and were anxious to return as quickly as possible to what obtained in '99; the other were what might be termed progressives, viz. those who wish to see the Cavalry the handy man of the Army, a good shot, a good scout, a good horseman, capable of beating a Mounted Infantryman on a horse, and yet being able to act on his feet equally as well, but fully recognising that, in addition to these things, Cavalry must be able to gallop and drill in close formation, and charge home with a sword when opportunity offers.

I decided to pay an early visit to Aldershot, the seat of all

learning, where most of the Generals who escaped the heavy sword of Stellenbosch, either by luck or by the premature ending of the war, are congregated, to see for myself how the Cavalry were being trained under their eagle eyes.

One fine morning I hired a local horse and rode out to what they call the Long Valley. Possibly it is a long valley as far as Aldershot is concerned, but not in accordance with South African views of one. I found it about half a mile long by half a mile wide. There is a good deal of useful ground south-east towards the town, but that apparently was kept for military police to ride about on, at least, judging by the fierce way they ordered me off. Well, on this drill-ground proper, I found Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Yeomanry officers, and men driving in boats on waggons, in fact, the whole place was scattered over by people moving in every direction like a lot of ants. If I had taken up a position anywhere, I could not have swung a cat without hitting a foot soldier, a horse, or a gun. However, here I was, in the midst of the Cavalry, doing their short squadron training under the squadron leaders, supervised, no doubt, by many cocked hats. I saw one or two, but I don't know who they were. I recognised at once my friend, the same old troop horse, made in England, that we saw so much of during the war, viz. the heavy, big-footed, bad-shouldered, common brute, who died at the thought of a long trek, and the long-backed weedy misfit which the dealers sold at such handsome profits! Not the little short-legged horse the officers used to swear by for work in the war.

The men were still seated on the same old saddle, right away from their horses, instead of on the Colonial saddle we hoped we had converted them to (I believe the officers still use them). Slung to the saddle was the same old heavy sword with bright steel scabbard, which we saw bent and rusty in war. Some troops were tent-pegging and playing what looked like mounted hockey on their clumsy beasts, endeavouring, I presume, to make them as handy as polo ponies and as clever as hunters, as is now being quoted. I pity the man's neck who hunts or plays polo on one.

Some troops were trotting about doing close drill, and occasionally dismounting from their horses on the tops of the hills and falling in in front of them with their rifles, whilst others dismounted under cover, then walked up on to the skyline and leisurely laid down; but when the order to mount was given, they all stood up and ran back to their horses. All ideas of taking cover or concealing their movements seemed to be forgotten. I may remark that these men wore pipe-clayed rifle slings to make them more conspicuous. I ventured a remark to a nice-looking lad near me,

as to whether they had not received the new short rifle I heard was being introduced. Fancy my astonishment when he replied, "Don't talk about rifles, we have not shot a course since peace."

I saw also other troops galloping about, with swords drawn, charging space. The little scouting I saw consisted of men riding on the skylines, looking like Nelson on his monument. As every one went home about 11 A.M., I returned to London a wiser and sadder man.

Having seen in the papers that his Majesty the King was visiting Aldershot to watch the field training of the Army Corps, and having heard with amazement that the Cavalry were rehearsing their *rôle*, I decided to pay a second visit on that day to see what was considered up to date. I went out to the Long Valley, and was soon attracted towards several Cavalry regiments and Artillery, formed up in line behind a hill at the south end of the ground. Then suddenly, I presume when his Majesty arrived, out went one regiment, due north, not preceded by scouts, and without flankers, down into the flat, where some flags were advancing, and then charged and disappeared behind a hill west. Then, under the roar of the Artillery in action, the rest of the regiments advanced in the same direction in a beautiful line, also without scouts, flankers, supports, or reserves, much less rearguard, and leaving the guns without an escort. Fancy what an ignoramus any Colonial would have been considered had he forgotten one of these items in war. Well, this line swept forward, first at a trot, then a gallop, and finally charged the same flags at the same spot. When they had pulled up their horses, which took some time, they retired from both flanks, joined by the first regiment that went forth, back to behind the same hill I found them at, where they faced about and dressed on markers in one long line. I wondered what was going to happen—possibly a march past; but no, they were about to make another charge in line, the whole lot this time.

This system of dressing on markers before a charge is strange. I remember reading, as a boy, that it was done by the heavy Cavalry at Balaclava. One of these regiments may have been there, and the old tradition is possibly adhered to by all out of compliment. Well, this long line moved forward and charged the flags at the same place as the preceding charges. I afterwards learnt that the King was seated in a tent overlooking this spot.

Cavalry charges, I always thought, were made like stone walls, knee to knee, and that this was so hard to do that the Cavalry were always practising it; but those I saw had a depth of 150 yards, wide intervals between men, and some of them may still be galloping, as far as I could see.

Had this display taken place at the Agricultural Hall, or at the Crystal Palace, one could have understood it; but having seen in the papers, both before and after, that his Majesty and the new Inspector of the Forces were witnessing the field training of the Army Corps, and that this was part of a tactical field day, I could not help thinking, "C'est magnifique mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

The Cavalry then disappeared, I believe, to continue the field day; but when next I saw them, the battle being at its height, and the Infantry attack being pushed home, they were lining the plain for the King's motor to pass through.

I dare say I have now opened your eyes as wide as mine as to how the Cavalry have profited by the lessons of the war; and, in conclusion, may I, as a poor, humble Colonial, with the best interests of old England at heart, offer them a little advice, which is: learn to scout, shoot, take cover, and conceal yourselves, and to fight in your own enclosed country before you assemble on Long Valleys or other plains to practice tomfoolery, if you don't want to spend another 200 millions to learn a second time your faults.

NOTES ON MOUNTED TROOPS.

By Lieut.-Colonel Hallewell, C.M.G.

Among other matters brought to light by the Royal Commission on the late war the recorded evidence discloses a great divergence of opinion regarding mounted troops. The extreme views held by some officers on this subject indicate a tendency to disregard the exceptional character of the operations, and emphasises the caution with which deductions should be drawn from our experiences in the late campaign.

The difficulties encountered by Regular troops in overcoming a national resistance are proverbial. To the language, features, and mode of life of the country, our troops were for the most part strange, which could but minimise their initial value. In addition, they had to face a mounted enemy, accustomed to shoot, possessing excellent sources of information; and this, be it remembered, was the first appearance in the field of heavy long-ranging guns, magazine arms and last but not least, smokeless powder. Looking back it is not surprising that such conditions could only be met by departing somewhat from existing methods.

Tactics are mainly influenced by the weapons in use, hence improvements and developments in guns and small arms produce corresponding changes in formations and modes of fighting.* In this case the results of recent improvements had to be experienced in actual warfare before their value was fully appreciated, and thus history merely repeated itself; on the other hand, the danger is apparent of our being led into adopting changes beyond those at present desirable in a laudable endeavour to keep up to date.

A just appreciation of the value of the man, his horse, and weapons, is necessary to decide on what lines to organise, arm, and train the troops. That these should follow broad, common-sense principles, seeking to develop the individuality in man and horse, whilst ensuring the soldier's appreciation of the aims and

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* Theoretically this is so; but practically, in the British Army, no opinion or argument except the bullet itself ever commands attention—and even this is usually misunderstood.—Ed. U. S. M.

objects of combined action, seems now to be generally admitted. Judging from the evidence, it is open to doubt whether these matters are always left to those best fitted to deal with them. We read of swords being withdrawn from Regular Cavalry in the field, whilst other corps were endeavouring to improvise a substitute. The issue of lances was not long since extended to other regiments than Lancers; now their abolition finds favour.

The necessity of supplementing the Cavalry by other troops of the nature of Mounted Riflemen to so large an extent, could not fail to attract general attention and a corresponding amount of criticism on their relative merits. This, when reasonable and unbiassed, is productive of good, and not to be deprecated in the interests of the Army.

Seeing that the Cavalry is armed with a firearm and composed of trained horsemen, we may fairly assume that, had it existed in sufficient numbers, the necessity for Mounted Infantry would not have become apparent, unless possibly in very exceptional cases.

It is also not unreasonable to inquire whether the temporary employment of officers and men of Infantry regiments on mounted duties in the field is to be regarded as due to choice or necessity, and whether, in view of the development now attained by Mounted Riflemen throughout the Empire, the principles of organisation which have hitherto been regarded as essential in the Regular Army, are still applicable to such a force.

Mounted Infantry has been employed at various times and in different countries; but the principles on which it has been raised have remained the same, though the actual form has varied with the nature of the service on which it has been engaged. Mounted Infantry has always been regarded as Infantry, pure and simple, but endowed with superior mobility; and these characteristics were especially insisted on when the force was mounted on horses. Companies were formed from officers and men temporarily detached from Infantry battalions, to which they reverted on their services being dispensed with, and, if the system had its inconveniences, it presented no insuperable difficulties, the numbers being small, and the service offering a popular chance of distinction.

The success of the force was largely due to the zeal and gallantry of the officers and men employed, and its use was gradually extended until Mounted Infantry battalions were contemplated in Army establishments for field service. Except, however, at certain stations, where companies remained mounted until their battalions left the command, the temporary character of such employment or training remained as before.

The greatest development of the movement was attained in the

[illegible] the Yeomanry and Mounted Infantry of the Army [illegible] contingents from the Empire at [illegible] of these, some 90,000 [illegible] the Colonies and the Imperial Yeomanry represented [illegible]

[illegible] it may be remarked that an efficiency [illegible] which had hitherto been attained, [illegible] of the service and the duration of hostilities; and [illegible] was very apparent.

[illegible] the results of some corps were most [illegible] was very varied, nor were the [illegible] These favourable conditions, however, their [illegible] experience. It is moreover, well to [illegible] the value of auxiliary troops, that [illegible] conditions unfavourable in some respects [illegible] only the lack of [illegible] on the part of the Boers enabled us to [illegible] the fighting line with any reasonable [illegible] and the results attained varied with the stamp [illegible]

[illegible] whether, in view of the higher [illegible] Mounted Infantry and Mounted [illegible] the war a reconsideration of their status in the [illegible] However we may inquire wherein the [illegible] officers and men of the Regular battalions [illegible] will for mounted duties in the field—as [illegible] the numerical of war; and on its conclusion, [illegible] their mounted work, reverting them to [illegible] the disadvantages laboured under by mounted [illegible] of their horses, we are un- [illegible] experience. The advantages of the [illegible] at the inception of the Mounted Infantry, [illegible] and the experience gained seems hardly [illegible] the greatest advantage. Our military assets are somewhat [illegible] it behoves us to ensure their fullest development.

[illegible] the lessons connected with the war will stand revealed in [illegible] and due credit will be given to those who, with [illegible] to do their duty on either side. The [illegible] should his interest not have waned, will then admit [illegible] on which his hostile criticism was sometimes [illegible] of its shortcomings, the recent campaign represents [illegible] the greatest effort this country has yet made on land; [illegible] administration be open to improvement, and politicians [illegible] labour under a mistaken sense of duty, the

follies which hampered our military operations in the Napoleonic wars, and as late as the Crimea, have disappeared, and the inscriptions on the British gravestones in South Africa remain the most eloquent and convincing proof of the living spirit within the Empire.

To develop and consolidate the position we have attained, it is essential that the movement so auspiciously inaugurated should be placed on a sound footing. Few portions of the Committee's Report are of more vital importance than the general observations made with regard to Imperial Forces, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the Home and Colonial Governments may be able to find a practical means of giving effect to the views indicated.

The constitution under which we live, the predominant importance of sea-power, and public opinion, all combine to hinder our adoption of the Continental system, excellent though it be, but out of harmony with our insular requirements and prejudices. That this is not due to lack of warlike instinct is apparent, on considering the number of men of all ranks of society who engaged voluntarily in the war, and the general enthusiasm evoked. Rather let us seek a development of our fighting power on lines shown to be in keeping with the spirit of our people.

There can be but few to-day who doubt the valuable material which exists amongst us, from which to form auxiliary Imperial troops; but careful organisation and training are imperative, if in future we are to avoid recent mistakes, inseparable from measures taken in haste under the stress of war, but of which on the whole we have every reason to feel proud.

Recent developments in small arms, which tend to increase the importance of dismounted service in the Cavalry, equally raise the value of Mounted Riflemen, and are to our advantage, as any large augmentation of the Cavalry is, under existing circumstances, out of the question; but we do possess the means of placing a considerable number of excellent auxiliary horsemen in the field drawn from the Empire at large. It is, however, essential that the men should be good riders, accustomed to the care of horses, well trained and led.

Such an Imperial Yeomanry, if the name is acceptable, whose services would be available on emergencies, and whose members were eligible for active service on all occasions, would be both a source of strength to our fighting power, and a fitting tribute to those who in their death vindicated the best traditions of our race.

H. L. HALLEWELL.

THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR,* NOVEMBER, 1894.

By Lieutenant W. Ellis Kelly, Royal Engineers

An account of the operations of the Japanese army in 1894, in their attack on Port Arthur, may be of interest at the present time. Since the Russians took possession, the defences have been vastly strengthened, and a land force attacking in the way in which the Japanese did in 1894 would meet with a very warm reception now, if such an attack were possible to-day. But, with the aid of a sketch-map, it will be interesting to follow the attack of nine years ago.

After the naval battle of Hai-yang-tai (17th Sept., 1894), the Japanese had complete command of the sea, only some six or eight vessels being left of the Chinese fleet, which now cruised in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li to convey transports laden with troops to Port Arthur, or ventured from Port Arthur to Wei-Hai-Wei rather aimlessly. The capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese would deprive the Chinese fleet, or what remained of it, of their most important base, and it would also assist largely in Japanese operations against Peking.

The Japanese 1st Army, composed of the 3rd and 5th Divisions (35,000 men), under Marshal Yamagata, was occupied in clearing General Sung and his troops from the Yalu River and the Motien-Ling Pass; so it was necessary that a completely equipped separate force, acting from a separate base altogether, should be sent to operate against Port Arthur. The Japanese 2nd Army was therefore organised, under Marshal Oyama. It consisted of the 1st Division, under General Yamaji, a brigade of the 6th Division, under Major-General Hasegawa, and a siege train, line of communication troops, etc. The total strength, including line of communication troops, was 39,000 men (a Japanese division on a war footing numbers 17,000 men).

The Army was transported to the Ping-Yang inlet on the 16th October, and remained there until the 23rd, under the protection

* I regret very much having been unable to publish this article last month.—Ed. U. S. M.

of Admiral Ito's fleet. The Chinese fleet was so shattered in the action at Hai-yang-tao that there was very little chance of its interfering with the transports conveying the 2nd Army to its point of disembarkation. Accordingly, the first batch of the 2nd Army disembarked on the 24th October at the mouth of the Hua-Yuan River. The landing-place was not a good one, owing to the shallow water, but it was hoped that a better spot would be found soon after a forward movement had been begun. An advance guard was pushed forward to Pitzuwo, twenty-four miles towards Port Arthur, on the 25th, the 1st Division following on the 1st November.

There was a splendid defensive position stretching across the isthmus at Chin-chou, about forty-five miles north-east of Port Arthur; but the Chinese, 6000 strong, instead of holding the hills, garrisoned the walled town, which was completely commanded by the hills on the north-east, within easy artillery range. As a defensive position on the land side, Chin-chou afforded excellent opportunities. Its left flank rests on Society Bay, where the water is so shallow that ships of war cannot co-operate with the land attack. Its right flank rests on Talienwan Bay, which the Chinese commanded with six forts, armed with modern guns. There seemed every likelihood, therefore, that the Japanese advance would be checked at Chin-chou. The 1st Division marched across from Pitzuwo to San-shili-pu, a village on the road from Fuchou to Port Arthur, leaving a small force to watch two entrenched works held by the Chinese on the Pitzuwo road.

On the evening of the 5th November the Japanese arrived before Chin-chou, and early on the 6th the attack began. The Chinese held a small position in advance of the town, and this was carried at the first onset of the Japanese Infantry, the defenders flying to the town. Artillery was then hurried up, and, occupying the position just evacuated by the Chinese, the guns shelled the town itself. Supported by the guns, two regiments of Infantry (6 battalions) advanced towards the walls. After two hours' shelling by the batteries, the 2nd regiment (2nd brigade) blew in the north gate and entered the town, the Chinese immediately fleeing southwards, pursued by the 1st brigade. Next day the six forts commanding Talienwan Bay fell into the hands of the Japanese, the defenders having fled during the night to Port Arthur. Thus, with practically no loss whatever, the Japanese had obtained possession of the first and strongest line of defence of Port Arthur.

A great strategical advantage now accrued to Japan. The line of communications from the Hua-Yuan River could now be

dispensed with, and the base shifted to Talienwan Bay, where, under the protection of the fleet, the Japanese landed their heavy artillery and all their stores and equipment. This affords an excellent example of a change of base, and a shifting of the line of communications under secure conditions, again rendered possible by the command of the sea.

Hasegawa's brigade, however, had landed at the Hua-Yuan River on the 1st November, and remained there while part of the siege equipment from Japan was being disembarked. The brigade reached Chin-chou on the 13th, in time to take part in the attack on Port Arthur. After a halt of four more days, to allow stores and provisions to reach the army, the advance from Chin-chou was resumed on the 17th. The army was divided into two columns. The right column, the stronger of the two, consisting of the 1st Division, took the main road, which skirts along the northern shore until it reaches the village of Tu-chengtsu, after which two branches lead due south to Port Arthur; one passes through a range of hills about six miles north of the town, and the other skirts the western end of this range, the two eventually joining again outside the town. The left column, made up of a part of Hasegawa's brigade (the remainder followed the 1st Division), marched direct upon Port Arthur through the centre of the peninsula.

On the 18th the advanced Cavalry of the 1st Division, moving from Shuangtai-kou, met with a large force of the enemy, and were in great danger of being cut off. The advanced-guard Infantry, however, came to the rescue, and succeeded in maintaining their position until further reinforcements arrived from the main body. The Chinese then retreated, and this skirmish was practically the only instance in the campaign where the Chinese showed any fighting capacity.

News of this fight was carried back into Port Arthur as a great Chinese victory, and it certainly helped to encourage the defenders; otherwise, they would have fled precipitately, before the Japanese advanced, although their only retreat was by the coast on the right flank of the army, since the sea was no longer open to their junks and transports.

At Shuangtai-kou the right column split up into two, the part of Hasegawa's brigade, attached to the 1st Division, taking a turning to the left, and advancing parallel to the 1st Division. There were thus three columns advancing on Port Arthur. The right column, forming the main body, reached Tu-chengtsu on the 19th November, and turned due south by the two branch roads leading from that village.

The land defences of Port Arthur, in skilful hands, would have



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provided a difficult problem for the generals of the Japanese army to deal with. A semi-circle of hills, running from the sea-coast on the south to the road from Tu-chengtsu, at two and a half miles from the dockyard, and crowned with forts and entrenched works, formed the eastern defences. Due north of the town is a gap between the eastern and the western hills. Through this gap runs the main road, which skirts the eastern slopes of a conical hill, called Cairn Hill. West of the gap stands the Itsushan Hill, crowned with three forts—Itsushan, Antsushan, and Wangtai—whose armaments included a miscellaneous assortment of Krupp guns, mountain guns, 8-inch mortars, and 40-pounder muzzle-loaders. Two forts on the east of the road, Erhlungshan and Sungshushan, commanded the approach. On the south side, three forts on the east, and three on the west arm, guarded the entrance to the harbour. A battery on Cairn Hill would have still further added to the command of the main road, and the hill itself might have formed an inner citadel, to be held as a last resource.

The Chinese garrison was strong enough in numbers to make a good defence, but their fighting capacity was ludicrous, and their *morale* hopelessly shaken by their defeat at Chin-chou. They numbered 14,000 all told. The six forts on the north were garrisoned by 3300 men; 2000 more manned the eastern defences. In reserve were 1200 men behind Sungshushan, and 2500 on Cairn Hill. The coast defences were manned by 4100 men; and about 1000 raw levies, posted round the dockyard, completed the garrison. About 3200 of this number were the remnants of the force defeated at Chin-chou.

The Japanese attack was ordered for daybreak on the 21st November. The 1st Division was to attack and capture the forts on the Itsushan Hill, and Hasegawa's brigade was to advance against the eastern forts, being supported by the 1st Division when the Itsushan forts had been captured. Evidently the capture of Itsushan Hill would render the works east of the main road untenable, and therefore the main blow was directed against this section of the defence.

On the afternoon of the 20th, while the Japanese force was still advancing, a large body of Chinese appeared through the gap where the main road ran, with the apparent object of attacking the Japanese before deployment, but most probably with a view to bursting out before the circle round them was completed. But they were easily repulsed after a few minutes' shelling by the Japanese batteries.

So perfect were the Japanese arrangements, that daybreak on the 21st saw all their columns ready for immediate attack. The

[illegible] with the two mountain batteries, supported by the [illegible] were north-west of Itsushan Hill. Hasegawa's brigade [illegible] east of the village of Sui-shih-ying, with one mountain battery formed the central column, while the remainder of his brigade, three battalions, forming the left column, was two miles to the left rear of the centre column. Four field batteries, supported by two battalions of Infantry, occupied a ridge within [illegible] of Itsushan, on the north. The 12-cm. and 9-cm. siege guns, 15-cm. and 9-cm. mortars were posted on a ridge just north of Sui-shih-ying.

At 7 A.M. the guns opened fire on Itsushan Hill. After an hour's bombardment the 2nd brigade advanced from the west, and with one rush up the hill carried the westernmost fort. Five minutes later the remaining two forts on the hill, Wangtai and Itsushan, were rushed, and thus, after an hour, Itsushan was captured. This gave a great advantage to the Japanese. Thence-forward the capture of the remaining forts was certain. A body of Chinese, in trying to escape westwards, threatened the Japanese right flank so the 1st brigade had to be hurried up in support. The Chinese were driven back, and the two brigades advanced together towards the eastern defences. Hasegawa, in the mean time, had developed his attack, and by the time the 1st Division had captured Itsushan, his brigade had made good way against the eastern forts, which kept up a very hot fire on his men, but did very little damage. The field guns of the right column now came to the assistance of the brigade, and opened fire on Sungshushan and Erhlingshan. At 11 A.M. the Infantry rushed the ridge, when the Chinese fled precipitately, and by 11.30 A.M. all the forts, except the sea-defences, had been evacuated. There only remained the harbour forts. The Japanese brought their field guns up to Cairn Hill to prepare for the attack on Huangchin-shan; but in the early part of the afternoon it was found that the Chinese had abandoned the place. The last forts on the west side of the harbour entrance were abandoned during the night. Thus Port Arthur fell into the hands of the Japanese with very little difficulty. The Chinese escaped round the right flank of the Japanese army, and fled past Chin-chou, leaving 2000 killed and *a few wounded* behind them. The Japanese losses were 66 killed, 350 wounded, and some 10 or 12 missing; a cheap victory, considering what might have occurred had the defences been properly manned.

General Sung, with a patriotism rather unusual with the Chinese, endeavoured to cut off the Japanese army from its base, by an attack on Chin-chou with 8000 troops, which he collected from the north and from Motien-Ling. However, the Japanese

garrison, 1500 strong, succeeded in driving him off with heavy losses; they also cut down thousands of fugitives from Port Arthur, who tried to escape past Chin-chou.

This was the ignoble end of the Port Arthur campaign. Had the Chinese been properly organised, their defence of Port Arthur might have cost the Japanese heavy losses; but their stamina was gone—if they ever had any—and the capture of the place was little more than a series of nearly bloodless manœuvres for the Japanese.

To-day, no doubt, the land defences of Port Arthur have been enormously strengthened, and, with a Russian garrison, no land attack would be likely to succeed. The railway practically follows the road taken by the Japanese 1st Division, and enters the gap between Itsushan and the Sungshushan forts. The Japanese will not attempt a land attack to-day, so long as there is any chance of a blockade being successful in reducing the garrison. But when the Russians have become crippled by disease and starvation, no doubt a land attack could be made after the same manner as in 1894. Time will show.

W. HYDE KELLY.

NOTE.—The account has been taken from the Japanese official documents, and the sketch-maps from the epitome of the war issued by the Intelligence Department.—W. H. K.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

A National Ambulance Service.

Sir,

As the writer of the review on 'Wounds in War,' which appears in this number of the United Service Magazine, I desire, with your kind permission, to call attention to the necessity for a national ambulance service. The Spanish-American and the South African wars have for the first time made us fully acquainted with the effect of smokeless powder and of small-bore rifles in the production of gun-shot wounds, and though the comparatively small number of casualties which, because of local circumstances, etc., occurred in battle in these wars, cannot be regarded as representative of what will happen in a war between any two of the great powers, yet in all other particulars the circumstances of the wounded were typical of what may be expected in the future.

From both wars it is deduced that a large moiety of the wounded cannot possibly obtain surgical attendance *in time*, and that the first aid or first-aid dressing must in many cases be applied by the wounded themselves, or by their comrades, etc. Colonel Nicholas Senn, who was chief of the operating staff with the army in the field in the Spanish-American War, holds this opinion, and Surgeon-General Stevenson considers it a physical impossibility for the medical service to attend to the wants of all the wounded on the day of battle.

The treatment of the wounded on the field of battle has for its objects in all cases the prevention of infection by the application of the first field dressing, and by rendering the wound immobile; also in a large proportion of cases the alleviation of shock, and in a smaller number of cases the arrest of hæmorrhage. It goes without saying that the sooner after the receipt of injury the wounded are attended to, and the more skilfully this work is done, the more favourable will be the chances of recovery.

For the after treatment, rest is all-important; but the first duty of the medical service after a battle is to relieve the army of all hindrances to its progress; hence the care of the wounded is dominated by military necessity, to which everything else must give way. Sir Frederick Treves graphically depicts the suffering and loss of life which the dragging about of the wounded causes, and he expressed the opinion that if the wounded could be treated as near as possible to where they fell, the death-rate would be greatly reduced.

A national ambulance service, trained by the medical department, which in war will be placed under the orders of the Director-General, is the only agency which could adequately perform this

duty. It will be said that there are various voluntary associations and societies already in existence for this purpose, and that on the outbreak of war the public will generously respond, but in my opinion this multiplicity of agencies, with a lavish expenditure of money during war, does not make for efficient medical aid in the field. What is wanted is to weld these associations together into one homogeneous service, each unit having its place assigned to it in war. Perhaps it may not be too much to hope that in the near future not only will there be a national ambulance service, but that the Great Powers will find it possible, by mutual agreement, to establish an international ambulance service to, in some measure, lessen the hardships of war, which the enormous strength of modern armies and the progressive development of armament will most assuredly increase.

THE REVIEWER OF 'WOUNDS IN WAR.'

P.S.—Since the above was written, there appeared in the *British Medical Journal* a letter from Sir Federick Treves, in which he describes Japan's medical service. Their Red Cross Society, which has no connection with their Army Medical Corps, performs all the duties in war which are here suggested for our national ambulance service, and sets free the officers and men of the corps at home stations for war service. Sir Frederick Treves says that three years' training is required, and that their services are invaluable.—R.

SUNDRIES.

I.

A SOCIALIST EDITOR ON CONSCRIPTION.

MR. ROBERT BLATCHFORD, the well-known Socialist, and editor of the *Clarion*, has contributed to his paper last month a series of articles on "Conscription and the Home Defences." The Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, and the majority's conclusion that compulsory military service is necessary for a proper defence of the country, have aroused universal interest.

As an ex-soldier and a close student of military affairs, Mr. Blatchford is well qualified to write on this important problem, while his point of view as a Socialist is sure to cause wide discussion. In his first article he introduces the subject by asserting his opinion that, "Conscription or no Conscription, the country should be put into a state of defence. As things now are, the Royal Commission tacitly declares that we are impotent to defend ourselves against invasion—a declaration which will be endorsed by almost every competent judge in England and on the Continent.

"There is the fleet. Yes. But are we *sure* that the fleet renders invasion impossible? Do the four millions of workmen who oppose

Conscription know enough about the naval and military position to justify them in depending upon the fleet alone?

"Personally, I do not believe the fleet can be absolutely depended upon to protect our shores, and I do believe that the danger of invasion is a real danger, and a danger by no means remote.

"Well. We have to consider, first, the question of whether an invasion of England is possible. I shall try to show that it is not only possible, but probable.

"We have then to decide whether, assuming an invasion to be possible, we have a Home Army capable of defeating it. I shall try to show that we have not.

"We have then, and not till then, to discuss the question of Conscription *versus* Voluntary Service.

"The Commission is, as I said just now, of opinion that a voluntary army cannot be made efficient enough to defeat an invasion in force by an army of Continental soldiers.

"In this view they have the support of many excellent judges and experts.

"On the other hand, there is a considerable volume of trained and capable opinion opposed to them.

"As regards Imperial Service, I do not think the voluntary system will suffice. Under existing conditions, I fear that Imperialism without Conscription is impossible.

"As regards Home Defence, I am inclined to think that voluntary service could be made effective. Many men for whose knowledge and capacity I have the greatest respect are of opinion that our Volunteers cannot be made efficient enough for Home Defence; but I shall make bold to argue against that view."

II.

A translation, by Colonel J. L. Keir, R.F.A., of a German article on "The Education of English Officers," appears in the April number of the *Journal of the United Service of India*. The author evidently knows more of the subject than most foreigners, and his remarks are scrupulously fair, and are substantially correct. The whole article is well worthy of perusal, and most people will find themselves in thorough agreement with his concluding observations.

"That so many English officers have progressed, in spite of all difficulties, and have come to eminence, is to be attributed to their undeniable character of sportsmen. Should the reforms now in progress succeed in devising a suitable training, it may be assumed that, under these more favourable circumstances, the officer will apply himself to his work with zeal and devotion. Yet he has a right to expect that a certain definite prospect will be opened to him. Up to the present, few signs of this are visible. The English officer's life in the Service is by no means an easy one. Continual changes in the Standing Orders leave room to doubt whether the authorities really know exactly what they want. His purse is drained by repeated changes in his uniform, which are made under the pretence that they are to reduce his expenses. Unfortunately

these attempts have, up to the present, only produced the opposite result.

"The English Press might do the officer some good, and at the same time gain time for the military authorities to thoroughly test their reforms; instead of, by means of articles, exposing abuses (many of which show defective knowledge of the subject), raising public discontent, and wasting the time of the War Minister in Parliament by compelling him to reply to senseless questions, most of which should not be answered. The radical reform of an army is an undertaking that cannot be carried out in one, or even in two, years."

III.

As a tentative measure, the Austro-Hungarian War Minister has increased the number of cartridges to be carried by the infantry soldier from 100 to 120, 40 being carried in the two pouches and 80 in the valise. The increase of weight resulting from this arrangement is about 24 ozs. To compensate for this increase, and in order to lessen the total weight carried by the man, the War Minister has decided that about half of the three reserve rations (about 2½ lbs.) and the daily ration (total weight of the two, about 6½ lbs.), carried by the man, shall in future be placed on the company supply and ammunition waggons. The gaiters and certain toilet articles may also, if necessary, be carried in the baggage waggons; the diminution in weight resulting from this will be about 27½ ozs.

IV.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy will carry out its annual summer manœuvres in home waters from the 15th June to the 15th September. It will be commanded by Rear-Admiral von Ripper, and will consist of two divisions and a torpedo-boat flotilla. The 1st Division will be formed by the battleships *Habsburg*, *Arpad*, and *Babenberg*; the 2nd Division will consist of the battleships *Monarch*, *Wien*, and *Budapest*. The torpedo-boat flotilla will be formed from the cruiser *Zenta*, of the torpedo-destroyers *Satellit*, *Meteor*, and *Komet*, of two seagoing torpedo-boats, and of several first-class torpedo-boats.

V.

The Belgian Army has recently been reorganised. Its total war strength under the present organisation amounts to 2513 officers, 97,533 men, 21,541 horses, and 2060 waggons.

VI.

The French colonel, Grandprey, gives some very interesting information regarding the Chinese Army in the May number of the *Revue de Paris*. The author of the article was formerly military *attaché* at Pekin, and therefore speaks from knowledge. He says that few countries have such excellent material as China for an army, where the whole of the population of 420 millions consist, so to speak, of one people displaying the same racial qualities. The Chinese is long-lived and tenacious of life. He thrives in every climate, in spite of heat or cold, is extremely thrifty, and therefore easily

supported. He has nerves of steel, when he is not an opium-smoker, which vice is generally confined to the upper class, and this strong constitution renders him impervious to discomfort; he can sleep in any position and in any place, and can do with a minimum of sleep. He seldom needs a doctor, and bears pain with the greatest stoicism. The Chinese is very teachable, and what he has once been taught he never forgets. At the same time, he is almost a stranger to a spirit of nationality and patriotism, and as a rule the Chinese look on soldiers as objectless and costly idlers. He is perhaps lacking in the qualifications to make a good officer, but he displays just those incomparable qualities which, under good leading and organisation, would make the Chinese Army a most powerful one.

VII.

The *France Militaire* announces that the draft of the War Budget for 1905 amounts to the following:—

1st Section—Home Troops	623,326,072	francs
2nd Section—Colonial Troops	28,636,694	"
3rd Section—Extraordinary Expenditure ...	27,367,150	"
Total ...	679,329,916	francs.

In other words, 3 million francs more than the amount of the Budget for 1904. The following provisions are made for 1905, viz. 28,927 officers, 520,805 men; 679 officers of gensdarmerie and 24,047 gensdarmes; 141,723 horses; or, as against the previous year, a decrease of 63 officers, 25 men, 600 horses, and 4 officers of gensdarmerie; and an increase of 13 gensdarmes.

VIII.

On account of the importance of reducing as far as possible the number of horses taken from cavalry regiments for the purpose of drawing infantry equipages during the French manœuvres, an attempt will be made this year to get together the greatest possible number of draught horses brought up by reservists who are called out. As a tentative measure during 1904, military governors and commanders of army corps may, if they see fit, increase the amount allowed for each horse per day (which is 5 francs at present), so that it does not exceed 7 francs. The personal allowance given to reservists owning horses during the supplementary days is increased from 2 francs to 2·50 francs per day.

IX.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* announces that the French military authorities have under consideration—

1. The formation of batteries of 6 instead of 4 guns at the time of mobilisation, in order to avoid the cost and the increase of personnel incidental to the formation of 7 new batteries per army corps, necessary to provide each of these large units with 120 guns. With regard to this, it should be mentioned that the artillery brigade of each army corps at present consists, on an average, of

23 batteries; 12 to the divisional artillery regiment and 11 to the corps' artillery regiment, or altogether 92 guns.

2. To do away with the corps' artillery regiment and to attach a regiment of 12 batteries, instead of half a regiment of 6, to each division. On mobilisation the corps' artillery regiment would be reformed by the selection of a certain number of batteries from each of the 2 divisional regiments.

3. To modify the present gun-carriage so as to lessen the weight of the gun in battery and to do away with the lowering movement.

X.

The *Engineer* announces that during the year 1903 the German Navy was augmented by the construction of 10 warships, representing an aggregate displacement of 59,477 tons. This is an increase in the tonnage over the previous year of 29,082 tons. Of this total launched there were 3 armour-clads aggregating 39,600 tons, 1 armoured cruiser of 9500 tons, 3 small cruisers of 9000 tons, and a gunboat of 977 tons.

XI.

Among the officers of the German Navy are 5 admirals, 7 vice-admirals, 17 rear-admirals, 62 captains of ships, 25 of frigates, and 111 of corvettes. The ships of the navy consist of 19 battleships, 8 coast-defence ships, 12 armoured gunboats, 10 armoured cruisers, 29 protected cruisers, 7 ordinary gunboats, 15 training ships, 9 special service vessels, and 9 harbour ships. Of these there are in commission 9 battleships, 4 coast-defence ships, 1 armoured gunboat, 7 armoured cruisers, 19 protected cruisers, 6 ordinary gunboats, 11 training ships, and 8 special service vessels.

XII.

The programme of Italian naval construction for the year 1904–5 is as follows:—

Arm a second-class battleship; construct and arm 4 first-class battleships; commence the construction of a first or second-class vessel; construct and arm 5 submarines; construct and arm 2 ships for the transport of coal; arm 2 torpedo-catchers; construct and arm 14 first-class torpedo-boats; construct 2 river gunboats and 3 tugs.

XIII.

Lieutenant Saporetti, of the 6th Alpine Regiment of the Italian Army, has just invented a telemeter, which, according to the *Neue Militärische Blatter*, appears to mark an important step in the solution of the difficult problem of measuring distances. This telemeter, which may be used in all positions by the operator, gives, without any calculation whatever, the distances of fixed and moving objects up to 3500 meters. It can be easily carried, and works on all grounds. The time required to take a distance varies from 5 to 30 seconds.

[illegible] recently with regard to [illegible] Shimose powder. It may [illegible] of that powder, given by [illegible] Shimose, [illegible] at Tokio, and [illegible] Dr. Shimose said—

[illegible] nor ignition, [illegible] cause this explosive to [illegible] but the fire [illegible] Combined with a [illegible] explosive power for warlike [illegible] American gelatine [illegible] Shimose came next, gun-cotton [illegible] To illustrate the explosive [illegible] plate, one [illegible] perforate the plate for [illegible] an experiment carried out at [illegible] Shimose shot was fired at a coal-store [illegible] of a certain cruiser. [illegible] diameter, whereas in the [illegible] the diameter of the hole was only 6 inches. [illegible] while the other exploded only [illegible] passing through the plate. [illegible] or three thousand pieces, [illegible] fifteen fragments." This [illegible] a blackjacket on [illegible] fragments of shell. The [illegible] would mean the wounding of all [illegible] was not intended for the killing [illegible] ships. One more noteworthy [illegible] was the fact that its cost was about [illegible]

X

[illegible] assumes that Russia had in the [illegible] commencement of April last a total of 151 [illegible] Cavalry there [illegible] of Artillery, at least 972 guns, [illegible] battalions of 800 men. In round numbers, [illegible] General Kuropatkin had at his disposal [illegible] men.

XI

[illegible] were formed in Russia, of [illegible] was attached to the 3rd East Siberian [illegible] March last, two other similar [illegible] were formed, meant for the 1st and 5th Divisions [illegible] Siberian Rifles. Each of the three first Siberian [illegible] thus disposes of a company of 8 machine-guns.

[illegible] must be stated that the East Siberian Rifle [illegible] each of 4 regiments of 3 battalions, have [illegible] consisting of 2 brigades of 2

regiments. The new divisions, as well as the corresponding Artillery brigades, bear the same numbers as the old brigades. The 1st, 2nd, and 6th Divisions at present belong to the Ist Siberian Army Corps, the 5th Division to the IInd, the 3rd, 4th, and 9th to the IIIrd, whilst the 7th and 8th are at Port Arthur and Vladivostock respectively.

XVII.

Preparations are actively progressing at headquarters, Atlantic Division, United States Army, for the combined manœuvres of the Regular Army and the National Guard, to be held in the vicinity of Manassas, Virginia, on the historic battlefields of Bull Run, in September next.

XVIII.

The United States *Army and Navy Journal* states that the new device for sponging out the bores of guns, which has been constructed by the Bureau of Ordnance, at the navy yard, Washington, has been tested with very satisfactory results. The device throws a draft of air at 200 lbs. pressure through the bore of the gun. The draft is strong enough to blow a block of wood clear out of the bore for a distance of 12 feet and more. When the tests at the yard have been completed, the device will be installed on all battleships.

XIX.

According to the *Engineer*, the new steel full-rigged training ships *Cumberland* and *Intrepid*, building for the United States, are not to cost more than £74,000. These ships will be 176 feet 5 inches on the load water-line, 45 feet 7¾ inches beam, 16 feet 5 inches draught, with a displacement of 1800 tons. The vessels will have accommodation for a commanding officer, 9 wardroom officers, 6 warrant officers, and a crew of 320 men. They will be equipped with all modern appliances for handling the sails, dynamos, refrigerating plant, and other machinery for various uses. They will be provided with a battery of six 4-inch ·40-calibre rapid-fire guns, four 6-pdr. rapid-fire guns, two 1-pdr. rapid-fire guns, and 2 Colt automatic guns, ·30 calibre.

REVIEWS.

THE NAVIES OF THE WORLD.

[illegible] Edited by T. A. Brassey. Griffin, Portsmouth. [illegible] 'The Naval Pocket-Book.' Edited by Sir [illegible] Thacker & Co. Price 7s. 6d. net.

In the mass of statistics which they contain, these books cover very much the same ground. Where they do not overlap, the Pocket-Book expends its energies in superabundant details, while the Annual reserves its strength for serious articles which have a lasting value. As to the statistics, it may be said at once that both reach a satisfactory level, but that neither is without blemish. To present thoroughly reliable details of even our own ships of war is not easy; with many foreign ships it becomes all but an impossibility. It is easy enough to get details of a new type of ship at the date of the laying of her keel; but it is quite another matter to keep pace with the various alterations in design which are made from time to time whilst she is still under construction.

With certain navies the practice of rebuilding or rearming old ships presents a constant source of error. It is owing to such causes as these that different details of the same ships appear in different parts of these two books. For instance, in the 'Annual,' details of the German cruiser *Rsw* and the U.S. battleship *Connecticut* do not agree with the plans, and some obsolete plans, such as *Charlemagne*, have been allowed to stand. In the 'Pocket-Book' it is noticeable that the changes in armament of, *e.g.*, the later ships of the *Republique* class have not been taken into account in the plans, nor do the *Devonshires* appear. It may be noted here that the 'Pocket-Book,' which had of late attained to a certain uniformity in the execution of these plans, has relapsed into haphazard methods, which make it very difficult to differentiate between internal and external armour. It also omits one or two of its recent features, such as the tables of the results of steam trials, and the table of ships lost during the year, both of which were peculiar to this one book. In exchange, it offers a section on submarine boats, which may be gratefully accepted by minor journalists, but will not be of much use to naval officers.

'The Naval Annual,' on the other hand, is not a mere record of details of new ships and guns; it is a history also of the development of naval ideas. It has, among other articles, one on submarines, which affords an admirable summary of what is known on the subject hitherto, and contrasts most favourably with Mr. Burgoyne's pages in the 'Pocket-Book.' It is a record of known fact, and speculates soberly and guardedly on the future use of

these craft. In actual statistics there are indeed certain errors, which may be checked by the Fleet's Return, published early in May; but there are none of the rash assertions that flow so trippingly from Mr. Burgoyne's pen. It is a pleasant relief to turn to such a paper after a course of unconfirmed statements, such as, "A1, which proved a very bad diver" (a statement which Mr. Burgoyne's editor thinks it necessary to contradict); "The year 1903 has been remarkable, chiefly for the way in which the submarine has received general recognition; * * * * The submarines of the *Naiade* class are, perhaps, the finest weapons of harbour defence as yet evolved." With regard to the last assertion we quote, on the other hand, the 'Annual's' writer. "They (*Naiade* class) are confessedly for harbour defence only; their speed and radius is very small, and they are generally stigmatised as being unsatisfactory." This being Mr. Burgoyne's frame of mind, it is needless to say that it is not easy to approach even his tables with confidence; they are too heavily varnished with the hopefulness of ebullient enthusiasm.

One of the peculiarities of the 'Naval Annual' is that, owing to the fact that the chapters are the work of different writers, various aspects of the same subject are presented at times with contradictory results. This is, to a certain extent, the case with the two chapters on the design of recent ships, the one by Sir W. White, the other, in Part III., by an anonymous writer. Sir W. White speaks strongly on behalf of the designs which found favour while he was at the Admiralty, and for the mere information which it conveys on the difficult subject of shipbuilding his chapter will be welcome; but it has a value beyond that, inasmuch as it throws a good deal of light on the relationship which exists between the Admiralty Board and the Director of Construction. It is a known fact that the Admiralty's policy of silence makes it necessary for the Board to bear much undeserved criticism; it is shown involuntarily by Sir W. White that at times the boot is on the other foot, and that the head of a great department may come in for criticism which should by rights be bestowed on the Board.

Another instance of the same divergence of views occurs between the editor, who, in Chapter IV., postulates a reduction of our Mediterranean Fleet, and Lieutenant Bellairs, who, in a valuable chapter on "Commerce and War," emphasises the need for keeping that fleet thoroughly up to its work. The contradiction is more apparent than real, however, and the demand is really for an exercise of the sense of proportion. It is very doubtful, however, if the editor's demand will be largely supported, and we are likely to keep more strength than necessary in the Mediterranean until the strain elsewhere reaches breaking-point. In the War of American Independence we had no real interests in the Inland Sea, yet we spent an enormous amount of strength in retaining Gibraltar, and though we might have had Russian help at the price of Minorca we would not consider the offer. It has in consequence been said, perhaps truly, that we preferred Gibraltar to the retention of the Colonies. But in future we can never be

[illegible] the Mediterranean, and it is safe to foresee that the [illegible] in the fleet which we maintain there [illegible] another outburst such as that [illegible] years ago. The question of the advisability [illegible] the China Fleet, a point which was first raised [illegible] is briefly referred to.

[illegible] with regard to the 1903 naval manœuvres [illegible] in a long chapter; but, inasmuch as the controversy which it has raised is not yet ended, it is in the present instance merely to refer the reader to Mr. [illegible] chapter on the Reorganisation [illegible] gives a full and concise account of the recent [illegible] in Engineering, has much [illegible] Also he quotes, seemingly with [illegible] Sir V. [illegible] as to the possibility of a great [illegible] The most satisfactory part of the book [illegible] the Russian and Japanese navies. Details, [illegible] are now introduced as postscripts, and [illegible] the Japanese Navy strikes one as being [illegible] [illegible] in some by full or reliable [illegible] the losses of the combatants or their methods, we [illegible] the writer of being merely human.

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 1878–79–80.

ITS [illegible], ITS INCIDENTS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

[illegible] Vol. II. Westminster: Archibald Constable & [illegible] Price [illegible] net.

The first volume of Colonel Hanna's masterly work was reviewed in the [illegible] for July, 1899, so that an interval of nearly five years separates the present from the previous volume, and during this long period of waiting many a reader of the first must have grumbled deeply over the delay in producing the second. No explanation of the cause of delay has been vouchsafed, but the merits of the volume itself are so great that all resentment upon account of its tardy appearance quickly vanishes, and when it has been read to the end, the feeling uppermost in the mind is a great desire for more—the sooner the better.

Holding the views he does upon the subject of the "Forward Policy," it is natural that Colonel Hanna should have employed his frequent opportunities of tracing back to their origin of political error many of the difficulties encountered during the campaign. Right or wrong, Colonel Hanna is a very able advocate, and however strongly people may agree or differ with him, they can scarcely fail to benefit by giving their most careful consideration to what he has to say.

The strategical policy that has preceded a campaign must necessarily exercise a great influence upon it; and thoughtful soldiers must therefore, if they would thoroughly master its inner

history, pay due attention to the political process by which it was brought about. The sentimental rights or the wrongs are of secondary importance; the real question is whether the true interests of our own country were well or ill served.

What we have hitherto gained by interference with Afghanistan it is difficult to say. We meddled in our usual muddling way; and then, for the sake of our prestige, we found ourselves compelled to go to war. Less meddling with Afghan affairs and a plain promise of support in case of difficulties with Russia would probably have been more beneficial in every way, and would certainly have been very much less expensive. Such political questions were, however, treated at such length in the previous volume that the author has been enabled to devote the present chiefly to the military history of the campaign itself. At the end of each chapter are critical "observations," in which the strategical and tactical issues involved are passed in review. Amongst other vexed questions thus dealt with will be found that relating to the conduct by Sir Frederick Roberts of the operations about the Peiwar Kotal. That Roberts made mistakes in this and in other cases we already knew, although the whole matter has never before been so well explained. But the result is only to furnish additional evidence as to the true secret of the greatness that Lord Roberts has won—namely, his superlative courage. Lord Roberts has seldom displayed remarkable gifts of foresight, and in the difficult situations in which he has frequently found himself he has often been caught unprepared. But in no crisis, however terrible, has his indomitable pluck ever failed him. Thus he has often achieved the apparently impossible and won victory where men of greater skill but less courage would have failed miserably. No general could have been put to a higher proof of courage than when Roberts found all his fortunes resting upon the conduct of one disaffected battalion. But he blenched not; his greatness of personality gave him *time;* time brought help, and the result was success as well deserved as if the preparations for it had been absolutely faultless.

A feature of the second Afghan War which Colonel Hanna has brought into bold relief is the pernicious influence of political authority. Not only were the operations, as a whole, hampered by Lord Lytton's desire to commence them in accordance with a theatrical programme, but the "political" officers who represented the government of the viceroy with the various units constantly gave trouble to the generals in the field. Every viceroy is not a Dalhousie, nor every commissioner a Lawrence—and hence the failures of so many who are strategists in their own conceit. Possibly after the sack of London we shall learn that it is the business of politicians to declare war, but of soldiers and sailors to conduct it. In India the politicals may often prove good servants to generals, but never desirable masters. Not that the political may not actually be the more competent strategist of the two, but because in that case the general is unfit for his command, and the political would do better by procuring his removal than by attempting to "run" him. For an example of an ideal "political,"

content to play thoroughly his proper part, Mr. Donald Macnabb whose great merits Colonel Hanna is careful to record, will serve as well as almost any known in history. Macnabb was a cool, calculating official, enthusiastic about nothing except doing his duty to the best of his exceptional knowledge and experience; but the gallant and ill-fated Cavagnari was an optimist to the extent of absolute fanaticism. Space prohibits further remarks; but to those who desire to understand the second Afghan War, no better advice can be given than that they should read Colonel Hanna's most instructive pages.

'THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870–1871.'

By Colonel LONSDALE HALE. London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall, S.W. 1904. Price 6s. net.

THERE is no man in England, and probably none in Europe, who knows more about the Franco-German War than Colonel Lonsdale Hale; and the second phase of that war, dealt with in the present work, is the part to which the author has devoted particular attention, and has indeed made his especial hobby. There is not a rood of the ground that Colonel Lonsdale Hale has not traversed, on foot; every incident is familiar to him, and the result is a narrative which, whilst it embraces the widest aspects of the strategy employed by the Royal headquarters, includes also the most minute details. The reader is carried behind the strategical scenes; he learns how 100,000 Frenchmen became invisible, were lost altogether to view, not of their own cunning, but because of German errors; how the German staff distrusted and abused each other quite as severely as if they had been British; how situations were misunderstood and combinations erroneously contrived accordingly; and yet how, taken on a fair average, the working of that staff is a pattern worthy of close imitation. Passing from such great matters, Colonel Lonsdale Hale describes the area upon which a few companies fought, with an attention to its—to him—familiar details that enables the reader (for whose guidance, by the way, admirable maps are provided) to imagine himself actually upon the very spot. The chief lesson for ourselves, to be gathered from this "People's War," is that, despite the consummate skill and experience of the most highly trained general staff, the obstacles presented by a determinedly hostile population to the collection of reliable information are enormous—practically insurmountable; that sentiment in such cases is misplaced; and that severity, judiciously applied, is in the end kindest to the population as well as most advantageous to the invader. Making war with the gloves on is foolishly quixotic. At all events, the very last people in the world who had any right to cry out against the ill deeds represented by our own suicidal humanity in South Africa were the Germans, whose conduct in France was frequently brutal, although but seldom unwise. A population that fights *must* be treated accordingly.

Colonel Lonsdale Hale's work is one that deserves the most careful study, and it has the great merit of having been compiled in so interesting a fashion that even the most idle can read it with real pleasure, as well as with great professional profit.

'WOUNDS IN WAR.'

THE MECHANISM OF THEIR PRODUCTION AND THEIR TREATMENT.

By Surgeon-General W. F. STEVENSON, C.B., A.M.S., B.A., M.B., M.C.H., Dublin University. Professor of Military Surgery, Royal Army Medical College, London. Second Edition. With 127 Illustrations. Longmans, Green & Co., 39, Paternoster Row, London, New York, and Bombay. 1904. Price 15*s*. net. All rights reserved.

THIS work, which is based on the author's experiences gained in the South African War, and on the medical history of the Spanish-American War, gives a full account of the wounds and injuries which are caused by modern weapons, and of the mechanism by which they are produced. Previous to these wars our knowledge of the effects of small-bore bullets on the human frame was acquired from experiments on animals and on the dead body; now we know that they in no wise represent the lesions which are produced in war on the living subject. For the first time the facts are available on a sufficiently large scale to serve as a guide in future wars, and they are of such a nature as to deserve not only the attention of the military surgeon, but of the commander of an army in the field, and of the Statesman.

Attention is called to the small number of wounds which are caused in war by bayonet, sword, and spear, amounting to only 1·5 per cent. of the total. Of the wounds produced by projectiles fired from large ordnance and artillery field guns, the number was about 7·5 per cent. in the Spanish-American War. The author considers that this will be about the average in the Boer War. But the statistics are not yet available; practically, therefore, 90 per cent. of the wounds which are received in war are from small-bore rifles, that is, from rifles less than 0·350 inch in calibre.

Consequently the nature, extent, and mode of production of these wounds receive careful consideration. Various theories, such as the "hydraulic" and the "projectile air," etc., are discussed in relation to the explosive effect of solid rifle bullets on animal tissues. They are brushed aside, and rightly so, as altogether untenable, and the simple common-sense explanation is accepted that this explosive effect is due to the enormous force or energy which a high-velocity bullet communicates to the surrounding parts. A child flings a pebble into a pond, and the surface of the water vibrates; a man throws a stone of large size and weight with violence into the same pond, when the waves rush with destructive force against its banks. Often in our search for scientific explanations we forget the simple lessons of our childhood.

It is rightly pointed out that, owing to the larger armies which are employed in modern wars, the percentage of losses to the total strength is less than in former wars. That of the British Army in the South African War is stated to have been 7·1 per cent., namely, 5·7 per cent. of wounded and 1·4 per cent. of killed. What would be more relevant, but which is well-nigh impossible to obtain, is the percentage of casualties which occur among the troops actually engaged and under fire, because it is upon that calculation that the arrangements for the collection and removal of the wounded must be based. There is, however, this to be said for the Spanish-American and the South African Wars, that their biggest battles represent only in miniature what the great battles of the future will be.

While allowing for differences of opinion as to the severity of small-bore bullet wounds, and that wounds of the chest and of the joints are less severe and less fatal than when larger missiles were used, the opinion is given, which is based on the experiences of the Spanish-American War, and, so far as is known, on the South African War, that "the death-rates of wounds of the head, of the spine, and of the abdomen have not been reduced as much as the employment of modern methods of treatment, so far as they are possible under the adverse conditions of war, naturally lead us to expect."

Chapters XIV. and XV. deserve the most careful consideration, not only of the medical department of all armies, but of all authorities responsible for army organisation in their respective countries. The reference is to the work of the bearer company in the field, to the work done at the collecting and dressing stations, and in the field hospitals, and to the assistance which should be given from outside by volunteer aid societies, acting under the authority of the Geneva Convention, during the battle, and for some days afterwards, or for even a longer period.

For the treatment of gun-shot wounds there are two essentials, namely, (*a*) the early application of antiseptic dressings (first field or first-aid dressings, as they are termed in military phraseology), with the least possible disturbance of the injured parts; and (*b*) immobility of wound, in other words, *rest*. The author points out how impossible it is for the present medical staff, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, to give this attendance with such a large stream of wounded following each other in rapid succession; also he shows the necessity for immediate relief being given in cases of shock, and that cases of hæmorrhage must be promptly dealt with—duties which require skill of a high order; consequently he considers "that the old methods of performing these duties are no longer suitable to the present conditions of warfare, and must be abandoned." Without securing immobility of wounds, the application of first field dressings is well-nigh useless, and it is the want of it which makes wounds in war so fatal. In this sense the opinion of the late Mr. Archibald Forbes is quoted to show that the wounded soldier "may lie, without serious detriment, often with actual advantage, where he falls, for even so long a time as twenty-four hours, if the weather is not bitter." Space does

not permit further notice, notwithstanding the great interest and importance of the work; sufficient it is to say that the author discusses the surgical problems of modern war in a clear and comprehensive manner, and that the conclusions which he comes to commend themselves as being theoretically sound and practically feasible.

'WITH THE INNISKILLING DRAGOONS.'

THE RECORD OF A CAVALRY REGIMENT DURING THE BOER WAR, 1899–1902.

By Lieut.-Colonel J. WATKINS YARDLEY, B.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. Late Inniskilling Dragoons. With Illustrations and a Map. Longmans, Green & Co., 39, Paternoster Row, London, New York, and Bombay. 1904. Price 16*s*. net.

AS the author of this fine volume says in his preface, "The good work of our severely criticised Cavalry has not yet been publicly appreciated." This is perfectly true. The failings of our Cavalry and their lost opportunities have been criticised at great length and made the most of by many writers for the most part totally incapable of forming any reliable opinions; and the good work done has been conveniently ignored, in order that all sorts of absurd deductions might be drawn from the imperfections, imaginary as well as real, that the war has brought to light. In actual fact, no part of our Army had been properly trained for war, and our Cavalry merely shaped as badly, but no worse, than the other arms. In our admiration for the uniformly splendid conduct of the Royal Artillery, and their excellent horse-mastership, we must not forget that they did not know how to "use ground." For their inability to gallop when required to do so, our Cavalry regiments themselves were not responsible; their horses were used up by higher authorities, and for their undeniable imperfections in dismounted fighting the system, not the Cavalry, is answerable.

In the rough school of war itself the majority of our Cavalry regiments learned their work, and by the end of the campaign not a few were on almost equal terms with the Boers. The Boers at the beginning were ready-made skirmishers, but were without discipline; the British Cavalry at the beginning had discipline, but were bad skirmishers—like the Infantry. By the end of the war the Cavalry, whilst retaining their discipline, had learned how to skirmish, and the Boers had added discipline to their initial advantages. The improvement of the British—that is to say, of the troops, regular and irregular, whose long service had brought them experience—was proportionately greater than that of the Boers; but the latter, man for man, retained a certain superiority, owing to natural aptitude for the work.

The record of the Inniskillings traces, step by step, the career of a good and well-commanded regiment throughout the war, and

should do much to open the eyes of the public to the facts. The line taken by Rimington, himself an officer of the Inniskillings and under whom the regiment served during the brilliant "driving" operations of that distinguished leader of men, will be found to be the right one. It is this—that Cavalry should be as good and, if possible, superior to Mounted Infantry for fighting on foot; and should, in addition, be able to go one better by being also proficient in the proper *rôle* of Cavalry. Finally, for a general idea of tactics; that there are times to attack on foot, and times to *gallop* at the enemy, or round him, or both. The leader on the spot must choose the method to be employed—not the theorist in his armchair.

'With the Inniskillings' can be most strongly recommended. The narrative is well written; full of interest for the civilian as well as for the military reader, and for the latter highly instructive. The numerous illustrations add special attractions, and regimental history of a more generally useful character has seldom been published.

'WITH THE GREEN HOWARDS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1899–1902.'

By Major M. L. FERRAR, Alexandra, Princess of Wales' Own Yorkshire Regiment. London: Eden, Fisher & Co., Ltd., 95–97, Fenchurch Street, E.C. 1904. Price 3*s*. 6*d*.

THE old 19th Regiment, known as the "Green Howards," has always been a good fighting corps, but, like some others amongst the senior regiments of Infantry, has had the ill-fortune to fight, as a rule, under unfavourable circumstances, so that the honours upon its colours but meagrely represent its performances on active service. In South Africa the Yorkshires commenced their career under General French at Rensburg; and of them Mr. John Stirling writes, in *Our Regiments in South Africa:* "The 1st Yorkshires had done their work in the Colesberg district without a mistake." At Paardeberg the regiment had one officer and 30 men killed and 4 officers (including Lieut.-Colonel Bowles) and over 100 men wounded—about 17 per cent. of their number present in the field. They played up well at Driefontein and in other actions, did plenty of hard marching, and took more than their share of sickness in the unhealthy districts of the Eastern Transvaal. The Mounted Infantry contingents contributed by the Yorkshires had an excellent reputation, which they fully deserved, and for which they paid a pretty stiff price in casualties. Major Ferrar has done his work extremely well, and both the regiment and the county to which it belongs have been fortunate in securing the services of so able a chronicler. The numerous illustrations, chiefly reproductions of photographs, add greatly to the interesting character of the volume.

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'THE PERADVENTURES OF PRIVATE PAGETT.'

By Major W. P. DRURY, Royal Marine Light Infantry (Retired). With Eight Illustrations by Arthur Rackham. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd 1904. Price 3*s.* 6*d.*

PRIVATE PAGETT is an old friend, whose yarns have now for some years afforded an increasing store of amusement; and though he does not appear to have been, or to have become an immaculate person, at least he is manifestly incapable of being a bore. With powers of invention that few could equal, and the gift of lying almost like truth, or else boldly attributing to his wilder impossibilities a supernatural origin, Private Pagett, in the flesh, would be a man worth meeting; and the refreshments required to stimulate his memory would always represent money well spent. The present collection of reminiscences has all the merits of its predecessors, but it would be a pity to lessen their value by any sketch of them here. Suffice it to say that the writer of this notice has read every word, with infinite amusement, and, though a busy man, would like to read more.

'THE ANCESTOR.'

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF COUNTRY AND FAMILY HISTORY, HERALDRY, AND ANTIQUITIES.

Edited by OSWALD BARRON, F.S.A. Number IX. April, 1904. Archibald Constable & Co., 2, Whitehall Gardens. Price 5*s.*

THE ANCESTOR for April is fully up to the mark. "Some Account of the Sheridan Family," with which many reproductions of portraits are given, is very interesting. "The Trafford Legend" is accepted as something different to the "Myths," more frequently attached even to families of the genuine antiquity enjoyed by the De Traffords; but in contrast to this, the editor makes merry at the expense of the extensive pretensions of the Blackers, in "Skoal to the Norseman." The Ogles furnish the subject for Number XI. of "Our Oldest Families;" and "Fifteenth Century Customs," and "A Fifteenth Century Roll of Arms" will appeal to very many. The story of "The Westbury Cup" is very interesting, and not a few will feel as if they might find satisfaction in execrating the memory of the foolish parson and churchwardens who allowed such a relic to leave the parish. "What is Believed" tears up sundry roots of Anglo-Saxon ancestry from the light sands in which modern imaginations had planted them. Altogether this is an excellent number, containing many articles that merit notice equally with those that have now been mentioned.

Field Fortification, by Major-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., and published by Messrs. Gale & Polden, price 4*s.* net, has

[illegible] in the [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible] evidence in support of [illegible] claim. The book is more than the author claims for it, because it is [illegible] an admirable guide to field engineering [illegible].

[illegible] *Field Engineering* is the title of an excellent [illegible] by Captain [illegible], Adjutant, [illegible] Militia. Captain [illegible] has boiled down everything to the minimum, and the essence that results is [illegible]. The difficulty is to get people to read lengthy [illegible]; in the present case a very little reading will suffice to impart a very great deal of sound knowledge of the most [illegible] instructions. The publishers are Spottiswoode & Co., New Street Square, and the price is [illegible].

[illegible] *Notes on the Use of the Rifle* compiled by Captain [illegible] and [illegible] Fusiliers, can be had from Messrs. [illegible] & Co., 15, Charing Cross, price 6d., and, though in some respects obsolete with reference to the new rifle, will, nevertheless, give valuable assistance for some time to come, in, at all events, the drill and [illegible].

"Asper's" Maps of the Seat of War include the following: (1) Port Arthur and Environs (2 miles to 1 inch), price 1s.; (2) Northern Korea (11 miles to 1 inch), price 2s.; (3) Southern Manchuria (10 miles to 1 inch), price 2s. These maps are, apparently, reliable, and are beautifully drawn. They are the work of a British officer, who has a very extensive knowledge of the country. The series will shortly be extended, and when completed will stand far in advance of any other maps published. Copies can be obtained from "Asper," Army and Navy Gazette Office, 3, York Street, Covent Garden.

The French Weather Chart, 1904, by B. G. Jenkins, F.R.A.S., has hitherto provided a wonderfully accurate forecast, and so much so that its success cannot fairly be ascribed to fortuitous coincidences. The charts, full size, cost 9d., and small, 1d. The publisher is R. Morgan, 65, Westow Street, Upper Norwood, S.E.

Hints for the First Year of Residence in India, by Anne C. Wilson, published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, price 1s. 6d., will be found useful. Yet it would seem as if the authoress might have increased the value of her little book by dealing with the case of married officers who have others besides themselves to think about.

Questions and Answers for the Imperial Yeomanry, by Captain C. B. Anderson Pelham, *Notes on Army Signalling*, and the *Shooting Scoring Book*, are other new publications by Messrs. Gale & Polden deserving of notice, but with which it is unfortunately impossible to deal.

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AUGUST, 1904.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 909.—AUGUST, 1904.

THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES.

BY MAJOR P. A. SILBURN, D.S.O.,* Permanent Staff, Natal.

NOTICE.

Owing to the indisposition of Colonel Maude, "The Evolution of Modern Strategy," X., is unavoidably postponed until September.

to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom
for very existence, which
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instance of the influence of environment
some of the larger Colonies, the seaboards of which have perhaps militated against a large seafaring community, the plains of the interior, long distances and sparse communications have favoured and fostered an equestrian community whose knowledge of the sea is remote. It is therefore hardly a matter for surprise that a people seeing so little of the element, the command of which they are told is their security, should show some want of belief in this statement.

The questioning of the importance of the Navy as the supreme means of the Empire's defence has fathered the axiom emanating

* Major Silburn's views are the more interesting because he is Colonial born.—ED. U. S. M.

from the Colonies, that a Navy of present or future strength is the requisite of England alone, be she the possessor of Colonies or not. and therefore, the Colonies should no more be called upon to contribute to this Navy then they should contribute to the London County Council. That this opinion is held by a number of Colonial politicians, and that it is gaining ground in the Colonies is evidenced by the attitude taken by at least one Colonial Premier at the Conference of 1902; it is also reflected by the debates in the Colonial Parliaments on the Colonial naval contributions; and articles in the leading English papers by Colonials of standing against Colonial contributions to the Navy are becoming more frequent.

Now, before affirming or denying the latter portion of the axiom, that the Colonies should not contribute to the Navy—for the former part is obviously correct, viz. that the Navy is as necessary to England with Colonies or not—it will be as well to attempt, judicially and dispassionately, to inquire into the naval requirements of the Colonies.

The main argument brought forward by the naval authorities themselves in favour of Colonial contributions, is that if the Navy were to be retained for home protection alone, the Colonies would be bound to provide separate navies for their own defence. Some of the American republics and certain European nations are given as instances. During the last few years many able and instructive articles have appeared in English newspapers and magazines, placing before the public reasons for and against small Colonial navies.

The naval writers invariably, and with apparently sound reason, strongly and in no unmeasured terms, denounce as folly any policy which would give the Colonies small self-owned navies. The deprecation of all these writers is, however, based on strategic control, and I have searched in vain for disapproval on any of the other and stronger grounds of objection.

It must appear to the most sanguine Imperialist that once a Colony creates an independent navy, there is at once brought into being a new element of danger to Federation; this element will be strengthened as this independent navy grows. Created for coastal defence and the defence of Colonial commerce in the Colonial seas, the responsibilities at first may appear light. With the rise of the democratic party in some of our Colonies, so costly an implement of defence, the Colonial Navy, immediately brings with it another and a stronger plea for secession, on the score of Imperial responsibilities endangering this Colonial navy which is costing the Colony a very large part of her revenue. The Colony owning its own army and navy should of a surety curtail as much as possible the dangers to these expensive machines. Belonging to the Imperial family,

dangers of embroilment in war are greater than if the example set by the American Colonies is taken. The steps are but natural ones, Crown Colonies, Responsible Government, a Colonial Army, Treaty, making powers, a Colonial Navy, Secession, Republic. The rise of Colonial navies could in no wise result in a diminution of the naval programme of England, for the strength of her Navy must ever lie in its homogeneousness. This homogeneity is intensified by the present system of drawing the *personnel* from the British Isles. The traditions of the British Navy belong solely to the United Kingdom; the *morale* gained by Drake in Armada days, strengthened by Howe and St. Vincent, and cemented at Trafalgar by Nelson and his captains, is now an attribute of the British-born seaman.

The *personnel* of a Colonial navy would have no past traditions to act up to; in all probability such seamen would be of mixed extraction, and representatives of many nations: this in itself would be an element of great weakness, and must of necessity militate against the efficiency essential to success in naval conflicts.

As the natural result of environment, the insular continent of Australia has been the first Colony to seriously discuss the advisability of creating a navy of her own. The independent spirits in that Colony chafe at the non-control of a squadron of war-ships ostensibly kept for their protection. The rapidly increasing importance of Australasia just emerging from the mists of discovery, her marvellous internal resources, her advantageous position geographically, mark her out for a high position among those future nations of the Southern Hemisphere. The successful naval policy followed by Japan, and crowned by her maritime victory over Russia, is an argument in favour of an independent navy not likely to be ignored by its advocates. Although it is freely recognised by Australians that naval defence is necessary, there is not that blind belief in its efficacy that is to be found in naval official circles in England. Had it been so, the direct contribution in money would greatly have exceeded the sum of £200,000 per annum. By reference to the debate raised in the Federal Parliament upon this vote to the Royal Navy, it will be seen that the sum was somewhat grudgingly given, not from any feeling of disloyalty or even of parsimony, but because of the growing feeling that these direct grants are far from the best means in aid of Imperial Defence. The majority of Australians would prefer to pay more and own a navy of their own; and there are specious arguments in favour of this view which must be met with incontrovertible evidence and a scheme eliminating those clashing elements conspicuous in most of the proposals emanating from the Imperial Defence Committee.

The system of monetary contribution by the self-governing

Colonies to the Navy, which results in a bare £400,000, or 1 per cent. of the Naval Vote, is a grievance to the United Kingdom and the Colonies alike; to the former because the primary object of the Navy is forgotten, viz. self-preservation, and it is felt that four-fifths of the population of the Empire is bearing the cost of the protection of the whole. To them it appears an injustice that the Colonies should not have an equal share of taxation, not only for the Navy, but for the Army as well; it seems to them selfish in the extreme that whilst they pay 16*s.* per head for Naval Defence, the Colonist pays but 4*d.* These apparent injustices are brought well before the British public by numerous writers, and the facts severely distorted. As an instance, it is stated that the Colonies pay but 4*d.* per head of the white population; this figure is obtained by the clever addition of the non-paying with the paying Colonies. Natal, with a white population of 70,000, gives £35,000 per annum, or 10*s.* per head; Canada, with a population of four and a half millions, contributes nothing, though it will be noticed that I contend that she contributes materially more than her sister Colonies. The objections of most Colonies to the direct contribution are as follows:—

1. That when asked for no proper basis for contribution was suggested; it was left for the Colonies to grant what they thought fit, thus placing them in a very ambiguous position with regard to the Mother Country, the other self-governing Colonies, and the Empire generally.
2. That when granted there is no control in expenditure.
3. That it gives in return no guarantee of naval protection.
4. It is felt in some Colonial quarters that these naval grants would be more effectually used in the interests of Imperial Defence by being expended on local defences.

The first grievance, then, is that when the First Lord of the Admiralty asked the Premiers of the self-governing Colonies to increase their naval grants, he did so without giving them any business-like basis upon which to work: here was the first rift in the discussion that ensued; various bases were suggested, but each was found to be impracticable. An apparently feasible basis was the tonnage of shipping; Australia, however, owns six times the shipping of India, yet the latter pays £413,000 in Naval Defence. Population was found an impossible basis, due, of course, to the varied races varying in wealth from India with 4*s.* 6*d.* per head of its population, and to the Transvaal with £3 14*s.* per head. Mercantile tonnage was likewise abandoned as a basis, as extreme inaccuracy was the result when the volume of trade for a given Colony was estimated by adding the exports and imports together; the increasing volume of inter-Colonial trade adds to the difficulty in obtaining reasonably accurate figures.

It would appear, then, that the Colonies were left to the generosity of their respective Premiers to decide upon the sum each should contribute. It is impossible to discern any system governing the amounts, not even the strategic importance of the contributors.

These direct contributions coming from the Colonial revenues, the question is raised in the Colonies of control in this expenditure; it takes but a moment to see how impossible this is. The Colonies must be content to know that the amount has gone to the Admiralty, and must remain content until they are prepared to bear an equal proportion of expenditure; then, and not till then, can they expect to have a voice in its control.

That the naval contributions do not bring, in return, a guarantee of local naval protection, is a grievance that at first sight appears to have some force in it. The Colonies object to being made a shuttle-cock of; and it is useless to deny that this is the *rôle* expected of them should the command of the sea not be retained from the outset of hostilities. The theory held by the Admiralty authorities, "That the safety of Colonial ports can be best secured by the operations of a fleet somewhere away out on the high seas," has yet to be confirmed in actual war; the past is full of historical examples, but the matter-of-fact Colonial mind looks for something fresher than the musty pages of history. To him it appears a matter of rash speculation to risk the safety of Australia in the hands of the Admiralty. In peace time sentiment runs strong; fear, personal safety, and numerous other conflicting passions are allayed, and the promises made under such conditions might not stand the strain of war. The Colonial, therefore, sees elements of danger in placing his whole trust for personal safety in the hands of a defence force provided by the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. To the latter the loss of a Colonial possession would but mean the loss of prestige; it might even mean the disruption of the Empire, but even that could entail no more than the partial estrangement of one-fifth of the white population.

Is it to be expected that the safety of the forty-five millions of inhabitants, those people who for years have been heavily taxed in order to keep the command of the element over which they draw their sustenance, mostly from foreign lands, though slightly from her Colonies, is to be jeopardised in order to attempt the security of a thinly populated Colony, which, should it fall into the hands of an enemy, would fall back again should command of the sea be regained, retained, or obtained?

Naval authorities will readily admit that it is idle for Imperial statesmen to declare that the Colonies are the cause of an increased naval budget. The geographical position of Great Britain, limited

area and increasing population, make her absolutely dependent for life on territories divided by the sea. The sea routes are her arteries of life; once closed, she is at the mercy of her enemy. The responsibility of Colonial possessions is a question beside the mark; these arteries would require the same circulation whether the Colonies existed or not, and therefore would require the same means of preventing this circulation from ceasing. Thanks to the common application of education, and the liberal supply of newspapers, the British public fully recognises that to it supremacy at sea means existence, not as an Empire so much as a British nation. It is idle, then, for Colonists to think that any contribution by them, short of an equal proportion on white population basis, can call for a proportion of that Navy to be detailed for local defence. Even under such a condition they would be hindering and greatly weakening the machine they had secured at a cost of heavy taxation.

Can it be expected that interests divided by oceans, people with different outlooks whose environments are different, can be brought into harmony over the administration of a common machine? Is it not more likely that many notes of discord will be sounded which at the very outset will result in disaster, disaster that may go further than the mere disruption of the Empire?

The first real bond of unity between the Colonies and the Mother Country was the practical illustration of trust by the latter, when granting responsible government to those Colonies ready to receive it. Had the statesmen of the day looked forward and foreseen the rise in the Colonies of the democratic party, they might have successfully forestalled its machinations by the careful creation of a Colonial nobility. The monarchical sentiment would have thus gained fresh impetus, and the true though hidden motive force that had successfully governed England for a thousand years would have likewise found its way into the Colonies. Since the institution of self-government, so long ago advocated by Burke, and which would have saved our American Colonies, there have been numerous bonds of unity between the parent and her offspring; added now, however, appears the first question of importance upon which the Colonies and the Mother Country are likely to disagree. It is, moreover, a question that neither party can allow to wait, for by so doing the breach is likely to widen. By assisting Australia, or any other self-governing Colony, to own an independent Navy, even though under Imperial officers, England is but countenancing secession. By accepting direct monetary contributions to the Navy, England is weakening the Empire's defences, unless the amount granted (and that is quite impossible) is surplus to the Colonial Defence Vote.

The lesson given to the world in the salvation, growth and expansion of England by her Navy is one that is apt to be illogically applied, especially so in the case of Australia, where, when advocating a navy, the cry is, "We are an island, and the history of England is our guide;" when advocating an army it is pointed out that they are a continent, though truly unique, for it is a self-contained continent; yet the interests of Imperial defence demand that the latter idea be taken. History does not contain an island continent; if it had, Alexander would have been baffled in its conquest. Australia, with her million men of a fighting age, and her internal resources, could well defy the strongest European Power, —even without the aid of a navy. No more practical illustration of this is needed than the difficulty experienced in mastering the Boer Republics. The feeling of national responsibility in Australia is due to a similar rapidly growing instinct in Canada, the proximity of foreign Powers, and the increasing commercial relations between them. In the past it was customary for all negotiations, whether commercial or otherwise, to pass through the Colonial Secretary; trade, however, is a poor respecter of persons until difficulties arise, then the official is quickly resorted to for assistance.

In the Pacific we find both Germany and Holland coterminous with Australia in New Guinea; she is also in juxtaposition to France and Germany in New Caledonia and Samoa; the war now proceeding in the East brings us nearer to the naval and military Powers of Russia and Japan; and she is but a few days off America in Hawaii. Her intercourse with those Powers is ever becoming more brisk, and the possibility of conflict with one or more of them is becoming apparent, and is directly responsible for the rise of a national instinct which, if diplomatically guided, will mean strength rather than weakness to the Empire. Although her intercourse with these foreigners is conveyed by sea, and her sea-borne trade is considerable, after due deliberation it cannot be acceded that the plea for an independent navy is even reasonable; it would rather provoke naval attack. A war in which this sea-borne commerce was threatened would not mean that the whole of that commerce was in danger, because a considerable portion would be carried under neutral flags.

The argument advanced by some of the advocates for this navy, that Holland surrounded by likely hostile powers is content with a navy costing her £750,000, and that by its means she is able to hold her Colonies, forget the fact that the balance of power practically guarantees her independence. By a glance, too, at her Navy List it will be seen that but one vessel is built for sea-going purposes, and that all the others are purely guard-ships for coast defence and

are even unsuitable for commerce protection. The safety of her Colonies lies in the jealousies that exist between her most likely foes; and a European war of any magnitude, whether she be involved or not, may mean their loss. Should Germany be a combatant, their loss is inevitable. But Australasia's position can in no way be compared to that of Holland; the former is unique, and its nearest parallel would be Madagascar, if of white population. It would then be absurd to try and model a defensive policy upon that of any of the European states; each, part of a whole, with territorial aims against their neighbours, sovereignty aims over common waters, the eye of suspicion ever upon a rising power that may be territorially adjacent and whose base at the most is but a few days away and may be but a few hours.

The rapid ascendency of Japan may cause some uneasiness to Australasia should that Colony ever contemplate seceding. Even thus it does not appear as if the resources of Australia would enable her to provide a navy that could ever hope to compete with that of Japan. Yet the command of the Australian seas by Japan would no more be disastrous to Australia, than it would be if the United States held the command of the sea in a war with Canada; her commerce certainly would be affected to the extent of her self-owned shipping, but this would be transferred to neutral bottoms. All contraband of war would be self-supplied, and invasion would be disastrous to the invaders; and now that the strain of naval war is financially greater than in the past, the command of the Australian waters would but re-act upon the holders. Under present conditions Australia, with adequate land forces, is unassailable by any naval Powers.

There is yet another weighty argument against Australia weakening herself by the creation of an independent navy, and that is her national character. The rise of all sea-powers, with the single exception of Rome,* is directly attributable to the sea-going proclivities of the inhabitants; the influence of this characteristic has brought with it wealth, and the wealth thus rapidly gained whilst raising empires to their zenith has further resulted in their decay.

The sea-powers of Spain and Portugal are notable instances of this; their extinction is wholly and solely due to the misuse of their power and their greed for rapid wealth. England's sea-power is all the more lasting as its growth has been the more gradual, and a greater proportion of her inhabitants have been and are employed in sea callings. In the past this maritime characteristic has bee

* Germany would appear to furnish yet another exception, and her motive is precisely the same as that which prompted the Romans.—Ed. U. S. M.

fostered by foreign nations in the employment of English shipping, thus strengthening her sea-power.

The callings of a people bear directly upon their fighting qualities. In Australia the calling of the bulk of the population is pastoral; and this calling, due to large areas of uncultivated land, is likely to grow at a greater ratio than can possibly her shipping, where lies a field for the competition of all the seafaring communities of the world. Even though from a growing population she succeeded in drawing sufficient mariners to man a fleet, where would she find that reserve which is absolutely necessary if that fleet is to have any fighting value? It was this lack of reserve that allowed the overthrow of Napoleon after the defeat of Villeneuve at Trafalgar. Would Australia be content to risk her all on one naval battle? The effect of her national characteristics upon fighting qualities are plain, the pastoral pursuits, the prosperity found in land, the healthy and comfortable means of livelihood to be obtained from the soil, and that at no great distance from the sea-board, militates against the growth of a sea-going community likely to be of any power. Captain Mahan has pointed out how little the size of a population is responsible for sea-power, and instances France with its greater population than that of England. It can, then, hardly be contended that with the growth of her population Australia may hope to possess a seafaring community of sufficient size to supply her with the *personnel* for an efficient navy.

The expenditure upon a navy which would be of little value either to herself or the Empire is weakening her true *rôle* in Imperial Defence. The value of the pastoralist as a soldier has been proved in ancient history, the middle ages, and modern times; it was brought home to us in the late South African War, not only forcibly by the enemy, but with satisfaction by our Colonists. The evolution of war, with its increasing call upon the physical senses and mental activity, makes the healthy-bred man of the greatest value. With the gradual but steady decline of agriculture in England and the equally steady increase of that industry in the Colonies, it appears but reasonable that a transfer of military responsibilities must take place. Australia has the nucleus of a very fine fighting force indeed; the value of their fighting powers were fully felt at a critical time; it is, then, the development of these latent powers that Imperial Defence requires, and not an immature scheme in the form of a wasteful force such as an independent navy that would only invite the attacks it would be utterly powerless to repel. An attack that would be all the more efficiently repulsed by a well-trained and equipped land force which would only be starved and neglected if the plaything of a local navy were

created. By the full development of her resources in the shape of men and horses for war purposes, Australia would be in a position to give a *quid pro quo* for all the naval defence from the Royal Navy she should ever require. Such a reserve of fighting force would to the Empire be of greater value than any direct monetary contribution she could give to the Navy; it would further relieve the British tax-payer of a proportion of the expenditure he is now called upon to give to the Empire's Army.

As the creation of the Empire is directly attributable to the Navy, and as that Navy has been a recognised force for over 400 years, we must expect that the Empire will be retained by it. Any deviation of a policy which centres the control of the Empire's first line of defence in the United Kingdom would be fatal to the Empire, though not necessarily fatal to the Colonies or to England. An attempt to depart from a policy that has stood the test of past wars must be as strenuously opposed by the Colonies as by England. The introduction of a disturbing element into this successful policy is undoubtedly the Colonial contributions; it has been stigmatised in a recent publication as cursing the giver as well as the receiver.

It certainly had the opposite effect of that which was expected of it, for it carried with it the stamp of taxation without representation. As the naval policy of the Empire has been, is, and it is trusted ever will be the primary question of importance in England, there is in that country a greater tendency to forget that naval defence is only one out of many items that require to be considered in connection with federation. The Colonies, whilst recognising the primary importance of Naval Defence, also recognise that there are numerous other factors that have to be taken into consideration before federation is actually accomplished. It is, however, freely understood that a great distance has been travelled towards the goal when Imperial Defence has been placed upon a proper basis, and in clearing the ground for this the clashing of rival interests must be avoided. The statement may appear paradoxical; yet the clashing elements at present are the Navy and Army, due to the advocates of the latter drawing it from a wrong source, a source that should supply the former. Naturally the result is one of two equally wrong principles, starvation of the service or of the tax-payers.

It is not the writer's object to reiterate and enlarge upon those fixed principles which have governed warfare from time immemoral —principles which history clearly shows us are dangerous to ignore. Captain Mahan by his invaluable works has deducted lessons from the past, and has painted those lessons in those moderate colours which no historian has ever attempted. Captain Mahan, Admiral Colomb, Sir George Clarke, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Thursfield, and Colonel May have each in their own inimitable style emphasised the principles of Imperial Defence; they have shown us by varied examples how rapid and sure the retribution is when and where these fundamental principles are abused. The inhabitants of a maritime Empire like our own should not require repeated exhortations as to the vital necessity of holding command of the sea.

P. A. SILBURN.

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UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE,

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apparent. Of course, it is only natural that a volunteer force —and in that generic term are also included regiments maintained under the militia or partially paid system—proves infinitely more difficult to administer than a regular force, and the maintenance of the discipline of the Regular Army and the exacting performance

of every little detail of duty cannot be achieved. But experience has proved that, if the Colonial is not as punctilious in saluting his officers and carrying out the "show" part of his duty as is his Imperial comrade, his value as a soldier is second to none.

The Royal Australian Artillery, which, as already indicated, forms the major portion of the small Regular Army of the Commonwealth, consists of three mounted instructional cadres (each with an establishment of thirty-six of all ranks) and ten companies of garrison artillery (the establishment of each of which is fifty-three), together with regimental staff and school of gunnery instructional staff The instructional cadres are stationed at Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne; and of the ten companies of regular garrison artillery four are in New South Wales, three in Victoria, two in Queensland, and the tenth is distributed between South Australia, Tasmania, and Western Australia—half the company being at Albany.

The residue of the permanent forces of the Commonwealth consists of small detachments of engineers and submarine miners, army medical corps, and army service corps in some of the states, but the greater portion of those branches of the service is composed of partially paid men. It is naturally much more costly to maintain a regular force in the Colonies than in Great Britain, for Colonial governments are ever confronted with the wages question. In this connection it is only necessary to note the pay of the Royal Australian Artillery to see how much better Colonial Tommy is paid than his Imperial comrade. Taking the officers first, the pay of a lieut.-colonel varies from £500 to £600 per annum, that of a major from £425 to £500 per annum, a captain from £325 to £400 per annum, while the minimum pay of a lieutenant or second lieutenant is £200, and the maximum £300 per annum. Coming to the lower ranks, warrant-officers receive from 12*s.* to 13*s.* per day, quartermaster-sergeants 11*s.*, battery or company sergeant-majors from 5*s.* 9*d.* to 6*s.* 3*d.* per day, battery or company quartermaster-sergeants from 5*s.* 6*d.* to 6*s.*, staff sergeants from 6*s.* to 7*s.*, sergeants from 5*s.* to 6*s.*, corporals 4*s.*, and drivers and gunners from 2*s.* 6*d.* to 3*s.* 6*d.*, exclusive of good-conduct pay, etc. In addition to these daily rates of pay (which include pay for Sunday), quarters, rations, fuel, light, medical attendance, uniform, bedding, and cooking utensils are supplied free. Good-conduct pay is made to acting bombardiers, gunners, and drivers as follows: After two years' service with good conduct, 2*d.* per day; after four years' service, and if in possession of one good-conduct badge for one year, 4*d.* per day; after six years' service, and if in possession of two good-conduct badges for one year, 6*d.* per day. A certain number of men also receive extra-duty pay, varying from 3*d.* to 6*d.*

per day, while the garrison at Thursday Island receives extra tropical pay as follows: officers, 2*s.* 6*d.* per day; company sergeant-major and company quartermaster-sergeant, 1*s.* 8*d.*; sergeants, 1*s.* 4*d.*; corporals, 1*s.* 3*d.*; bombardiers, 1*s.*; and gunners, 9*d.*

Coming now to the auxiliary forces, we have a total establishment of about 24,600 officers and men—about 13,750 militia or partially paid troops, and about 10,900 purely volunteers, comprising all branches of the service—light horse, artillery (field and garrison), infantry, and technical and departmental corps. The parent state, New South Wales, leads in regard to numbers of both partially paid and volunteer troops, her quota of the former being about 5530, and of the latter about 3500. Victoria stands next with 3400 militia and about 2700 volunteers; Queensland has 2800 militia and about 680 volunteers; Western Australia has about 2000 volunteers, South Australia has 2050 militia, and the small island state of Tasmania about the same number of volunteers.

Uniform regulations for pay of the militia (or partially paid) forces of the Commonwealth have been issued, and under these the pay of a trooper or private for a whole-day parade is 8*s.*, a half-day parade 4*s.*, and a night parade 2*s.* The pay of officers and non-commissioned officers is correspondingly higher. In the mounted regiments, field and garrison artillery, infantry and departmental corps, the amount which it is possible to earn annually is limited as follows: colonel, £36; lieut.-colonel, £30; major, £24; captain, £18; lieutenant, £12; brigade sergeant-major and quartermaster-sergeant, regimental sergeant-major and quartermaster-sergeant, £9 12*s.*; troop, battery, or company sergeant-major, squadron sergeant-major, colour-sergeant, £8 16*s.*; troop, battery, and company quartermaster-sergeant, £8 8*s.*; sergeant, £8; corporal, £7 4*s.*; bombardier (artillery), £6 16*s.*; gunner or private, £6 8*s.*; trumpeters, buglers, and drummers (under 18 years of age), £3 4*s.*; trumpeters, buglers, and drummers (over 18 years of age), £6 8*s.*

The remuneration for these branches is based on parades aggregating 16 days per year, while in the case of field and electrical engineers it is 20 days, and submarine miners 25 days, including in all cases the annual course of continuous training, which varies from 4 days in the infantry, 8 days in the mounted forces, and 14 days with the submarine miners.

In the matter of efficiency, officers and men of the infantry regiments and departmental corps must attend parades equalling 11½ days during the year, light horse and field and garrison artillery 12 days, field and electrical engineers 14 days, and submarine miners 20½ days, continuous training being compulsory for efficiency in all cases. With the volunteers the requirements for

efficiency are 8 out of 12 half-day parades, 10 out of 16 night parades, and a complete course of musketry. It will be observed that continuous training in camp is not compulsory, but the musketry (which in some states in the past has been obligatory only every two years) is now to be carried out annually.

The efficiency and discipline of the militia or partially paid troops is much more satisfactory than is the case with the purely volunteer force, notwithstanding that the latter force has considerably more parades than the former. This is explained by the fact that the enforcement of fines by stoppages in pay in the militia greatly improves the state of the force, whereas a similar means of enforcing discipline in the volunteers does not exist.

In the matter of dress, uniformity will also ultimately be effected, but although it is nearly twelve months since the new service uniform was authorised, it has not yet been issued. The new uniform will be made of a special khaki-coloured serge with a greenish tinge, with turned-down collar. This uniform will become the service dress for all arms, but gorget patches, with a distinguishing colour for each branch, will be worn on the collar. The centre of this patch will contain a regimental badge or numeral. The titles and number of regiments and corps will be embroidered on a curved strip of the same material as the garment, and will be worn on the upper arms of jackets and great-coats. The trousers for dismounted corps will be made of khaki serge, similar to the jacket, loose in the breech and at the knee, cut narrow as they approach the ankle, and made short, just reaching the top of the ankle boot, as now adopted in the Imperial Army. The breeches for mounted corps will be of Bedford cord, of a colour to match the dress, and will be laced below the knee. Woollen puttees of the same colour as the uniform will be worn by all branches (mounted and dismounted), as will also a great-coat of rainproof khaki cloth. The full-dress uniform will consist of the general service dress, with the addition of aiguilettes and cord shoulder-pads, and girdles in the case of mounted corps, and breastlines with cord shoulder-straps in dismounted services. Regiments which now have a review order, and which desire to retain it in preference to the above-described ceremonial dress, will be permitted to do so, and it is expected that a large number of regiments will take advantage of this provision. Of course, the Government bears the whole cost of uniforms and equipment (except for officers), the former being provided from regimental capitation funds. The annual capitation for the militia (or partially paid) branch, including clothing allowance, is £2 per head, and for volunteers, £2 10*s*. per head.

In addition to the militia and volunteers, there are rifle-clubs

and cadet corps, but as far as the former are concerned, Victoria and New South Wales are the only states in which any serious attempt at organisation has been made. The former state possesses a splendid system of rifle-clubs, the members of which number nearly 22,000, while the New South Wales clubs total 760 members. The rifle-clubs are now being reorganised, and, when that has been effected, should form a reliable and at the same time comparatively inexpensive reserve.

Victoria also leads in respect to cadet organisation, the state possessing nearly 6000 youthful soldiers, organised into senior and junior corps, whose efficiency is most creditable. New South Wales and Queensland also have cadet corps. At present the Victorian and Queensland forces are administered by the military authorities, but in New South Wales the cadets are under the control of the Department of Public Instruction. It is intended, however, to ultimately bring the whole of the cadets under the military department, and the Victorian force will, no doubt, be the model on which the cadets of the other states will be reorganised.

Coming now to the reorganisation, the scheme outlined by Sir Edward Hutton in a minute on Australian defence, and written soon after he assumed command, forms the basis of the new organisation. The scheme would be satisfactory if only it secured uniformity throughout the continent. It will naturally be some time before the new military machine works smoothly, and, as General Hutton has said, Australia is now passing through the most critical period of her military history. If ever the Army needed generous treatment it is at the present time, and if the "cutting down" to which the military vote has been subjected by Parliament is continued, it must certainly prove detrimental to the forces for a considerable time to come.

Under the reorganisation scheme the Army is divided into two distinct forces—a field force and a garrison force. The former is intended for inter-state or Commonwealth defence, while the latter will be employed for local or state defence. The scheme is essentially an elastic one, capable of expansion in time of war; and under it the peace establishment of the Army (that is, for the whole of Australia) is set down at 25,844 of all ranks. This total is distributed among the various states as follows: New South Wales, 8364; Victoria, 7119; Queensland, 3773; South Australia, 2341; Western Australia, 2039; Tasmania, 2208. On a war establishment the scheme proposes that the Army shall be increased to 39,766, as follows: New South Wales, 13,018; Victoria, 11,486; Queensland, 5585; South Australia, 3715; Western Australia, 2922; Tasmania, 3040.

Although Sir Edward Hutton's scheme provided for a peace establishment of 25,844, the total number of troops which the Government has provided for is only 22,741; or, in other words, the forces, for political reasons, are to remain nearly one-eighth below the peace establishment. But that is not all. On March 1, 1900 (the date on which the military forces passed to the control of the Commonwealth), the establishment of the forces was 28,923, and comparing this number with the above-quoted figures, the reduction in establishment alone in three years has been 7182; and it is notorious that very few of the regiments are up to their establishment, which makes matters more unsatisfactory. There has also, of course, been a corresponding decrease in expenditure, and while for the year 1900–1 it was £774,656, the amount voted for 1903–4 was £677,579 or a reduction of £97,077. The Government is primarily responsible for the retrenchment that has taken place, but the enormous reduction in *personnel* and the "sinews of war" serve to illustrate how the military authorities have been harassed in their task of reorganisation.

Under the new organisation scheme, the field force numbers on its peace establishment 13,831, and is made up as follows: light horse, 5352; field artillery, 1072; engineers, 351; infantry, 6140; departmental corps, etc., 916. The light horse is to be organised into six brigades of three regiments each. Each regiment is to be composed of four squadrons of 72, which, with regimental staff, will total 294 of all ranks. The field artillery, it is proposed, will ultimately consist of 13 four-gun batteries, each with an establishment of 76 of all ranks. An infantry brigade is to consist of four battalions of eight companies each. The infantry company will include 60, and the battalion 509 of all ranks.

The garrison force has an establishment of 11,896, of which 3728 are allotted to New South Wales, 2775 to Victoria, 1964 to Queensland, 953 to South Australia, 1155 to Western Australia, and 1321 to Tasmania. The proportion of the various arms of the service in the garrison force is approximately as follows: mounted troops, 756; field artillery, 476; garrison artillery, 2295; engineers, 587; infantry, 7279; other corps, 503. There is also an ordnance department of 117, distributed among the various states, which brings the total peace establishment up to 25,844.

The scheme of organisation allots to each corps throughout the Commonwealth its distinct share in the defence of Australia, and as Sir Edward Hutton has said, every unit, whether battery, squadron, company, or even private soldier, will in future understand the individual military duty allotted. In explaining the scheme, General Hutton says: "It should be observed that the

peace establishments laid down for the units of the several arms and departments are numerically small, but possess nearly a full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, with approximately one-half of the rank-and-file laid down for the war establishments. Peace cadres, with their full complement of trained officers and non-commissioned officers, can therefore, upon mobilisation in time of national emergency, be expanded, by partially trained men, to the requirements without serious difficulty. Thus squadrons of light horse and companies of infantry have in peace 5 officers, 6 sergeants, and 61 others, and 3 officers, 4 sergeants, and 53 others respectively; while in war they will have 6 officers, 10 sergeants, and 119 others, and 3 officers, 5 sergeants, and 108 others respectively. It will be seen, therefore, that the increase is almost entirely among the rank-and-file, with whom incomplete training is less detrimental."

Taken as a whole, it is doubtful whether a better scheme could have been produced by Sir Edward Hutton with the means at his disposal, but even so, there is still much to be done before the Army becomes a thoroughly effective and up-to-date fighting machine. "When effectively trained and efficiently equipped, the field force," General Hutton has said, "will become a mobile force for the active defence of the Commonwealth." And similarly, the Army as a whole will not become an effective fighting force until it is "effectively trained and efficiently equipped." The training is probably not so ineffective as the equipment, and Sir Edward Hutton has stated in his annual report that "the military stores and equipment are in a most unsatisfactory condition throughout the Commonwealth, and the situation can only be viewed with the gravest concern." These words of themselves contain a grave and serious warning, but when the commandant adds that "modern equipment for cavalry, artillery, and infantry (a proportion of rifles and a small proportion of field guns excepted) may be regarded as non-existent," the situation is accentuated a thousand-fold. Sir Edward Hutton estimates that to satisfactorily arm and equip the Army on its peace establishment would require an expenditure of £237,997, and on a war footing an additional outlay of £248,286, making a total of £486,283. The federal commandant's report throughout is one protest at the treatment meted out to the military forces, and he has had courage, as a last resort, to give utterance to statements and comments which should have a sobering effect on the Government's career of ruthless retrenchment and apparent indifference to the possession of a necessary and effective defence force.

GEORGE A. KING.

"BLUE WATER" OR "HEARTH AND HOME"?

By Lieutenant Lionel H. Hordern, R.N.

The controversy between the above schools has now become somewhat acute. Speaking very generally, the former view is held by the Navy, the latter by the Army, and the names of the schools express the different aspects in which each view the question of defence. Hitherto, the two services have been shut up in separate compartments, and the consequence has been that each has considered itself the best, if not the only, judge of how war should be conducted. Now that we have a Committee of Defence on which both services are represented and the scales held by civilians, we may hope for co-operation and a more rational system which will lead to the question being decided once for all. The "Blue Water" School have no doubt of the result, but the "Hearth and Home" School seem to be rather shaking in their shoes, and have even in one case descended to abuse, by calling those who differ from them the "White Flag" School. Such singular want of taste may be safely ignored, for it is not likely to be repeated.

Briefly, the question may be stated in this way. Shall we assume the offensive or the defensive in the event of war? The Blue Water School say the former, and the Hearth and Home School—though they are not unlikely to deny this—say the latter. I hope to show that my statement is true.

The arguments used by the "Hearth and Home" School are that the Fleet may be defeated or may be absent, and that in either of these cases the enemy may land or attempt to land an army in these islands. The conclusion they come to is that it is therefore necessary to fortify largely and prepare a big army for home defence. Both argument and conclusion are founded mainly on distrust of the Navy, which again is based on ignorance of naval affairs. They are strengthened by the feeling of patriotism which leads all those who have not lost it through our wretched cosmopolitan education to desire to be able to do something for their country in the event of war, and a willingness to spend a large proportion of their spare time in preparing

for it. The Volunteers express this feeling. They were originally raised when we were fighting the world, but practically disappeared many years before that fight was ended, because naval events showed the nation the Navy could be trusted for security against invasion, and military fighting must be done abroad and not at home. The resuscitation of the Volunteers some forty-five years ago was the result of popular fear founded upon mistrust of the Navy, wholly unjustified by any new experience. The old Militia Force, which has descended from the days when we used to fight amongst ourselves, and is really founded upon our feudal system, stands in a different category. So far, this, which might be valuable material, but for the teaching of the "Hearth and Home" School, is perverted from its true function, and is instead patted on the back and told that its duty is to "hold the fort," to "line our hedgerows and ditches with rifles," to "repel invasion," and various other equally catchy expressions which have no application to our conditions. The school in question say that a strong Navy is essential, but their teaching is against it, for their whole scheme is based on a weak or incompetent Navy which is either defeated or absent when most wanted. Further, they ignore the whole of the Empire except these islands, they omit to provide for the lines of communication between the different States of which it is comprised, and for the protection of its trade and supply of food. They cannot believe that a fleet, which they don't understand, can prevent invasion. They fail to realise that the fleet has prevented invasion on more than one critical occasion. They forget the Armada, they forget Napoleon, they forget even the risk we ran according to their own ideas during the South African War. They forget, in fact, that we are an island, and they misread history. Truly, "whom the gods would destroy they first make mad."

Suppose for the moment that the sea is a desert, with sand so loose that troops cannot march over it, and that the only conveyances which can pass over it are specially built motor-cars, which are useless anywhere else. Now, I take it that in such a case there would be only one department concerned with defence, and that the War Office would build a certain number of military motor-cars which, owing to the circumstances of the case, would be very expensive machines. If this blissful state of affairs were to exist, and there were no Admiralty to trouble them, what policy would the War Office adopt, supposing that the Army Estimates were limited in amount? They would have to trust to their motor-cars to keep off the enemy's machines, and I think they would station them at certain strategic points, so as to cover not only these islands, but the remaining parts of the Empire and

the lines of communication. Further, I think that with only a certain sum to spend they would save wherever they could so as to increase the number of military motor-cars, and they would feel that they could best save by omitting to fortify these islands or keeping up a large army for local defence, but that they would fortify the *garages* and would keep up an army for conveyance across the desert to attack the enemy. That they would in fact prepare to take the offensive in the event of war, and would not dream of spending so much on defending their bases as to weaken the fighting line, *i.e.* the motor-car brigades. They would consider the fighting line and lines of communication as of paramount importance, and would look to the forces there to cover their base. Further, they would, I think, argue that, if money were short, it would be an additional saving, and would fulfil all practical requirements if a large part of the Army were only trained in marching and shooting and were not kept permanently embodied. They would feel there would be time to complete their training after war was declared, provided that the organisation was really effective and the necessary staffs and instructors were kept ready. I think also it would be held that the motor-car brigades would have to be kept on a war footing and at a strength sufficient without question to prevent invasion, also that any second line or third line of defence in case of accident would be more motor-cars and not more troops.

I think they would insist on every one in the Army, whether permanently embodied or only called out for training occasionally, being ready to be conveyed across the desert to be landed where required, and that they would not go to the expense of training a lot of men who were not prepared to do this when the time came.

What answer would the War Office in such a case give to any one who argued, as the "Hearth and Home" School do to-day, that the motor-car brigades might be defeated or absent when required. I think they would reply, "Well, if you really consider this in the least likely vote us more money for building more motor-cars," and to the argument that food would get in somehow even if the enemy's motor-cars held the command of the desert they would say, I imagine, "True, some food will get in; but it won't be at present prices, and if your communications are cut and your trade interfered with, how are you going to pay for it?" They would go on to say, I believe, "You must take some risk in war; you can't prepare thoroughly both for the offensive and the defensive, because you can't afford it. And as the first includes the second, you had much better put your money into motor-cars,

for if they are defeated your food will be doubled in price at least, and your wages will be at best halved, you will have no market for your goods, and not being able to afford to feed yourselves you will have to give in." I think the man in the street would say at once, "Yes, I see you are right, we must put our money into motor-cars and keep our Army for the offensive."

The Blue Water School look upon the defence of the Empire as one inseparable whole. The "Hearth and Home" School would separate it all up into little bits and make each part defend itself, leaving it to the Navy to undertake some indefinite part in the scheme. The teaching of this school is towards separate responsibilities and disintegration, and they are trying to get their ideas taken up in the Colonies. The consequence is that there is a grave danger of the minds of their hearers being taken off essentials, and of the adoption of narrow instead of broad principles. The whole scheme of Colonial defence is based on the Navy being strong enough to keep off any force stronger than a raid. The same scheme should hold good for ourselves. If we consider the risk too great we cannot wonder if they should do so. If we build forts and keep up armies of Volunteers and Militia for home defence we cannot wonder if they do the same. The consequence of the teaching is therefore to spend the national funds in a wasteful manner. If half the sum now spent on the home defences of the various parts of the Empire were spent instead on increasing the Navy, the attack of any part of it by the enemy would be impossible, while with the other half we could keep up a really effective Army for landing abroad. Under the present system the Navy is kept at a minimum strength, and the major part of the military expenditure is incurred in providing against the defeat of the Navy in a manner which would not have the least effect in protecting the whole or any part of the Empire if the Navy were crushed.

The instinct of our people both at home and oversea is to look upon the Navy as their real defence; but the teaching of the "Hearth and Home" School tends to make them distrust the ability of the Navy to defend them. If this policy is pursued it must end in disaster, but there are signs of a return to sanity. Even from the point of view of the military school it is recognised that it would be useless for each man to remain at home and defend his own fireside. It is recognised that the men must leave their homes and combine, that they must be trained and organised and go where wanted, with a view to throwing as many as possible upon the enemy at the same time. Surely the same holds good with regard to the defence of the Empire. We must train and organise

a force sufficient to deal with the enemy, and must be prepared to concentrate that force to meet him on our frontiers, which are his coasts, instead of dividing it up amongst a lot of scattered defensive positions on our own, and waiting for the enemy to choose which he will attack first. In our case this is only possible by means of the Navy, and, therefore, by the Navy we must stand or fall.

L. H. HORDERN.

P.S.—Since the above was in proof, Mr. Arnold Foster has made his speech on the Army. In that speech he is reported to have said, "The Committee of Defence, voicing, I believe, the universal opinion of all thinking men in this country, have come to the conclusion that the time has arrived when we must lay down as an axiom that the duty of the Army in this country is not primarily to stand with fixed bayonets round the coast, but to defend our possessions oversea."

If this axiom be adhered to, we may proceed to solve our problems.

NOTE.—Lieutenant Hordern is clearly an out and out supporter of the Blue Water School; yet this does not blind him to the need for an army, and his objections to the "Home Defence" delusion are limited to such as arise from a sensible preference for mobile defences. Forts and "Hedgerows" are all very well in their way, but their influence is purely local—the enemy may possibly attack them, but they certainly cannot attack the enemy. What too many people fail to realise is that an army raised for offensive purposes must *ipso facto* provide also for "Home Defence," in short, that the greater defence, the offensive, includes the lesser defence, the defensive. Supremacy at sea would have to be won before we could send an expeditionary army abroad, and such supremacy having been secured, invasion would consequently have been rendered impossible. But upon the other hand, if our Navy were to be beaten, of what good would any army be to us?—great or small, good or bad. We can afford to spend a certain sum annually upon our fighting services, and of this sum we ought to spend upon the Navy so much as may be required in order that the Navy shall be strong enough and good enough to defend us successfully. This done, the balance should be employed to provide as good and as large an army as the available funds can enable us to pay for.—ED. U. S. M.

DUMMIES FOR DRILL PURPOSES.

By Commander The Hon. H. N. Shore, R.N. (Retired).

A paragraph recently appeared in the Press to the effect that the *Wild Swan*, which has been fitted to replace the *Clyde* drill-ship for the Royal Naval Reserve at Aberdeen, "marks an important step towards the abolition of the useless and misleading system of drill which the force is compelled to undergo in consequence of the obsolete weapons in use at many of the Royal Naval Reserve drill-batteries and some of the ships set apart for training." And after pointing out that the *Clyde* carried two 7-inch muzzle-loading guns and two 32-pounders, smooth-bore, the writer pertinently asked, "How can it be hoped or expected to fit the men of the Royal Naval Reserve for service afloat in modern ships, taught, as they have largely been, by drill with these antiquated weapons?"

Perhaps in this, as in other matters, the wisdom of our much-despised ancestors may be of service in helping us to find a solution of the ever-present difficulty of providing up-to-date weapons for instructional purposes in the drill-ships and batteries around our coasts.

Any one who has the curiosity to examine the watch-rooms attached to some of the older and more remotely situated Coast-guard stations, especially in the west of England, may be rewarded by the discovery of what is termed in naval parlance, a "half-port," blocking the lower portion of a window; and, if he pushes his investigations a little further, he may find one or more ring-bolts in the floor. And thereby hangs a tale.

Some sixty odd years ago, when the smuggler had ceased to be a common object of our coast, the idea occurred to some one of utilising the disciplined force employed in safeguarding the revenue as a reserve for the fleet. This happy thought led to some interesting developments, not altogether to the taste of the preventivemen, who viewed any innovation on time-honoured custom as premonitory symptoms of the service "going to the dogs." And amongst the edicts issued at this period, having for their object the preparation of the men for their new *rôle* as

fleet-men, was an order directing that the "crews" of the several stations were to be sent up in rotation to the nearest guardships, "for the purpose of being instructed in the great-gun exercise." As however, the interests of the revenue required the presence of sufficient men at their posts, at all seasons, the training could only be carried out in a piecemeal fashion; and there was the further risk of the men forgetting what they learnt, for lack of frequent exercise. At this juncture some inspired genius, unknown to fame, saved the situation by suggesting the addition of dummy guns to the equipment of coastguard stations, for instructional purposes. All the circumstances connected with that important measure have long passed into oblivion. And, but for the accidental discovery of an official memorandum in one of the few "Rough Order Books" that have survived the periodical book-burnings initiated from time to time by zealous inspecting officers, every trace of the transaction would have perished. The paragraph to which I allude runs thus: "The ingenuity in fitting the wooden guns now supplied to the respective stations will be taken advantage of as a means of perfecting the officers and men in the drill, and preparing them for a satisfactory inspection by the Comptroller-General" (ibid.).

Our modern gunnery specialists may laugh at the idea of dummy gun-drill. But the country reaped the advantages of the system when, later on, the Crimean War broke out, and found both Navy and Army totally unprepared for a protracted struggle with a foreign power. Every available coastguardman was drafted to the fleet; and it is on record that, in many of the ships of Charley Napier's Baltic fleet, the few coastguardmen on board were the only men who possessed even a rudimentary knowledge of gunnery.

The wooden guns have long disappeared from the economy of coastguard stations; and, with such exceptions as I have mentioned, every trace of their existence has vanished. Even the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution is unable to boast of a specimen. Amongst the "ancients" of the coastguard service, however—pensioners of eighty and upwards, who can "mind the time" when they were called up for service under Charley Napier—the tradition of the wooden guns still survives.

The man who invented those dummy guns was a benefactor of his country; and there is no exaggeration in affirming that, if the system had been incorporated into the Naval Service, after the Crimean War had proved its efficacy, the editor of a Service paper would not have had to complain, in the year 1904, that "the training of the officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve has

been for a number of years an absolute farce; taught, as they have been largely, with antiquated weapons." Let me instance what came under my own observation while holding the post of Divisional Officer of Coastguard from 1881 till 1889. During that period my duties comprised the supervision and inspection of certain Naval Reserve drill-batteries, at one of which a force of over 1600 men was enrolled for annual training. Under such circumstances it would be reasonable to suppose that the men, who were liable to be called up for service in the fleet at any moment, would be afforded the chance of familiarising themselves with the outward appearance of a modern weapon. As a matter of fact, however, the whole of the instruction was confined to guns that had been supplied to the fleet some seventeen years previously, and were long out of date; while all applications for modern weapons were met with the reply that, until the fleet had been re-armed, it would be impossible to comply with requests for up-to-date guns for instructional purposes. This was reasonable enough; but it strikes one as a little curious that the alternative never occurred to any one in authority—the recourse, that is to say, to the system of dummies which had served its purpose so admirably on a previous occasion. But our modern "experts" are too wise to take hints from their unscientific forbears. And so, for the past twenty years and more, the Royal Naval Reserve have been put through a "useless and misleading system of drill with obsolete weapons."

The absurdity of training men with weapons they are never likely to fight with, and at the same time keeping them in ignorance of the very appearance—to say nothing of the manipulation—of the guns they will have to serve, if called out, must seem patent to every one who is not deficient in the sense of humour. And yet it would be false policy to supply up-to-date guns for drill purposes while the fleet remained unarmed. The obvious way out of the dilemma would be to provide every centre of instruction with models, so that the Royal Naval Reserve might, at least, be familiarised with the appearance and manipulation of guns they will be expected to handle in war. This, however, is by no means the solitary advantage, though certainly the most important one, that would ensue from the use of models. Ask any of our gun-makers the cost of a modern quick-firer. The reply would stagger most people. And then to think of this costly article, on which months—one might almost say years—of thought and labour had been bestowed, being abased to a mere drill-machine—knocked to pieces without firing a shot! A more wanton waste of a nation's hard-wrung earnings it would be

difficult to conceive. Here, then, is another instance in which the dummy system would afford a means of escape from an awkward predicament.

To take a wider view of the question. The wear-and-tear to which our armaments are subjected, for purely instructional purposes, is well known. And yet the valuable results that can be obtained by the use of dummies (models) has been demonstrated in the most convincing manner by Captain Percy Scott, whose apparatus for loading-drill has achieved a world-wide fame. Here, then, surely we have the nucleus of a system which is capable of being developed *ad infinitum*, and would result in enhanced efficiency, combined with a very appreciable reduction in the wear-and-tear of armaments. The models might be constructed of the cheapest materials—chiefly of wood—after the manner of the old coastguard dummies of the year 1848, the working parts only being of metal, to enable them to withstand rough treatment. And then, on the introduction of a new gun, the model department would supply every drill-ship or battery with a replica. The same system might advantageously be extended to gun-mountings for turrets, barbettes, casemates, and the hundred and one methods of equipment that obtain throughout the Naval Service.

The same arguments apply to the land forces. Any contrivance, indeed, that would reduce the wear-and-tear of armaments, and at the same time increase efficiency, ought to be welcomed by the responsible authorities—to say nothing of the Chancellor of the Exchequer! And I venture to say that the introduction of the "dummy drill-system" into the economy of our coast defences and fortresses would bring about all these happy results, and many others.

With regard to the manual operations of modern gunnery, these are so simple, and few in number, that every gunner should be able to perform them as naturally as he performs the operations of walking—and with as little thought. Under present conditions these operations are either not taught at all—as in the case of the Royal Naval Reserve—or are painfully and laboriously acquired through the agency of weapons that have cost the country hundreds, possibly thousands, of pounds. Does not this imply a want of perception of the fitness of things somewhere? A few pieces of wood and old iron, fixed up into proper shape, would suffice for teaching green-hands the manual operations of gunnery, every bit as well as the last new thing in quick-firers, and possess the additional advantage of saving the country hundreds of pounds annually.

The great object of all training should be the inculcation of

respect, even affection, for the costly weapons that are placed in the hands of our fighting-men. And in no way can this much-to-be-desired end be so readily attained as by the general use of models for drill purposes. Let no one plead the absence of a precedent. There is the precedent of the old coastguard wooden guns. While if a more venerable one be demanded, may not the battle of Mylæ, fought B.C. 260, between the Romans and Carthagenians, be triumphantly cited as a practical proof of the value of dummies for drill purposes? The Romans, with a view to measuring their strength for the first time with a naval power, caused their soldiers—in default of seamen, to go through a course of arduous training for the most important of their duties afloat, that, namely, of rowing in time to the shout of *Keleutes*, by taking their seats on tiers or stages erected on land, and by making believe to go through the various evolutions of a sea-fight. And the result? A crushing victory over the greatest naval power the world had seen. The battle of Mylæ was fought more than 2000 years ago. And yet, here are we, the modern representatives of the Carthagenians, in the year of grace and enlightenment (1904), putting our Royal Naval Reserve through a "useless and misleading system of drill, with obsolete weapons," and rendering their training an "absolute farce," because no one has studied history, or has possessed sufficient imagination to introduce dummies for drill purposes. Are we not, by our careless self-confidence and neglect of precautions, inviting the same fate that overtook the Carthagenians at Mylæ?

HENRY N. SHORE.

NOTE.—Since the above was written, letters have appeared in the Press complaining of the absence of modern appliances on board the drill-ship in the Thames, destined for the use of the Royal Naval Volunteers. "The guns," says one writer, "would be more useful as ornaments for a charity bazaar."—H.N.S.

AFFAIRS OF BOTH HEMISPHERES.

A Study in Colours.

By Major C. B. Simonds, R.G.A.

Abolition of Slavery, followed by Civilisation and Education of the Coloured Races have resulted in America, through somewhat injudicious forcing into progress, in their gaining sufficient power politically to seriously hamper the freedom of movement of the Government at Washington, not only in their internal affairs, but also in their things international—so much so that, while the country still has plenty of room for internal development, the policy of getting rid of a certain industrial social class of black at any price has become a dire necessity for the peace and welfare of the country; exodus to Africa, whence they came, has been looked upon as the best solution to this growing complex problem. Liberia was first mooted, but climate and nakedness of the land said "No;" the attraction was not promising to the fore-runners. Try the Cape they did. The Cape has been favourably reported on. The stream has started, the stream is increasing; if not checked, and very soon, the Cape must mind the flood and its consequences. The Cape Colony slumbers on all this, while its energies and time are devoted to childish imaginary grievances about British, Boers, Bond, and the parish pump. Given a little longer of this, we may find our foreign relations and freedom of action connected therewith seriously hampered by the attitude of the coloured races within our gates. This is not a pleasing prospect for the British Empire.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—Opinions have been much divided as to the wisdom of our alliance with Japan, and all sorts of complications which "are bound to follow" have been hinted at, even to war with France—ominous suggestions that if China makes war with Russia, a secret treaty binds France to Russia, and therefore we must join Japan. True, while our treaty with Japan is public property, it is also public property that a treaty exists between Russia and France—of a secret nature—on similar lines to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, with just this difference, wherein lies the secret (and so-called difficulty), that we do not know whether China

is included or not in the list of outside Powers who might chip in, whereas she is not considered in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Coercion of China.—Russia, China, Korea, and Japan may include a fairly wide area, and "problem-constructors" may find plenty of field for their fun within that area; but if they really wish to find a simple solution, and a very satisfactory one, to the whole problem, it is only necessary to step back a little from the picture in order to obtain a wider field of view. If there is any interference on the part of China, either with or without the consent of the Chinese Government, in the struggle now being fought out between Russia and Japan, it is the bounden duty of all European countries, and even of the United States of America, to co-operate in the coercion of China. How far this will suit the book of our "doughty little ally" (success is inclined to breed lofty aspirations) it is difficult to say—probably not at all; but for the white races to wait and look on, and then to have, at the eleventh hour, to fly at each others' throats in order not to infringe on merely delicate points of honour, which timely action can so clearly absolve, seems to be too ridiculous to treat as serious. The progress of Western civilisation must not run the chance of such a serious check—the game is not worth the candle. Russia has wanted a lesson for some time, her system of expansion and absorption has many defects, and, not having exercised due care, she has got herself in a mess. She must work out her own salvation in so far as Japan is concerned, but beyond that limited area the picture fast develops into one of colours, white, yellow, black.

To one who has had the fortune to have visited the four continents, to have kept a fairly open eye, and acquainted himself with the writings of some of the best-informed men, and even met some of them, the really difficult problem seems to be what will happen if China behaves herself, and will not justify coercion and interference from outside. Suppose Japan, exercising moderation, brings about a peace, having attained her object in establishing a protectorate over Korea and placing a hard-lined buffer State, Manchuria, between herself and Russia (with the present internal troubles in European Russia, this seems quite within the limits of possibility—even probable when finances too are considered), she will not waste much time in colonising Korea, and Japanising China, and training and organising China's Army on the same lines as her own. Then the white races may have to look out for the "yellow peril," or even worse—"Asia for the Asiatics."

Rôle of the British Empire in Immediate Future.—There is no time like the present, and no more favourable time could well be chosen for setting our house in order, seeing that we have probably

the largest-minded man in the world for our King, and two of the most clear-headed and at the same time hard-working ministers at the head of affairs in Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain (I place neither first, but take them in alphabetical order) of modern times. Maybe the Opposition is weak—and it is said no strong Ministry could exist in England without a strong Opposition—on the other hand will not a perfect Administration defy the existence of an Opposition? We really have no time for petty party politics, and probably shall not have again. The country has suffered a good deal during the last thirty years or so, while education has been developing through that stage where a little knowledge is a dangerous thing; fortunately, we have now a sensible British public and all that is now required is that introduction of the technical schools which are beginning to spring up all over the country. We may have dropped behind a little in the rapid development of some of those industries in which America and Germany for a brief space have possibly given us a lead, but we have retained that honesty which must tell in the long run in our favour—in fact, which has done so already—that the late Mr. Rhodes was inclined to think rather stood in our way, viz. the "unctuous rectitude of the Britisher." That "forced" technical education (by "forced" I mean of hot-house growth) that the United States and Germany have adopted has not had quite a fair chance, and by many has been abused, not having sprung from sound foundation. The mind of the people was not ripe for it; the result has been that deception and cunning has crept in, and though they have undersold British manufacturers, it has been by the production of inferior goods, rendered attractive by their cheapness, and not by their superior merits. Purchasers in British Colonies have found them out in the long run, China has done so too, likewise Japan, and so British trade has been steadily improving, while leaps and bounds backwards and forwards mark the records of the two countries mentioned. Whatever may be the result of the thoroughly honest open inquiry into what our future fiscal policy is to be, we may rest assured that the British public will find out the soundest and best lines to work on. To adopt a radical change for no reason is absurd; to stick to Free Trade because it has done us well in the past, but is now played out, is likewise absurd. If outsiders are going to throw bricks into our windows, we must find a means of preventing it, and with a little time and trouble we shall. Just at present there may be a little poverty and misery in England and the Colonies, since we are recovering from troublous times, but we can congratulate ourselves on the enormous decrease of strikes, which a less educated public would certainly

have given way to ten or fifteen years ago. The outbreak of the Boer War showed other nations what strength we can rely on from our Colonies, without even having to ask for it—all voluntarily contributed. Events have occurred since then which have cemented the Colonies closer still to the Mother Country, and with a fiscal policy suited to our future progress we hope to be able to ignore the attempts of other countries to squeeze us. As soon as we have got to know better the requirements of our various Colonies in their various trade industries, which technical education can soon do, backed up by honesty and unison we can push ahead. *But* the welfare of all classes must be treated as sacred; every class of weakling who can adopt only special trades should have those trades set apart for them, provided the supply is equal to the demand. Here we can learn a lesson from Japan; to quote one instance alone, the blind are provided for in being the sole class permitted to exercise the treatment of massage so extensively employed in most ailments in that country. Given a little time, the outlook is generally fairly cheerful, but we must make good use of that time.

India is fast setting things in order under the able administration of an energetic and competent Viceroy, and an equally energetic and sound Commander-in-Chief. Canada, Australia, New Zealand mean pushing along rapidly enough. We must have no set-back in Africa. Left to our own good government, that country south of the Zambezi will develop and progress all right, but coloured America must be made to understand that affairs out there are "none of her funeral." Prevention is better than cure. In other parts of Africa, too, we do not want America. An enterprising American visited the Soudan recently with a view to growing cotton in the Atbara region, and proposed to employ black educated skilled labour from the Southern States—the very people we want to exclude from South Africa! Are we going to allow these undesirable weeds to take root all over our African Colonies, when it can all be prevented by timely representation, and, if necessary, judicious negotiation with a friendly Power? It is an unfortunate thing that the influence of colour in our foreign negotiations is steadily increasing. The welfare of the coloured must naturally be always considered, but we must set our faces against anything approaching the dictatorial from that quarter. We have plenty of enterprise within the Empire to develop the Soudan, or any other of our African Colonies; and though it may be argued that it is largely due to American technical experts that the mining industries of South Africa owe their marvellously rapid development, it is not unlikely that, had all the industries South Africa

offers been brought on evenly, instead of some forced and others neglected, affairs out there would have been far more satisfactory than they are at present.

Conclusion.—King Edward VII. and his wise ministers cannot last for ever, and in his short reign he has not only brought about a state of harmony within the Empire which few, even the most hopeful, could have dreamed of; but his influence in Europe has already marked him as a great monarch. The Czar and the Kaiser may have been before him in their attempts at preaching peace, but their methods resulted in failure. King Edward's methods have resulted in peace and harmony without the preaching. There is plenty left yet for him to do; may he live long enough to accomplish it!

C. B. SIMONDS.

OUR MILITARY SYSTEM.

Is Reform possible?

By "Irishman."

A "NEW" State engaged in the matter of building up a military system, or an "old" State engaged in remodelling a military system which has proved inadequate, will do well to forbid its counsellors the consideration of more than three influences, to wit—

1. *Policy*, the expression of national destiny, partially obvious and inevitable, but for the rest controllable by its statesmen, and therefore varying with the national temperament.

2. *Geographical Situation*, which contributes so largely to the shaping of national characteristics, which predisposes peoples in favour of certain national ambitions, against others, and which may be modified from time to time by the acquisition or abandonment of territory, the fruits of policy.

3. *National Idiosyncrasies*, partly the result of geographical situation, but largely influenced by the precepts and by the example of rulers and leaders.

These three influences may be said to form the Trinity of Strategic Forces, each of which is complex, each of which is closely interwoven with the other two, and each of which is fixable by the exercise of national free will.

The resultant of these three elemental forces decides, in direction and magnitude, the ideal military system. The direction prescribes the kind of military service which should be demanded of loyal subjects, the magnitude (considered side by side with geographical situation) will point the armed strength and the correct distribution of the armed forces within the territories of the State.

For each case there is an ideal resultant, and the consideration of unnecessary or secondary forces, their introduction into the calculations of the counsellors, must tend to divert the resultant from the ideal position.

Moreover, when the relative magnitudes of the three elemental forces are plotted for investigation, they must be proportioned by that common sense which should form the mainspring of national

[illegible] will. The matter of moment to any one who reads is the direction of a similar divergence from the ideal.

Whenever any serious modification in one or other elemental force calls for a corresponding readjustment of the remaining [illegible] that the resultant, and therefore the military system, may continue to approximate to the ideal.

If we proceed to review our own military history in this light we shall find, I think, that the divergence from the ideal is so serious that there are no indications whatever of our military system having been framed by any consideration of elemental strategic forces, nor that the variations it has from time to time undergone were either adequate or in the right direction.

To all intents and purposes we have no military system, and never have had. For a sound military system is indispensable for a sound national life. Alone amongst the great peoples, we have arrogated to ourselves the privilege of dispensing with a military system. Our national life is therefore unhealthy.

Our history in general, and our military history in particular, teaches us that if our regimental records are lustrous, our military records are consistently lamentable. "The British Constitution is admirably adapted for the conduct of warfare," and we have accordingly made war badly.

The biographies of our most famous warriors are epitomes of overwhelming struggles with imbecile trammels, terminating in a glorious and heroic success crowned by honours and rewards.

So too the careers of successive War Ministers (supposing their successors would tell of high ideals, of confident hopes, shattered on the quicksands of a benighted public indifference, failing before the unseen barriers which stultify each effort, robbing reform of its vital [illegible] of all its point even whilst the Army Order which promulgates it is circulating through the garrisons of the Empire.

We find, too, that the "Establishments," the irreducible minima of the "Military Forces," have never of recent times been attained. Nor the Parliament will never vote one man, one mule, one pound of [illegible] more than the quantity prescribed as the irreducible minimum; and Parliament is careless as to the quality.

The logical inference is that we habitually live on the wrong side of the military danger-line, but that we have long since ceased to recognise the fact as involving serious risk.

Such success in war as we have hardly won has been won by the devotion of individuals. A fortuitous combination of chances has alone prevented our many "regretable incidents" from assuming the proportions of national disaster.

In one respect alone does our military "system" of to-day

proximate to compliance with our Imperial exigencies. It is oluntary," and voluntary military service is in accord with the nperament of an intellectually unimportant majority, which efers to pay rather than to act.

For the rest, it has been thrown together at different times and divers manners, with no regard to national destiny or geographical odifications, but with every concession to a public opinion which ill prates of "turbulent and licentious soldiery."

No change of policy, no inevitable acquisition of territory, has een permitted to exert its strategic influence. National idiosyncrasies remain in their shape of a hundred years ago, and lean owards the ignoble distaste for military service, which, next after roclivities for buying and selling, is perhaps our most strongly narked national characteristic.

No useful purpose can be served by tracing our egregious 'system" from its source in the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, through the Norman levy, the Tudor impressment, the train band, to the establishment of a standing army after the Restoration.

Nor is it necessary to dwell upon the development of that standing army since 1660, to probe for the origin of the Militia, to discuss the estimates of sea-power at different stages. It is sufficient to recall the fact that this development has never proceeded along lines calculated to imbue the nation with any fondness for military service, or with any respect for those who engage in it, and that no attempt has ever been made to sink the roots of a military system in such manner that they should penetrate and draw sustenance from *all* strata of society.

However fascinating such retrospects may be for the erudite few, they have little or no bearing upon the military problems of to-day, which imperatively demand that we should abandon tradition and cut ourselves free from its paralysing influences. It is, I think, sufficient to note two comparatively recent land-marks, two of the last milestones we have passed on a none too creditable pilgrimage —the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, and the Volunteer Revival of 1859.

So far as our system rests upon the Regular Army, it dates only from 1870, when the crushing results achieved by Prussian preparation for war had set the civilised world a-thinking.

Since that day, the German Empire has supplied the pattern and the model for everything that pertains to the science of military organisation, and to the higher branches of warfare. To Germany we must look, now as then, but we must not allow ourselves to be hypnotised by German hats, buttons, or coat-tails. And if some are inclined to raise the "Made in Germany" sneer,

it is sufficient to remind them that Prussian military organisation was "made in Germany." The organisation that did that is no fit butt for cheap sarcasm.

German military organisation is as nearly perfect as can be, just because due consideration has been paid in framing it to elemental strategic forces, and because Germans do not shrink from undertaking necessary modifications. We should grasp the principles which underlie that perfection, and apply them, in our own way, to our own circumstances.

Sir Howard Vincent, in a recent letter to the Prime Minister, referred to Lord Cardwell, when shaping his Enlistment Act, having been strongly influenced by "recognition of the extraordinary success of the rapidly formed People's Army of France." This was by way of advocacy for the perpetuation of our present Volunteer Force, which, in Sir Howard Vincent's opinion, is a "People's Army."

Now, Lord Cardwell, in common with all observers at the time, can scarcely have been oblivious to the fact that the People's Army referred to had no claim to be considered "extraordinarily successful" from any point of view. Perusal of the works of French and German military historians shows them to be singularly blind to the military virtues of this People's Army. Certainly the loss of all Alsace, of a portion of Lorraine, of two first-class fortresses, the Commune, an indemnity of five milliards, the transfer of a population of 1,600,000 to Prussian soil, and the weakening of her strategic position, was rather a heavy price for France to pay for the "extraordinarily successful" operations of her People's Army!

During the first month of hostilities, when the Prussians were confronted by the professional forces of the Empire, all miserably directed as they were, Prussian battle-losses totalled 78,000. After Sedan, five months spent in crushing the "extraordinarily successful" levies cost but 51,000. It is tolerably certain that no Frenchman desires to perpetuate the methods by which this extraordinary success was achieved, or to experience afresh the dire consequences which followed in its train.

Lord Cardwell's system, after all, turned upon a short colour service and the creation of a trained Reserve, and bore no relation whatever to the improvisation of levies which characterised the People's Army of France in 1870–71. To assert that Lord Cardwell was influenced by that improvisation in framing his Enlistment Act is surely incorrect.

If Sir Howard Vincent himself was so enamoured of the People's Army idea as he would have us believe, why did he publish "Reports on the *Prussian* Army" in 1871, instead of

elucidating, for the benefit of an expectant public, the secret of how to raise a People's Army *à la Française?*

If a People's Army is a synonym for makeshift and improvisation, as it always is, then it is full time the People's Army fetish were exploded.

As a nation, we are ignorant of war, and this sort of language goes down well with the ignorant, but with the ignorant alone. The fact is that the heroic but fore-doomed struggles of People's Armies must be viewed for what they are, more or less creditable efforts to make the conqueror pay as dearly as possible for his success. If they produce, as they almost always do, a crop of "heroes" and of "heroines," and invest some leaders with a halo of romance, they must also serve to remind us of the weaknesses and pusillanimity of those whose business it should have been to ensure that no such People's Army were required.

People's Armies of this kind are ordinarily born amidst the death-throes of an empire or of a republic. To deliberately select such methods as the basis of a military system would be the act of an imbecile.

One is forced irresistibly to the conclusion that Sir Howard Vincent's tenderness for the Volunteer Force is of more recent date, that he unconsciously takes his own *corps d'élite* as typical of the Volunteer Force in general, and that he is not quite acquainted with the broader strategical requirements of our situation.

Granted the existence of a practical and widespread patriotism, of a temperate and amenable national character, of a strong and universal sense of national duty, a voluntary military system is, ethically, preferable to any form of compulsion.

It is doubtless axiomatic to aver that a Volunteer is worth two pressed men, but the axiom assumes the patriotism, the temperate and amenable character, and the sense of duty. In the absence of these virtues the axiom becomes merely a shibboleth, a catch-word with which to play upon the ignorant and prejudiced.

When patriotism wanes, or takes unpractical forms, when the national character is weakened and the reverse of amenable, when the sense of duty is dulled, then compulsion may rightly be called in to redress the balance, and, from the purely military standpoint, becomes absolutely essential, if possessions, prestige, and precedence are to be upheld in the interests of unborn generations who may aspire to higher ideals. A People's Army on a "universal" basis is perhaps the most potent educational institution which a nation can possess.

So it is with us to-day; and, in face of waning patriotism, degradescent national character, and an almost complete absence

[illegible] sense of national duty in whole masses of our population, if we want to go straight to the root of our military shortcomings, we can do so by putting our finger on the fact that our military service is voluntary.

[illegible] If we want to see the inherent go-as-you-please voluntary [illegible] we must go to the Volunteer Force. Considering the Volunteer Force in the light of our strategical requirements, its very existence is difficult to justify.

The recent Royal Commission found it impossible to obtain any satisfactory official pronouncement as to its functions, as to its place in our synoptic system. Yet the Volunteer Force, by reason of its [illegible] the Voluntary Ideal, is the key to our military situation. The Volunteer Revival of 1858–59 is an episode of far greater moment than even the Enlistment Act of 1871.

Numerically, on average, the Volunteer Force is a mass of very indifferently trained, very "mixed," very badly equipped, very badly officered men banded into an organisation which is more social than military, which is financed partly from Army Funds, which is [illegible] with the inglorious motto "Defence, not defiance," which is equally powerless for either offence, or defence, or defiance, and which, amid the military forces of the Crown, is allowed to be politically active.

Strategically speaking, such a quasi-military force is in no way essential, or even desirable. Its existence is due merely to that strange and Sugrue-like caprice which bids Great Britain renounce for ever the offensive and the initiative, which regards all war as necessarily immoral, and physical weakness as the surest sign of moral strength.

From another standpoint, the Volunteer Force is the "reply of a free people to a tyrannical conscription," and a very inadequate reply too.

To grasp the full significance of the Volunteer Revival of 1858, it is necessary to recognise the fact that its consolidation by the Act of 1863 (as bulky a statute as encumbers the Statute Book) rendered it impossible for the Ministry of 1870 to reproduce any genuine semblance of the organisation which underlay Prussian success, even had that Ministry cherished any genuine desire to do so; that the political activity of the force is at the present moment the greatest difficulty encumbering the path of reform, and that its existence in the midst of a people supremely ignorant of war and of military affairs has imbued our population with radically false ideas of what military service means, and of what military efficiency involves. In the eyes of a majority of that population, military efficiency is conferred by the wearing of a uniform,

by the carrying of a gun, and by the possession of a military rank.

Adulation of the Volunteer Ideal precludes any realisation of the need for a sound military system, any comprehension of the benefits, physical, moral, educational, and disciplinary, conferred upon a State strenuously minded enough to accept a basis of universal military service, compulsory universal service if needs be.

Thanks in great measure to the Volunteer Revival, the opportunity of 1870 was lost, and the Enlistment Act of that year became but sour Rhine wine in musty British bottles. But in public estimation that mattered little, for the label which adorned those musty bottles bore the blessed word of good cheer, so dear to the British heart—"Voluntary."

Thanks to the existence of a Volunteer Force, the opportunities of 1900 and 1901 were lost; and, thanks to its political activity to-day, the opportunity of 1904 is being passed over.

The methods of British statesmen in consulting their "Military Advisers" are curiously persistent. The unfortunate soothsayers are decapitated one after the other until advice is obtained which will be "acceptable to the public."

There is never any attempt to lead or form a healthy public opinion on matters military. British statesmen have always regarded the study of strategy as incompatible with British statesmanship, as something closely akin to immorality. Therefore they always make war badly, and peace worse. They are slaves to Demos. Consequently, it has been left to Great Britain alone to rely consistently upon improvisation in emergency, and to exploit to its depths the degradation which military improvisation necessarily involves.

Great Britons have even been heard to defend military improvisation as something laudable, something "typically British," and they have become habituated, by recurring experience, to "muddling through" such crises as cannot be avoided by an elastic and exasperatingly nebulous National Policy.

At this moment there are hundreds of thousands in Britain who believe that the C.I.V.'s conquered South Africa, shaming the poor incompetent Regular troops by their heroism in doing so. These are the folk who gibe at the Duke of Norfolk and his courageous Commissioners as "estimable and worthy gentlemen, whose opinions must not be taken too seriously." These are the folk whose power at the Poll prompts the Prime Minister to declare that "His Majesty's Government do not, *of course*, agree with the recommendations of that Report." The words *of course* are highly significant. That well-informed and well-meaning men should

differ in opinion as to the recommendations of the Commission is inevitable and healthy, but those two words are of themselves sufficient to deprive the official verdict of His Majesty's Government of all the weight it might otherwise have carried. Besotted indifference and a cheap and nasty Press that caters for an ignorant public have indeed brought us to a pretty pass.

The Volunteer Ideal, the essence of the Voluntary Ideal, stands to-day between the nation and the recasting of its military system in accordance with the elemental strategic forces which act upon our Empire, and an unemotional glance at the history of the Volunteer Force may be useful.

Originally accepted in 1758 in aid of the Militia Ballot, first singly, later as separate companies under their own officers, it was not until 1794 that the Volunteers developed an organisation of their own, and came to be administered under Acts separate from those enactments which formed the Militia law. The keynote to the system lies in the fact that service in the Volunteers carried with it exemption from the more onerous service in the Militia. Such a keynote augurs badly for the efficiency of a combatant body.

In 1802 the "movement" received a tremendous impulse under the panic legislation precipitated by the threatened Napoleonic invasion. More than 400,000 Volunteers were enrolled, the majority, it is rational to suppose, seeking exemption from the Militia Ballot, and from the other and more drastic exactions authorised by Parliament at this period, rather than an opportunity to strike a blow at "Boney."

It is not a little suggestive to find that the very existence of this Volunteer Force was, in some responsible quarters, deemed to constitute a national danger rather than a national safeguard, in that it tended to "starve" the other and more highly trained services, which were available for offensive action, the truest defence of all.

On the other hand, we now know that it was Wellington's deliberate opinion—and he of all others was best qualified to judge—that had Napoleon once landed, he could have *easily* marched on London, despite the valiant 400,000!

Quite apart from all considerations of compulsory or voluntary service, it is fairly obvious that the Volunteer Force of to-day is playing the same part, diverting very many eligible recruits from better-trained branches into an organisation which is powerless for either offence or defence, and which cannot by any possible means be rendered capable of performing useful military service in either capacity, wasting the available manhood of the country, and not a little public money, in bolstering up a valueless military asset.

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This principle may be magnificent, and in accord with the "voluntary principle," but it is totally at variance with military ideals, and, whilst very fine from the "People's Army" point of view, does not make for the education of a war machine. It is a principle which is never permitted to strike root in any other branch of the public service; so much is certain.

What would be said in Parliament and in the country, of a Postmaster-General who organised a "People's Post Office," who permitted his subordinates to erect buildings and instal plant for the recreation and technical instruction of sorters, telegraphists, clerks, and postmen, at their own expense, or with borrowed money, or by voluntary public subscription, and who then declared himself unable to cope with grave irregularities in the postal service, on the score that the individual self-sacrifice of those concerned precluded all interference?

To permit either an individual or a body in the service of the State to acquire such a pecuniary and personal interest in its perpetuation is, in every other department, recognised as impossible, nor can any logical reason be advanced for differentiating military service: yet Volunteer service is differentiated, with fatal results, for every attempt of responsible military authority to increase the military efficiency of the force necessarily involves interference with a complicated network of vested interests, which interests are regarded by the force as of greater importance than its warlike training and preparation.

If it be true that a good general looks a hundred times to his communications for one glance that he bestows upon the enemy in front, it is doubly true that the Volunteer commanding officer thinks a hundred times of specious plans for "keeping his men together," and of his financial responsibilities, for one thought given to the military efficiency of the unit over which he exercises a nominal command.

This aspect of affairs was scarcely touched upon by the recent Royal Commission, yet it is of infinitely greater importance than even the provision of boots, because it lies at the root of the whole evil. If the worst came to the worst, it might be possible to steal or commandeer boots, but a perverted spirit in their wearers would be an intangible matter, impossible to eradicate.

Many military traditions may be deserving of the utmost respect, being indissolubly connected in our minds with noble deeds done in the past, but the Volunteer tradition having no such background of accomplishments to recommend it, is in no respect

a tradition which we need be fearful of destroying. And it is possible to say so without meaning or desiring to in any way disparage the services of present Volunteers, who are in no wise responsible for either the tradition or the crop of abuses which has sprung up around it, and who can only in exceptional instances possess that broad grasp of fundamental military principles which might reveal to them the anomalies and impossibilities of a system in which they have been taught to believe.

The absurdity of attempting to extract military efficiency from the Volunteer Force is made clear by a glance at the history of the recent "crisis."

Two generations of administration by indifferent Regular officers, with one foot in the grave of half-pay, and taught to suppress any remnants of military common sense in presence of the Volunteer Ideal, a generation of public derogation (*vide* back numbers of *Punch*) followed by a generation of extravagant adulation, had led to the force establishing its own standards of military efficiency and preparedness for war.

Twelve casual attendances of one hour each in a twelvemonth were supposed to fit the citizen soldier for the arduous and responsible task of defending his hearth and home against the trained and disciplined soldiery of a Continental invader. When it is remembered that two of these "attendances" could legally be completed on any one day, the full ineptitude of the "conditions of efficiency" previous to November, 1901, will be apparent, without at all going into the question of "cooking returns," "faking the books," and so forth, in favour of those who failed to perform the minimum.

The Annual Inspection was a good-natured farce, followed by the junketing and speechifying so dear to the British heart, and so intimately connected with the Volunteer Ideal. Those units which went to camp went there with marquees and tent-bottoms and napery for all ranks, for holiday-making pure and simple. "It kept the men together," and it "helped to bring recruits."

The Volunteer joined a corps as he would join a friendly society, for much the same reasons, and often, at less expense, he found himself "better done." He had Church parades periodically, he "lined the streets," he presented arms very indifferently in guards of honour, he bought myriads of wonderful little books on 'How to pipeclay Belts,' and usually became an enthusiast on rifle-shooting (whether he belonged to an Artillery, Engineer, or Rifle Corps); eccentric noblemen with money to waste carried him free of charge to distant "field days," where the opposing forces patiently wended their way through dense crowds of people

eating things out of paper bags, and where he was supplied with excellent cheer for nothing, and there were sports and smoking concerts, and prizes galore to be won for doing little or nothing, with a permanent staff of ex-Regular soldiers to do all the dirty work that couldn't be shirked.

Putting on one side the few *corps d'élite* which it would be invidious to name, will any one with knowledge of Volunteers seriously dispute that the above programme is not a fair sample of what went to make the "Trained Volunteer" previous to 1901?

Then came the Army Order of 1901, and the same mob that shrieked for drastic reform in the Regular Services, could scarcely shout loud enough in denunciation of the unwarrantable measures taken by supercilious military authority to reform the Volunteers.

The more palpable "frauds" of the force itself were prompt to resign, seeing that some definite military efficiency was to be exacted, and whole thousands of more valuable men also expressed their disapproval of interference with vested interests by sending in *their* resignations, quite regardless of whether or no they were able to comply with the new conditions.

A so-called military body in which such action is possible has no claim to be considered "combatant," no claim to be regarded as a pillar of the State, and no claim upon the consideration of those military authorities whose responsibilities are genuine and onerous.

Yet an ill-informed public opinion was quick to range itself alongside of disappointed and insubordinate Volunteers, in opposition to responsible military authority, and to clamour for the preservation of the Volunteer Ideal in all its pristine worthlessness.

Believing as I do that the Volunteer Force is the key of our present military system, that it has set up in our midst a false standard of military efficiency, worshipped by an ignorant general public which accepts the Volunteer Ideal at its own valuation, and that the further maintenance of such a body is mischievous, I see no hope of recasting our military system into any shape more suited to our strategic requirements of to-day until that force is removed from the path which it now encumbers.

THE AUXILIARY FORCES COMMISSION.

HOME DEFENCE WITH OR WITHOUT COMPULSION?

BY COLONEL SIR HOWLAND ROBERTS, BT., V.D., Commanding the London Irish Rifles.

A PERUSAL of the Report issued by the above Commission would lead one to suppose that the problem set before them, as they understood it, was to ascertain whether the Auxiliary Forces of this country are ready and fit, *at twenty-four hours' notice*, to take over its defence against a conscript army of Regulars from across the water, without any backing by our own Regular Troops, and, furthermore, if this question must be answered in the negative, whether and by what means they (the said Auxiliary Forces) can be prepared for such a contingency.

The primary question, so understood, could have been answered in the negative at one single meeting of the Commission, for neither the Militia, Yeomanry, nor Volunteers, nor for the matter of that our Regular Forces either, can be adjudged to be ready, in their present nebulous state of "organisation" (for which they as troops are in no sense responsible), to meet an invading foe. Certainly the Auxiliary Forces are not "ready, aye ready," except as regards the *corpus vile*, and that to a necessarily limited extent, for it would require a final turn of hard training to tune up to fighting pitch.

It has been pointed out by our late Inspector-General that the whole problem is, from the outset, governed by the geographical fact that, unlike Continental Powers, our home frontiers are not coterminous with those of any foe; the fleet of the first sea-power of the world is our outpost—watching as well as defence—line, and would, under any circumstances, give us more or less time for final preparation. We are warned that, in some mysterious fashion, our squadrons might be decoyed away, or else beaten (in such case is it likely the enemy's fleet would be intact?), and that consequently the Channel would be left open for a longer or shorter period.

At any rate, there *must* first be a time of international and diplomatic tension before the blow can reach our shores, sufficient wherein, under our present laws, to call out and mobilise our Auxiliary Forces. On their part, our enemy or enemies would

have to collect their invading troops, transports of all sorts to carry them over sea, and a convoy of fighting ships as escort and guard against our mosquito fleet; all this could not be done without some foreknowledge reaching us. Judging comparatively from the experience of our Japanese friends with their perfect organisation, it would be *impossible* for any enemy to land 50,000 men on our coasts, complete with all details, under a fortnight or three weeks at the very least, and even then with the assurance that the force thus landed, a veritable forlorn hope, would be cut off at any moment from retreat or succour by our certain recovery of the local command of the sea.

The problem therefore to be worked out should be put somewhat as follows:—Premising that we keep, say, at least 25,000 Regulars at home, how to assure that we shall have Auxiliary Troops, fully organised into Divisions and Brigades with their staffs, and ready after three weeks or so of hard training, *after* mobilisation, to meet Continental Regulars invading our own country.

It must be clear that the larger (*not* the smaller) *in toto* of the Auxiliary Forces, the larger must be the number individually trained up to the preparatory standard; yes, and the more would be ready to volunteer for active service in such a case of need as arose during the late Boer War; while the balance, after further training, would be available as Reserves. Hence it must be an unstatesmanlike and fatal error to cut down the Auxiliary Forces numerically, or even the Regulars. In this freest of free countries the statesman should encourage true patriotism and *allow* British subjects, by joining one or other of the services, to give the best of their power and ability, even though a proportion, under the exigencies of civil life and wage-earning, cannot attain a certain technical condition of efficiency until the crisis appears, when all and everything must give way to national stress and danger.

Before sketching out my ideas how this fateful problem can be worked out *sans* compulsion, I wish to call attention to certain points of disability brought against the Volunteer Force (in which I have served for thirty-eight years in all ranks), and which are reiterated in the Report of the Commission without reference to their being simply the effect of causes for which the Volunteers themselves can in no sense be held responsible, for the said causes arise above their heads, and from some of them relief has constantly been sought.

1. *So large a proportion of Volunteers under twenty years of age.*—Of course there are, because, under the Volunteer Act, enlistment can be accepted at seventeen, and the term is almost universally for three or four years, during which the capitation grants earned

recoup the corps for initial outlay, uniforms, equipment, etc. The balance left of men over twenty or twenty-one are chiefly those who "sign on" for further service year by year. The most serious fall in numbers during the past three years has not been caused so much by the cessation of the war fever as by newly imposed or threatened conditions of service, which have frightened the men individually. They feared they could not possibly meet these new conditions, and hence would be liable for "non-efficiency," so out they went. In my experience it is the very best men who have retired, those of the longest service and training, and many more will go in their turn unless more elastic conditions are introduced and definitely settled.

2. *The Volunteers cannot shoot.*—A certain proportion are the finest shots in the world, composed of men who take shooting up as a sport and can afford the time and money it costs; but the majority do not shoot as well as they might, because "practice makes perfect," and neither sufficient rifle ranges nor sufficient ammunition are supplied by Government to enable the ordinary run of Volunteers to perfect themselves. On a Saturday afternoon in June, I took down a small battalion of 400 for sectional practices, field and volley firing, on the Pirbright Ranges. The result was fairly good, in view of the fact that the test (for official record) was equivalent to schoolboys going up for examination at the beginning instead of the end of a term; but let us imagine the result if we could have afforded the ranges for even a couple of complete days' musketry training; practise first with blank cartridge to steady the men and section commanders, then two or three times through with ball, and finally the test shoot to be recorded. The same is equally true as to class-firing; for lack of time, practice ammunition, and travelling allowances the majority of our men (besides attendances at drill) can only afford to give up one day to class-firing, hence they have to take wind and weather as they come, with little or no previous practice, otherwise 80 or 90 per cent. of our men would be marksmen. The heads of the War Office inculcate the absolute necessity of rifle-shooting, yet they allow the speculative builder to close rifle-range after rifle-range without protest; they allow us ten rounds a man for encouragement, *i.e.* prize-shooting, propose an enhanced course of musketry without extra allowances, and then jump on us because we are not all marksmen. If rifle-shooting is a national necessity, then, so are rifle-ranges, and these should be legally protected against interference by notices analogous to "ancient lights;" they should be national property, and so should manœuvre grounds.

3. *Lack of Discipline.*—'Combined Training,' Part VI., Section 140, para. 2, reads as follows:—"Success in War depends mainly on an Army's discipline. True discipline cannot exist unless all ranks feel absolute confidence in the fitness of their superiors to instruct in peace and lead in War." So far as my long experience goes, there is *no* lack of discipline in the Volunteers, and no "crime." There is far less discipline and much crime in the Regulars, and the power of dismissal vested in the Volunteer C.O. is an ample safeguard. It is quite true that, individually, Volunteers cannot be "ordered" out in ordinary times, and that bad weather affects the musters on parade except at the annual inspection, when attendance is practically compulsory; but, once on parade, there is no question as to "discipline." In proof of this, for four years running I have had 60 per cent. of my battalion in brigade (23rd Field Army) camp for fifteen days, have never had a "drunk," and but twice to "tell off." The first case was that of a pioneer who drew a glass of beer while sweeping out the wet canteen after clearing up the latrines on a blazing hot day, and the second that of an old "Regular" who shirked inlying piquet. *Esprit de corps* and personal self-respect keep the Volunteer within bounds when in uniform or at training, which latter is for us the nearest approach to war service, and an ample promise of our conduct when the band begins to play in earnest.

I am told, on the highest authority, that at the War Office and amongst the Regulars there is a feeling of jealousy towards the Volunteers, because we give ourselves airs and cost money (under £7 a head!) which might be better expended on the senior service; but I cannot believe it, they owe us too much; the popularity of the soldier, the improvement in firearms is due to us all the world over, and last, not least, we have provided bodies of troops on which to practice the higher commends—surely these are boons to be gratetul for?

But the higher training in Brigade and Division of all arms, which we appeal for, are to prepare us for active service, and simply arise from our keen desire to improve ourselves, and a hankering after that "true discipline" which can alone be inculcated by knowing who we shall be associated with when it comes to real fighting, and that we shall not have Generals of Divisions and Brigadiers pitchforked on to us with scratch staffs, who know nothing of us and our capabilities, and of whose qualifications, as our "Superiors," we know practically nil.

As to animal courage we Volunteers are English, Scotch, and, as far as we are allowed to serve, Irish, the same blood as our Regular brethren, and we can rest on the reports our fellows won

in South Africa, bearing well in mind that these were in no sense "picked men," but just those (and mostly very young) *who could go*,—I sent out over 200 of them. Remember what the troops, and they were but Volunteers, did in the American Civil War, and read Henderson's 'Battle of Fredericksburg;' when in storming Mary's Hill an Irish Corps lost 1200 out of 1500 in a few minutes, and a large number fell within 100 yards of the wall held by another (Southern) Irish regiment. Cannot our countrymen believe that the Volunteers of Great Britain, if well led, would be as staunch and do equally well? Then are we not prospectively worth what we cost? Again, the more you have of us, the more there will be to *volunteer* "foreign" in case of need.

4. *Inefficiency and shortage of Officers.*—These, alas! are true and damaging charges, the effect of causes which do not altogether lie at the doors of either the Militia or the Volunteers. How can they be obviated?

Inefficiency.—Up to twenty years ago we had no training, practical or theoretical, beyond mere drill; and while the appearance of a Regular officers' name in the 'Army List' implies, necessarily, that he has qualified in all respects for his rank, no such meaning can attach to the names of Auxiliary officers in the adjoining columns; but, thanks to the institution of Tactical and War Game Societies in large centres, with their instruction classes, and, further still, the admission to the Promotion Examinations, things have improved of late years; witness the mysterious initials tacked on to our names. But there are still too few "Qs,"* especially among commanding officers, who surely *ought* to set an example to those who serve under them. If the Auxiliary officer cannot get the practical training of his Regular brother or cousin, then, and all the more, should he be encouraged to, at least, study and pass theoretically. But this latter task requires of the busy civilian much self-abnegation of leisure, ay and expenditure too, for "coaching" is an expensive amusement, especially when it carries with it no professional or social recognition, and no chance of more rapid promotion. Hence the majority demur to give something for nothing, let things slide, and take it easy.

* The letter "q" or "Q" attached to the name of an officer of Auxiliary Forces in the Army List signifies that he has voluntarily passed the same technical examinations in military science that the Regular officer is compelled to pass before promotion to the rank of Captain or Field Officer respectively.

The recent rolling up of the three subjects, tactics, engineering, and topography, into one examination, acts for the Auxiliaries somewhat as a deterrent; they like to take one fence at a time, and in spite of the fact that the three subjects trench on each other's borders, yet the reiteration is good, and the studies more complete and perfect.

What is urgently wanted is official encouragement (if not extra grants to their corps), by selection to command, promotion, and employment of those "Q"ualified when training in Brigade or Division, with facilities for study by means of free garrison or correspondence classes throughout the year.

Shortage of Officers.—There are corps and corps, some very few composed in all ranks of "gentlemen," others with just sufficient of the latter to fill up vacancies; but with the vast majority this eligibility does not now exist, and yet as a fighting machine the "non-class" corps is not second to the others. It is an axiom indisputable that men like to be commanded by their social superiors, and, like his brother of the Regulars, the Volunteer should be an "officer and gentleman."

It is useless to shut our eyes to the simple fact that too many officers of Volunteers are neither by birth nor education entitled to hold commissions. In so important a consideration it is well not to mince matters, and an illustration or two will point the tale. Not long ago a friend told me that he had witnessed the following scene at a levee—an old General stared with surprise as a Volunteer officer came up to claim acquaintance and shake hands, still he conceded the courtesy, and afterwards turning round to a friend was overheard to say, "Know who that chap is? When at home he mends my closets!" Another officer of a well-known corps lately told me, in discussing this subject, that he did not think it proper that he should be able to go into the shop of one of his brother officers and buy a shilling packet of haberdashery of him over the counter! Some years ago the Editor of one of the 'Peerages' told me that he had intended publishing therein a list of holders of the "Volunteer Officer's Decoration," but gave up the project on finding that one holder was a "pig-sticker," *i.e.* butcher, and that many others were *small* tradesmen.

Doubtless it is this depreciation of rank which has called off hundreds of eligible gentlemen from accepting commissions in the Volunteers, and I have known many excellent N.C.O's spoilt by taking those commissions.*

With regard to the "V.D." it is now recognised that a great opportunity of enhancing its value, and of encouraging proficiency

* The fault, of course, lies with the country "gentleman" and man of means, the natural leader and instructor, who will not give up from his leisure and amusements a portion of his time to the service of his sovereign and country: one cannot but pity the C.O., who, finding his companies perishing for lack of officers, at last gives way and offers, as a *pis aller*, commissions to the local tradesmen and others whom the men cannot from association look up to, and who are not born leaders by prescription and right. This is also to be deprecated in view of the concession, not long granted, which gives to officers of Volunteers the right of presentation at Court.

without cost, was thrown away when the Decoration was bestowed for simply twenty years' service without any professional qualification whatever: certainly the "Q" should have been a *sine quâ non*, this would have given a stimulus to study, and still something might be done by shortening the term for holders of the "Q" over the next, say, five years.

At present Militia and Volunteer officers gain nothing by "sweating up exams.;" no matter what time, labour, and expense are involved, the corps gets 30*s.* a head for those passed in "Tactics,"—scanty recognition for burning the midnight oil in military study, after long hours of civilian business. One thing is that all Volunteer officers should constantly be under the Army Act to enhance their status and discipline, it would also give the public a higher idea of their rank and position, and thus induce recruit officers.

I have already stated that in the higher interests of the Empire all encouragement should be used to induce every able-bodied man possible to join one of the services; but still more, on every boy, for whose education the community pays a groat, the public should have a claim: from ten years and upwards he should be regularly drilled and disciplined, and when fourteen he should be taught to shoot with a light rifle up to 100 yards; there need be no fear but the boys would take to this preparatory military work like ducks to water, and at seventeen they would naturally drift into one of the services, well grounded and physically fit. The Public Schools should follow suit and train officers.

Now the differences between the several military forces of the Crown are roughly these:—

1. The Regular is a young fellow without so far a trade or calling, and who fancies a few years' soldiering. He costs the country £94 per annum.

2. The Militia man has an intermittent calling, or none at all, or his trade can spare him for 28 days' training, or more, without personal loss or hardship; costs £21 per annum.

3. The Volunteer is an expert at his trade or calling, is in constant work, and cannot leave it at beck and call of the War Office to train at times, even for a week consecutively, without risking his billet; but he can, and will, put in drills, etc., during his leisure hours. Costs the country under £7 a head! Thus, it is the closely tied, busy, intelligent brain-worker who is a Volunteer, whether he be a Peer with large personal interests to conserve, or a printer's devil in constant employ. If, therefore, King and Country don't want this sort, or consider the best service we freely give worthless and futile, in God's name let us be disbanded

without further anxiety and waste of our energies, time, and money.

But, on the other hand, if the Volunteers are still to give of their best, it must be readily granted that "those who call the tune must pay the Piper," and when fresh conditions are thought necessary, after *full* consideration of our civil exigencies, then the concomitant facilities, ranges, ammunition, manœuvre grounds and cost of getting thereto must be found for us and not at our own or our friends' expense; we must also be thoroughly organised by the Powers that be.

Granting then that the Volunteer Force is not to be disestablished, and that compulsion or conscription are impossible, simply because under our system of Party Government, and the low franchise, were such a thing proposed by the "Ins" of either Party the "Outs" would assuredly stump the country and oust them, I would most strongly urge that the Volunteers be *nominally* classified from the Orderly-room Rolls as follows (but not badged in any way, that would be invidious and unnecessary as are "service sections")—say into three classes, the totals in each of which could be telegraphed on emergency at a few minutes notice on demand of the War Office.

1st Class.—Those who attend camp every year, marksmen and first-class shots, doing twenty-five or more drills besides annual camp. These would go straight to the front on mobilisation and cost about £8 a head per annum.

2nd Class (or 1st Reserve to above).—Intermittent attendants at camp, marksmen and first-class shots, twenty-five drills and over. These would go to the depôt on mobilisation to be drafted on as fit, and cost on average £5, or £6 per annum.

3rd Class (or 2nd Reserve).—Men who can seldom or ever attend camp, but do everything else in drills and musketry; would go to the depôt on mobilisation for hard training until fit for the front. Cost as an irreducible minimum 35*s.* per annum.

Officers and men on final retirement would form an excellent 3rd Reserve.

Such a system would be eminently elastic, every citizen being encouraged to do his best, and, above all, the employer would not be frightened or antagonistic, knowing that in busy times his men would not be dragged away to attend camp to his detriment, but would only drop into a lower "class," to recover their pride of place as times became normal.

As regards these Classes, circumstances alter cases, scattered country corps, whose men have always been individually forced to attend camp to get any combined instruction at all, ought to

produce 80 per cent. 1st, 15 per cent. 2nd, and 5 per cent. 3rd class; while corps in great cities, where the exigencies of civil life are more accentuated, should turn out 60 per cent. 1st, 25 per cent. 2nd, and 15 per cent. 3rd class.

Having thus got the battalions of officers, N.C.O.'s, and men, still more remains to be done (which has never yet been seriously attempted) before we are ready for the real thing—war—viz. Staff and complete organisation into Divisions and Brigades must not only be drafted but carried out, and the appointments gazetted, so that it may be known in time who our "Superiors" may be, and they may know us. At present everything is chaotic, many battalions have two Brigadiers, one for home administration, and the other for camp training, neither of whom would command on actual service, and they have no fixed staffs, and we seldom or ever see them except at inspection or in camp; they have other duties than watching and helping at the ordinary trainings of the several corps. If Divisional Generals and Brigadiers are only to be pitchforked into their places on mobilisation, then God help us, it would handicap the best troops in the world.

Every other year Divisional should be substituted for Brigade camps and of all arms, these camps should be flying instead of fixed ones; there is nothing occult about the duties of a standing camp, and every intelligent Volunteer learns them in a couple of days, the only benefits being continuous drill and discipline, but a moving camp against a quasi enemy is in the highest degree instructive, and keeps all ranks on the *qui vive.*

Transport and Mobilisation Equipment.—This provision has always been a crux; in the cases of country and town corps officered in part by members of agricultural or trading firms there is no difficulty in securing engagement of horses and waggons free; but the majority not so lucky are being constantly worried by orders to do likewise, being even told that "verbal contracts" will suffice!

The only way to ensure a universal and complete system will be to form an Auxiliary Transport Department to make *all* contracts and engagements, and finally on mobilisation to detail to each corps its proper proportion of transport, horses, equipment, etc. Then all will be served alike, and not one lucky corps here and there alone rendered efficient and mobile.

Finance.—The whole burden of financial risk and responsibility now rests on the C.O. of a Volunteer corps, he is generally a closely tied man of business—and it is this incubus which prevents some of our best officers from accepting promotion. The C.O. should be relieved in great part of this worry, all enlistment

engagements should be made actually (not nominally) on behalf of the Crown, and fines for nonfulfilment be recoverable by its powers; all clothing and equipment should be issued through the Government Stores, thus ensuring similarity of pattern and quality, the cost to be charged against the grants allocated for support of the Corps. The local situation of corps must also be taken into consideration as regards "allowances," for while the country battalion or detached company has free training and exercise ground at its very doors, the intermural corps have to engage special trains ahead at heavy expense to get into the open, and also take the risk of weather influencing a poor muster.

The Volunteers have been of the greatest possible service to the country, not only by popularising the soldier's trade, but also by personal service to the extent of nearly 10 per cent. in the late war. I am therefore astounded at the countenance and encouragement given by the highest military authorities to civilian Rifle Clubs, which, owing to that very encouragement, have robbed us heavily of recruits. If, as the Royal Commission appears to have decided, the Volunteers are lacking in serviceability on account of imperfect organisation, equipment, discipline and cohesion, then the civilian clubman, with his *entire* lack of all these first principles, would be absolutely worse than useless in case of invasion. On the other hand, military Rifle Associations and Battalion Rifle Clubs, or those composed of all the Services, should be encouraged to the utmost possible extent.

A word more as to the divisional commands in a completed system of organisation for all Auxiliary Forces; these must be in the hands of men having already a practical knowledge of and sympathy with those Services, men up to the times and keen for the work; one may venture indeed to instance, Lieut.-General Moncrieff, Major-Generals Sterling, Sir Henry Trotter, Sir Alfred E. Turner, Lord Falmouth, and many others, or those just retired from regimental districts like Colonel E. Fitzherbert. Very few officers of Volunteers are fully qualified for brigade commands, but with the greatest advantage these might be given to colonels just retired from Regular regiments on completion of their terms of command, thus keeping them in touch with the Service.

The good old story of the strong man keeping his goods in peace, and the threadbare adage "si vis pacem, para bellum" were never truer than now; but it is neither just nor politic to charge the Auxiliary Forces with shortcomings for which they are in no sense responsible, and for lack of organisation which they can and ought neither to institute nor carry into effect themselves.

Owing to orders in Council and revising Army orders there has

been for the last three years a feeling of unrest and doubt abroad, which, accentuated by a strong sense of lack of official, if not popular, recognition for services so freely rendered to the State, has resulted in the rapid depletion especially of the Volunteer Force; a state of tension the Report of the Royal Commission has done nothing to relieve, but rather the opposite; in fact, commanding officers are looking forward with dismay to a further heavy outgoing after the 31st October next. Something, therefore, must be done and done speedily to remedy this dangerous state of things.

Given, however, such an elastic reorganisation as I have ventured to sketch, and we may feel assured that, behind the fleet and the Regular Army, we can (without recourse to unnecessary, and in our country's case ruinous, resort to Compulsion or Conscription), have an homogeneous body of Auxiliaries who, when the need comes, will give up everything and risk everything in defence of our hearths and homes.

HOWLAND ROBERTS.

P.S.—Since writing the above, the expected pronouncement on the Army, as a whole, has been made in the House of Commons, and that portion of it affecting the Regulars and Militia will doubtless receive due criticism at the hands of professional soldiers. It appears, however, that the Militia, with its time-honoured *rôle* of Home Defence and the garrisoning of certain Mediterranean stations, in case of need, will cease to exist, except as depôt battalions to the Line ("Depôt lurchers," Tommy styles them); thus wiping out an identity of which, from time immemorial, this our oldest Force has been so justly proud.

As to the Volunteers, they are, it seems, to be divided into two battalion regiments, the one taking the place of, and so should be styled, "Militia," while the other remains on the same footing as before. This will be a fatal change, viz. to have a "1st Chop" and a "2nd Chop" class, marked and numbered as such, in the same body—or, as our old friend Lord Wemyss calls them, "Go-and-fights" and "Stay-at-homes;" both officers and men will be ashamed to join or remain in the despicable "2nd Chop," to be made laughing-stocks of and jeered at, while the slack ones will get yet more slack.

Moreover, Volunteers were never intended and did not enlist for foreign service, but to prepare for Home Defence up to the highest possible individual standard—at the least cost to themselves, but as a public duty—a standard from which they could rise to be "fighting-fit" in least possible time. Nevertheless, as in the Boer War, Volunteers who find that, *at the time of crisis*, they can get away, will come forward in plentiful numbers (if the Force, as a whole, is sufficiently strong) to go foreign, and a week or two's hard training will screw them up fit for anything. Meantime let us all work together unbadged, without friction or jealousy, and at any moment the C.O. and Adjutant will be able, from personal knowledge (not a mere matter of drill totals or even "camping") to tick off those who are ready for the front, and it will be the vast majority.

With these views, and as one of the senior C.O.'s of Volunteers, I consider it would be a national catastrophe to cut down the Volunteers, who have, as a body, done so much already for Sovereign and Country.—H.R.

SOME ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE ARMY.

BY "RED COAT."

SOME conditions of life in the Army are susceptible of improvement, some are unavoidable consequences of that way of life. Most civilians have little knowledge of what the advantages and the disadvantages of the Army really are, though none the less bold to criticise and condemn. Let us discuss some of these from the point of view of the man who wears the belt.

The first advantage is the consciousness of serving the country. I am afraid this feeling—patriotism—is not so much an everyday root of action as one could wish, but, from the General to the Drummer in a Volunteer Corps, it is there; and, in time of stress, its fruits are seen, and seen to be good. In time of peace other callings may be more attractive and almost all are certainly better paid—in money. Few people realise that the pay of a lieutenant-colonel, commanding an Infantry battalion, is only £328 10*s.* a year; this, after probably twenty-five to thirty years' service, at home and abroad. Even this is subject to income tax, and to deductions, obligatory or voluntary, for the good of the Service and of the Regiment. But these other ways of life miss the *camaraderie* that follows the sharing of good or bad luck with one's regiment, one's home all over the world. For the officer there is a certainty of a measure of social consideration; often a hereditary pride in the profession of arms; a life of travel; a life of adventure, it may be. On the other hand, for the vast majority, it will be a life with much monotonous but necessary drudgery. The absence of responsibility will deaden the professional pleasures of life; the frequent failure to see any result of labour will deaden ambition to achieve.

Advancement by seniority has advantages, but where it is the rule, there the one great incentive, promotion by merit, is absent. In no other calling in the world is seniority the great recommendation, yet in no other calling than that of arms is it so necessary that the best man in vigour of mind and body should be at the top. Just consider what seniority promotion means—that however good

a man may be at his work, however much of a "professional" soldier, he must bide his time for advancement and, technically, may not even remonstrate with a foolish fellow one day senior to him in the Army. I am all for instant and cheerful obedience of orders—which is discipline—but more often than is for the good of the Service the seniority system gives power into the hands of the wrong man. An alteration in our system means promotion through the Army; a bogy that alarms many people. It is said it would destroy *esprit de corps*. I do not believe it would, to any harmful extent—as things are. Even now, when extra-regimental promotion is offered, it is not often refused by a keen officer. *Esprit de corps*, in our sense, was nourished to a great extent on peculiarities of dress which again were often reminiscent of distinguished conduct. Now the dress of all ranks and regiments has been so levelled down to one unpleasing, almost universal, pattern, and the individual history of regiments has been cooked up into so indistinguishable a *mélange*, that *esprit de corps* has lost its pungent savour. The history of the Peninsular, Crimean, and other wars before 1881, is as confusing, in the matter of the regiments engaged, to a young soldier of to-day as the honours borne on the colours of existing regiments of Infantry are misleading to all men. Observe that to this day the Army list shows the old numbers after the present names of each battalion, as a necessary explanation; yet numbers were abolished in '81. Only by promotion by merit can full efficiency be achieved, and promotion by merit must run extra-regimentally. It must be remembered that rank carries pay, and that command means further opportunity of distinction. It is the keen men, the men who should be encouraged, who would go to other corps rather than miss chances. That extra-regimental promotion would be gladly taken advantage of is seen by the eagerness there is to get Scallywag billets whenever there is a small war on. What sort of encouragement would it be to a young barrister to say to him, Because So-and-so was called before you therefore his briefs will always be marked higher than yours, and therefore also, until he has taken silk, you cannot. If you want the best men, seniority is an illogical absurdity. As a safeguard against nepotism, it is a very feeble barrier, more honoured in the breach than in the observance. If promotion by merit is made the principle, and is carried out with a view to the good of the public service only, then, in a few years, all regiments will be commanded by good men who, for their own reputations' sake, will try to push on the promising juniors and keep back the lazy and the fools. I know a scheme of Army promotion will be derided and thwarted by the majority of officers, but then the majority of officers are not

keen, and would rather keep the certainty of promotion by seniority than strive for advancement in time of peace. They are not to be condemned without considering that, so far, good regimental work is not rewarded in any way. Given a good man and a waster, in the same regiment and no special opportunities to be seized, the senior will remain the senior from the first to the last day of their service. *Esprit de corps*, in its common and limited sense, is a good thing, but having done away with as much as possible of it, with open eyes, let the remainder be replaced by a larger spirit of pride of profession. I never heard that the Artillery are lacking in *esprit de corps*, yet they are transferred from battery to battery on promotion; nor that the Navy allow love for the Service at large to languish because each commission takes them to a new ship, and seniority is, with them, tempered by selection. Still I would limit extra-regimental promotion in this degree—Dragoons to Dragoons, Hussars to Hussars, Lancers to Lancers, Highlanders to Highlanders, Fusiliers to Fusiliers, Light Infantry to Light Infantry, Rifles to Rifles.

Opportunities of adventure, of travel, of seeing men and cities, are great advantages. There are consequential disadvantages too. As a man gets older, he tires, or many do, of having no settled home; there is separation from family and friends; there are the expenses of taking leave from far off countries, of double establishments as children grow up, who must be educated at home.

The pay is low, very low, but it has the advantage of certainty and of a pension. The terms of Service are hard on a man who, unlucky in promotion, must retire at an age when he is still able to be of service to the country as a soldier but is too old to start again in any other way of life. I know that this must be, to keep up the flow of promotion; nor do I, a poor man, desire to see the pay of officers much increased. A large increase of pay would alter the class of officer rather than improve it, I think,—

> "For gold the merchant ploughs the main,
> The farmer ploughs the manor,
> But glory is the soldier's pride,
> The soldier's wealth is honour."

Too great readiness is shown to blame the commander in the field if disaster follows, as might be expected, on the system of starving the Service in men and material; too little investigation of the conditions before it is decided that failure must be the result of culpable negligence on the spot. Sometimes it is so, but not always, not even often. The British public wants an uninterrupted course of victories, it wants them quickly, and it wants them without paying a high price in blood or money. It will not get them so—

the thing cannot be done. Also the British public is willing enough to pay for successful performance, but grudges the necessary antecedent expense. Money spent in due time and in due manner saves itself over and over again when a sudden call is made for the soldier. The mere fact that money is in the pocket, is not the element of victory; the money must be laid out in time, otherwise wealth is only a snare and an inducement to the spoiler.

Leave is liberal in the Army, and that it is so is advantageous to the Army and to the State. It is well that men should go home to rebuild constitutions shaken by climates unnatural to them; it is well that they should get out of narrow Colonial views.

As to style of living, it is well that it should be, as it is, high in comparison with the pay; and this is possible only by the system of messes. Few men starting life in other professions can afford to live as we do, thanks to our messes. Plate, glass, table-linen and the service of food generally are infinitely better than individual members could afford on their pay. It is desirable that the bearers of the King's Commission should live in a liberal style; the country reaps a benefit from this, especially in the East, where externals count for so much.

The new scheme for furnishing quarters is not to be reckoned as an advantage; the rent charged is exorbitant, and as the scheme is only applied to Home Service, it necessitates a foreign service set of furniture also; thus doubling expenses in the long run. The furniture supplied is not sufficient, and is not good; it must be supplemented by privately purchased curtains, carpets, etc., and the allowance for transport of furniture is cut down.

By all means reduce officers' expenses by making it unnecessary for them to subscribe to mess and band funds. There is an allowance of £80 a year to the band, and a good deal of prominence is given to this allowance when debates take place on the domestic economy of regiments; but attention is not equally drawn to the fact that £70 a year of it must be paid to the bandmaster. Does any one suppose that £10 a year would keep up the band if officers did not pay towards it—even if it were only the regulation band of one sergeant and nineteen men—still less, bands as they are? It is not only, nor in the highest degree, the officers who profit by the band. The dignity of the country, the pleasure of the public are served by the regimental bands as much as the actual military ends for which they are kept up. What sort of stations might a regiment expect if it had only its State aided band? Every one would say, and rightly, that regiment is fit only to serve in an out-of-the-way quarter. For the mess the same, if the officers did not subscribe to make and keep it decent, what

sort of a report would a General officer make after his inspection dinner? The result would be, as in the case of the regulation band—black holes be their dole. The British officer is aggravated by step-motherly interference with his private expenses; though we all know that such orders are meant only to please the British public, and the regiment that ventured to obey them, in the spirit, would find itself in a succession of stations where it would have plenty of time to chew the cud of sweet and bitter fancy. After all, officers are not children, but grown men, and if they have not sense enough to manage their own affairs, or to do without what they cannot afford, they are not likely to be good leaders of men —the end for which they are commissioned. It is useless to talk about individuality, if officers are to have their private affairs regulated "by order." No one interferes with the manner of the private's spending of his pay: sauce for goose, sauce for gander. If neither his character nor his love of the noblest profession in the world will lead the officer to forego what he cannot afford, let him go to some more renumerative occupation. The poor strong man can live in the Army, and the poor weak man is not much wanted—nor the rich weak man either. Nevertheless wealth is a great help in the Army, or out of it. The man of liberal means can make himself a name in peace time, and can seize opportunities of medal hunting denied to his poorer companions in arms. Even going on Service often means spending money as well as risks to life and health.

Again, let the Government treat the officer fairly; let a contract be acknowledged. An officer joins under a certain warrant; let its terms bind him, as they do, and also the Government, as they do not, till he elects to come under new conditions. At present the contract is all on one side. It may be, sometimes is, varied by the Secretary of State without consulting the officer and without appeal; nor can the officer pursue the Government in a Court of Law. The officer is, again, worse off than the private soldier, whose conditions of Service cannot be varied without his consent.

Continual examinations and continual new standards of examination we do not object to. They may be necessary, as the only possible tests of efficiency in peace time; but no one could read an average examination paper without seeing that many of the questions are purely academic. And as to the results of examinations; if any one ever got any advantage from passing "distinguished" in any subject, I never heard of it.

Regimental officers are very rarely consulted in anything; if their advice is asked, it is even more rarely followed. The Staff are *rather* apt to forget that it is very easy to lose touch of regimental life.

The worst enemy of the Army is the newspaper correspondent. Many of them have no acquaintance with matters military, in detail. The best of them, like any other men of sense, can recognise bad strategy when they see it; but failure comes in their propensity for reprobatory criticism, while in the nature of things they cannot know all the conditions of the case (no one but the officer in command can); and in their intention to write what is striking and picturesque—which is what they are paid to do. Unfortunately the British public mostly believes what appears in its favourite paper, without taking the time or the trouble to think.

Now with special regard to the men, they have, in other degree, much the same advantages as fall to the officer. The feeling of duty to the country is, in their case, almost invariably one that comes into being after some years of Service. They have the advantages of regularity of food, clothing, and lodging, and on a better scale than, in most instances, they have been accustomed to before; the chances of adventure, travel, and a healthy open-air life; the chances of employment that will benefit them later on, and that, presently, increase their pay. The State acknowledges their rights, and the Houses of Parliament are more careful in watching the due observance of the terms of their contract than in the case of officers. Still, not without grounds, I grieve to say, the soldier is suspicious that he does not always get all his rights; nor will this be otherwise till there is an end to issuing of regulations and orders that seem couched in plain English, but that can be, and are, wrenched to meanings they do not bear on the face of them.

The soldier would be more contented, and the Army would profit, if the conditions of discharge and of variations of terms of Service were made more easy. If a man finds he has mistaken his profession in joining the Army, the sooner he leaves it the better for him and for the State. Many a man is disgusted to find out, after enlistment, that though he enlisted for three years or seven years with the Colours, still he can be, and if abroad is, held to serve four or eight years. It is legal, but it is not expedient. Terms of enlistment cannot be too explicit nor too scrupulously adhered to. The discharge of bad characters, who are a blot on our most honourable profession and, moreover, a useless expense to the State, should be the rule, not the exception. I do not mean the men who are guilty of purely military crimes, but those who have committed disgraceful crimes, such as theft, or are physically and morally debased by inveterate drunkenness. Why should the country be satisfied with the services of its worst sons when it should have, as it needs, the willing service of its best? Remember the wise words of Bacon—

"Above all for Empire and greatness it importeth that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study and occupation. . . . Walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, good races of horses, chariots of war, elephants and ordnance—all this is but sheep in a lion's skin, unless the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike."

Let the Regular Army be more of a profession for life. Let the Army have the best years of a man's life, and let good service give the man a right to subsequent employment by the State, or in municipal service, as long as he is fit to work—then a sufficient pension. One thing is sure, there is neither time nor opportunity to teach a man any other trade than fighting, and that not completely, in three years' service; a soldier cannot serve two masters. There is a great incongruity in the matter of men who are employed in billets other than in the necessary service of the regiment. Such a man draws his extra pay, but leaves his duty to be done by another man who does the extra soldier-work without extra pay. Surely any man who is employed outside the regiment, and paid for it, should be obliged to give up part of his extra duty pay to the man who does his guards for him.

The Regular Army, the Army for foreign service, must still be a voluntary Army, but every able-bodied man who enjoys the privileges of citizenship should also do his share of the duty of serving the country in arms, on sea or on shore, in his degree. It is not only his duty, but it would, it will, improve the nation in character and in body. We are still begging the question. The raising of Yeomanry and Volunteers is a good thing for the men themselves, but a bad thing for the State, in that it tends to delay universal Service. It is a paltering with the plain duty of every man without exception, if morally and physically fit, to be ready to serve his country in person as well as in purse. Until this is recognised and acted on there is no salvation for the British Empire in Protection, in Free Trade, nor in any other way.



MAP V.

THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT.

A Few Experiences in Field Defence for Detached Posts which may prove useful in our Next War.

By "Backsight Forethought."

Fourth Dream.

"O wad some power the giftie gie us,
To see oursels as others see us!"
Burns.

(See Map 5.)

Again did I find myself facing the same problem, this time with *ten* lessons to guide me. I started off by sending out patrols as described in my last dream, but their orders were slightly different. All human beings were to be brought into our post, and any animals which could be of use to the enemy were to be shot, as we had no place for them.

For my defensive post I chose the position already described in my last dream, which seemed very suitable, for the reasons already given. We consequently dug a trench similar in plan to that already described, but, as I feared the possibility of guns being used against us, it was of a very different section. In plan it faced north generally, and was slightly broken forward to the front, each half being quite straight. In section it was about three feet six inches deep, with a parapet about twelve inches high in front of it; we made the trench as narrow as possible at the top compatible with free movement. Each man hollowed out the under part of the trench to suit himself, and made his own portion of the parapet to suit his height. The parapet was about two feet six inches thick at the top and quite steep inside, being built up of pieces of broken ant-heap, which were nearly as hard as stone.

The patrols returned shortly with their bag of a few men, women, and children. The women indulged in much useless abuse, and refused to obey orders, taking the matter less philosophically than their mankind. Here was evidently an opportunity of making use of the short training I had once had as A.D.C.

I tried it. I treated the ladies with tons of "tact" in my suavest manner, and repeated the only Dutch words of comfort I knew—"Al zal recht kom"—but to no purpose. They had not been brought up to appreciate tact; in fact, they were not taking any. I turned regretfully round to the colour-sergeant, winked solemnly and officially, and seeing an answering but respectful quiver in his left eyelid, said—

"Colour-sergeant."

"Sir?"

"Which do you think is the best way of setting alight to a farm?"

"Well, sir, some prefer the large bedstead and straw, but I think the 'armonium and a little kerosine in one corner is as neat as anything."

There was no need for more—the ladies quite understood this sort of tact; the trouble was over.

The Dutchmen and Kaffirs were at once started digging shelters for themselves and the women and children. The latter were placed together, and were put into a small ravine not far from the trench, as it was necessary to place them in a really deep trench, firstly to keep them safe, and secondly to prevent their waving or signalling to the enemy. The existence of this ravine, therefore, saved much digging, as it only required some hollowing out at the bottom and a little excavation to suit admirably.

All dug with a will, and by night the shelters for the women and children and men prisoners, and the firing trench, were nearly done. All arrangements for the guards and sentries were the same as those described in the last dream, and after seeing everything was all correct and the ladies provided with tents to crawl under (they had their own blankets), I went to sleep with a feeling of well-earned security.

At daybreak next morning, as there were no signs of any enemy, we continued to improve our trench, altering the depth and alignment where necessary, each man suiting the size of the trench to his own legs. In the end the trench really looked quite neat, with the fresh red earth contrasting with the yellow of the veldt. As one of my reservists remarked, it only wanted an edging of oyster shells or gingerbeer bottles to be like his little "broccoli patch" at home. Upon these important details and breakfast a good two hours had been spent, when a force was reported to the north in the same position as described in the previous dream. It advanced in the same manner, except, of course, the advanced men were met by no one at the farm. When I saw this, I could not help patting myself on the back and

smiling at the Dutch ladies in the pit, who only scowled at me in return, and (whisper) spat!

The advanced party of the enemy came on, scouting carefully and stalking the farm as they came. As they appeared quite unwarned, I was wondering if I should be able to surprise them, all innocent of our presence, with a close-range volley, and then magazine fire into their midst, when suddenly one man stopped and the others gathered round him. This was when they were some 1800 yards away, about on a level with the end of Incidentamba. They had evidently seen something and sniffed danger, for there was a short palaver and much pointing. A messenger then galloped back to the main body, which turned off behind Incidentamba with its waggons, etc. A small number, including a man on a white horse, rode off in a vague way to the west. The object of this move I could not quite see. They appeared to have a vehicle with them of some sort. The advanced party split up as already described. As all were still at long range, we could only wait.

Very shortly "boom" went a gun from the top of Incidentamba, and a shrapnel shell burst not far from us. A second and third followed, after which they soon picked up our range exactly, and the shell began to burst all about us; however, we were quite snug and happy in our nice deep trench, where we contentedly crouched. The waste of good and valuable shrapnel shell by the enemy was the cause of much amusement to the men, who were in great spirits, and, as one of them remarked, were "as cosy as cockroaches in a crack." At the expenditure of many shell two men only were hit—in the legs.

After a time the guns ceased fire, and we at once manned the parapet and stood up to repel an attack, but we could see no Boers, though the air began at once to whistle and hum with bullets. Nearly all these seemed to come from the river-bank in front, to the north and north-east, and kept the parapet one continual spirt of dust as they smacked into it. All we could do was to fire by sound at various likely bushes on the river-bank, and this we did with the greatest possible diligence, but no visible result.

In about a quarter of an hour we had had five men shot through the head, the most exposed part. The mere raising of a head to fire seemed to be absolutely fatal, as it had on a former occasion when we were attempting to fire at close range over a parapet against the enemy concealed. I saw two poor fellows trying to build up a pitiful little kind of house of cards with stones and pieces of anthill through which to fire. This was as

conspicuous as a chimney-pot on top of the parapet, and was at once shot to powder before they had even used it, but not before it had suggested to me the remedy for this state of affairs. Of course, we wanted in such a case "head cover" and "loopholes." As usual, I was wise after the event, for we had no chance of making them then, even had we not been otherwise harassed. Suddenly the noise of firing became much more intense, but with the smack of the bullets striking the earth all round quite close it was not easy to tell from which direction this fresh firing came. At the same time the men seemed to be dropping much oftener, and I was impressing them with the necessity of keeping up a brisker fire to the front, when I noticed a bullet hit *our* side of the parapet.

It then became clear, the enemy must evidently have got into the donga behind us (to which I had paid no attention, as it was to the rear), and were shooting us in the back as we stood up to our parapet.

This, I thought, must be what is called being "taken in *reverse*," and it was.

By the time I had gathered what was happening, about a dozen more men had been bowled over. I then ordered the whole lot to take cover in the trench, and only pop up to take a shot to the front or rear. But no more could be done by us towards the rear than to the front. The conditions were the same—no Boers to be seen. At this moment two of the guard from Waschout Hill started to run in to our trench, and a terrific fusillade was opened on to them, the bullets kicking up the dust all round them as they ran. One poor fellow was dropped, but the other managed to reach our trench and fall into it. He too was badly hit, but just had the strength to gasp out that except himself and the man who started with him, all the guard on Waschout Hill had been killed or wounded, and that the Boers were gradually working their way up to the top. This was indeed cheering.

So hot was the fire now that no one could raise his head above ground without being shot, and by crouching down altogether and not attempting to aim, but merely firing our rifles over the edge of the trench, we remained for a short time without casualties. This respite, however, was short, for the men in the right half of the trench began to drop unaccountably whilst they were sitting well under cover, and not exposing themselves at all. I gradually discovered the cause of this. Some snipers must have reached the top of Waschout Hill, and were shooting straight down our right half trench. As the bullets snicked in thicker and thicker, it was plain the number of snipers was being increased.

This, I thought, must be being "*enfiladed* from a flank." It was so.

Without any order, we had all instinctively vacated the right half of our trench and crowded into the left half, which by great good luck could not be enfiladed from any point on the south side of the river, nor indeed by rifle-fire from anywhere, as, owing to the ground, its prolongation on the right was up above ground into the open air, and to the left did not touch ground for some 3000 yards away on the veldt on the north bank.

Though we were huddled together quite helpless like rats in a trap, still it was in a small degree comforting to think that, short of charging, the enemy could do nothing. For that we fixed bayonets and grimly waited. If they did make an assault, we had bayonets, and they had not, and we could sell our lives very dearly in a rough-and-tumble.

Alas! I was again deceived. There was to be no chance of close quarters and cold steel, for suddenly we heard, far away out on the veldt to the north, a sound as of some one beating a tin tray, and a covey of little shells whistled into the ground close by the trench; two of these burst on touching the ground. Right out of rifle-range, away on the open veldt on the north, I saw a party of Boers, with a white horse and a vehicle. Then I knew. But how had they managed to hit off so well the right spot to go to to enfilade our trench before they even knew where we were?

Pompom pompompom again, and the little steel devils ploughed their way into the middle of us in our shell-trap, mangling seven men. I at once diagnosed the position with great professional acumen—we were now *enfiladed* from *both* flanks, but the knowledge was acquired too late to help us, for—

> "We lay bare as the paunch of a purser's sow,
> To the hail of the Nordenfeldt."

This was the last straw; there was nothing left but surrender or entire annihilation at long range. I surrendered.

Boers, as usual, sprang up from all round. We had fought for three hours, and had twenty-five killed and seventeen wounded. Of these, seven only had been hit by the shrapnel and rifle-fire from the *front*. All the rest had been killed or hit from the *flanks*, where there should be few enemies, or the *rear*, where there should be none! This fact convinced me that my preconceived notions as to the *front*, and its danger relative to the other points of the compass, needed considerable modification. All my cherished ideas were being ruthlessly swept away, and I was plunged into a sea of doubt, groping for *something* certain or fixed

to lay hold of. Could Longfellow, when he wrote that immortal line, "Things are not what they seem," ever have been in my position?

The survivors were naturally a little disheartened at their total discomfiture, when all had started so well with them in their "crack." This expressed itself in different ways. As one man said to a corporal, who was plugging a hole in his ear with a bit of rag—

"Somethink sickening, I call it, this enfilading racket; you never know which way it will take yer. I'm fairly fed up." To which the gloomy reply, "Enfiladed? Of course we've been enfiladed. This 'ere trench should have been wiggled about a bit, and then there would not have been quite so much of it. Yes, wiggled about—that's what it should have been." To which chipped in a third, "Yes, and somethink to keep the blighters from shooting us in the back wouldn't 'ave done us much 'arm, anyway."

There were evidently more things in *earth* than I had hitherto dreamt of in my philosophy!

* * * * * *

As we trekked away to the north many little points such as the above sank into my soul, but I could not for some time solve the mystery of why we had not succeeded in surprising the enemy. There were no men, women, children, or Kaffirs who knew of our arrival, who could have warned them. How did they spot our presence so soon, as they evidently must have done when they stopped and consulted in the morning? It was not until passing Incidentamba, as I casually happened to look round and survey the scene of the fight from the enemy's point of view, that I discovered the simple answer to the riddle. There on the smooth yellow slope of the veldt just south of the drift was a brownish-red streak, as plain as the Long Man of Wilmington on the dear old Sussex downs, which positively shrieked aloud, "Hi! hi! hi!—this way for the British defence." I then grimly smiled to think of myself sitting like a "slick Alick" in that poster of a trench and expecting to surprise anybody!

Besides having been enfiladed and also taken in reverse, we had again found ourselves at a disadvantage as compared with the concealed enemy shooting at close range, from having to show up at a fixed place in order to fire.

Eventually I collected the following lessons:—

11. For a small isolated post and an active enemy, there are no *flanks*, no *rear*, or, to put it otherwise, it is *front all round*.

12. Beware of being taken in *reverse*; take care, when placing

and making your defences, that when you are engaged in shooting the enemy to the front of your trench, his pal cannot sneak up and shoot you in the back.

13. Beware of being *enfiladed.* It is nasty from one flank—far worse from both flanks.

Remember, also, that though you may arrange matters so that you cannot be enfiladed by rifle-fire, yet you may be open to it from long range, by means of gun or pompom fire. There are few straight trenches that cannot be enfiladed from somewhere, if the enemy can only get there. You can sometimes prevent being enfiladed by so placing your trench that no one can get into prolongation of it to fire down it, or you can "wiggle" it about in many ways, so that it is not straight, or make "traverses" across it, or dig separate trenches for every two or three men.

14. Do not have your trench near rising ground over which you cannot see, and which you cannot hold.

15. Do not huddle all your men together in a small trench like sheep in a pen. Give them air.

16. As once before—cover from sight is often worth more than cover from bullets.

For close shooting from a non-concealed trench, *head cover* with *loopholes* is an advantage. This should be bullet-proof and not be conspicuously on the top of the parapet, so as to draw fire, or it will be far more dangerous than having none.

17. To surprise the enemy is a great advantage.

18. If you wish to obtain this advantage, *conceal* your position. Though for promotion it may be sound to advertise your position, for defence it is not.

19. To test the concealment or otherwise of your position, look at it from the enemy's point of view.

FIFTH DREAM.

"A trifling sum of misery
New added to the foot of thy account."

DRYDEN.

"Jack Frost looked forth one still clear night,
And he said, 'Now I shall be out of sight;
So over the valley and over the height
In silence I'll take my way.'"

GOULD.

(See Map 6.)

Again I faced the same task with a fresh mind and fresh hopes, all that remained with me of my former attempts being *nineteen* lessons.

Having detailed the two patrols and the guard on Waschout Hill as already described, I spent some twenty minutes—whilst the stores, etc., were being arranged—in walking about to choose a position to hold in the light of my nineteen lessons.

I came to the conclusion that it was not any good being near the top of a hill and yet not *at* the top. I would make my post on the top of Waschout Hill, where I could not be overlooked from any place within rifle-range, and where I should, I believed, have "command." I was not quite certain what "command" meant, but I knew it was important—it says so in the book; besides, in all the manœuvres I had attended and tactical schemes I had seen, the "defence" always held a position on top of a hill or ridge. My duty was plain: Waschout Hill seemed the only place which did not contravene any of the nineteen lessons I had learnt, and up it I walked. As I stood near one of the huts, I got an excellent view of the drift and its southern approach just over the bulge of the hill, and a clear view of the river further east and west. I thought at first I would demolish the few grass and matting huts which, with some empty kerosine tins and heaps of bones and *débris*, formed the Kaffir kraal; but on consideration I decided to play cunning, and that this same innocent-looking Kaffir kraal would materially assist me to hide my defences. I made out my plan of operations in detail, and we had soon conveyed all our stores up to the top of the hill, and started work.

Upon the return of the patrols with their prisoners, the Dutchmen and "boys" were told off to dig for themselves and their females. The Kaffirs of the kraal we had impressed to assist at once.

My arrangements were as follows: All round the huts on the hill-top, and close to them we dug some ten short lengths of deep firing-trench, curved in plan, and each long enough to hold five men. These trenches had extremely low parapets, really only serving as rifle-rests, some of the excavated earth being heaped up *behind* the trenches to the height of a foot or so, the remainder being dealt with as described later. In most cases the parapets were provided with grooves to fire through at ground-level, the parapet on each side being high enough to just protect the head. As with the background the men's heads were not really visible, it was unnecessary to provide proper loopholes, which would have necessitated also the use of new sandbags, which would be rather conspicuous and troublesome to conceal. When the men using these trenches were firing, their heads would be just above the level of the ground. These firing-trenches having been got well under way, the communication trenches



MAP VI.

Having deta
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d. These were to be narrow and deep, leading from one to the next, and also leading from each trench back of the huts, which were to be arranged as follows, to allow men to fire standing up without being seen. Round the inside of the walls of these huts part of the excavated earth, of which there was ample, would be built up with sandbags, pieces of ant-hill, stones, etc., to a height that a man can fire over, about four and a half feet, and to a thickness of some two and a half feet at the top, and loopholes, which would be quite invisible, cut through the hut sides above this parapet. There was room in each hut for three men to fire. In three of them I meant to place my best shots, to act as snipers, as they would have a more favourable position than the men in the trenches below, and the fourth was a conning tower for myself. All the tents and stores were stacked inside one of the huts out of sight.

That evening, in spite of the hardness of the work, which caused much grousing among my men, we had got the firing trenches complete, but the others were not finished—they were only half the necessary depth. The earth walls inside the huts were also not quite completed. The Kaffirs and Dutch had deep pits, as before, in three of the huts. Ammunition and rations were distributed round the trenches the last thing before we turned in. I also had all water-bottles and every vessel that would hold water, such as empty tins, Kaffir gourds, and cooking-pots, filled and distributed in case of a long and protracted fight. Having issued orders as to the necessity for the greatest secrecy in not giving away our position should Boers turn up early next morning, I went to sleep with confidence. We had, anyhow, a very good position, and though our communications were not quite perfect, these we could soon improve if we had any time to ourselves the next morning.

Next morning broke; no enemy in sight. This was excellent, and before daylight we were hard at it, finishing the work still undone. By this time the men had fully entered into the spirit of the thing, and were quite keen on surprising Brother Boer if possible. While the digging was proceeding, the "dixies" were being boiled for the breakfasts inside four grass screens, some of which we found lying about, so as to show nothing but some very natural smoke above the kraal. I picked out one or two of my smartest N.C.O.'s, and instructed them to walk down the hill in different directions to the river-bank and try if they could see the heads of the men in the firing-trenches against the sky. If so, the heaps of earth, tins, bones, grass screens, etc., should be re-arranged so as to give a background to every man's head.

To review the place generally, I and my orderly walked off some half-mile to the north of the river. As we were going some distance, we doffed our helmets and wrapped ourselves in two beautiful orange and magenta striped blankets, borrowed from our Kaffir lady guests, in case any stray Boer should be lurking around, as he might be interested to see two "khakis" wandering about on the veldt. It was awkward trying to walk with our rifles hidden under our blankets, and, moreover, every two minutes we had to look round to see if the sentry at the camp had signalled any enemy in sight. This was to be done by raising a pole on the highest hut. The result of our work was splendid. We saw a Kaffir kraal on a hill, and to us "it was nothing more." There were the heaps of *débris* usually round a kraal, looking most natural, but no heads were visible, and no trenches. There was only one fault, and that was that a few thoughtless men began, as we looked, to spread their brown army blankets out in the sun on top of the huts and on the veldt. To the veriest new chum these square blots, like squares of brown sticking-plaster all around the kraal, would have betokened something unusual. To remedy this before it was too late I hastened back.

After we had done our breakfasts, and some three hours after dawn, the sentry in one of the huts reported a force to the north. We could do nothing but wait and hope; everything was ready, and every man knew what to do. No head was to be raised nor a rifle fired until I whistled from my conning-tower; then every man would pop up and empty his magazine into any of the enemy in range. If we were shelled, the men in the huts could at once drop into the deep trenches and be safe. Standing in my "conning-tower," from the loopholes of which I could see the drift, I thought over the possibilities before us. With great luck perhaps the Boer scouts would pass us on either side, and so allow us to lie low for the main body. With a view to seeing exactly how far I would let the latter come before opening fire, and to marking the exact spot when it would be best to give the word, I got down into the firing-trenches facing the drift and the road south to see how matters appeared from the level of the rifles. To my intense horror, I found that from these trenches neither the drift nor the road on the near bank of the river, until it got a long way south of Waschout Hill, *could be seen!* The bulging convexity of the hill hid all this; it must be *dead ground!* It was. The very spot where I could best catch the enemy, where they *must* pass, was not under my fire! At most, the northern loopholes of the conning tower and one other hut alone could give fire on the drift. How I cursed my stupidity! However, it was no good. I could

not now start digging fresh trenches further down the hill; it would betray our whole position at once. I determined to make the best of it; and *if* we were not discovered by the scouts, to open fire on the main body when they were just on the other side of the river bunched up on the bank, waiting for those in front. Here we could fire on them; but it would be at a much longer range than I had intended. It was really a stroke of luck that I had discovered this serious fault, for otherwise we might have let the bulk of the enemy cross the drift without discovering the little fact of the dead ground till too late. I reflected, also (though it was not much consolation), that I had erred in good company, for how often had I not seen a "brass-hat" ride along on horseback, and from that height fix the exact position for trenches in which the rifles would be little above the ground. These trenches, however, had not been put to the test of actual use. My error was not going to escape in the same way.

Meanwhile the enemy's scouts had advanced in much the same way as detailed before, except that after coming past Incidentamba Farm they had not halted suspiciously, but came on in small groups or clumps. They crossed the river in several places and examined the bushy banks most carefully, but finding no "khakis" there, they evidently suspected none on the open veldt beyond them, for they advanced "any way" without care. Several of the clumps joined together, and came on chatting in one body of some thirty men. Would they examine the kraal, or would they pass on? My heart beat. The little hill we were on would, unluckily, be certain to prove an attraction for them, because it was an excellent vantage ground whence to scan the horizon to the south, and to signal back to the main body to the north. The kraal was also a suitable place to off-saddle for a few minutes while the main body came up to the drift, and it meant possibly a fire, and therefore a cup of coffee. They rode up towards it laughing, chatting, and smoking, quite unsuspecting. We uttered no sound. Our Dutch and Kaffir guests uttered no sound either, for in their pits was a man with a rifle alongside them. At last they halted a moment some 250 yards away on the north-east, where the slope of the hill was more gradual and showed them all up. A few dismounted, the rest started again straight towards us. It was not magnificent, but it was war. I whistled.

About ten of them succeeded in galloping off, also some loose horses; five or six of them on the ground threw up their hands and came into the post. On the ground there remained a mass of kicking horses and dead or groaning men. The other parties of scouts to east and west had at once galloped back to the river,

where they dismounted under cover and began to pepper us. Anyway, we had done *something*.

As soon as our immediate enemy were disposed of, we opened fire on the main body some 1500 yards away, who had at once halted and opened out. To these we did a good deal of damage, causing great confusion, which was comforting to watch. The Boer in command of the main body must have gathered that the river-bed was clear, for he made a very bold move; he drove the whole of the waggons, etc., straight on as fast as possible over the odd 400 yards to the river and down the drift into the river-bed, where they were safe from our fire. Their losses must have been heavy over this short distance, for they had to abandon two of their waggons on the way to the river. This was done under cover of the fire from a large number of riflemen, who had at once galloped up to the river-bank, dismounted, and opened fire at us, and also of two guns and a pompom, which had immediately been driven a short distance back and then outwards to the east and west. It was really the best thing he could have done, and if he had only known that we could not fire on the ground to the south of the drift, he might have come straight on with a rush.

We had so far scored; but now ensued a period of stalemate. We were being fired at from the river-bank on the north, and from anthills, etc., pretty well all round, and were also under the intermittent shell-fire from the two guns. They made most excellent practice at the huts, which were soon knocked to bits, but not till they had well served their turn. Some of the new white sandbags from inside the huts were scattered out in full view of the enemy, and it was instructive to see what a splendid target they made for rifle-fire, and how often they were hit. They must have drawn a lot of fire away from the actual trenches. Until the Boers discovered that they could advance south from the drift without being under rifle-fire from our position, they were held up.

Would they discover it? As they had ridden all round us by now, well out of range, they must know all about us and our isolation.

After dark, by which time we had one man killed and two wounded, the firing died away into a continuous but desultory rifle-fire, with an occasional dropping shell from the guns. Under cover of dark, I tried to guard the drift and dead ground to the south of it, by men standing up and firing at that level; but towards midnight I was forced to withdraw them into the trenches, after several casualties, as the enemy then apparently woke up and kept up a furious rifle-fire upon us for over an hour. During this

time the guns went through some mysterious evolutions. At first we got it very hot from the north, where the guns had been all along. Then suddenly a gun was opened on us away from the south-west, and we were shelled for a short time from both sides. After a little the shelling on the north ceased, and continued from the south-west only for twenty minutes. After this the guns ceased, and the rifle-fire also gradually died away.

When day dawned not a living soul was to be seen; there were the dead men, horses, and the deserted waggons. I feared a trap, but gradually came to the conclusion the Boers had retired. After a little we discovered the river-bed was deserted as well, but the Boers had not retired. They had discovered the dead ground, and under the mutually supporting fire of their guns, which had kept us to our trenches, had all *crossed the drift* and trekked south!

True, we were not captured, and had very few losses, and had severely mauled the enemy, *but* they had crossed the drift. It must have evidently been of great importance to them to go on, or they would have attempted to capture us, as they were about 500 to our 50.

I had failed in my duty.

During the next few hours we buried the dead, tended the wounded, and took some well-earned rest, and I had ample leisure to consider my failure and the causes. The lessons I derived from the fight were—

20. Beware of convex hills and *dead ground.* Especially take care to have some place where the enemy *must* come under your fire. Choose the exact position of your firing-trenches, with your eye at the level of the men who will eventually use them.

21. A hill may not, after all, though it has "command," be the best place to hold necessarily.

22. A conspicuous "bluff" trench may cause the enemy to waste much ammunition, and draw fire away from the actual defences.

In addition to these lessons, another little matter on my mind was what my colonel would say at my failure.

Lying on my back, looking up at the sky, I was trying to get a few winks of sleep myself before we started to improve our defences against a possible further attack, but it was no use, sleep evaded me.

The clear blue vault of heaven was suddenly overcast by clouds, which gradually assumed the frowning face of my colonel. "*What?* You mean to say, Mr. Forethought, the Boers have *crossed?*" But, luckily for me, before more could be said, the face

began slowly to fade away like that of the Cheshire Puss in 'Alice in Wonderland,' leaving nothing but the awful frown across the sky. This too finally dissolved, and the whole scene changed. I had another dream.

SIXTH DREAM.

"Sweet are the uses of adversity."

(See Map 7.)

Once more was I fated to essay the task of defending Duffer's Drift. This time I had twenty-two lessons below my belt to help me out, and in the oblivion of my dream I was saved that sense of monotony which by now may possibly have overtaken you, "gentle reader."

After sending out the patrols, and placing a guard on Waschout Hill, as already described, and whilst the stores were being collected, I considered deeply what position I should take up, and walked up to the top of Waschout Hill to spy out the land. On the top I found a Kaffir kraal, which I saw would assist me much to concealment should I decide to hold this hill. This I was very inclined to do, but after a few minutes' trial of the shape of the ground, with the help of some men walking about down below, and my eyes a little above ground-level—I found that its convexity was such that, to see and fire on the drift and the approach on the south side, I should have to abandon the top of the hill, and so the friendly concealment of the Kaffir huts, and take up a position on the open hillside some way down. This was, of course, quite feasible, especially if I held a position at the top of the hill as well, near the huts on the east and south-east sides; but, as it would be impossible to really conceal ourselves on the bare hillside, it meant giving up all idea of surprising the enemy, which I wished to do. I must, therefore, find some other place which would lend itself to easy and good concealment, and also have the drift or its approaches under close rifle-fire. But where to find such a place?

As I stood deep in thought, considering this knotty problem, an idea gently wormed itself into my mind, which I at once threw out again as being absurd and out of the question. This idea was—to hold the river-bed and banks on each side of the drift! To give up all idea of command, and, instead of seeking the nearest high ground, which comes as natural to the student of tactics as rushing for a tree does to a squirrel, to take the lowest ground, even though it should be all among thick cover, instead of being nicely in the open.



MAP VII.

No, it was absolutely revolutionary, and against every canon I had ever read or heard of; it was evidently the freak of a sorely tried and worried brain. I would none of it, and I put it firmly from me. But the more I argued to myself the absurdity of it, the more this idea obtained possession of me. The more I said it was impossible, the more allurements were spread before me in its favour, until each of my conscientious objections was enmeshed and smothered in a network of specious reasons as to the advantages of the proposal.

I resisted, I struggled, but finally fell to temptation, dressed up in the plausible guise of reason. I would hold the river-bed.

The advantages I thus hoped to obtain were—

Perfect concealment and cover from sight.

Trenches and protection against both rifle and gun fire practically ready made.

Communications under good cover.

The enemy would be out in the open veldt except along the river-bank, where we, being in position first, would still have the advantage.

Plentiful water-supply at hand.

True, there were a few dead animals near the drift, and the tainted air seemed to hang heavy over the river-bed, but the carcases could be quickly buried under the steep banks, and, after all, one could not expect *every* luxury.

As our clear field of fire, which in the north was only bounded by the range of our rifles, was on the south limited by Waschout Hill, a suitable position for the enemy to occupy, I decided to hold the top of it as well as the river-bed. All I could spare for this would be two N.C.O.'s and eight men, who would be able to defend the south side of the hill, the north being under our fire from the river-bank.

Having detailed this party, I gave my instructions for the work, which was soon started. In about a couple of hours the patrols returned with their prisoners, which were dealt with as before.

For the post on Waschout Hill, the scheme was that the trenches should be concealed much in the same way as described in the last dream, but great care should be taken that no one in the post should be exposed to rifle-fire from our main position in the river. I did not wish the fire of the main body to be in any degree hampered by a fear of hitting the men on Waschout Hill, especially at night. If we knew it was not possible to hit them, we could shoot freely all over the hill. This detachment was to have a double lot of water-bottles, besides every available

receptacle collected in the kraal, filled with water, in anticipation of a prolonged struggle.

The general idea for the main defensive position was to hold both sides of the river, improving the existing steep banks and ravines into rifle-pits to contain from one to four men. These could, with very little work, be made to give cover from all sides. As such a large amount of the work was already done for us, we were enabled to dig many more of these pits than the exact number required for our party. Pathways leading between these were to be cut into the bank, so that we should be able to shift about from one position to another. Besides the advantage this would give us in the way of moving about, according as we wished to fire, it also meant that we should probably be able to mislead the enemy as to our numbers—which, by such shifting tactics might, for a time at least, be much exaggerated. The pits for fire to the north and south were nearly all so placed as to allow the occupants to fire at ground-level over the veldt. They were placed well among the bushes, only just sufficient scrub being cut away to allow a man to see all round, without exposing the position of his trench. On each side of the river, just by the drift, were some "spoil" heaps of earth, excavated from the road ramp. These stood some five or six feet above the general level, and were as rough as the banks in outline. These heaps were large enough to allow of a few pits being made on them, which had the extra advantage of height. In some of the pits, to give head-cover, loopholes of sandbags were made, though in most cases this was not needed, owing to the concealment of the bushes. I found it was necessary to examine personally every loophole, and correct the numerous mistakes made in their construction. Some had the new clean sandbags exposed to full view, thus serving as mere whited sepulchres to their occupants, others were equally conspicuous from their absurd cock-shy appearance, others were not bullet-proof, whilst others again would only allow of shooting in one direction, or into the ground at a few yards' range, or up into the blue sky. As I corrected all these faults I thought that loopholes not made under supervision might prove rather a snare.

The result was, in the way of concealment, splendid. From these pits with our heads at ground-level we could see quite clearly out on to the veldt beyond, either from under the thicker part of the bushes or even through those which were close to our eyes. From the open, on the other hand, we were quite invisible, even from 300 yards' distance, and would have been more so had we had the whiskers of the "brethren." It was quite evident to me that these same whiskers were a wise provision of nature for this

very purpose, and part of her universal scheme of protective mimicry.

The numerous small dongas and rifts lent themselves readily to flanking fire, and in many places the vertical banks required no cutting in order to give ideal protection against even Artillery. In others, the sides of the crooked waterways had to be merely scooped out a little, or a shelf cut to stand upon.

In one of these deeper ravines two tents, which, being below ground-level, were quite invisible, were pitched for the women and children, and small caves cut for them in case of a bombardment. The position extended for a length of some 150 yards on each side of the drift along both banks of the river, and at its extremities, where an attack was most to be feared, pits were dug down the river-banks and across the dry river-bed. These also were concealed as well as possible. The flanks or ends were, of course, our greatest danger, for it was from here we might expect to be rushed, and not from the open veldt. I was undecided for some time as to whether to clear a "field of fire" along the river-banks or not, as I had no wish to give away our presence by any suspicious nudity of the banks at each end of our position. I finally decided, in order to prevent this, to clear the scrub for as great a range as possible from the ends of the position, everywhere below the ground-level, and also on the level ground, except for a good fringe just on the edges of the banks. This fringe I thought would be sufficient to hide the clearance to any one not very close. I now blessed the man who had left us some cutting tools. Whilst all this was being carried out, I paced out some ranges to the north and south, and these we marked by a few empty tins placed on ant-heaps, etc.

At dusk, when we had nearly all the pits finished and some of the clearance done, tents and gear were hidden, ammunition and rations distributed to all, and orders in case of an attack given out. As I could not be everywhere, I had to rely on the outlying groups of men fully understanding my aims beforehand, and acting on their "own." To prevent our chance of a close-range volley into the enemy being spoilt by some over-zealous or jumpy man opening fire at long range, I gave orders that fire was to be held as long as possible, and that no man was to fire a shot until firing had already commenced elsewhere (which sounded rather Irish), or my whistle sounded. This was unless the enemy were so close to him that further silence was useless. Firing having once started, every man was to blaze away at any enemy within range as judged by our range marks. Finally we turned in to

our pits for the night with some complacency, each eight men furnishing their own sentry.

We had about three hours next morning before any enemy were reported from Waschout Hill (the pre-arranged signal for this was the raising of a pole from one of the huts). This time was employed in perfecting our defences in various ways. We managed to clear away the scrub in the dry river-bed and banks for some 200 yards beyond our line of pits on each side, and actually attained to the refinement of an "obstacle;" for at the extremity of this clearance a sort of abatis entanglement was made with the wire from an adjacent fence which the men had discovered. During the morning I visited the post on Waschout Hill, found everything all correct, and took the opportunity of showing the detachment the exact limits of our position in the river-bed, and explained what we were going to do. After about three hours' work, "Somebody in sight" was signalled, and we soon after saw from our position a cloud of dust away to the north. This force, which proved to be a commando, approached as already described in the last dream; all we could do meanwhile was to sit tight in concealment. Their scouts came on in clumps of twos and threes which extended over some mile of front, the centre of the line heading for the drift. As the scouts got closer, the natural impulse to make for the easiest crossing-place was obeyed by two or three of the parties on each side of the one approaching the drift, and they inclined inwards and joined forces with it. This was evidently the largest party we could hope to surprise, and we accordingly lay for it. When about 300 yards away, the "brethren" stopped rather suspiciously. This was too much for some man on the east side, who let fly, and the air was rent by the rattle as we emptied our magazines, killing five of this special scouting party and two from other groups further out on either side. We continued to fire at the scouts as they galloped back, dropping two more, and also at the column which was about a mile away, but afforded a splendid target till it opened out.

In a very few moments our position was being shelled by three guns, but with the only result, as far as we were concerned, of having one man wounded by shell-fire, though the firing went on slowly till dark. To be accurate, I should say the river was being shelled, our position incidentally, for shells were bursting along the river for some half-mile. The Boers were evidently quite at sea as regards the extent of our position and strength, and wasted many shells. We noticed much galloping of men away to the east and west, out of range, and guessed that these were parties who intended to strike the river at some distance away, and

gradually work along the bed, in order probably to get into close range during the night.

We exchanged a few shots during the night along the river-bed, and not much was done on either side, though of course we were on the *qui vive* all the time; but it was not till near one in the morning that Waschout Hill had an innings.

As I had hoped, the fact that we held the kraal had not been spotted by the enemy, and a large body of them, crawling up the south side of the hill in order to get a good fire on to us in the river, struck a snag in the shape of a close-range volley from our detachment. As the night was not very dark, in the panic following the first volley our men were able (as I learnt afterwards) to stand right up and shoot at the surprised burghers bolting down the hill. However, their panic did not last long, to judge by the sound, for after the first volley from our Lee-Metfords and the subsequent minute's independent firing, the reports of our rifles were soon mingled with the softer reports of the Mausers, and we shortly observed flashes on our side of Waschout Hill. As these could not be our men, we knew the enemy were endeavouring to surround the detachment. We knew the ranges fairly well, and though, as we could not see our sights, the shooting was rather guesswork, we soon put a stop to this manœuvre by firing a small volley from three or four rifles at each flash on the hill-side. So the night passed without much incident.

During the dark we had taken the opportunity to cunningly place some new white sandbags (which I had found among the stores) in full view at some little distance from our actual trenches and pits. Some men had even gone further, and added a helmet here and a coat there peeping over the top. This ruse had been postponed until our position was discovered, so as not to betray our presence, but after the fighting had begun no harm was done by it. Next morning it was quite a pleasure to see the very accurate shooting made by "Brother" at these sandbags, as betokened by the little spurts of dust.

During this day the veldt to the north and south was deserted by the enemy except at out-of-range distance, but a continuous sniping fire was kept up along the river-banks on each side. The Boer guns were shifted—one to the top of Incidentamba and one to the east and west in order to enfilade the river-bank—but, owing to our good cover, we escaped with two killed and three wounded. The enemy did not shell quite such a length of river this time. I confidently expected an attack along the river-bank that night, and slightly strengthened my flanks, even at the risk of dangerously denuding the north bank. I was not disappointed.

Under cover of the dark, the enemy came up to within, perhaps, 600 yards on the open veldt on the north and round the edges of Waschout Hill on the south, and kept up a furious fire, probably to distract our attention, whilst the guns shelled us for about an hour. As soon as the gun-fire ceased they tried to rush us along the river-bed east and west, but, owing to the abatis and the holes in the ground, and the fact that it was not a very dark night, they were unsuccessful. However, it was touch-and-go, and a few of the Boers did succeed in getting into our position, only to be bayoneted. Luckily the enemy did not know our strength, or rather our weakness, or they would have persisted in their attempt and succeeded; as it was, they must have lost 20 or 30 men killed and wounded.

Next morning, with so many men out of my original 40 out of action (not to include Waschout Hill, whose losses I did not know), matters seemed to be serious, and I was greatly afraid that another night would be the end of us. I was pleased to see that the detachment on Waschout Hill had still got its tail well up, for they had hoisted a red rag at the masthead. True, this was not the national flag, probably only a mere handkerchief, but it was not white. The day wore on with intermittent shelling and sniping, and we all felt that the enemy must have by now guessed our weakness, and were saving themselves for another night attack, relying upon our being tired out. We did our best to snatch a little sleep by turns during the day, and I did all I could to keep the spirits of the little force up by saying that relief could not be very far off. But it was with a gloomy desperation at best that we saw the day wear on and morning turn into afternoon.

The Boer guns had not been firing for some two hours, and the silence was just beginning to get irritating and mysterious, when the booming of guns in the distance aroused us to the highest pitch of excitement. We were saved! We could not say what guns these were—they might be British or Boer—but, any way, it proved the neighbourhood of another force. All faces at once lighted up, for somehow the welcome sound drew the tired feeling out of us like a hot iron removes a grease spot off a pair of trousers.

In order to prevent any chance of the fresh force missing our whereabouts, I collected a few men and at once started to fire some good old British volleys into the scrub, "Ready—present—fire," which were not to be mistaken. Shortly afterwards we heard musketry in the distance, and saw a cloud of dust to the north-east. We were relieved!

* * * * * *

Our total losses were 11 killed and 15 wounded; but we had held the drift, and so enabled a victory to be won. I need not here touch upon the well-known and far-reaching results of the holding of Duffer's Drift, of the prevention thereby of Boer guns, ammunition, and reinforcements reaching one of their sorely pressed forces at a critical moment, and the ensuing victory gained by our side. It is now, of course, all public knowledge that this was the turning-point in the war, though we, the humble instruments, did not know what vital results hung upon our action.

That evening the relieving force halted at the drift, and, after burying the dead, we spent some time examining the lairs of the Boer snipers, the men collecting bits of shell and cartridge-cases as mementoes—only to be thrown away at once. We found some 25 dead and partially buried Boers, to whom we gave burial.

That night I did not trek, but lay down (in my own breeches and spotted waistcoat). As the smoke from the "prime segar," presented to me by my Colonel, was eddying in spirals over my head, these gradually changed into clouds of rosy glory, and I heard brass bands in the distance playing a familiar air: "See the Conquering Hero comes," it was they were playing.

I felt a tap on my shoulder, and heard a gentle voice say, "Arise, Sir Backsight Forethought;" but in a trice my dream of bliss was shattered—the gentle voice changed into the well-known croak of my servant. "Time to pack your kit on the waggon, sir. Corfy's been up some time now, sir." I was still in stinking old Dreamdorp.

THE TRAINING OF RECRUITS.

OUR SYSTEM DURING THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

BY "FOURTEEN."

WRITING with an experience of twenty-seven years in all ranks, from Trooper to Field Officer, I feel that, at the present day, we are still far behind in making the early training of the recruit attractive and intelligible. A great deal of the drill of precision of former days has been abolished, but whatever course of training a recruit is put through, the beginning of it all must mean a certain amount of drill in close formation and practice in the handling of arms, and it is this part of the recruit's training that should be made more attractive. I am quite convinced that, although we are doing everything possible to make our soldiers more comfortable and contented, their first couple of months' work at the depôt does more to dishearten them than anything else in the whole course of their service.*

My first experience of a soldier's life was in the seventies, and a recruit in those days certainly had a very poor time, especially in the mounted branches, where, of course, riding and the care of horses had to be considered, in addition to the ordinary barrack square drill. Work began very early in the morning, and went on pretty continuously until it was time to go to bed at night. The rations supplied were never sufficient to satisfy the cravings of a hungry young man, and as the amount of pay was small, owing to stoppages for clothing, etc., there was little opportunity of increasing the food-supply.

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* Most certainly: and yet how very different all this might be if only a little common sense were allowed to pervade regulations framed by high officials who have never in their lives trained a recruit—or even idled their time at a depôt! The War Office has been the arch-enemy of efficient training at depôts, and is chiefly responsible for the failure of it, owing to which the regimental depôts are now to be abolished. For example, it is ordered that each Instructor shall take a particular squad through the whole course—which is absurd. One man is best at one thing and one at another, and each should deal with his own speciality. One is a beautiful "drill," but a poor section or half-company commander, and so on. The first thing I myself did on going to the depôt, as Major, was to take stock of the Instructors, and then set them to the kind of work that each was best fitted to carry out.—ED. U. S. M.

The instructors were non-commissioned officers, who, in most instances, undoubtedly did their best to teach the recruit how to handle his weapons, how to ride, and, in a small way, how to shoot. They repeated the drill, as laid down in the book, word for word, the recruit very often being in some tiring position, with the result that very little of this instruction entered his head, and he was left to wonder what was required from him. Certainly everybody was weary of the whole thing long before the hour's drill was up. The same thing applied to the riding drill, with the addition, I am sorry to say, of a certain amount of bullying which accompanied the instruction. Musketry was a part of the young soldier's training (I am speaking of the Cavalry) that nobody bothered much about; the great object was to get it over as soon as possible.

There was not one single point about the young soldier's life that could be held out as an attraction to induce him to stick to the service, and this impressed me very much at the time.

In the years that have followed, very many changes for the better have taken place in the system of training the young soldier—notably, the instruction being divided up so that he gets more time to himself, and his surroundings are more comfortable—but the great fault of twenty-seven years ago is still apparent to-day. Young officers and soldiers are trained under this system, they in turn become Adjutants and Sergeant-Majors, and the old routine is carried on from generation to generation.

At present the instructors are, as a rule, a better-educated class than in former years, and they try their best to comply with the regulations as to imparting the drill; but to speak to the recruit in his own language, and not in the language of the book, is beyond them. It is not given to every man, clever though he may be, to impart his knowledge so that it shall be both understandable and interesting to the individual under instruction; and our system does not help the instructor when the gift is wanting.

In my experience as an Adjutant, and also as a Company Commander, I have found the soldier, both young and old, take the greatest interest in the work he is learning when it has all been explained to him in a clear and intelligible manner, and, in fact, men have said they enjoyed the instruction because they understood what was expected of them before they started their work.

And now to find a means to alter the usual system? It is certainly very difficult, for directly you attempt a reformation, you interfere with the authority of the officers nearly concerned. It may very rightly be said, too, that provision is made for this in the 'Infantry Training, 1902;' but so far as I have been able to judge from observation, when a squad of recruits has been drilling, the

desired result has not yet been attained and so some special arrangement will have to be made to meet the difficulty.*

I would suggest a school, similar to the musketry school, where officers and non-commissioned officers would be trained. It would not be a difficult matter to select officers and non-commissioned officers with special qualifications as instructors, and once a good practical system of instruction had been established in every regiment and battalion, the school could be closed.

This scheme means expense, and with the present heavy army estimates, it is most improbable that any money would be sanctioned for such a purpose.

As an alternative, an Inspector of Recruits' Instruction might be appointed. He should, of course, be selected for his special aptitude in this work, and he should visit the different units in his special area, and would advise and criticise the instruction, so that in time we should arrive at a system which would benefit the recruit, and in bring that would benefit the service at large.

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* By all means let us have such a school—it is greatly needed; but God forbid that I should take Hyde for its patron!—Ed. U. S. M.

THE BRITISH CAVALRY AND THE LESSONS OF 1899 TO 1902.

BY "ONE OF THE OLD SCHOOL."

I HAVE been a good deal amused by the article in your magazine, July number, entitled "The British Cavalry and the Lessons of 1899 to 1902," where "A Colonial" tries to teach his grandmother. If you can spare the space I should like to offer a few criticisms.

1. With regard to the seven weak points enumerated, every one knows that, as far as the Boer campaign is concerned, they existed; our Cavalry has never been, and is not now being, trained to fight farmers, natives, or such like, but to meet Continental Armies, should ever our politicians bungle us into a war with them. With our strength, money, and resources, we can always, at the last moment, adapt ourselves to anything, and learn our lessons as we did in South Africa, and on many other occasions. Our Army of recent years has been "made in Germany," and is yearly kept up to date by able officers who attend German manœuvres. The latest reform is that excellent hat, erroneously called the "Brodrick hat," which was, I believe, the outcome of the visit of the Secretary of State for War, Commander-in-Chief, etc., after peace was declared.

2. "A Colonial" criticises the Cavalry manœuvres at Klip River, conducted by a dashing Cavalry officer, whom he sneers at as having commanded a town during the late war. Many Cavalry generals and C.O.'s commanded towns and blockhouse lines in order, I believe, to vary their experiences of war, to improve their training, and, lastly, to give the younger men a chance of leading columns and regiments. I feel quite sure that the gallant officer in question would have led charges in Natal with great *elan* had it not been for the dongas, kopjes, and Boers.

3. The next allegation that our Cavalry is divided into two schools; viz. the progressives, as "A Colonial" styles them, *versus* those who adhere to the old traditions.

Thank goodness these new ideas are confined to squadron leaders and subalterns. Our Cavalry generals and some C.O.'s

still believe in the Cavalry charge; they have no fear of the rifle, and I feel confident that they, especially the gallant G.O.C. Cavalry Brigade, Aldershot, would charge unbroken Infantry with a *sang froid* as great as that which was, I hear, displayed by the latter officer when he encountered blank ammunition at close range in the recent Cavalry reconnaissance.

4. "A Colonial" sneers at the short squadron training. He apparently does not know that in our Army we begin at the top and work downwards in our training. The G.O.C. instructs the C.O. and the C.O. the squadron, and so on. We don't start at the bottom, as our squadron leaders lack experience, and, besides, the generals and C.O.'s would have nothing to do but inspect. We do not possess highly trained officers like the Germans.

5. "A Colonial" calls the troop horse "bit footed, heavy," etc. I feel sure most senior officers like a big horse, so long as he is fat. What idiots we would look on ceremonial parades in full dress, mounted on the small horses he suggests! Again, the big-headed horses are invaluable in a charge, as their heads act as battering rams against the smaller ones of the better-bred class.

6. The saddle.—The present pattern is used almost universally in Continental armies; and I would like to know how we could have carried all the kit we did in South Africa without it? The front arch must necessarily be high to give the bad riders, of whom we have many, something to hold on to when a horse travels at speed; and, secondly, it must have a high cantle to enable men to mount easily and carry a lot of kit.

7. The sword.—"A Colonial" laughs at the glittering scabbard. Of course he does not know that we coloured them khaki when we went to South Africa. In peace it must glitter, and we must have noticeable things like pipe-clayed bandoliers, etc., or else it would take opposing Cavalry a long time to find us. In like manner, Artillery use black powder to mark the position, or else no one would know where they were.

8. Taking cover and concealing movements.—Of course we train our people to have contempt for cover and bullets; how else could we persuade them in war to face the rifle at a gallop? Why, they would all want to go to ground behind rocks and kopjes!

9. The Cavalry display before the King appears to have displeased "A Colonial," who forgets that ours is a voluntary Army and generally plays at soldiering, and that unless we have these shows we cannot get recruits. Who knows how many would-be fathers, or young lads, witnessed those charges?

10. Lastly, "A Colonial" shows complete ignorance when he criticises Cavalry manœuvring without scouts, flankers, or rear-

guard. Our Cavalry never have such things when in brigade or large bodies—with the object, I always learnt, of inducing the enemy or opposing force to come boldly up and surprise them. Every Cavalry officer of standing knows that from General Luck downwards, all inspecting officers chiefly examine C.O.'s and squadron leaders in what they would do if suddenly attacked; and troops three-quarter right- or left-about wheel was invented for the purpose. Another favourite question is, "If coming through a defile in sections and suddenly attacked, how would you form to repel it?" *

Again, reconnaissance schemes are only carried out to practise officers in writing reports, and to see how quickly they can be transmitted to the G.O.C. No one cares how the scouting is done, nor has a chance of seeing.

To conclude, I would give "A Colonial" a little advice, viz. take care when the next war comes, you have an imperial officer as your colonel, and don't officer your corps with all your relations, but select men of experience—for example, myself.

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* There is but one other British examination question with which I am acquainted that can compare with the absurdity of this. My example is as follows: "Why do troops now advance to the attack in extended order instead of in quarter-columns?" A Militia subaltern, in reply to this question, wrote: "Because if they were to advance in quarter-column it is probable that they would all be killed." It is a pity that this wise young officer was not also called upon to answer the question quoted by "One of the Old School;" he would probably have written: "It would depend upon whether the shortest way to more favourable ground was to the front or to the rear."—ED. U. S. M.

THE CAPTURE OF GIBRALTAR

JULY 24TH, 1704.

BY CAPTAIN R. J. B. MAIR, R.E.

ON the bicentenary anniversary of Gibraltar becoming a British possession, a narrative of its capture will, it is thought, be of interest. The following has been compiled from English and Spanish accounts in the Garrison Library at Gibraltar, from some of which copious extracts have been made.*

On the 1st November, 1700, Charles II. of Spain died, leaving an issue, and by his last will Philip, Duke of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin Louis, and grandson of Louis XIV. of France, was made heir to all his estates. He assumed the title of Philip V. of Spain. There was, however, another aspirant to the throne in the person of Charles, Archduke of Austria, second son of Leopold I. of Germany, who based his claim on the right of his mother, Margaret Theresa, daughter of Philip IV. of Spain. The fear of a coalition between France and Spain, which would have been disastrous to Europe in view of the power and ambition of Louis XIV., induced William III. of England, in 1701, to make the celebrated alliance with Austria and Holland, which resulted in the War of the Spanish Succession. This war, which had for its ostensible objects the placing of the Archduke Charles upon the throne of Spain, and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, ceased with the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. It will be for ever memorable in the annals of Great Britain for the capture of Gibraltar from Spain.

The alliance had scarcely been entered into when on the 8th March, 1702, William III. died. He was succeeded on the throne by Queen Anne, who upon her accession announced her determination to continue the war.

Little having been effected, in the spring of 1704, Portugal and Savoy having then joined the alliance, it was determined to attack Spain on her own coasts with the aid of the Portuguese. With

* I am indebted chiefly to the following works: 'The History of Gibraltar,' by Captain Sayer; 'A History of Gibraltar and its Sieges,' by J. H. Mann; and 'The History of Gibraltar,' by Don Lopez De Ayala.—R. J. B. M.

his object, a British fleet was prepared at Spithead to convey the Archduke Charles to Lisbon, and Admiral Sir George Rooke was appointed to the command. This fleet with its allies arrived at Lisbon on the 25th February, 1704, and four days afterwards Rooke detached Admiral Dilkes with a squadron of seventeen sail to cruise in the Straits of Gibraltar, where he captured two Spanish vessels of war, one of which was brought back to Lisbon, the other being lost at the entrance to the harbour. On the 9th March Admiral Rooke himself went to sea and remained cruising for nearly a month, without, however, achieving any result of importance. On his return to Lisbon at the end of March he found orders awaiting him to proceed to the Mediterranean to the assistance of the defenders of Nice and Villafranca, but was induced by the Archduke Charles to attempt the capture of Barcelona with the aid of the troops he had on board under Prince George of Hesse. In this he failed, and, proceeding on his voyage to the westward, missed the French fleet at sea, and so lost the opportunity of bringing it to an engagement.

Determined to do something important with the powerful force under his command, from which so much was expected, and being well aware of the imputations and calumnies to which he would be subjected if he failed to do so, Admiral Rooke, on the 17th July, when within a few leagues of Tetuan, summoned a council of war on board his flagship the *Royal Catherine* (Captain Scaley). This council was attended by the commanders of the allied fleets and troops, viz. Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt, Sir George Rooke, Rear-Admiral Byng, Lord Torrington, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, Admiral Leake, Sir Thomas Wishart, and the three Dutch admirals, Collingberg, Vassenaer, and Vanderdussen.

Several schemes having been proposed and for various reasons rejected, after a prolonged discussion it was resolved to make a sudden attack on Gibraltar, as it was known that the place was weakly garrisoned, and that its fortifications were in a bad state of repair, the Spanish finances having been diverted to more pressing objects in spite of the protestations of its Governor. It was also considered that its capture would increase the prestige of Queen Anne, and would tend to dispose the Spaniards in favour of the Archduke Charles's cause.

It was decided to make the attempt forthwith, and four days having been spent in the necessary preparations, on the 21st July, 1704, the allied fleets—the British composed of forty-five ships, six frigates, seven fire-ships, two hospital ships, two bombs, and a yacht—came to an anchor in the Bay of Gibraltar. Many of the ships comprising this squadron are famous in the history of the

[illegible] may be named the [illegible] Captain [illegible] Rear-Admiral [illegible] of the admiral who [illegible] on the [illegible] March [illegible], the [illegible] Sir [illegible], [illegible] Sir George, [illegible] Sir George [illegible], [illegible] Rear-Admiral Dilkes, [illegible], [illegible] Admiral Sir [illegible] Captain, afterwards Sir [illegible]

[illegible] of the same day a body of about 2000 marines, [illegible] of the Prince of Hesse, was landed before the [illegible] on the [illegible] of supplies and reinforcements for the garrison. So little time had been lost, that the [illegible] of the ships took the Moors completely by surprise, and the landing of troops caused alarm and consternation throughout the district.

Immediately afterwards a demand for the surrender of Gibraltar in the name of Charles—in whose cause as rightful King, styled Charles III. of Spain, the Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt [illegible] arms—was sent in the following terms:—

"THE KING—TO THE GOVERNOR OF GIBRALTAR:—

"Being fully informed of the services which with great zeal you have always rendered to my August House, and not doubting the continuance of them, I think proper to inform you that Admiral [illegible] commanding the maritime forces of Her Britannic Majesty, when passing into the Mediterranean on other expeditions for my Royal Service, will deliver to you these my Royal Letters, and acquaint you with my intention speedily to leave this Kingdom, and pass into and take possession of my own, which, by just right and [illegible] belongs to me since the death of His Majesty Don Carlos II., my Sovereign King and uncle (who now rests in glory): fully assuring himself as you have always shown your fidelity to my August House, that so soon as you shall see these my Royal Letters, you will proceed to proclaim me, causing the same to be done at all places adjoining under your jurisdiction, by the name of Charles [illegible], by which title my Royal Father caused me to be proclaimed at his Imperial Court, and under which I am acknowledged in all my European Dominions as the legitimate and rightful King of Spain, assuring you, and pledging my Royal word, that, on so doing, there shall be preserved to you all your exemptions, immunities, and privileges, in the same manner as they were kept and preserved by his deceased Majesty Charles II., my Sovereign Lord and uncle, bestowing upon you and all my beloved Spaniards

the favour and benevolence you have always experienced from the clemency and benignity of the Kings, my predecessors. If, on the contrary, you should act otherwise, which I cannot believe of subjects so faithful to their legitimate Lord and King, it will be necessary for my High Allies to adopt such severities as war brings along with it, although with great grief I must see those whom I love as children suffer as if they were my greatest enemies. The said Admiral Rooke is instructed that, on quitting your Port, he may leave with you, if you desire it, as many men as you may think necessary for your assistance.

"Given at Lisbon, 5th May, 1704.

"I, the King.

"By order of the King, Henry de Bongei."

With this was enclosed a letter from Prince George, which stated: "That before proceeding to the extremity of warfare, he took occasion to express a hope that the city would be governed by a sense of justice and its true interests; that the cause in which he was engaged was alone sufficient to create a desire to be employed in it, and that he hoped, on sight of the Royal Letter, they would obey the commands of His Majesty King Charles, as might be expected from so noble and loyal a City." An answer, it was added, was expected without delay.

The garrison did not consist of more than 150 men, exclusive of the inhabitants (about 6000), although the stores appear to have been sufficient for the needs of a prolonged siege. The fortifications were, however, in bad repair. The Governor, the Marquis Diego de Salinas, a man of considerable energy and talent, resolved to defend the fortress to the last extremity, although, as the Spanish historians say, seeing the vast superiority of the force opposed to him, he was well aware of the impossibility of making a successful resistance, and, on receipt of the summons to surrender, assembled a council of the city magnates to consider the reply that should be given.

Little deliberation was found necessary, and a reply was without delay agreed to and transmitted to the Prince in the following words: "That, in having taken an oath of fidelity to Don Felipe V., as their natural Lord and King, they would, as faithful and loyal subjects, sacrifice their lives in the defence of the city and its inhabitants; and that, consequently, no reply to the contents of the letter enclosed was necessary."

Anticipating the immediate commencement of hostilities, De Salinas arranged his plans of defence. The whole force that could be mustered, including the 150 regulars, did not exceed 500 men.

These were dispersed in various directions and placed in the positions thought best adapted to repel the enemy.

The fortifications consisted at that time of a strong line wall, compassing the town from north to south, and terminated at the extremities by two moles, the southern one called the New, the northern, the Old Mole. These were armed with heavy ordnance. A few hundred yards north of the New Mole was a bastion, now Little Jumper's, also heavily armed. The line wall was mounted with artillery along its whole length. There were in all at least one hundred pieces of cannon, of heavy make for that day, and, in spite of the weakness of the garrison, so strong was the fortress by position and natural defences, that a prolonged resistance was quite within the bounds of possibility.

On the first appearance of the allied fleets, information had also been sent to the Captain-General of the Province, the Marquis of Villadarias, acquainting him with the defenceless state of the Rock, and with the landing of troops at the North Front; communicating at the same time the letters received from Prince George, and the determination of the inhabitants to die in the service of the Sovereign to whom they had sworn allegiance, and in defence of their country.

On the receipt of the reply of the garrison, which was late on 21st July, the ships which had been appointed to cannonade the town received orders to take up their positions before the line wall on the morning of the 22nd; but, owing to the wind being contrary, they were not successfully placed in time.

In consequence, the first offensive step was actually taken by Captain Whittaker, of the *Dorsetshire* (80 guns), who was sent with boats to burn a French privateer of twelve guns, which lay at the Old Mole.

Although the reply to the summons to surrender was couched in such energetic terms of refusal, Sir George Rooke still believed that, awed by the presence of so powerful a fleet, the garrison would be intimidated and would capitulate on the commencement of active proceedings. To test the firmness of their intentions, he gave orders at daybreak on the 23rd July, for a few shots to be fired into the city. A further letter was also sent from Prince George, who wrote: "That, although the answer from the city little accorded with the mildness it was his wish to exercise towards it, there was yet time to accede to the proposition already made; but that, if in half an hour the place was not surrendered to their legitimate Lord and King, Charles III., it would be instantly subjected to all the rigour its resistance would naturally deserve."

The reply to this letter not being more favourable, and the

Admiral now convinced that the garrison had no intention of surrendering, and that vigorous action was necessary, placed his fleet in line of battle. Six Dutch ships, under Admiral Vanderdussen, and sixteen English vessels, viz., twelve third-rates and four fourth-rates, fronted the line wall between the heads of the moles. At the same time, Captain Hicks with the *Yarmouth* (70 guns), *Tiger* (50 guns), and *Hampton Court* (70 guns), moved westward to the New Mole, against which point the principal attack was to be directed. The cannonade commenced at five o'clock in the morning along the whole line, and was kept up unremittingly for six hours, during which time not less than 15,000 shot were thrown into the town.

The consternation of the inhabitants was profound. The nuns, the women and children, and those useless for the defence of the place, fled in terror and took refuge in the sanctuary of the Virgen de Europa at the south of the Rock.

The material effects of the bombardment were also soon apparent. The guns on the New Mole were speedily silenced, and its garrison put to flight. Perceiving this, Sir George Rooke resolved to take the defences in flank, by effecting a landing on the abandoned works.

Signal was accordingly made to Captain Whittaker to arm all the boats of the fleet, to provide himself with a sufficient force, and to make himself master of the New Mole head. Captain Whittaker was at this time in the *Nottingham* (60 guns), at the northern extremity of the line, and nearly a mile from the spot where he was ordered to land. Whilst he was preparing to execute his orders, the signal conveying his instructions, was made out by Captain Hicks, who with his ships was within 500 yards of the New Mole head. He resolved to risk the Admiral's displeasure, and to anticipate Captain Whittaker by gaining possession of the abandoned works himself. Pinnaces were accordingly lowered, manned by sailors and marines under the command of himself and Captain Jumper, of the *Lennox* (70 guns), and put off for the shore before Captain Whittaker could arrive. Scarcely, however, had the men set foot on land when the enemy sprung a mine beneath them, blowing two officers and forty men into the air, wounding sixty, and capsizing seven of the boats. Captain Whittaker, who came up at this juncture, was more fortunate; he took and kept the New Mole, repulsing a vigorous sortie made by the enemy, and, proceeding northward along the line wall towards the town, assailed and captured Jumper's Bastion. The line wall defences being thus taken in flank, the guns were abandoned, and the whole of the south district fell into the hands of the English.

In the meantime the marines on the isthmus, and the ships opposite the north-west face of the city had not been idle. A heavy fire had been kept up against Fort Leandro, at the Old Mole head, which resulted in the destruction of the battery and the capture of the mole.

It was hardly possible to sustain such an attack as this. Beaten at every point, the two principal positions of defence taken, the line wall in possession of the enemy, and their artillery destroyed, the besieged began to see the futility of prolonging the contest.

Alarm now prevailed everywhere. The terror of the people, the destruction produced by the fire of the fleet, the impossibility of holding out much longer, added to the great loss of life that had already occurred, and the horrors attendant on a possible capture by assault, determined the Governor and his officers to treat for a surrender. The fire from the fortress accordingly ceased, a flag of truce was displayed, and officers were landed to explain the terms on which the fortress should be given up.

The Governor having formally notified the Town Council of the necessity for surrender, a Council of War was held, when it was at once agreed by all that a capitulation, as honourable as could be obtained, should be immediately assented to, and an intimation thereof be sent to the King. The capitulation was speedily settled and consisted of the following six articles, the conditions being less severe, as the Spaniards themselves admit, than might have been expected.

ARTICLE I.

The officers and soldiers shall be allowed to march out with their baggage, and the soldiers may take what they can carry with them; the officers, the magistrates, and gentlemen are allowed to take their horses; and for those without baggage who choose to depart by water, vessels shall be provided.

ARTICLE II.

Three pieces of brass cannon of different sizes may be carried away, together with twelve rounds of ammunition to each gun.

ARTICLE III.

A supply of bread, meat, and wine for six days' march shall be provided

ARTICLE IV.

The trunks containing the baggage of the officers, magistrates, and gentlemen shall not be examined. The garrison shall march out within three days; the effects that cannot in that time be

removed shall remain in the place to be sent for when convenient, and no obstruction shall be given to the carts conveying them.

ARTICLE V.

To the inhabitants, soldiers, and officers, who may choose to remain in Gibraltar, shall be conceded the same privileges they had in the time of Charles II.; the religion and all the tribunals shall remain intact and without alteration, it being understood that the oath of fidelity to H.M. Charles III., as legitimate lord and king, is to be taken.

ARTICLE VI.

All the magazines of powder and of implements of war are to be pointed out—all useless arms, and all the provisions that exist in the city.

From this capitulation the French and all subjects of His C. Majesty are excluded. They shall remain prisoners of war, and all their property be at the disposal of the conquerors.

(Signed) GEORGE,

July 24th, 1704. Landgrave of Hesse.

On the 24th July, 1704, the Prince of Hesse took possession of the fortress; the Imperial standard was raised on the walls, and the Archduke Charles proclaimed King of Spain and owner of the city. Sir George Rooke, however, being too well aware of the value of Gibraltar to the English nation as the key of the Mediterranean, and for the reasons given below, overruled this proceeding, hauled down the standard of Austria, set up that of Great Britain, and took possession in the name of Queen Anne, a garrison of 1800 English seamen being at the same time placed in the fortress. The loss of the allies in the action was 2 lieutenants, 1 master, 57 sailors, killed; 1 captain, 7 lieutenants, 1 boatswain, 207 sailors, wounded.

Thus Gibraltar passed to the keeping of England, and although Admiral Rooke's proceeding may appear to have been high-handed, the strong strategical, as well as political and moral, motives which induced it, sufficiently justified his action. It is certain that the place could not have been retained in Charles III.'s possession during the remainder of the war; the English alone of the Powers then present were competent to hold it, for the Dutch force was quite subordinate to that of its allies.*

* Some historians altogether discredit the story of the hauling down of Charles's flag. Mr. Julian S. Corbett, in his recently published 'England in the Mediterranean,' says: "I can find no confirmation of this improbable tale. Modern Spanish authorities reject it. Rooke had orders to act strictly as Charles's agent, and the garrison was certainly

Most of the Spaniards departed from the fortress which they had so valiantly defended; the exodus from the city being, according to eye-witnesses, a melancholy and affecting spectacle. Many reached Tarifa, Medina-Sidonia, Ronda, and other towns in the neighbourhood; but the majority, including the authorities, remained at San Roque, keeping with them the archives of their ancient city.

The importance of the capture was not appreciated by the British Government at the time, and Sir George Rooke, who died on 24th January, 1709, received no reward whatever.

The Spaniards, however, fully alive to its value, at once made great efforts to retake the fortress, and within three months were besieging it with 12,000 men (9000 Spaniards and 3000 French), a French squadron of twelve ships of the line and seven frigates co-operating. The siege was prosecuted with vigour, and was met with a strenuous resistance on the part of the English. The garrison, which had been increased to about 3000 men, though never in serious danger of losing the fortress by assault or bombardment, were at one time in sore straits owing to the lack of provisions and stores; but, when supplies for seven days only remained, were opportunely relieved by the arrival of fresh troops, food, and munitions of war. The siege was not finally raised until the 18th April, 1705, after having lasted for six months, during which time 70,000 shot and 8000 shell were thrown into the fortress. The loss of the besiegers was 10,000 men, of the besieged 400.

No further attempt was made against the Rock during the war, and it was finally ceded to Great Britain by Article X. of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, when a general peace was signed by the Sovereigns of England, Spain, France, and the other allies, with the exception of Austria.

The following were the terms of the cession:—

"The Catholic King does hereby for himself, his heirs, and successors, yield to the crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the Town and Castle of Gibraltar, together with the Port, fortifications, and forts belonging thereto. And he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely and with all manner of right for ever without any exception or impediment whatsoever. . . . And in case the possession of Gibraltar should hereafter be alienated, it is covenanted that a preference, to the entire exclusion of all other pretenders, shall be given to the Crown of Spain."

Upon this Treaty, even more than by right of conquest, the British claim to the retention of Gibraltar has since rested.

R. J. B. MAIR.

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summoned in Charles's name. The origin of the story may lie in the fact that the sailors planted the British flag on the works they took before the final summons and capitulation. It may well be that, when all was settled, Rooke ordered it to be removed, and so the perverted legend might have arisen."—R. J. B. M.

UNIFORM IN HIGHLAND REGIMENTS.

BY "ALBYNN GU BRAGH."

ANTICIPATING difficulties is usually a thankless task, but if the anticipation is with a view to overcoming them it may, perhaps, be of some use. This particular difficulty is one which will shortly become of deep interest to all connected with Highland regiments, and is one which effects the clothing department to a certain degree also, and therefore indirectly the British tax-payer.

In South Africa the issue of clothing during the war was, on the whole, simple, as all arms wore more or less the same boots, putties, and khaki clothing; but the Highland regiments introduced complications with five different tartans, and three different patterns of hose-tops, as well as other minor differences.

Nowhere is *esprit de corps* higher than in these regiments, and they cling with great tenacity not only to their peculiar tartans but also to their many less noticeable distinctions. Any one even daring to hint at alterations or changes is usually received with a howl of rage for interfering with what are fondly imagined to be time-honoured and historic appointments. "Some ignorant Englishman at the War Office who does not understand what he is doing!" is the cry. Now, it would be interesting to hear how many officers in Highland regiments know the origin of most of the differences in their kit, differences that it passes the wit of man to understand how any one can take a pride in, such as the peculiar cut of a spat, the number of tails to a garter-knot, and so on.

Nine officers out of ten could not say off-hand what differences there are between the *sgian dubh* their regiment wears and those of the other regiments, yet they would resent a change with great vigour.

If the truth was out it would probably appear that these distinctions were the inventions of interested outfitters, for the kit of Highland officers and men bears only a shadowy resemblance to the old Highland dress, and has been changed already many times and oft. For proof of this see Major Davidson's most excellent series of coloured plates in his two volume history of the 78th. The various alterations of kit shown therein are broadly

applicable to all Highland battalions, and most people will agree that they were not for the better.

Now, bearing in mind:—

a The difficulties connected with the supply of clothing during war.

b The tendency of the times to organise in brigades rather than in small units.

c The expenses which arise in transferring officers and men into other regiments with different uniforms.

d That the old Highland dress and the claymore who wore it (whose traditions the Highland regiments are now supposed to perpetuate) were practical to a degree in everything connected with war.

e That those who do not wish to be hopelessly "left" must move with the times.

f That it is always better to bring about your own reforms from within, rather than have outsiders tinkering at you from without.

Bearing in mind all the above, I venture, greatly daring, to bring forward the following suggestions in the hope that, though they may not meet with universal approval, they may lead the powers who control the fate of these historic battalions to consider how the present unpractical state of affairs may be remedied.

SUGGESTIONS.

1. That a universal *cath dath* or war-tartan be designed, uniform for the kilt or *feilebeag* throughout all the Highland regiments. The resultant hue at distances over 200 yards to be of the greenish—"Lovat mixture"—khaki, or some similar "invisible" colour, as all the present regimental tartans are too dark for the majority of the backgrounds we usually fight on. This design should present no difficulties, for the component colours of the regulation khaki-drab are blue, white, and four widely different shades of brown. Thin red and yellow lines might, without detracting from the invisibility, be introduced to make the tartan brighter looking at short distances. That rather unsightly compromise the khaki apron would thus disappear.

The cry at once goes up, "But you are going to do away with the historic tartans in which the different regiments have hitherto fought and won renown; you will ruin *esprit de corps* and everything else!" The answer is that some of these battalions have at one time worn other tartans in battle than those they now wear; and the senior one of all, the famous "Forty-twa," had originally a different tartan for each company, and yet seems to have survived the change.

2. The red [illegible] white jacket to be abolished, and their places tal[illegible] present regimental tartan for wear during [illegible] for walking out. Facings

as at present. This is not a new-fangled innovation, it is merely a reversion to an old fashion.

3. While retaining such easily removable things as the present badges, all the other items to be made of a universal pattern for all regiments: *e.g.*:—

Hose-tops.—The black and red of the 42nd are the most practical; the red and white show the dirt; and the red and green fade too easily in the sun.

Garter-knots.—To be simplified, and reduced in length.

Sporrans.—The present useless bunches of hair to be disposed of, and a practical leather purse, copied from some old pattern, to be introduced. This might have small detachable ornamental tassels for full-dress.

Head-dress.—It is time the feather-bonnet joined the sabre-tache and the gorget in the museum. A proper blue Highland bonnet (not a glengarry) with one, two, or three feathers, according to rank, to replace it for full-dress.

Officers' and Pipers' ornaments, such as full-dress belts, sporrans, dirks, sgian dubhs, etc., to be greatly simplified, and of two universal patterns. There are dozens of old examples of these articles to get good designs from; all the present ones are much too heavy, clumsy, and ornate.

4. Revert to the long-hose for walking out and ceremonial purposes; abolish the high white spat altogether, and introduce a short unobtrusive khaki one for service-dress to keep little stones and dirt out of the shoe.

It is sometimes said that it is necessary, from a military point of view, to go in for pipe-clay and gold lace, but the rifle regiments seem to get along excellently without them, and they are certainly both out of place in the Highland dress, especially the former. Try to imagine Prince Charlie's Army in white shell-jackets and pipe-clayed spats, or Rob Roy and Evan Dubh in gold dirk-belts!

Altogether the uniform might be much simplified with advantage to its utility, convenience, historic correctness, and appearance, to say nothing of the officers' and ratepayers' pockets.

5. Thus all Highland soldiers would be dressed the same in war, the regiments distinguished by the badges; and in peace their own tartans would be well to the fore in their coats.

The suggestions made in this article are not [illegible] ideas at all; [illegible] exception of the small spats for the service-dress they are [illegible] old fashions when the Highland dress was [illegible]

[illegible] points, such as steel [illegible] the regiments [illegible]

applicable to all Highland battalions, and most people will agree that they were not for the better.

Now, bearing in mind :—

(*a*) The difficulties connected with the supply of clothing during war.

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(*c*) The expenses which arise on transferring officers and men into other regiments with different uniforms.

(*d*) That the old Highland dress and the clansmen who wore it (whose traditions the Highland regiments are now supposed to perpetuate) were practical to a degree in everything connected with war.

(*e*) That those who do not wish to be hopelessly "left" must move with the times.

(*f*) That it is always better to bring about your own reforms from within, rather than have outsiders tinkering at you from without.

Bearing in mind all the above, I venture, greatly daring, to bring forward the following suggestions in the hope that, though they may not meet with universal approval, they may lead the powers who control the fate of these historic battalions to consider how the present unpractical state of affairs may be remedied.

SUGGESTIONS.

1. That a universal *cath dath* or war-tartan be designed, uniform for the kilt or *feilebeag* throughout all the Highland regiments. The resultant hue at distances over 200 yards to be of the greenish—"Lovat mixture"—khaki, or some similar "invisible" colour, as all the present regimental tartans are too dark for the majority of the backgrounds we usually fight on. This design should present no difficulties, for the component colours of the regulation khaki-drab are blue, white, and four widely different shades of brown. Thin red and yellow lines might, without detracting from the invisibility, be introduced to make the tartan brighter looking at short distances. That rather unsightly compromise the khaki apron would thus disappear.

The cry at once goes up, "But you are going to do away with the historic tartans in which the different regiments have hitherto fought and won renown; you will ruin *esprit de corps* and everything else!" The answer is that some of these battalions have at one time worn other tartans in battle than those they now wear; and the senior one of all, the famous "Forty-twa," had originally a different tartan for each company, and yet seems to have survived the change.

2. The red doublet and the white jacket to be abolished, and their places taken by a doublet of the present regimental tartan for wear during peace as full-dress and for walking out. Facings

as at present. This is not a new-fangled innovation, it is merely a reversion to an old fashion.

3. While retaining such easily removable things as the present badges, all the other items to be made of a universal pattern for all regiments: *e.g.*:—

Hose-tops.—The black and red of the 42nd are the most practical; the red and white show the dirt; and the red and green fade too easily in the sun.

Garter-knots.—To be simplified, and reduced in length.

Sporrans.—The present useless bunches of hair to be disposed of, and a practical leather purse, copied from some old pattern, to be introduced. This might have small detachable ornamental tassels for full-dress.

Head-dress.—It is time the feather-bonnet joined the sabre-tache and the gorget in the museum. A proper blue Highland bonnet (not a glengarry) with one, two, or three feathers, according to rank, to replace it for full-dress.

Officers' and Pipers' ornaments, such as full-dress belts, sporrans, dirks, sgian dubhs, etc., to be greatly simplified, and of two universal patterns. There are dozens of old examples of these articles to get good designs from; all the present ones are much too heavy, clumsy, and ornate.

4. Revert to the long-hose for walking out and ceremonial purposes; abolish the high white spat altogether, and introduce a short unobtrusive khaki one for service-dress to keep little stones and dirt out of the shoe.

It is sometimes said that it is necessary, from a military point of view, to go in for pipe-clay and gold lace, but the rifle regiments seem to get along excellently without them, and they are certainly both out of place in the Highland dress, especially the former. Try to imagine Prince Charlie's Army in white shell-jackets and pipe-clayed spats, or Rob Roy and Evan Dubh in gold dirk-belts!

Altogether the uniform might be much simplified with advantage to its utility, convenience, historic correctness, and appearance, to say nothing of the officers' and ratepayers' pockets.

5. Thus all Highland soldiers would be dressed the same in war, the regiments distinguished by the badges; and in peace their own tartans would be well to the fore in their coats.

The suggestions made in this article are not new ideas at all; with the exception of the small spats for the service-dress they are all based on the old fashions when the Highland dress was in daily practical use.

There are many minor points, such as steel scabbards, sword slings, sealed-pattern sewed-up plaids, the ridiculous tartan rag

issued to the men as a belted plaid, voluminous silk sashes, an unnecessary number of coats and jackets for officers, etc., which are merely enumerated here, but which might well be declared obsolete. They never were part of the old Highland dress.

6. A representative committee to be convened from all Highland Regular, Militia, and Volunteer battalions, with a leaven of civilians who are well up in the historical details, to thrash out the question, and to arrive at a decision for this new uniform. It would be on the following broad lines:—

SERVICE-DRESS.

Rank and File—
- Shoes.
- Black and red hose-tops.
- Garters.
- Short khaki spats.
- Cath dath kilt.
- Plain leather sporran.
- Service jacket (khaki-drab as at present).
- Head-dress according to climate (blue Highland bonnet in temperate climes).
- Bronze regimental badges on bonnet and sporran.

Officers, practically the same as above, but with badges of rank and appropriate appointments.
- Belts either brown leather or black. Sgian dubh.
- Mounted officers to wear cath dath breeches, with leggings or putties.

FATIGUE-DRESS.

All ranks—
- Shoes.
- Cath dath trews.
- Service jacket.
- Glengarry bonnet.

FULL-DRESS.

Rank and File—
- Shoes.
- Black and red long-hose (no spats).
- Garters.
- Cath dath kilt.
- Leather sporran with ornamental tassels.
- Doublet of regimental tartan and facings.
- Head-dress according to climate (blue Highland bonnet in temperate climes with one feather for sergeants and upwards).
- Silver or white metal badges on bonnet and sporran.

Officers, the same as above, but with buckles on shoes, full-dress sporran, plain black sword-belt with plain silver buckle, dirk-belt worn *under* the doublet, and sgian dubh.
- Feathers in Highland bonnet; field officers three, company officers two.
- [For levées, balls, etc., officers might wear kilt of the regimental tartan.]
- The red shell jacket might be retained as at present for mess.
- Mounted officers to wear ordinary trews, jack-boots to be abolished.

NOTE.—It seems to me that what is required might be effected, without expense, by the issue of a universal pattern *Cath dath* kilt for active service and manœuvres. The tartan kilt, if reserved for full dress and walking out, would last for several years; and the saving thus obtained would, I imagine, cover the cost of the service kilt.—ED. U. S. M.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,

Since writing the short article which appeared in the May number of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, entitled "Some Notes on Night Attacks in the Boer War," it has come to my knowledge that I have not accurately described the events regarding the construction of trenches in the Delhi manœuvres. My paper being written at home, from memory of these events, must be my excuse for this inaccuracy which has thus resulted.

In his criticism of the operations of the first phase of these manœuvres the director states :—

"The marching of the infantry of both armies was good, as was also the actual spade and shovel work; especially realistic and excellent was the work of the Northern Army on the night of the 6th December, when they took advantage of the darkness to work forward, so that when morning broke they were facing the infantry of the defence in equally well-constructed trenches at close range.

"The attack by one and a half battalions of General Whitby's brigade, and the seizure of Raja Kheree at dawn on the 7th, was an especially well-conceived and well-carried out operation."

You will see by this that the actual capture of the village referred to was a separate operation to that to which I referred in my paper, and the credit for it has been officially accorded to General Whitby. I cannot be sure now what brigade carried out this night trench work, but for the mere purpose of my essay this is immaterial.

I am, etc.,
H. R MEAD, Major,
46th Mahrattas
Indian Army.

NASIRABAD RAJPUTANA,
11, 6, '04.

SUNDRIES.

I.

EXTRACT FROM THE *CLARION*.

"WHAT is the Government doing? The Government is tinkering and muddling, and making bad worse.

"The state of the Army and Auxiliary Forces being nothing short of scandalous and dangerous, the latest propositions of the Government, as reported in the Press, take the shape of the abolition of the Militia and the reduction of the Army and the Volunteers.

"We are not to have more men, but less; and the declared object is to save money.

"Now, I am going to say here in plain words that one of the greatest sources of danger to the Empire is the incompetence of the Government. And when I use the word "Government," I mean it to apply, not only to the present Government, but also to all the Governments, Liberal and Tory, which I can remember during my own lifetime.

* * * * * *

"Now, what is the matter with the Government? How is it they cannot do the work for which they are paid their salaries? Here are some of the reasons:—

"1. They do not know anything about military matters.

"2. They are jealous of all the men who know more than they know themselves.

"3. They are afraid to resist the interested pressure brought to bear upon them by men and women in high places.

"4. They dare not ask for the necessary money, because they are afraid of losing office.

"5. They are afraid to tell the public the truth, for fear of losing votes.

"6. In their ignorance and their cowardice, they allow themselves to be hectored by naval and military men of the old school, who cling to tradition, and mistrust all innovation."

II.

The Austro-Hungarian Grand Imperial manœuvres will take place this year, says the *Armeeblatt*, in south-western Bohemia. The following troops will take part in them, viz. the whole of the VIIIth (Prague) and XIVth (Innsbruck) Army Corps; the greater part, if not the whole of the IXth (Josephstadt) and IInd (Vienna) Army Corps, as well as 4 divisions formed from the Landwehr and from men of the Tyrol. These troops are almost entirely Germans from Upper and Lower Austria, Salzbourg, the Tyrol, and Czecs from the districts of Bohemia and Moravia. Italians, Poles (1 Uhlan regiment), Hungarians and Bosnians are also represented. The *entourage* of the Emperor will be composed of the Grand Dukes Franz Ferdinand and Renier, the chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of War and of National Defence, and several distinguished generals.

III.

The *Reichswehr* states that the Emperor Francis-Joseph will invite the German Emperor to attend the Austrian-Hungarian Imperial manœuvres this year. The German Emperor, says that journal, will accept this invitation, and will, on the 1st September, proceed direct to the Castle of Stekna, which belongs to Prince Windisch-Grætz, without passing through Vienna. The Emperor Francis-Joseph will also stay at the Castle during the manœuvres,

immediately after which the German Emperor will return to Germany.

IV.

A new landing gun has been recently introduced into the Austrian Navy. It is the product of the Skoda works, Pilsen, and is entirely of Austrian manufacture, says the *Militär-Wochenblatt.* It is a 2·6-inch gun of nickel steel, and is 18 calibres in length. The barrel recoils on the carriage, and its support moves on a pivot. The system of laying the gun is that of the Austrian field gun, and the elevation is effected by two concentric screws. The barrel weighs 282 lbs.; the carriage, 194 lbs.; the brake, 16·5 lbs.; the axle, 48·5 lbs.; each wheel, 55 lbs.; gun and carriage, 793·6 lbs.; the limber, with 48 rounds, consisting of 16 shells and 32 shrapnel, 970 lbs.. The whole can be drawn by 10 men. The weight of the projectile is 8·8 lbs., and the muzzle velocity 1050 ft.

V.

The Commission on the Reorganisation of the Land forces of China, the president of which is Prince Ching, has agreed on the following plan of reorganisation, exclusive of the troops in the Pe-chi-li province: 4 large army groups will be formed, viz. 1 for Honan and Shan-tung, 1 for Liao-Kiang, 1 for Hu-Kuang, and 1 for Lian-Kuang. Each of these army districts will have a small arms manufactory and a gun foundry.

VI.

The French Grand Army manœuvres between the IIIrd and IVth Army Corps, under General Hagron, will take place in the country between Dreux, la Ferté-Vidame, Verneuil, Danville and Evreux. The concentration of the IVth Army Corps will take place at la Ferté-Vidame, and will cover Dreux, which will be assaulted by the IIIrd Army Corps. The 5th September will be the first day of the manœuvres, which will conclude with the taking of Dreux. The assembly for the grand review will be on the 15th September. The 1st Cavalry Division will take part in these manœuvres.

Large Cavalry manœuvres will take place from the 30th August to the 8th September, under General Burnez, of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, joined in for the last four days by the 42nd Infantry Division. The theatre of operations will be bounded by Joinville, St. Dizier, St. Michiel, and Gondrecourt.

VII.

Every year, at the commencement of the fine weather, the cadets at the French military schools, under the supervision of their instructors, undertake various instructional movements on foot, on horseback, and also by rail; these movements are divided into two categories, viz. the first embracing the study of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery tactics, military history, General Staff

duties, and the art of fortification; the second consists of journeys on the frontiers and coasts. The first period extends from the 15th May to the 18th August, the latter from the 23rd June to the 7th August. The country for this year's frontier journey lies between Toulon and Albertville, and includes the harbours at the Toulon arsenal.

VIII.

The appendices to the draft French Navy estimates for 1905, state that the new vessels to be laid down during the year number 33, and consist of 1 armoured cruiser, 4 torpedo vessels, and 8 submarines, to be built in the various Government dockyards; whilst private firms will receive orders for 20 other submarines.

IX.

The *Marine Verordnungsblatt* has recently published a decision of the Emperor that in addition to the fleet already detailed the following vessels will take part in this year's naval manœuvres:—From the 4th to the 10th September the *Schwaben*, the *Prince Adalbert*, the *Pelican*, the *Carola* and 2 torpedo-boats; from the 4th to the 13th September the *Nymphe* and the *Hamburg*. The Emperor will himself be present at these manœuvres on board the flagship *Kaiser Wilhelm II.* It is also said that he may perhaps take command in person.

X.

According to the *Engineer* the following are the particulars of the new German battleship *Lothringen*, which was launched at the Schichau yards, Danzig, recently. Length between perpendiculars, 398·63 ft.; beam, 73·82 ft.; draught, 25·1 ft.; displacement, 13,400 tons; engines, 16,000 to 17,000 horse-power; speed about 19 knots. The armour-belt extends right round the ship, and the citadel above it occupies a length of about 246 ft. amidships. She will carry four 11-inch guns, two in each turret, fore and aft; fourteen 6·7-inch guns, ten in casemates, divided by thick splinter screnes, and four in turrets; twenty 3·46-inch guns, some with shields and some without; four 1·45-inch machine guns, and two mitrailleuses in the tops; and six 17·7-inch torpedo tubes, all submerged.

XI.

The June number of the *Internationale Revue über die gesamten Armeen und Flotten* gives a most interesting account of the Japanese Imperial manœuvres held last year in the neighbourhood of Seltsu, in which 4 divisions took part. The directions of the manœuvres were in the hands of the Emperor and of Field Marshal Marquis Oyama, recently appointed to the chief command of the Japanese forces in Manchuria. The two sides were commanded by General Kuroki (now commanding the 1st Japanese Army), and by Lieut.-General Baron Yamaguchi. The manœuvres were, on the whole, very good, the Infantry, as usual, appearing to

the best advantage. The Cavalry seemed more efficient than formerly, and the Artillery appeared to have learnt much, although their movements were at times slow and heavy, more especially as all three of the divisions were only armed with mountain guns. The pioneers had frequently to make bridges, and displayed the greatest ability. The most instructive and interesting part of the manœuvres was the transport by sea of the 11th Division from Shikoku to Kobe, which was conducted with extraordinary rapidity and in good order.

XII.

In accordance with the advice of the Artillery Experimental Commission the Portuguese Government have just placed a contract with the Schneider firm for the supply of 36 Q.F. field batteries, of 4 guns and 8 ammunition waggons, or altogether 144 guns and 288 ammunition waggons; 2 batteries must be delivered by the 9th December next, 12 by the 9th May, 1905, and 22 by the 9th May, 1906.

XIII.

According to official lists the Swiss Federal Army consists, including officers, of 236,431 men of the Élite and Landwehr, this distributed:—

Élite: Infantry, 114,971; Cavalry, 5107; Artillery, 17,464; Engineers, 5763; Medical Service, 1919; Administrative Services, 1414; total, 147,861 men.

Landwehr: 18,659; 1st Levy, 41,435; 2nd Levy, 25,476 men.

The distribution of the whole by the various arms is as follows:—

Infantry, 178,522; Cavalry, 8904; Artillery, 30,326; Engineers, 10,246; Medical Services, 3796; Administrative Services, 2251; Cyclists, 109. Total, 7104 officers, 28,303 non-commissioned officers, and 198,747 men.

In addition the Landsturm consists of 294,388 men, 45,864 are combatants, and 242,524 non-combatants.

REVIEWS.

'THE HISTORY OF THE KING'S BODYGUARD OF THE YEOMEN OF THE GUARD,' ETC., ETC.

By Colonel Sir REGINALD HENNELL, Kt., D.S.O., lieutenant of the King's Bodyguard. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd. 1904. Price £3 3s.

It is characteristic of the Island-English love of ancient institutions and old names for things that have passed away, that this title has been retained, though the Yeoman proper has almost ceased to exist in England for nigh a hundred years.

Sir Reginald Hennell, in his interesting book, has not confined himself to the 400 years of the uninterrupted existence of the Yeomen of the Guard, but gives us a picturesque glimpse of all former bodyguards of English kings from the days of Canute. He then traces with an indefatigable labour of love the origin and history of the Yeomen of the Guard from the time of its baptism of blood on Bosworth field up to the present.

It is interesting to note the selection of the *Yeoman* for his bodyguard by the Tudor King. The aristocracy, who would seem to be the natural guardians of the throne, had become such violent partisans during the Wars of the Roses, on the battlefields of which the Yeomen had been but pawns, that the Tudor House determined to rest itself on the broader foundations of the people.

Henry VIII.'s Archer Yeomen had proved their mettle on more than one Continental battlefield, and overthrown men-at-arms, as their ancestors had done at Cressy.

The records of Henry VII.'s reign are extremely meagre, because the invention of printing tempted men rather to print the history of the past than to multiply the manuscripts of the present, and this has greatly increased the labour of the early part of Sir Reginald's task, while the end has been made difficult by the destruction of the manuscripts of the Guard in the burning of St. James' Palace in 1809; but he tells us graphically how the little band of Yeomen, mostly of Welsh extraction, as behoved the followers of a King of Tudor race, clung round him in exile, and protected him against the last furious onslaught of Richard III. on Bosworth field, until the battered crown which had adorned the helmet of the fallen king was found in a holly-bush and brought to his successor.

Henry showed his gratitude by inaugurating them as a permanent bodyguard within three weeks of that date, and they again followed him to the war in France, where we have the record of

the doughty John Person, who, "when his leg was smitten off, still fought upon his stump."

Another member of the Guard saved the Standard of the Emperor Maximilian during the French wars of that period.

In Henry VIII.'s reign they accompanied him abroad to aid Ferdinand in his war against the Moors in Spain, and in 1513 they fought at the sieges of Tournai and Théronanne. Later they appeared on the less bloody field of the cloth of gold.

The Guard was at its zenith in the reign of Henry VIII., "who strove to make them the most powerful bodyguard in Europe."

The stalwart monarch was not ashamed to appear in their uniform, and we are told of a Harun Alraschid incident with a cobbler.

The history of the Yeomen from this time virtually becomes the history of the kings.

Though kings may come and kings may go, the Guard go on for ever; and they never seem to flinch from their duty, whether it be smoothing the crumples in the king's bed or attending the dismal execution of heretics under Mary.

As we may imagine, the captaincy of the Guard was greatly sought after during the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth, and the most brilliant holder of this post was our first Empire-builder, Sir Walter Raleigh—soldier, sailor, explorer, courtier, poet, historian. The story of his destruction to placate the enemies of England is history that repeats itself, as also "the dislike of even the higher classes to military service at the commencement of Elizabeth's reign, overcome by the threat of invasion," when "every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and sixty enlisted into the Militia, and royal fleets sprang into existence, manned by willing hands." All immediate danger removed, the nation sinks back into apathy. As Sir Reginald pithily remarks: "When Elizabeth came to the throne, all ranks were averse to militarism, the country was defenceless. She left the English an armed nation. We wish we could say they had remained so ever since."

The faithful character of the Guard is shown by their again following their king into exile. They return triumphant with Charles II.

When James II. fled, they continued to guard his palace, and the continuity of their service was not broken on the accession of William and Mary. It is to the king's credit that he did not displace them by his own Dutch Guard, and carried them with him to the battle of the Boyne. They afterwards saved him from assassination on more than one occasion.

Incidentally this history removes something of the acrid criticism by Thackeray of the "Four Georges." We are shown the first George, a real soldier from his youth, trusting himself entirely to the protection of half a dozen Yeomen of the Guard, who had orders to let the people walk with him. The diminutive figure of the second George, the last king of his race who appeared on a stricken field, excites our admiration, as dismounting from his runaway horse, he places himself at the head of his Guards, at

Dettingen, with the laughing remark, "Now I know I shall not run away," and leads them, on foot, to victory.

With the death of their fighting king, the Guard, as a body, laid aside for ever their duties in the field, though as individuals every man bears on his breast the record of distinguished service performed before he takes up the halberd of the Yeoman. The heart of every true Englishman goes out to the grizzled veterans on their last parades, and to the soldier-historian who so graphically gives us their story.

'NATIONAL SERVICE.'

THE ONLY EFFECTIVE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

By Colonel E. C. BROWNE, Brigadier-General Volunteer Force, late commanding 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers and 21st Regimental District. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons. 1904. Price 1s. net.

THE title of this brochure, in its explanatory part, conveys a perfectly correct idea which the author does not, however, appear to have grasped in the fulness of its proper significance. He attempts, and necessarily fails, to make a lesser matter include a greater, instead of the contrary; in short, he proposes that an organisation made for purposes of purely Home Defence shall, by the force of sentiment, provide also for Imperial Defence, instead of dealing at once with the greater question and thereby disposing also of its factors, of which Home Defence is one. By all means let the Regular Army be reduced in numbers, and consequently in cost, and with the savings thus effected let us create a National Army based upon universal training—in schools. But in view of possible wars with Great Powers we cannot afford to leave the question of defending the Empire in territories beyond the seas, be they foreign or Colonial, to the incoherent patriotism of individuals. We cannot expect to wage a successful war with regiments and battalions collected anyhow on the outbreak of that war; the units must be properly organised and available, as such, for immediate mobilisation when the need arises.

Provided that we train all our boys, so far as they can conveniently be trained at school, and subsequently give further training to a proportion of them so as to bring the corps in which they are enrolled up to a standard slightly superior to that now attained by the existing Militia, we shall have done all that is required; because the Navy will either be victorious, and thus give the necessary time for the National Army to render itself fit for war, or else the Navy will be beaten, in which case the efficiency or inefficiency of the Army will be of little consequence. But it is upon an Army, not upon individuals, that we have need to rely. It may or may not be possible to create a National Army by voluntary methods, but at all events it is certainly possible to do

so by utilising the Militia ballot as the basis of the recruiting system or as an auxiliary thereto; and by one means or another an army, national or otherwise, we *must* have. The "Blue Water School" overlook the fact that the Navy can fight only at sea, and that complete victory has never been won in any great war by the unaided exercise of sea-power. The basis of our British defensive and offensive is sea-power; but an army is required to reap the fruits of naval victories. The fact that if the Navy is defeated the Army is useless, does not affect the truth of the previous assertion. Colonel Browne and others who advocate the compulsory training of our male population for the purposes of a strong Home Defence Army are doing good, assuming the success of their advocacy, to this extent, that they are thus inserting the thin end of the wedge. If the British nation can be brought to realise that it is the duty of the citizen to defend his country, a step will have been taken towards the desired end, and it may subsequently be more easy to establish the fact that there can be no sound system of defence unless it be one that includes ample forces wherewith to attack the enemy. Subject to the limitation just asserted, Colonel Browne's brochure is valuable; and apart therefrom it is quite worth reading. Colonel Browne falls, however, into the too common error of desiring to train too many men. Let us by all means train *every* schoolboy whilst at school; but enrolment in the National Militia should be limited to the annual quota actually required to produce, on, say, a twelve years' engagement, a Reserve Army numbering about one million effective *men*.

'THE VIEWS OF CHRISTOPHER.'

WITH A PREFACE BY COULSON KERNAHAN.

London: Elkin Matthews, Vigo Street, 1904. Price 2*s*. net.

CHRISTOPHER keeps a string of well-bred, active hobbies, and is supremely happy riding them over or through all kinds of ethical obstacles. Nothing checks the impetuous career of this bold horseman; the post and rails that his gallant steed cannot jump he bursts asunder with a crash, and no brook is so broad that he cannot arrive on the other side—at all events with a scramble. What Christopher yearns for is a close alliance, for the betterment of society, between the forces represented by *noblesse oblige* and the manly religion of a Saint Paul. Christopher takes the Great Apostle of the Gentiles for his pattern of a truly gallant gentleman —as in truth he was—and the chivalrous Sir Nigel Loring, so charmingly depicted by Conan Doyle, would certainly have said of Christopher, "By Saint Paul; a gentle knight from whom much honour and advancement might be gained."

Christopher contrasts, for example, the social tone of to-day with that which prevailed in the times of the crusaders. These warriors, he says, were indeed the "originators of the curse of

absentee landlordism"—and they had other faults; but in their day "a man who injured his order by behaving like a low cad, of necessity injured the members of it. It is a thousand pities that this clause of the creed of a gentleman has become obsolete to-day." Christopher is himself obviously a gentleman, and a lively hater of everything "caddish," a firm believer in muscular christianity, and a very voluble idealist. He does not tell us how often he has been "fined five pounds and costs" for assaults committed in the interests of good manners; but the occasions must surely have been many.

A definite opinion as to the probable reception that awaits this little book is hard to give; the majority of readers who attempted the whole at a sitting would probably be bored, but not so if the chapters are taken separately. Many will be much pleased, whilst others will dub Christopher a prig and therefore a bore. But amongst those whose approval will certainly be gained will be the tiny remnant of Gentlewomen and Gentlemen who still survive the pressure of advancing vulgarity. To the "ladies and gentlemen," who are accepted as such upon account of their raiment and habitations, Christopher will appeal in vain—one page of him will suffice for them.

'QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE TEXT-BOOK OF MILITARY LAW.'

Compiled by Captain H. R. GALL. London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall, S.W. 1904. Price 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE text-book in use at the R.M.C. has been so judiciously as well as extensively cut down, that its contents include little that the subaltern does not require to know; and therefore little that the cadet should not learn before he joins. Books of questions and answers, properly employed, are valuable aids to working up a subject; but unfortunately they are too generally consulted for purposes of unintelligent "cramming." Some such books are really good of their kind, and Captain Gall's present work is most certainly of the number; but, strictly speaking, all "cram" books are as objectional as the system of examinations that renders them almost absolutely essential. Meanwhile Captain Gall has conferred an undeniable boon upon the officers who teach military law at the R.M.C., by providing an ample selection of sound useful questions ready for their use.

'FROM THE GUN-ROOM TO THE THRONE.'

BEING THE LIFE OF VICE-ADMIRAL H. S. H. PHILIP D'AUVERGNE, DUKE OF BOUILLON.

By HENRY KIRKE, M.A., B.C.L. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. 1904. Price 5*s*.

SINCE Philip D'Auvergne passed through the various ranks of the British Navy to his petty sovereignty—and the loss of it; others, King William IV. and H.R.H. the late Duke of Cobourg, have also kept watch before succeeding to more exalted positions. D'Auvergne was a good officer and his naval career, as well as the misfortunes that attended the closing scenes of his life, will be found interesting. Yet the number of people who will pay five shillings for so small a volume cannot be expected to be very great, and this is a pity, because D'Auvergne deserves to be rescued from oblivion.

'THE PREVENTION OF DISEASE IN ARMIES IN THE FIELD.'

By ROBERT CALDWELL, F.R.C.S., D.P.H., Major R.A.M.C., member late War Office Committee on Field Sanitation in connection with the South African campaign; late member Sanitary Committee, Island of St. Helena; senior medical officer, Zululand; medical officer in charge of Isolation Hospital and District Laboratory, First Army Corps. London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 8, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden. 1904. Price 5*s*.

THIS work starts with an acknowledgment of the failure of sanitation in the South African war, and of the consequent subsoil pollution of camping-grounds. The author considers that enteric fever may have a pythogenic origin, and that the disease may not in all cases spring from a specific cause, but as enteric fever was endemic in South Africa before the war, and as our troops quartered there suffered from it in the first eight months of 1899 to a greater extent than did British troops in India during the same period, it seems hardly necessary to travel so far afield, besides, no large body of troops, under the sanitary conditions which existed in the Home Army in 1899, could leave England without taking with them the seeds of the disease; it is as difficult to believe that a cat could beget a tiger as to believe in the transformation of another bacillus into the *bacillus typhosus*. Necessarily these theories are indefinite, but they are suggestive, and they are welcomed as showing the present interest of the R.A.M.C. in questions of sanitation, which has been, alas! too long delayed. That an army travels on its belly is a military maxim as regards food-supply, but the author shows it to be no less true in relation to the prevention of such diseases as dysentery, diarrhœa, and enteritis. Preventive measures

are tersely given, and are generally of a practical character. Without entering into details, it may be said that the necessity for a properly organised sanitary service to prevent subsoil pollution and all other sanitary defects, which hitherto have been the curse of armies in the field, is fully demonstrated. Major Caldwell's work has been awarded the Parkes Memorial Prize, consisting of seventy-five guineas and a bronze medal. The author is to be heartily congratulated upon this well-earned recognition of his undeniable merits, and the R.A.M.C. has good reason to feel proud of the success achieved by a brother officer.

A German Map of Eastern Asia, with 14 inset maps of districts thereof, has been imported by Messrs. Williams & Norgate, 14, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, and is offered by that firm at 1*s.* 6*d.* The map appears to be an excellent one of its kind; but we have already others, British and French, that are more useful; because, being on a larger scale, they are better adapted to the purpose of following the course of the operations in Southern Manchuria. Yet the more maps we have at our disposal the better chance have we of identifying places, the names of which are so continuously being spelled differently, and which so often are extremely similar and therefore likely to confuse our minds.

The Army on Itself.—The Editor is very sorry that Mr. Gwynne's valuable book, which he has read with the greatest interest, is amongst the number of those works which he is compelled to set aside for review next month. Every one who is intelligently interested in the Army should read and ponder over the evidence that Mr. Gwynne has collected.

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

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

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

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

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 910.—SEPTEMBER, 1904.

THE USES OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE WHITECHAPEL ART GALLERY TO AN EAST END AUDIENCE.

BY JOHN LEYLAND.

THE subject into which we are about to inquire is one of very great and, it might be said, of quite capital importance to all of us. It is the significance, the functions, and the employment of the British fleet, of that force upon which we all largely depend for our material safety and the immunity we enjoy, whether we be inhabitants of these islands, or members of that race which is sometimes spoken of as "our children beyond the seas." It is a subject of equal importance to us whatever manner of men we be; for do we not all cherish this England of ours to keep it free from the foot of the invader?—

> "This precious stone set in the silver sea
> Which serves it in the office of a wall,
> Or as a moat defensive to a house,
> Against the envy of less happier lands;
> This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England."

Do we not all live by the produce of other lands that comes to us across the sea? Do we not, many of us, gain our livelihood by working with our hands at the raw materials which reach us from abroad? Do we not all of us cling to those daughter colonies that drew their life from Mother England?

Let us realise to the full the enormous significance to an Island and an Empire like ours of what we have learned to speak of as Sea-power. Let us discover the conditions out of which the British Navy came, and that have made it what it is, and bring to mind what is its relation to the defence of these islands, to the protection of our commerce, our food supplies, and the raw materials for our manufacture, and also to the safeguarding of our imperial heritage.

In speaking of the origin of the British fleet, I might invite you to think of the war galleys of the Vikings, of the "keels" of our Saxon ancestors, of the ships of the Normans, the fleets of the Cinque Ports, and those vessels wherein the men of mediæval England waged war with England's foes. But I do not seek the origin of our Navy in those distant times. If we would discover the chief cause in its development, the very beginning of it, as we know it to-day, we shall find it in the explorations of the great old navigators. There have been times when the sea has acted as a barrier, when navigators have shrunk from its perils, and have pushed along the coasts, dreading the portents of the storms. But the age came when that which had been a barrier became a pathway, and a means for the discoveries and the meeting of men. Now the triumphs of the great navigators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries operated in two principal ways—first, by bringing about an immense development in the seaman's art and craft, and in the material means at his disposal, and secondly, in calling for the exercise of sea-power on a vastly greater scale. I know no more inspiring thoughts than those which arise from a contemplation of the exploration and development of the unknown countries of the world. Conceive what it must have been to those valiant captains of Prince Henry of Portugal, "the Navigator," to push, in successive voyages, along the west coast of Africa, until, at length, Vasco da Gama doubled the Cape of Good Hope, doubled what he called the Cape of Storms, and was the first of modern men to reach India by sea. Imagine what were the labours and the glories of Columbus and his successors, traversing the ocean to open up the new continent of America; of Magellan also, when he pushed through the narrow strait which bears his name; and of Juan Sebastian del Cano, first of these great seafarers to circumnavigate the globe. They were a splendid band of men, those old seamen, and we will link with them Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, the first of Europeans to set eyes on the great Pacific, and of whom his countrymen said that he never knew when he was beaten. We might add Juan de la Cosa, the bold pilot of Biscay; and Ojeda, and Nicuesa, and many more.

The names which I have mentioned are not the names of Englishmen, and we shall presently discern the significance of that fact. They are the names of men on whom had fallen the maritime heritage of the old Phœnicians, of Carthage, and of Rome, who had drawn their instincts and their ambitions from the States of Venice and Genoa, and who dwelt mostly in the Iberian Peninsula of Spain and Portugal, between the great ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. It is good for us Englishmen, who live by the sea, to whom, I may say, it is food and raiment, to whom it is sword and buckler, to

contemplate their achievements, and to recognise in their endeavours and their valour qualities comparable to our own.

You know, I think, the surprising development of commerce which resulted from their voyages—the rich argosies of silver that plenished and replenished the treasury of Spain, the ferment that arose for the spices and gems of the Oriental world. Englishmen were not behindhand in this widening of knowledge and this extension of endeavour. There was Sir Hugh Willoughby, who perished on the coast of Lapland; there was Borough, who passed between Nova Zembla and the Russian mainland; Pet, who penetrated the Kara Sea beyond; and there were others who proved their enterprise in attempting the North-East passage. Nor do we forget Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, and many more, whose names are written on the maps where they made their efforts to discover the more celebrated passage by the North-West. Men like these, and like the more famous John Hawkins and Francis Drake, were not to be baulked in their quest of treasure where it was to be discovered at sea; and it is a fact, not to be overlooked, that the growth of our power which followed was due to the determined efforts of such men to wrest from the foreigner the advantages he had won. Spain had set up exclusive monopolies in her West Indian and American settlements, and Drake and his comrades determined to grasp a share. His voyages are written in all our histories. You have heard of that adventurous cruise in which he took Nombre de Dios, sacked Venta Cruz, laid hands on the silver-laden mules of Spanish grandees, and came home with more treasure than ever ship had brought to England before. It was an achievement which he afterwards surpassed, capturing Spanish ships and towns by the dozen, circumnavigating the globe, and returning with wealth that seemed fabulous.

Now, to Englishmen, Drake was a hero, but to Spaniards only a pirate and a robber, the sharing of whose plunder by Elizabeth was considered sufficient reason for an appeal to arms. We need not go much further, I think, to discover the cause of the despatch of the "Invincible Armada," of which you have heard so much, in 1588. How it was defeated I shall not pause to tell you. "By whom was the invasion of the Armada met?" asks Professor Seeley. "Not by the Hotspurs of mediæval chivalry, not by the archers who won Crecy for us, but by a new race of men such as mediæval England had not known—by the hero buccaneers, the Drakes and the Hawkinses, whose lives had been spent in tossing upon that ocean which to their fathers had been an unexplored, unprofitable desert. Now, for the first time, might it be said of England—what the popular song assumes to have been always true of her—that 'Her march is on the ocean wave.'"

I have dwelt rather at length upon these matters, because they serve to illustrate how intimately the British Navy was, and is, bound up with the safety and extension of commerce; and, of course, it is equally obvious that the defeat of the Spaniards in [illegible] protected this country from the invasion that was planned. The victory greatly stimulated our maritime enterprise, both east and west, by inspiring the people with confidence in superiority at sea, and by opening fresh avenues for activity and enterprise. There was no disguise as to the warlike character of commercial enterprise in those times. The squadrons of the merchants trading to the East were organised as if for war, the principal ship being known as the Admiral, and the second as the Vice-Admiral, while the commanders in each were called the General and the Lieut.-General. Captain Lancaster, in 1601, going out to the East, captured a Portuguese vessel on the coast of Guinea with her cargo of wine, oil, and meal. In the Straits of Malacca he effected a similar capture. And in the same way, almost every adventure of those times was accompanied by acts in the nature of war. You will see that I am showing how, in extending our dominion through the world and in securing the fruits of commerce, our naval power mainly had its origin; and you will perceive that, as it is origin, so it is use. It is primarily concerned with the extension of influence, the protection of trade, and the prosperity of the country and empire.

The commercial struggle was not with Spain alone; the Dutch, who had grown from a race of herring fishers to be the ruling commercial people of the world, had been before us also. They had gained possessions in the East, and were undisguisedly bent on expelling their Portuguese, Spanish, and other rivals. By the massacre at Amboyna in 1623, they drove the British Trading Company from the Eastern Archipelago to the Indian Continent, and this perhaps led eventually to the foundation of our Indian Empire. The events of Amboyna were but a prelude to the Navigation Act of the Long Parliament, which was levelled at the Dutch carrying trade and led to the three Dutch wars, from which we emerged victorious. We look back, in those wars, to the adventures of Blake, Penn, Aysoue, and their companions, conspicuous with the fiery spirit of Tromp and the great seamanship of De Ruyter. It is unnecessary, of course, to describe them. Their result was to break the power of the Netherlands, and to drive them into the arms of France, with the result that much of their trade passed to us, and we inherited the sea-power they had lost.

But another conflict, and a long and an arduous one, had yet to be waged. The French were our rivals in the Old World and

the New. Jacques Cartier had been before Frobisher and Drake. Champlayne and his companion had established the settlements of Canada and Acadie, and La Salle had descended from the head waters of the Mississippi even to the Gulf of Mexico. It is beyond my scope to recount to you the course of that great struggle, which shook the world by its tumult, and left us, when Trafalgar had made Waterloo possible, undisputed masters of the sea and the commercial world. It was a struggle which we may well believe to have been inevitable, and that reflects equal credit upon both Englishmen and Frenchmen. Both fought worthily in causes which they regarded as equally noble. It was a war filled with action, and marked by many glorious engagements. It was distinguished not less, at times, by what has been described as a noiseless pressure exerted upon the vitals of France: "That compulsion," says Captain Mahan, "whose silence, when once noted, becomes, to the observer, the most striking and awful mark of the working of sea-power"—that power, let me add, exerted even in peace, and as an agency of peace, which compels the actions of nations, as a magnet compels the movements of filings of iron, without any visible manifestation of effort—that same power which enabled us to send hundreds of thousands of men, and thousands of tons of stores from England and India to South Africa, undisturbed by the jealousy of foreign rivals.

This brief survey of naval history should convince us, if we felt any doubt about it, that the Navy is, as I said at the beginning, intimately bound up with our material welfare—that it is part and parcel of that welfare. We are, in the first place, an island people. I ask you to reflect what that means. "England," wrote Sir Walter Raleigh, "is a country that can never be conquered while the sovereigns thereof have the command of the sea." Our wars are not marked on the map by those crossed swords, which show, on the soil of other countries, where they have done battle with foreign foes. By reason of our being encircled by the sea we are spared, and we believe that we may always be spared, from the impost of blood under which the nations of the Continent are bowed down. I have recalled to your memory how Shakespeare speaks of England as "This precious stone set in the silver sea," protected by a wall or moat. Mark that the sea is the wall that surrounds us—the moat or wet ditch that keeps out the foe. I ask you to direct your attention to the immunity which the fleet gives us from invasion. In this matter the naval factor is necessarily dominant, and the fleet the gauge of our security. Just as the Navy of Alfred was a protection against the Danes, and just as in 1588 we were protected against the Spaniards, so did the blockade that preceded

Trafalgar and the battle itself protect us from invasion by the French. As the Duke of Wellington said, "We have no defence, nor hope of defence, except in our fleet." Let us, then, realise as a cardinal fact that a Navy which is insufficient is prodigiously dear, since its failure would imply immeasurable calamity, while a sufficient Navy will be cheap, at any cost, if it fulfil its purpose.

I shall not dwell upon what would result from an invasion of these islands. We cannot admit that any invasion in force is possible. We cannot contemplate such a possibility without dismay. We do not contemplate it. I think it is clear that command of the sea is at once the natural and the only defence of a country like ours, or of any other similarly circumstanced against invasion. This is the teaching of history. The records of eight hundred years are the proof of it. Never, when Englishmen have held together, has hostile foot been set upon our shores. We cannot misread the lesson of such a history. We cannot explain it unless we admit, as we must, that it results from immutable conditions. The truth is that the operations of war are ruled by the risks they involve, and we shall not be true to ourselves unless we make that risk so appalling that no would-be invader will venture the attempt.

I do not wish you to forget that raids, more or less serious, may possibly be attempted, that scattered bodies of men may even be disembarked. But I would offer this important consideration, that these islands will always possess enough of manhood—of manhood to be organised—to resist such raiding attacks. Remember that until we have asserted command of the sea, we shall be unable to despatch troops abroad, and when once we have established that complete command of the sea, enabling us so to despatch them, then no chance of serious attack upon us will remain. An old writer, about the year 1422, anticipating what Shakespeare puts so well, wrote these words—

> "Keep then the sea that is the wall of England,
> And then is England kept by God's hand;
> That, for anything that is without,
> England were at ease without doubt."

While I speak of the Navy as our safeguard against invasion, I am not oblivious that there are those who argue, and argue with great cogency, that, with our command of the sea once lost, we should be reduced to the calamity of submission without a man being landed upon our shores. We have a population in these islands of forty-one millions, and those who have reflected upon the subject feel great anxiety as to the question of food supplies in time of war. A haunting fear is abroad that we may fail to do in the future what we have accomplished in the past, accompanied

by the conviction that if we fail our failure will be final and irretrievable, whereas, in the past, it might have been merely temporary and remediable. Certain facts bearing upon the question of food supplies are indisputable. Some three-fourths of the food we consume comes to us from abroad, the greater part of it carried in British ships, which are liable to capture or destruction by an enemy strong enough to hold his own against the British Navy. There are millions of our people who live on the margin of subsistence, and, in the event of food rising in price to any serious extent, they would be brought face to face with starvation. The constriction of national industries would add other millions to these, with a result which no man can measure, and which no Englishman will care to contemplate. The poor would be the first to feel the pinch, and eminent men of business in the corn trade have expressed the opinion that if we were involved in a European war, we must be prepared to see bread at famine prices. There is, says one writer most forcibly, no arguing with an empty belly!

Let us not, however, be discouraged by dismal apprehensions. Let us realise that, in this matter also, the Navy is to us all in all. The problem of protecting maritime commerce has been solved successfully by this country in the past, and, in the nature of things, there is nothing to prevent its successful solution in the future. It has become more complex, but, with foresight and naval preparedness, we may feel reasonable assurance of safety. We cannot contemplate a state of affairs which would immediately place the common necessities of life far beyond the reach of the poor, and things must never be allowed to come to a pass like that. Never can they come to it if our sea-power be maintained, never, to quote Shakespeare once more, "If England to itself do rest but true."

But what I have said concerning the problem of food supplies is only one part of a great question, and here I pass on to another portion of my subject. The sea-borne commerce of the Empire differs enormously in degree, and altogether in kind from that of other countries. By it we exist, and we cannot exist in any other way. Unless we maintain it, we perish. Our complex industries depend upon it, and nothing but ruin could result from the cutting off of the raw materials of our commerce, and the break down of our Colonial and foreign trade. It has been estimated that the total value of our property at sea reaches the colossal sum of 1700 millions sterling. Now it is not to be denied that nations are in no way so vulnerable as in their commercial life. Commerce is, in fact, the chief object of attack, in all naval operations, and it will not be questioned that the result of an unsuccessful war might well cripple us for generations—perhaps for ever.

Some, who have had a fond trust in that instrument known as the Declaration of Paris, have said that our mercantile marine might be made safe, upon the outbreak of war, by placing it under a neutral flag or flags; but no one ever seems to have considered how that prodigious operation could be conducted in the tumult and confusion incident to a state of war. How could this be done when we remember that the express condition laid down in the Declaration is that the captains and crews of the ships employed must be, in very large proportion, of that nationality whose flag is represented at the peak; that some countries have not subscribed to the Declaration at all; and that France will not recognise the neutral flag unless every arrangement connected with the transfer of shipping is made before the declaration of hostilities.

The neutral flag, as you are aware, is supposed to cover the enemy's goods, unless they be contraband of war. But what is contraband of war? That has never been defined. There was an occasion when that expansive term included rice. There is no reason, so far as we can see, why it should not some day include corn, coal, or other vital necessity. In short, so unsatisfactory is this treaty, and so elusive in its character, that Lord Charles Beresford has accurately described it as, "false, rotten, misleading, and treacherous." It is worth while to remember, too, the words of Washington, "To secure respect for a neutral flag requires a naval force able and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression."

Evidently, we cannot trust for our commercial protection to such an instrument as the Declaration of Paris. We can trust to nothing but the British fleet—to that fostering force under which our commercial prosperity has grown and exists—which must alike be the instrument of our power and the safeguard of our supplies without which we should be reduced to impotence and decay.

And now I enter upon the last part of my subject, a part of it, indeed, which, though I separate it for clearness, is really inseparable from the considerations already suggested. We are not an island people only. We are an Empire with dominions scattered throughout the globe, upon which the sun never sets. The world has no parallel for an Empire like ours. We are accustomed, sometimes, to look back to the Colonies of Greece as something of a prototype, but there never existed that intimate bond between them which holds our Empire together. We cannot do without our Colonies. They cannot exist as prosperous communities without ourselves. "If our islands fall," said Nelson, speaking of certain possessions then of value, "England would be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves." It is by reason of our possessing sea-power that the commerce of the Colonies has grown, that their

credit has been maintained, and that they have been able to borrow cheaply the money necessary for their development.

Much of what I said concerning the defence of the kingdom against invasion applies with equal force to the defence of the Empire at large. Without command of the sea, each of our Colonies is open to attack, with the ultimate consequence, if success attend the enemy's arms, that the bond of our Empire would be severed. Let us not forget that the rich Colony is the ripe fruit which falls into the lap of the finally dominant Power. It was thus that Spain lost the Indies, that Holland was shorn of the means of her vast commercial power, that France was deprived of the lands that had been won by the energy of her sons and the might of her sword. In our upward struggle towards our present unexampled state we have conquered each of these, and have grown to be the greatest Empire in the world. Who shall say, if we relax our efforts, that such a fate, but far more calamitous than that which overtook Spain, or Holland, or France, does not await ourselves—a fate far more disastrous, because our scattered Empire, in the great catastrophe, would not be broken but dissolved. It is scarcely necessary to point out that, while we create means to protect our Empire, we create also an agency for attack—that command of the sea is not only the tenure by which we hold the Empire, but also the title by which we may claim the transmarine possessions of the Powers we may defeat in future wars.

There is not space to dwell upon the complexities of Colonial defence, but one pregnant suggestion may be made. It is that a vital strategical principle, established in history, and founded upon reason, indicates that Australia or New Zealand, for example, may be better defended from attack, in the English Channel, than they could be in the Colonial seas, because a crushing defeat inflicted upon an enemy near the heart of his power would paralyse every effort he might make against the distant possessions of others.

It has already occurred to you, I am sure, that the Navy cannot suffice for everything. We must have an Army as well. We cannot defend the land frontiers of India without one. We cannot enter upon territorial operations, unless we have military forces in adequate numbers. But I would point out, as a paramount fact, and as one sufficient for my present purpose, that no military forces can avail without command of the sea, without the fleet to transport them to their over-sea base, and to maintain their communications with their base at home. What would avail half a million of men in these islands, burning with the desire to come to blows with an enemy in Africa or India, let us say, if that enemy were supreme at sea? And from this point of view, the fleet has very appropriately been

described as the "over-sea shaft of that imperial spear of which the military forces are the head." As was said a few months ago, by Sir John Fisher—that gallant admiral who has been called upon to give counsel upon the re-organisation of the War Office: "The soldier can go nowhere unless the sailor carries him on his back."

Such, then, are the uses of the British Navy. It came into being for purposes for which it now exists. I have attempted to show, in some measure, what our sea-power is. We saw how, at the awakening touch of the seafaring explorers, there first arose, in a real sense, the full knowledge, and, with it, the practical expression of maritime sway. It was no new thing, for it was nvolved in the immutable conditions that had existed ever since men traversed the sea. We have noted how, by exercising sea-power, Englishmen wrested from the hands of Spaniards, Dutchmen and French, the possessions and the trading monopolies they had won and established, and we have seen how sea-power is our necessary safeguard to-day. Let us not attach too much weight to material things only, important, and vitally important as those things are. There are other things as well, things, if I may be permitted to use the expression, "which cannot be gotten with gold, neither shall silver be paid for the price thereof." They are the brain power, and the strength, and the manhood, the courage, resource, and endurance of the race. What says the great Lord Bacon: "Walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, ordnance, artillery, and the like—all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike." By such qualities alone can our imperial heritage be preserved. It is the force, the strength of purpose, and the foresight in preparation of the nation behind the Navy, that ensures the strength and sufficiency of our naval forces. It is the quality of valour, and discipline, and efficiency in officers and men that gives the Navy its true value at sea. Let us then regard the Navy as an agency both human and material. We have recognised in it the indispensable means for our protection from invasion, the watching over our food supplies and our commerce, and the holding of our Empire together. We know that command of the sea—that abiding strategic principle that is unchanged and changeless in the presence of abundant changes—means for us security, and the loss of it annihilation. And, finally, we have seen that the Navy is the means whereby this command of the sea is won, and is, if I may use the words of the Naval Discipline Act, that force, "whereon, under the good Providence of God, the wealth, safety, and strength of the Kingdom do chiefly depend."

JOHN LEYLAND.

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have a common history from the days of Alfred the Great to the time of Hawke. This is a simple reference to the more distant past which I think you will forgive me for drawing your attention to. But projecting one's mind into the future, there is something more to be said. The object of the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, in its truest aspect, is not to make wars, but to prevent them. And I take it that the Navy of which Captain Mahan has

* This full report of the speeches delivered by Captain Mahan and Sir John Colomb is published by request of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee.—ED. U.S.M.

been a distinguished ornament, has with ours that common mission in the world in the future. The great American Commonwealth, of which Captain Mahan is a distinguished citizen, and the British Empire, of which we are all ourselves citizens, have a great common interest in the peace of the sea. Surely it is obvious that the two greatest trading peoples of the world have an abiding interest in the preservation of maritime peace. My Lords and Gentlemen, those are three aspects which occur to my mind in introducing this toast. Had the toast been in the hands of my Right Hon. friend on my left, Sir Edward Grey, it would have been proposed in a more eloquent and appropriate manner. Having referred to those three aspects, I pass to the main subject in connection with which this dinner is held. The special gratification which you, Captain Mahan, have conferred upon the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee is this—that you have enunciated principles which are their guiding stars. I think it is unnecessary to say that those for whom I speak to-night, the members of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, belong to both parties. On the defence question we are absolutely free from the prejudices either of political parties at home, or in the Colonies. And as regards certain questions of policy which are now disturbing so many minds, let me say that we are not taking sides upon the fiscal question, or questions of trade. We seek to fix our aim upon a consolidated Empire, based primarily upon combination for maritime defence, and we believe that not only in the interests of all parts of the Empire, but in the interests of the peace of the world, the time has come for each of us to do what we can, in the short life given to us, to get our fellow-citizens to face these big questions of Imperial Defence, and to think of them. We are not constitution-mongers or faddists; we have no cut and dried scheme of Federation. But we believe, if the consolidation of our Empire is to come about and endure, it will be by the same process through which we have risen to our present state. We look to the force of educated public opinion to evolve the result, which, in the interests of all, is our aim; when public opinion is ripe the scheme and the men to work it will come too. Now, my Lords and Gentlemen, our method, as I have told you, is simple—to do what we can in an unostentatious way to place the facts before the public and to induce people to think. Our definite plain object is stated in other words than ours. If you look at the menu before you, you will see the declaration of the late Right Hon. W. B. Dalley, who was Chief Secretary of New South Wales, as follows:—

'Let there be one Navy, under the rule of a single Admiralty —a Navy in which the Colonies shall be as much interested as the

Mother Country, which shall be theirs as well as hers, and on which they may all rely in time of danger.'

"It is between twenty and thirty years ago that Mr. Dalley made that declaration, and he was, I would remind you, the first Colonial Minister to give practical effect to the Imperial instinct, for it was he who took upon himself the responsibility of despatching troops from Australia to the Soudan. There is a small medallion to his memory in the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral, where Nelson and Wellington sleep, which was unveiled by Lord Rosebery. Now I come to the point of connection between our work and that of our illustrious guest. We work to draw the attention of our fellow-citizens at home and over-sea to the growth of our Empire—a growth which we think claims an effort by all citizens of the Empire to try to find some means by which the responsibilities and the burden of defence can be equitably shared. We keep putting the facts of growth forward by means of publications and lectures, and in a variety of other ways. We rejoice to find that Captain Mahan, as a philosopher and thinker, of commanding influence and great knowledge (without, I think, knowing much about this Committee) stated our case in a British magazine much better than we have ever been able to state it ourselves. I allude to his article in the *National Review*, of May, 1902. Therefore you can easily understand our great anxiety to meet, and hear the voice of, one who we believe is fighting our battle from an outside standpoint, and who looks at it as one of the world problems to be settled by the common sense, knowledge, and resolution of the British people in every part of the Empire. I will now read two or three extracts from Captain Mahan's article, which will explain the whole situation. The paper, which is entitled, 'Motives to Imperial Federation,' starts by showing why it is that he sees reason for taking up the great subject which this Committee was formed to advocate. He says that 'the broadening and strengthening of British power by the progress of Imperial Federation is necessarily an object of profound interest to Americans,' and he further says it would probably 'strengthen the external policy of the United States during the next generation.' So he, as a true citizen of his country, looks to the interests of his own country; but, further than that, he looks out upon the world and sees it in its true perspective.

"He points out that 'Imperial Federation is needed for probable emergencies, to combine military preparation, to avert war by evident readiness, or to meet it if it come.' Then, as a master of naval history and an impartial teacher of the big principles of that history, he indicates very delicately in another article how the

Imperial instinct in our Colonies, if given a wrong direction, might lead to weakness and not to strength. He speaks, of course, on the matter of local Navies, and comments upon them. He says that what a Colony needs 'is not a petty fraction of an Imperial Navy, but an organisation of naval force which constitutes a firm grasp of the naval situation.' Your hosts to-night, Captain Mahan, all feel that no statement that they could frame would so exactly state the real broad principle that we are trying to propagate, and get our fellow-citizens in the Colonies to understand.

"Imperial Federation is a very big phrase, but as you cannot drive six omnibuses abreast through Temple Bar, neither is it possible to reform the whole Empire, and put everything right, at once. It appears to us that the crucial question upon which combination now is urgently needed, is the provision and maintenance of the sea-power of the Empire by the co-operation of all its parts, and, as Dalley said, by a sharing of the responsibility and the burdens. So we feel justified in fixing our attention mainly upon that. Although we call ourselves an Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, our immediate aim is narrowed down to the definite point of urging combination to provide and maintain what is essential to the existence of our Empire, and that is—Sea-power. In the first article from which I have quoted, Captain Mahan embodies in a single sentence what we, his hosts of to-night, are doing our best to teach. We have, in the last sentence that I will read to you, a beacon light given to us to show that we are on the true path. It is in these words: 'Imperial Federation in action will manifest itself pre-eminently along ocean and naval lines.'

"In conclusion there are two propositions which appear to us to involve danger in the near future, and for which Imperial Federation affords the only remedy. Firstly, the Empire is outgrowing its organisation, and secondly, each compartment is thinking chiefly of its own business. May I, in two sentences, try to drive home to your minds the magnitude of this growth of which we think so little about? Taking sea interests as capable of being expressed by the annual value of sea-trade, two facts, I think, strikingly illustrate the rapidity of growth. The aggregate value of the Colonial sea-trade now is far greater than the aggregate of the total sea-trade of the whole British Empire when Queen Victoria ascended the Throne, and it is more than double that of the United States when President Lincoln occupied, for the first time, the White House at Washington. I hope I have made that point clear. We want to bring this sort of considerations to a focus in the public mind, and arouse attention to the conditions

of growth, for the one thing that would shake the Empire to pieces is deficiency of Sea-power. We therefore think the time has come when provincial patriotism may make way for the patriotism of mutual effort and sacrifice for the good of the whole, and that the maintenance of our Navy shall be recognised as the first duty of every British citizen in all the self-governing States.

"This Committee is earnestly trying to induce the British public, at home and in the Colonies, to realise the perils to which the Empire is exposed, and to bring about by the education of public opinion that unity of Empire which shall give practical and visible effect to the recognition that its whole existence depends upon sea-power. Captain Mahan we welcome you here to-night, and we thank you for honouring us by coming here. I give you the health of Captain Mahan."

Captain Mahan said, "Whether I deserve the credit that Sir John Colomb has so abundantly bestowed upon me is a matter that perhaps may be put aside. It is sufficient for me to know that I have been so cordially welcomed by all of you who are here present, and who, I suppose, whether members of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee or not, are at least by your presence testifying to your interest in that great subject. I beg, therefore, to thank you all for the kindness which has brought you here together, manifesting so much good-will towards me, and adopting such ideas as I may have put forward. The matter of Imperial Federation is one upon which it behoves a foreigner, although of a race so closely allied with your own, to speak with befitting modesty of expression at least. But it is quite impossible for an American who is at all familiar with the history of his own country not to feel a profound sympathy as well as interest in the general progress of a movement which as yet, I presume, is in its incipiency at the present time. You are going through a history not only very analogous to our own, but I may say very similar to our own. Of course you are all familiar, in a general way at least, with the genesis of the United States of America—how we began some three centuries ago as a number of Colonies, some of them of different nations, not even a group of Colonies, because in no way related one to another. Although the majority were settled by English people, you know how those Colonies grew up separate from each other, with jealousies that were perhaps accentuated by the very fact that they were so close one to another. The differences between them, differences of religion, differences of habit and thought, differences of social custom, alienated them very markedly one from another. A feeling that was worse than jealousy, a feeling approaching at times almost to hatred, and certainly

aversion, was felt among Colonies that were very closely situated together, geographically. In the work on which I am at present engaged—a history of the war of 1812 between your country and my own—I was led at a very early period, even before I began the history of that war, to notice that the factors which brought about the war, the conduct of the British Government, proceeded from ideas that far antedated the particular period at which those measures originated. The habit of thought of the British Government which led them to those particular lines of action had its origin long before the Napoleonic period, or the period of the French Revolution. It sprang directly from certain habits of thought, and certain policies, which were entirely familiar to them in the period of colonial relations, and when they put them into action and gave us grievous offence—and, I think, very reasonable offence—they were only carrying out lines of thought with which they were already familiar. That led me to pursue my studies a little more into this matter, and pay more and more attention to the general condition of the American Colonies at that period, and it enforced more and more upon my mind that of which I have just spoken, the general aversion of the Colonies one to another; how hard it was, and how much it was at first acting against the lines of natural feeling, but how a preponderating influence gradually forced people along the same lines, broadly and inevitably, until they got what we now know as the union of the United States. After all, the union of the United States is only another instance of that which we now know as Imperial Federation. We began as Colonies, and afterwards continued for a brief period as States; we had diverse interests, and those of you who remember what we passed through after the war which we know as our Revolutionary war, or the War of Independence, will know that the period which succeeded that was one almost chaotic. The hope of bringing the people together, of bringing the several Colonies into anything like operative union, was something which appeared almost desperate to a man like Washington. If you look into Washington's correspondence, between 1783, when the several States became independent, and the year 1789, when the Constitution in its essential features was adopted, there was a period of anarchic thought, and of almost hopelessness of ever bringing them to act together, or of forming a federation to constitute a unified government, capable of consistent action, sustained action, and united action. I will not attempt, of course, to go into that. But we formed at last a federative union under the pressure of circumstances. And I would like to say also that after that took place, we had our period of reaction, of reaction very similar to that which

the British Empire went through in the middle of the century which we have just closed. There was a period during the eighteenth century when the Imperial idea was very forcibly recognised. This was apparent even in the words of our own American thinkers. They recognised that the control which was exercised by the general Government of Great Britain over matters like trade, and so forth, was justifiable from the point of view that it strengthened the Empire. Whether they used the word Empire or not, I do not know; but even the grand old independents who rallied so forcibly against taxation without representation were quite ready to admit a regulation of trade which amounted practically to a control of taxation, because it was in the interests of the Empire as a whole—as long as it was not a literal imposition of taxes by the Imperial Parliament. The unity of the Empire, the mutual interest, the value of the big fabric which was built up in those days, was recognised, even by men like Franklin and others, who afterwards so strongly supported the movement towards independence, because they admitted that trade organisation could minister to the greatness of the whole, that it was something that was beneficial to the whole. In other words, they cherished the Imperial idea even before the Revolutionary war. Along with that there went also the idea of federation between the Colonies. Then came our quarrel with you, and the War of Independence, and upon that there came a relapse—a relapse which lasted a very long time, and which, I think, was very analogous to the feelings through which you passed between the years 1840–1880, more or less the middle of the last century. Even after we had formed a constitutional union, a nominal union, and after we had a central Government—with all the powers of a central Government at the present time—the feeling of nationality, the feeling of Empire in the United States, was almost gone. That was very strongly impressed upon my mind by the study of the war of 1812. I would not, for very shame, narrate some of the incidents which have been forced upon my attention with regard to the conduct of some of the citizens of the United States during that war, which shows how feebly the idea of nationality was held by many of our people as late as 1812. It has been maintained by American thinkers that it was that war, 1812–1814, to which we first really owed the vital spark of union. I mention these things as of interest, because it shows how slowly and under what difficulties any great idea must take its shape, what inexhaustible patience is necessary on the part of those who would nourish an idea of a union such as that of the United States, or of Imperial Federation, whatever shape that may ultimately take for the British Empire of the

present time. For of course it must have been that feelings such as were announced by many English Statesmen in the middle of the nineteenth century, a couple of generations ago, could not but induce a very great weakening of the ties which existed between the British Islands themselves and their Colonies. But it has its precise analogy in our own country. After the war of 1812, and in the years which succeeded, there came on those troubles of which you all know, connected with slavery; and the interest of that period, looked upon as a whole, is that of the power of a great idea, held by a certain number of people, propagating itself like leaven in the lump, until at last it becomes an overpowering force that sweeps everything before it. My own boyhood was coincident with that period. The war of 1812, or that period at least, was marked by a disunion feeling on the part of certain States of the country, particularly the North-Eastern States, what we commonly know as New England. It was so marked that it was looked upon as very possible that they might leave the union at that time. Those were among the States that were eventually so strong in upholding the cause of the union in the Civil War. I think it was due to the reaction that the feeling for what we call the union become so exceedingly strong. I can recollect it perfectly well. Union was a word that had a magic which it was impossible to express. If a person has not felt it, he cannot know what it was. It had taken hold of our imagination. We worshipped it almost as a person worships a supernatural being. Union stood then for everything, and I can see no reason why ultimately this nation, when it comes to understand the benefits which will proceed from Imperial Federation, when it realises its community of interests, should not give full effect to the same sentiment. Of course it in no wise becomes a person not a citizen of Great Britain to express any opinion as to the means or ways in which such a matter as that is to be brought forward, or the particular methods by which the idea may be realised. But the interest to us Americans who think at all about the matter, or realise what it all means, is extremely great. In the first place, there is the interest of sympathy in watching a movement which, in its inception and its probable future, is so closely analogous to that of our own country. The difficulties which you have in your way are immense. They are of a different character from those of our own country. The conditions are different, but it seems as if it were quite possible that, under whatever shape or phase it takes form eventually, it might possibly be the case that the sentiment for it would sweep away all the difficulties in its path. But we have, in my opinion, an interest even greater and further than that of sympathy, and that

is self-interest. It is my belief—and I have expressed it very often —that it is very largely to the interest of the United States that the various English-speaking communities under the British flag should be so far capable of coincident action, so far united, in whatsoever form or way it may take shape, as to be able to exert their power as one great nation. I believe it would further the interests of the United States that you should be able so to do. But it goes even further than that. We are in the age now of the creation, or rather of the growing up, of great nations or great political communities. It is a period of aggregation and not of segregation any more. That was the deplorable error of the fine and noble fellows who fought against us in the Civil War in our own country forty years ago. They failed to realise that the stars in their courses were fighting against them, that they were acting against the spirit of the age. It is, I believe, in the interests of the United States that your idea of Imperial Federation should succeed; but more than that, it is to the interests of the world at large, because, after all, it is, as it were, one in a series of approximations to that time when all the nations of the world will recognise their common interest. You cannot have that sort of thing by enactments, or by special movements of one sort or another. I confess that it has always seemed to me that the Hague Tribunal was rather premature in its ideas and manifestations; and it is as the communities get larger and larger, and as the sympathies of people who speak the same tongue widen, like those of the various communities under the British flag and our own are doing, that as they grow together there will be an approximation to that period of which we have heard so much—the federation of the world. You cannot have it at once. I do think that the union of the United States as we have now succeeded in realising it—wherein the question of disunion is never so much as thought or heard of—and the Federation of the British Empire, are all indications of the coming of the time when the nations of the world shall no more be diverse or adverse one to another, but shall live together in harmony."

VICARIOUS PATRIOTISM.

By Charles E. Lart.

If the Press rightly represents public opinion, the reception accorded to the Report of the Royal Commission on the *Militia* and Volunteers exhibited a striking change in the habit of mind with which Englishmen have been used to view and digest matters of such momentous importance to the life of the nation as National Defence. The Commissioners examined 134 witnesses—military authorities of the highest rank, whose opinions must be of the greatest weight; Militia and Volunteer officers; business men; managers of banks, insurance companies, railways and great commercial enterprises. A vast mass of material was placed at their disposal by the War Office, and by those in touch with every class of industry throughout the country.

It is to be presupposed that "the changes, if any, required in order to secure the military efficiency and adequate strength of the Militia and Volunteer forces" depend on certain conditions. Finding that those conditions did not exist, the Commission naturally reported in this light. To report on the best route for a railway to the moon would be the height of quixotic folly. Apparently the whole question was prejudged by the Government, determined not to risk any popularity by running counter to preconceived popular prejudices. Hence Mr. Balfour's prompt repudiation of the Commission and its work.

When the Commissioners came to the conclusion that the primary condition necessary for Home Defence is manhood service they came to a conclusion several thousand years old—that bricks cannot be made without straw. And if it is contended that the business of the Commission was to find ways and means of providing the straw, it may be pointed out that it is likewise impossible to find the straw, except in one way. In defining the way they merely reaffirmed the great principle which has never been, till now, questioned by the English people.

There is, however, a wide difference between a principle and its application—and the application prescribed by the Commission may not recommend itself to all of those who agree with the principle. It is the principle, however, which was condemned—

within forty-eight hours of the issue of the Report, the Press almost unanimously dismissing the question with contempt and ridicule.

Leaving the Militia, which is a paid force—a sort of Reserve for the Army, liable to find itself serving abroad in urgent need—let us consider what the Volunteer Force—which comprises nearly two-thirds of the Auxiliary Forces—really is. In its early existence the Volunteer Force fairly represented the nation. It was composed of its able-bodied manhood—outside the Regular forces—which sprung to arms at the sight of Napoleon's white tents visible across the Channel. Out of a population of 16,000,000 in 1805, after excluding the Regulars and Militia, 286,000, no less than 429,000 men were serving in the Volunteers. To-day, with a population of 42,000,000, excluding the Regulars and Militia, the Volunteers number 245,000.

The statistics of London music-halls, or their equivalent, for 1805, are not available. In the darkest days of 1900, however, the receipts of four of the principal ones in London went up by leaps and bounds, and reached the highest figure before or after the war. But patriotism does not consist in singing songs, or in giving free drinks to departing patriots. In the late crisis, the British public stood on the pavement and watched the Volunteer march past with the nation's arms and kit on his shoulders. Again, in 1848, the threats of the French colonels aroused our English manhood, and the Volunteer Force revived. The danger passed, and the force became what, till recently, it remained—a purely amateur and irresponsible adjunct: the butt of public sarcasm and good-natured wit. With the South African war, however, a change took place. Still 80,000 short of its establishment, the authorities saw its possibilities, and awoke to the fact that they possessed a reserve of partially trained men. 27,000 Volunteers responded to the call, and served at the front. The force, from being a reserve, to be called up in case of "actual or apprehended invasion," was used as a feeder for the fighting line 6000 miles away. Inspecting officers said nice things about it—the public placed its patriotism to its own credit, and passed on its way to its amusements. Thirteen men revelled in the immunity one man purchased for them: for the Volunteer Force is the only barrier between them and universal service. The force became a second horse—grass-fed, and finding its own fodder; but still, a horse—on three or four more or less serviceable legs; and ever since the military authorities have been trying to get it to do the work of the corn-fed, well-trained troop-horse. It has become a cheap substitute.

No less than 75 per cent. of Home Defences are handed over to the Auxiliary Forces, of which 50 per cent. are allotted to the

Volunteers. In a great war it is certain that the whole will have to be undertaken by them.

The Home Defence Army, under existing plans, is divided on mobilisation into two parts—

1. Fixed garrisons for coast fortresses and defended ports.
2. The field armies.

The former [illegible] are of primary importance to the Navy, our first line, since unless its base can be secured against raids, its efficiency will be seriously interfered with. The issue of a campaign will greatly depend on Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham being absolutely safe.

"These fixed garrisons are composed almost entirely of Auxiliary Forces, except for some regular gunners. All the Infantry garrisons, and most of the Engineers, are provided by Militia and Volunteers, who also provide 15,000 artillery." (Memorandum by F.M. Sir H. Evelyn Wood, V.C., K.C.B.)

The British public, for whose use and comfort the Volunteers exist, is not accustomed or trained to the science of war. It judges the Volunteers by Hyde Park inspections. The practical difficulties which arise when war comes are not appreciated.

"There is a concrete example of the impracticable conditions of our voluntary system in the 2nd Army Corps District, Portsmouth, one of our most important naval bases, is strongly defended by a series of coast batteries, and requires a larger number of garrison artillery than any other British fortress. The men required to work this armament were drawn from the local population, it would be comparatively easy to ensure a high standard of efficiency and the presence on the gun floors of a sufficient number of manning detachments within a few hours of the order to mobilise. This is not, however, possible under our Volunteer system. There are two corps of Volunteer artillery in the neighbourhood, as well as the Hampshire Militia Artillery. Neither of these are falling off in numbers, but if they were up to establishment they would not provide more than one-third of the artillerymen required. On the other hand, there are five Volunteer battalions of Infantry . . . the military requirements of Portsmouth in war would be more adequately met if the gunners, rather than the Infantry, were local men. *The local taste*, however, tends rather towards Infantry. As a result, on mobilisation, the Artillery garrison of Portsmouth is made up to its necessary strength by bringing Militia corps from Lancashire, Durham, Northumberland, and various parts of Scotland."

Now, the French are perfectly well aware of this, and keep forty torpedo-boats permanently at Cherbourg, St. Vaast, and St. Servan, ready at short notice to steam for Portsmouth. Not only in time of war, but of *any tension*, these boats are manned, half their reserve crews being fishermen well acquainted with the tides and harbours of our southern ports. Within twenty-four hours of orders from Paris, these boats will appear off Portsmouth, long before the corps in the north of Scotland have entrained—and even if the local Volunteer artillery are at their guns, there will

be no preliminary gun-drill, but war in deadly earnest. The odds will be greatly in favour of some of the boats getting in. They do not want to get out.

The political horizon may be clear to-day, but he would be a bold man who would predict permanent clear weather. At present, however, *local taste* prefers to base its war requirements on a peace footing.

To those who look deeper, the Volunteer is more than a cheap substitute. In these latter days of unrest—of the strenuous life, where the weak and luxurious go to the wall; when modern war is an exact science, and steam has made of the sea a connecting rather than a dividing element; while nations lie outside our door armed to the teeth; when we are striving to keep the Navy up to a two-power standard, whereas "in 1805 we possessed such a superiority at sea as we shall never possess again"—under such circumstances the Volunteer has become a bench on which our able-bodied manhood—untrained, unhandled, undisciplined, unthinking except of self, rapidly deteriorating in health and physique—sits and watches its football matches; a hedge, on the sunny side of which it shelters from the bracing blast; a shadow of a great rock in a land growing weary of effort—even to play, instead of watch, its games.

Like Issachar, the Volunteer Force is "a strong ass" in more senses than one—"between two burdens"—the one official non-understanding, the other public apathy. "On some tremendous day" we may curse Meroz for not coming to our aid, and it will not avail; for though careless, selfish, untrained, unorganised Meroz may turn up at the last moment, with a golf club in one hand and a cricket ball in the other. It will be too late—the outbreak of war is not the time to train men. "Work while ye have the day, the night cometh," is perhaps more true of modern war and its conditions than of anything else. Thick as the swathes of English dead may lie in English fields, they cannot atone for the years the locust hath eaten; for sloth and apathy, luxury and self-seeking—those lotus-eating years.

"Does any man mean to say that Colenso was lost on the Tugela? It was lost at Aldershot! Let us face it. Magersfontein was elaborately prepared for on the Fox Hills. I will go further. Colonel Long's guns were lost in the Long Valley, and Colenso was disastrously rehearsed for years on the banks of the Basingstoke Canal." (Lieut.-General Sir W. Butler, K.C.B. Evidence before the Royal Commission.)

If our future battles of Maldon and Colchester, Brighton and Dorking, are lost, they will have been lost on the playing fields and in the music-halls of the country.

"When I see reports of these football matches, I know exactly what it means, that some 20,000, 30,000, or 40,000 men are simply looking on at a football match played." (Colonel C. T. Hart, V.D. Evidence.)

The nation is not wholly to blame. For a century it has not known what war means. Even the South African war was seen through the cinematograph, with the blood and nastiness left out. At its worst, the hotels at fashionable resorts lost none of their patronage. In three years of war we lost in dead, only what the Japanese lost in three months. We do not yet know war as our grandfathers knew it. And now that the first notes of the *réveillé* are sounding, we long to turn on our sides and sleep again.

We cannot afford to live on our traditions; they are too great and too lofty to sleep upon; they point to further effort to safeguard the heritage won for us.

> "Follow after, follow after—we have watered the root,
> And the bud has come to blossom that ripens for the fruit.
> Follow after, follow after—for the harvest is sown,
> By the bones about the wayside, ye shall come to your own."

At the first mention of personal service to this end the image of Freedom is brought out of its temple and dusted; its sacred name is invoked with hysterical cries by its raving worshippers. But the fetish they bow down to is but a fetish, and not the God. The freedom of the English race was bought by centuries of storm and stress, and blood and tears; and they imagine it can be kept for us by vicarious patriotism—by singing national songs, by patting the Volunteer on the back and "encouraging" him to go on doing his—and other people's—duty.

Amidst all the shouting of the captains, who should lead—but who are anxiously seeking a path through a thorny wilderness beset with pitfalls, which perchance may lead them to the ballot-box and the haven of a seat in the next Parliament—one thing is clearly seen. If the nation's manhood will not train for its defence, they must pay those who will. Modern military service is not a picnic on Brighton Downs nowadays, and Home Defence is a tax which somebody has to pay; either the nation at large or the Volunteer—terms by no means interchangeable. The proportion of men under the age of twenty and over forty in the Volunteers is 80 per cent.; and after deducting the Regular forces of the Crown, the proportion of men in the country between eighteen and forty, to the Volunteer, is thirteen to one!

If the Volunteer is to continue to do the nation's work, he can no longer, at the very least, be out of pocket. The man who loses £1 by his voluntary service must be paid £1; the officer who has to spend £15 to £50 will have to receive the amount he is out of

pocket.* There can be no two ways. The British public cannot expect to eat its cake and still have it.

200,000 men at £1	£200,000
9000 officers at £20	180,000
„ „ cost of outfit spread over ten years at £30	27,000
	£407,000

At a moderate estimate, the mere cost of relieving the proxy of expense will be nearer £500,000 a year for the Volunteers alone, in addition to the present grants. This much the public must expect to pay. But there is the Volunteer—he will still give his time that others may escape service. It remains to be seen whether he will do so. If so, it is certain that in exchange for being no longer out of pocket he will be called upon to give more of his time than he does at present. There are, however, abundant signs that the Volunteer is not inclined to shelter the loafer from the obligation to serve his country.

Lord Grenfell, in a recent speech to Volunteers, eulogised the voluntary system on the ground that a man was free to join the branch of H.M. Forces which suited him best. *He omitted to mention the important point, that the voluntary system enables men to join nothing at all—a fact which the vast bulk of them take advantage of.* No one denies that a voluntary system which sends the bulk of the nation into its service is better than one which attains the same result by compulsion. This is just what our system does not do. Here, again, the voluntary principle is good; it is in its application that it fails.

"Help the Volunteer to relieve us of the necessity of personal service"—not abroad—"for the defence of the country whose blessings we enjoy to the full—but do not ask us to do more," is the cry. "Panis et circenses" is not a cry which leads nations to victory; it has always been the prelude to disaster; it preceded the recall of the Roman legions for Home Defence. It may be only one step from sheltering behind a small section of our manhood, to calling on the warlike races of India to garrison English towns. We have brought them as far as Malta before now.

But does the Press represent the opinion of the British public, above all, of the working man? Two years since, at a debate of miners in one of the colliery districts with which the writer is acquainted, the question of the advisability of compulsory service was discussed; although the men were entirely opposed to what they called "conscription," in the Continental sense, they were

* The officer at present pays £50 for his uniform, of which he can recover £20, if he can afford the time for a month at a military school, which few can do. This cost might be reduced to £30. The officer, however, should receive a month's pay.

unanimously in favour of universal training for Home Defence. It is greatly to be doubted whether the British working man is so unpatriotic * and apathetic as we are asked to believe; it is almost certain he is not, but would entirely agree with the proposals, for instance, of the National Service League. There is a wide margin between compulsory service of a year and nothing at all. And it must be remembered that any proposal yet made has only applied to those 380,000 youths who attain the age of eighteen every year, and leaves untouched those now over twenty. Train 250,000 each year, as the National Service League proposes, for a period hereafter to be decided upon by the nation, leaving the Volunteers as a *corps d'élite*, and recruiting the Navy and Army as at present—and in ten years' time the able-bodied manhood of the country will have done some training instead of none at all; training, moreover, undergone at an age when three months' consecutive drill is worth far more than the same amount given in driblets, spread over ten or twelve years as at present, in the Volunteer Force.†

Whatever kind of general compulsory training might eventually be enforced on the rising generation, one thing is certain—if the present system enables us to "muddle through," it will only be at a tremendous sacrifice of life, treasure, and, most of all, prestige; and in the end a far more onerous burden of manhood service than one adopted at the present time.

If one-tenth of the aggregate of energy, time, and money which the average Englishman of all classes spends in games and self-amusement were given to his country, we should stand in a very different position from that in which we stand to-day, and could look forward to the future with no mistrust. England calls for the best her sons can give her, and not the dregs, wrung from them unwillingly at the eleventh hour.

"*England expects every man this day to do his duty.*" There never was a time in the history of the country when Nelson's signal was more applicable and less heeded than the present. If we are to believe the Government and the Press, he was never so anxious to get some one else to do it for him.

CHARLES E. LART.

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* The working men of Great Britain and Ireland are not naturally unpatriotic, but they are ignorant, credulous and impulsive, with the result that they become the ready dupes of their political representatives; and the latter, for their part, are so intent upon their own personal advantage in party politics that genuine patriotism is hopelessly excluded from their thoughts and utterances. Thus the working man has been educated to find in the election to Parliament of the most untruthful candidate the whole duty of the citizen.—ED. U. S. M.

† The average service a Volunteer puts in per annum is not a fortnight; or thirty drills of one hour each, nominally equal to five working days of six hours: plus a week's camp. He is not *required* to do so much.—AUTHOR.

AUSTRALIA'S UNPREPAREDNESS.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD HUTTON'S ANNUAL REPORT.

BY GEORGE A. KING.

AUSTRALIA has now experienced three years of Federal control of the Military Forces, and the ideal Army which was promised as one of the first fruits of the union is almost as distant of accomplishment as ever. The astounding and precarious condition of affairs with which Australia is face to face cannot be laid to the charge of the military authorities, but is a sin for which the wretched and almost unbearable political system must answer. The military department, in the face of extreme difficulties, be it said to its credit, has striven to place the forces on a footing more in keeping with the importance of the defence of the Continent, and has produced an elaborate and complete scheme of organisation. But, unfortunately, that system, excellent as it is admitted to be, has in many particulars reached little beyond the paper stage. While the military authorities have thus been endeavouring to set the forces in order, the political element has been "pulling" in a direction calculated to destroy those efforts. The defence vote is being consistently starved, and this with the consent of the Government and against the repeated advice of the military experts. Instead of the Government assisting in the task of producing an adequate defence force, there is the sorry spectacle of members of the Ministry continually at loggerheads with the military commandant. The result is that many regiments exist merely on paper, the existing forces even on the authorised peace establishment are deficient in arms, many obsolete guns occupy the places of modern weapons in the forts, stores and equipment in sufficient quantities are absent, the stock of ammunition is much below what safety in the case of even a temporary suspension of the importation of supplies from oversea dictates, the physique of the forces is deteriorating, and altogether the Army shows so much unpreparedness as to render the responsibilities of the military authorities anything but cheerful in the event of attempted invasion. Then, in the face of all these well-known facts, the Minister for Defence (the title is becoming a misnomer) and also the Government as a

whole resent Press statements of the inefficiency of the defences, and, notwithstanding the grave reports of the Military Commandant, calmly and deliberately assert that such statements are misleading. The position from the political point of view is this, that expenditure of public money on the defences is so much wasted, inasmuch as there is no appreciable return, that it does not assist in obtaining votes, and that it does not increase the chances of the party in power retaining office.

From the military standpoint the situation is grave in the extreme, and the annual report of Major-General Sir Edward Hutton on the defences, which was recently made public, does the Federal Commandant credit in its outspoken denunciation of the present system of looking to to-day and trusting to Providence for to-morrow. Sir Edward Hutton's initial grievance is in connection with the reduction of the Headquarters Staff. This staff (which is totally distinct from the District or State Staffs) originally consisted of eight officers, in addition to a private secretary and aide-de-camp to the General Officer Commanding, but the Government determined to reduce it by two officers. It is but natural that General Hutton should strenuously resent this retrenchment, and he says:—

"The reduction now directed will, if carried out, render it impracticable for the General Officer Commanding to accept the responsibilities laid down for him. It is, I venture to submit with all respect, unreasonable to expect any General Officer to accept the vast responsibilities of command unless he is granted the assistance of a suitable Staff to administer the various Departments under his charge. I accepted the position, when offered to me on behalf of the Commonwealth Government, with a full understanding that I should receive the same assistance from an adequate Staff as any other General similarly situated. I did not press for the appointment of experienced Imperial Officers to help me in the task, as I well knew, from personal knowledge and intimate acquaintance with the conditions prevailing in Australia, that I could reckon upon a sufficiency of Australian Officers to assist me in the work of organisation and reconstruction. I have from the first pointed out the impossibility of efficiently and satisfactorily carrying out the duties of command without the eight Staff Officers whom I originally recommended should be placed upon the Estimates as the Headquarters Staff. My recommendations in this regard have been consistent throughout, and I have, both officially and unofficially, pointed out the impossibility of complying with the conditions pertaining to my command with a reduced number of Staff Officers to assist me. The difficulties which have beset me in the position which I hold, as General Officer Commanding and Military Adviser in the service of the Commonwealth, the mass of detail and work which I have personally had to deal with during the last two years and a half, constituted, I had hoped, some claim at least to special consideration in regard to my earnest representations.

"The whole Defence System, moreover, as adopted by the Government, is based upon a Headquarters Staff, and if this Staff is reduced in numbers, as proposed, it is only a question of time for chaos and disintegration to replace the military order and system which is now being gradually introduced.

"I should fail in my duty to the Commonwealth Government if I did not point out that with a reduced Staff it is impossible for any General in Command to accept the responsibilities attaching to the position."

As regards the process of reorganisation, Sir Edward Hutton expresses satisfaction as far as circumstances have permitted that task to be carried out. The organisation provides (1) a permanent cadre force for certain important military services, and for administrative, technical, and instructional purposes; (2) a field force for Inter-State or Commonwealth defence; and (3) garrison troops, primarily for local or State defence. General Hutton says—

"The changes necessitated and the modifications required for converting the whole of the six military forces into a Commonwealth System, based upon one general plan of defence, have been little less than revolutionary. It has been necessary that every portion of the military forces of each of the six States of the Commonwealth should one and all, jointly and severally, sink personal interests and ambitions in the general welfare of the Commonwealth, and by much self-sacrifice insure the success of the military system adopted by the Government, and thus form a homogeneous force which shall be identical in organisation, system, uniform, and suited to the duties allotted to each unit in the general scheme."

The total cost of the adoption of the Commandant's scheme in its entirety is shown to be £609,419, but a considerable number of units in the scheme of organisation still remain to be formed, and certain units already formed are still wanting to be completed to the recognised peace establishment. The number of troops comprised by the former is 886, and by the latter 2,385. To complete the peace establishment requires an additional annual expenditure of £50,493, which is exclusive of the amount required to satisfactorily arm and equip the forces. Writing in regard to the reorganisation, Sir Edward Hutton says—

"It has been sought by the system now adopted to make the militia and volunteer organisation complete in its character. It is proposed that the brigadiers and staff allotted to the brigades of the Field Force shall be militia officers. It is similarly proposed that the regimental and departmental staffs shall be militia or volunteer officers. The Permanent Staff will, therefore, be reserved mainly for administrative staff duties, and for instructional purposes in time of peace, and for special administrative and staff duties and as a stiffening in time of national emergency. A new departure has in this regard been adopted in the creation of the Australian defence system now put into force, and the principle is maintained that in time of peace the responsibility of command and of administration shall, as far as possible, be placed in the hands of those militia and volunteer officers who would inevitably have those responsibilities thrust upon them in time of war."

Passing on, the Royal Australian Artillery (the regular force), the present establishment of 34 officers and 714 other ranks, is viewed with apprehension by Sir Edward Hutton, who says—

"I represented that a reduction of the permanent artillery *personnel* existing in the six States prior to Federation from 50 officers and 1170 other ranks to 38 officers and 850 other ranks might be effected, but only as a temporary measure. In spite, however, of my earnest representations, the late Minister of Defence still further reduced the number to 34 officers and 714 other ranks. Practical experience and personal investigation, extending over the last twelve months, have fully confirmed my opinion that the result of this last reduction can only be to seriously compromise the security of the Commonwealth." After giving reasons regarding the inadequateness of the present force, the G.O.C. says: "I earnestly represent, therefore, that an increase of the Royal Australian Artillery by four officers and 106 others is of the gravest importance."

Sir Edward Hutton expresses regret that so long a delay has occurred in the Government finally approving of the organisation of an ordnance department. On the subject of stores and equipment General Hutton writes—

"The serious condition of the stores and equipment was brought to the notice of the Government in the Minute on Defence, dated 7th April, 1902. This unsatisfactory condition of affairs was further commented upon at length in the annual report, dated 1st May, 1903. It is with feelings of the gravest apprehension that I again invite attention to the unsatisfactory condition of the warlike stores."

To make good the deficiency in stores and equipment Sir Edward Hutton recommends that a special warlike stores vote be provided annually for the next three years, viz., 1904–5, £177,332; 1905–6, £140,000; 1906–7, £132,351; total, £449,683; 1903–4, already provided, £75,000; grand total, £524,683. This proposed vote would be additional to the annual outlay of £609,419 necessary for the maintenance of the authorised forces on their peace establishment.

A supply and transport department, General Hutton states, still remains to be created. He then goes on to say—

"New South Wales is the only State which at present possesses an organisation suitable for the responsibilities which devolve upon this indispensable department in time of war. A system of supply and transport for a mobile force has not been seriously considered in any of the other States. It may fairly be said, therefore, that until this defect is overcome the Military Forces of the Commonwealth are useless for military operations in the field. A system of regimental transport does not exist in any of the States. I recommend the adoption of an organisation similar to that existing in many of the Volunteer corps in Great Britain, and which has proved practical and sound. The transport thus provided should be supervised and controlled regimentally."

Great stress is laid on the necessity of establishing an arsenal and a small arm ammunition factory. In regard to the former, Sir Edward Hutton dryly states—

"No further action has been taken in regard to my earnest representations for the formation of an arsenal, and for the creation of those manufacturing departments which are indispensable to the defence system of the Commonwealth, and for rendering it independent of over-sea supplies." . . . "I would

again emphasise the importance of, at least, establishing a Small Arm Ammunition Factory, which shall be in the hands of the Commonwealth Government. The small arm ammunition required by the Commonwealth is at present supplied by the Colonial Ammunition Company, Melbourne, Victoria, under an agreement, expiring in 1914, which was entered into by the Government of Victoria. The obligations arising from this agreement have, under the Constitution Act, been transferred to the Commonwealth in so far as the supply required for the State of Victoria is concerned. No contract for the supply of small arm ammunition for the Commonwealth Military Forces as a whole has, I am informed, been finally entered into. I have already expressed the opinion that it is undesirable in the extreme that the supply of small arm ammunition, vital to the very existence of the Commonwealth in time of war, should be dependent upon a private firm which relies upon outside sources for the supply of ingredients required in its manufacture."

Suggestions have been made that a Committee or Army Council, following on the system adopted by the Imperial Government, should replace the General Officer Commanding. Sir Edward Hutton points out that it is well to bear in mind that the keystone of the policy advocated by Lord Esher's Committee is that the Government of the Army shall, while subordinate to the responsibilities of the Minister, be in the hands of soldiers, and that the Committee further points out that "the criticism of military policy by civilians, whose functions should be limited to examination of estimated cost and expenditure, has become a habit incurable, unless drastic reforms are applied." "It is doubtful," adds Sir Edward Hutton almost sarcastically, one cannot help noting, "if the foregoing principles would be acceptable to the Commonwealth Parliament." General Hutton also states that, after twelve years' experience, he is strongly of opinion that Australian officers, unaided by assistance from the Imperial Army, whether as commandants or as members of an Army Council, would find it most difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the requisite discipline in face of local political pressure and personal influence. Sir Edward Hutton then expresses the opinion that the Board of Advice, provided for in the Defence Act, is necessary for "the administration of the defence system of the Commonwealth, which shall bring together the civil and military elements concerned. It is by such a Board that the co-ordination under the Minister of the Military and Civil Departments might be arrived at." The Commandant suggests that the Board of Advice should be composed as follows:—President, the Minister of State for Defence. Vice-President, the General Officer Commanding. Members, the Second in Command (that is, the senior State Commandant), the Chief Staff Officer, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, a selected officer of the Militia, and the Secretary of the Department of Defence. Associate members to attend when required. The

A.A.G. for Artillery, the A.A.G. for Engineer Services, the Assistant Director of Artillery and Stores, the Director-General of Medical Services, and a selected officer of the Volunteer Force. "It is not contemplated," adds General Hutton, "that the Board in question should give decisions, but should merely record their views and consider questions of large importance." The Board of Advice which Sir Edward Hutton suggests is not favoured locally, nor is its constitution considered satisfactory. One local newspaper, in speaking of the matter, says—

"It is doubtful whether a Board constituted as the General suggests would be a success, if only on the score that it would always be open to a weak Commandant to shelter himself behind a body composed mainly of his own subordinates. Then, again, it is strange that Sir Edward Hutton proposes to have a selected officer of the partially-paid forces as a member of the Board, while the Volunteer branch of the Service is given only an associate member, 'to attend when required.' There may be some very good reason for this distinction, but it is well known that Major-General Hutton does not regard the Volunteers too kindly; as a matter of fact, it is said that not very long before coming to Australia he actually described them as 'a broken reed to trust to.' Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Volunteers (at any rate on paper) form an important branch of the Australian Army, and as long as that is so it is but right that they should have equal representation with the partially-paid branch."

The above quotation states very fairly the local view of the question.

In concluding his report Sir Edward Hutton surveys the military outlook in Australia, and the conclusion he draws is pessimistic in the extreme. He says—

"It may be as well to state at once that a force of the requisite strength, organised and capable of taking the field, does not at present exist in Australia, and that there are at present no local means of equipping such a force. The organisation is incomplete; the departments necessary for a mobile army have yet to be created; and there are neither sufficient guns, arms, equipment nor ammunition. . . . It is impossible to view the military situation in Australia, in face of the momentous changes taking place in the balance of power in the East, without grave misgivings. The victories of the Japanese arms within the last four months have astounded the whole civilised world by their brilliancy, and by their astonishing rapidity. The future and far-reaching results of the war have yet to be felt, but it is safe to predict that the opening up of China will follow as a result which, together with the opening of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, will materially alter the existing political and commercial supremacy in the Pacific. It is certain that commercial supremacy in the Pacific will be the aim and ambition of the leading naval and military powers of the world, and that Australian interests must thereby be seriously compromised, if not imperilled, unless they are effectively secured by a reasonable measure of military defence."

GEORGE A. KING.

SYDNEY, N.S.W.,
14th *July*, 1904.

MR. ARNOLD FORSTER'S PROPOSALS: HOW THEY STRIKE A REGIMENTAL OFFICER.

BY "RED COAT."

THE War Minister asserts, in all good faith, that all sorts of advantages will follow on the heels of his reforms. The one advantage, on securing which he has, apparently, kept his mind with persistence, is a reduction of expense. It is to be hoped that this is not, and that the safety of the Empire is, the essence of these reforms, and will be their sequence. Much doubt must be felt as to the probability of the very sweeping changes now proposed leading to the results so earnestly to be desired by the whole Empire; still more is it doubtful whether there is any prospect of continuity in the proposed lines under our changeful system of Party Government. The recent successive one-down-another-come-on style of reforms of the Army do not offer much hope of steady progress in any distinct line. Of Royal Commissions, and of new and "improved organisation," we have had, and are having, almost a surfeit. What is really needed as a motive and a guide, is that the electorate should be convinced of, and persistent in requiring from their representatives in the House of Commons, an assurance that the safety of the Empire, at any pecuniary cost, is to be the most urgent necessity of the time, as it must always be the only means by which each man, woman, or child under our flag can live in freedom and in honour. I fear that until it is realised, as now it is not realised, that each individual Briton, or Greater Briton, is personally concerned in the matter and owes a personal duty in the matter, we shall never attain to the patriotism which will make and keep us safe. This realisation will not, I also fear, come until its fundamental truth is borne home to us. God grant it may not be by disaster on the sea or on our own shores, too late!

Taking the summary of the proposals as published in the papers, the following remarks suggest themselves at once to me, a regimental officer:—

*1. *Improved Organisation and Committee of Defence.* 2.

* The numbering of these paragraphs corresponds with that of the "Summary," Part IV. of Mr. Arnold Forster's explanatory memorandum, published in the daily newspapers of July 16th.

Improved Organisation of War Office.—So far, improvements in organisation have principally evidenced themselves by sweeping changes in *personnel.* Old and trusted military servants of the Crown have been removed and replaced by comparatively new men—and yet these new men are not altogether in accord with the views of the Government. Note the difference of opinion on the subject of conscription—Sir N. Lyttleton approves; Mr. Forster cannot even contemplate. When one remembers the assurances heralding the still recent appointments of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief and of other high officers in the War Office, the suddenness of their fall and the obscurity of the reasons thereto leading, still more recently, one cannot be sure that all *is well,* even yet.

3. *Improvement of Intelligence Staff.*—The increase in the establishment of the Intelligence Staff is good; whether it is good enough, we cannot tell without further details. It is rumoured that the Treasury again objects to the allotment of sufficient funds for the efficient performance of duty by this most highly important office. Such experience we have had in the past, and it is not unreasonable to expect it in the future; but unjustifiable it is, in the danger to which it exposes the country and the subsequent reckless expenditure it entails.

4. *Linked Battalion System to be abolished.*—The effects of this decision are difficult to understand. If all drafts are to be sent direct from depôts, then the depôts must be enormously increased in establishment, in accommodation, in efficiency. This alone is a gigantic reform. The linked battalion system is to be retained for exchanges for all ranks. Under what conditions? Will not this new principle (as far as the men are concerned) prove a difficult one to work, and a promise hard to keep in the spirit, as the men may interpret it, and as the good of the service of the Crown may demand?

5. *Numerical Relation of Units at Home and Abroad.*—A fallacious (and not exact) correspondence has been kept between the numbers of units at home and abroad, but inasmuch as it has lain in the number of the units only, not in their strength or efficiency, there is no use in continuing such a pretence.

6. *Mobilisation to be complete, and no Men left behind.*—A consummation most devoutly to be wished; but it seems to predicate, as laid down, that the Home Service battalions will not be efficient fighting units—if so, they are a useless expense.

We are already cognisant of the disadvantages of having forces the character and extent of whose efficiency are not, in the different branches, equal. Will not this want of homogeneity be emphasised?

7. *Organisation of Reservists.* — The organisation provided appears to be of such a sketchy nature and so dependent for its officers, on the goodwill and convenience of its commissioned ranks, that it does not inspire much confidence. Experience and history show the difficulty of disciplining and working a new unit to be much greater than that of expanding, even very largely, units in existence and in working order.

8. *Reservists to know what Calls will be made on them.*—Another consummation devoutly to be wished; but with examples behind us and only promises in front. The Reservist may not, nor his employer, feel quite so much confidence in the unlikelihood of recall as does Mr. Forster. If the Reservist is to be left alone till "the extremity" arrives, then the extremity will arrive. As it is necessary to have a "striking force," so it is desirable to have all your available reserves mobilised, as a precaution, at the first threat of danger. Trust not to calling out men in driblets—*Il ne faut pas faire la guerre en petits paquets.*

9. *Pay of General Service Infantry.*—What pay? At the market rate of skilled labour, or a higher, as it should be?

10. *Home Service Infantry.*—Most of your recruits will join for two years; if they like the Service they may vary the conditions of enlistment—who knows? Anticipations are not always verified —test, three years' enlistment—and how will drafts be furnished this year and next?

11. *Employment of Soldiers after Expiry of Engagement.*—"The large amount of employment already found" for General Service soldiers reads rather sarcastic, as far as Government employment and efforts are concerned. For the next few years, will the Home Service battalions get on without N.C.O.'s, or will General Service battalions be denuded of N.C.O.'s for their benefit?

12. *Guards' Recruiting.*—Was the three-years' system so valued in the Guards, and were the three-years' men found so satisfactory there? Not that I have heard, in either sense. Again, if the General Service man is the best man, why give the Guards a three-years' term and inferior men?

13. *Striking Force.*—Is our "striking force" of 15,000 or 16,000 enough to give the slightest anxiety to a European enemy; and if that is all the force at disposal (and fully efficient), will the rest of our Home Service army be very terrifying to them?

14. *Barrack Accommodation.*—There is much room for improvement. Is there a likelihood that obsolete barracks will be swept away at once, new ones and new depôts at once built to help the "agreeable conditions" under which Home Service troops are to serve, while the "striking force" and the General Service

[illegible] is [illegible] sweet or sour in the present less agreeable [illegible]?

[illegible]—The same remarks as to choice of regiments [illegible] apply to the Cavalry; the unlinking of regiments is [illegible] good for horse and for foot—very good indeed. To my [illegible] who have served from private to field officer, it is the best [illegible] of the proposals.

[illegible] *Militia and Volunteers.* I do not propose to [illegible] at present.

[illegible]—The shooting is much, but discipline is more. [illegible] in the present war in the East. Character is induced [illegible] discipline and [illegible]. With character and *discipline*, a [illegible] any hardship, any punishment; [illegible] any tactical and strategical plan. [illegible] discipline wealth and equipments, numbers [illegible] "historical traditions" either.

[illegible]—Good, very good, but they should be even [illegible] and [illegible] kept up to full strength of men, horses, [illegible]

[illegible]—Is it intended to localise regiments [illegible]? If so, Scotland and the North will be over-garrisoned and the South [illegible] undermanned. Yet London, [illegible] Chatham, Dover, are all, as I remember, in [illegible] garrisons, in the forefront of danger invasive. [illegible] localise ideas, to damp [illegible] spirit, to lead to the many rootings in the soil? Is it [illegible] that a regiment should have all its training in hilly or in [illegible] or a neighbour? Are Foreign Service regiments [illegible] abroad also with the same undesirable results? [illegible] some regiments be unduly favored by their "agreeable [illegible]" and some penalised by theirs, less agreeable? Will [illegible] at home or abroad, please the intending [illegible]? It might please Mr. Forster, but he is not a recruit. May [illegible] Service soldier choose his depôt, but not his regiment [illegible]? On what principle are the Home Service regiments to [illegible]? All our regiments are famous in their degree; are those with fewer honours to be chosen out for Home Service? [illegible] would not be a fair test, for the honours borne do not [illegible] means complete the record, though the most patent proof [illegible] regiment's services. Again, as it is manifest that the Foreign [illegible] will consider themselves, and will be considered [illegible] to be better than those chosen for Home Service, will [illegible] considerations make for less efficiency, less soldierly [illegible], less real in those for whom less efficiency is postulated

by this choice? If such a rule of battle-honours' selection is used, will it not be necessary to unlink the regiments first and choose them after? Some regiments profited more than others in this matter in 1881, and further back still—in 1800 and war-time many regiments had more than one battalion, which, after 1815, reverted to single battalions. If it is a mere question of counting honours, the ancient plurality of battalions should also be allowed for. The classing of battalions in any way is a matter which cannot, human and military nature being as they are, be done with the slightest possibility of avoidance of offence. Rather reduce at once all the battalions not considered good enough for General Service and start Home Service battalions from the beginning, than raise such a storm and give such offence.

23. *Three-years' System.* 24. *Two-years' System.*—If the three-years' terms, with power to prolong, are not acceptable to our present soldiers, will (24) the two-years' system prove more so? Who knows? Who can be sure?

25. *Dependence on Extension of Service.*—If there is no compulsion, how will the supply of longer Service men be insured? If the conditions of Service, pay, etc., were satisfactory to the men now, the re-engagements would be satisfactory also; the proof that they are not, is patent.

26. *Reserves a Supplement.* 27. *Supply of Junior Officers.* 28. *Temporary Officers.*—These are all earnestly to be desired, but are incapable of proof, and are dependent for their success on more inducements than are presently offered, or clearly foreshadowed.

29. *Cost of Army.*—The objection to universal service is held up to be expense, but surely no one contemplates that in that event there would be need of pay at anything like the present rates, or to train annually so many as 400,000 recruits.

These are some of the remarks and questions that come at once to my mind. Reforms in the Army will, in a few weeks, no longer personally affect me as a soldier. Next month I shall be gazetted to retired pay, but they will deeply affect me, as every other member of the Empire, still; and I would that every one would recognise his and her interest therein. Finally, the general impression on my mind of this early consideration of the proposals is, that first they show a wish to reduce the estimates, at any risk; secondly, that they trust too much to the supposed (and I hope real) efficiency and sufficiency of the Navy. The Navy may, and will, I trust, justify this confidence, but it cannot, without an Army, do more than protect us in our Island; it cannot inflict upon our enemies a complete defeat, nor a defeat oversea.

MR. ARNOLD FORSTER'S ARMY SCHEME.

BY THE EDITOR.

WHEN King Nebuchadnezzar set up his famous golden image and bade all men bow down to it, three stalwart Protestants of the day were, for their contumacy, cast into a "Burning Fiery Furnace." But, cremation having been miraculously prevented, the king was consequently converted, the intended martyrs obtained promotion to higher offices, and the precious metal of which the discarded idol had been fashioned no doubt passed through the melting-pot to more useful purposes. As it was with the Babylonian image, so be it with Mr. Arnold Forster's proposals. The scheme itself includes much valuable matter, but it comes in very questionable shape, and the author of it, whilst he has asserted principles that are in the main perfectly sound, has failed to apply them correctly—has not, apparently, realised their logical significance. Thus the precedent supplied by the constancy and resulting good fortune of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego does not seem altogether unworthy of consideration by the four military members of the Army Council. If those members are actually the sound soldiers they are generally believed to be, it is quite impossible that they can be satisfied with the scheme propounded by the Secretary of State; and, consequently, under the constitution of the Council to which they belong, it will become their obvious duty to resign their appointments if the proposals to which they object are actually adopted.

No intelligent person would for a moment contest the soundness of the three main principles asserted by Mr. Arnold Forster: (1) That we should aim rather at increasing our military strength for over-sea operations than at maintaining large land forces for the local defence of these islands; (2) that land forces which are "redundant" (that is to say, do not appear capable of returning good value for the money spent upon them, because useless or superfluous), should be dispensed with; and (3) that the efficiency of the Army stands in very urgent need of improvement, whilst the cost must at the same time, so far as possible, be reduced.

With the above entirely praiseworthy objects in view, Mr. Arnold Forster has produced a scheme under which the Regular

Army, as well as being reduced in numbers with the Colours (a perfectly sound proceeding), is at the same time foolishly reduced to a lower standard of mobilised efficiency. If a Reservist who has served only two years with the Colours is (the conditions of training being the same for all) as good for immediate service as a Reservist who has served for seven or eight years, and if a small battalion can as readily as a comparatively large one assimilate the number of Reservists required to raise it to a common war strength, then my objection fails; otherwise it stands good. That a soldier could in two years, or even in six months, be better trained than our soldiers now are in the whole of their service, is beside the question; because, the more efficient the system, and the longer, within limits, the training, the more reliable must the soldier still become.

Mr. Arnold Forster has either declined to admit or is unable to understand what appear to be fundamental elements of any efficient system for the British Army: (1) That it is impossible for us, unless at prohibitive as well as needless expense, to provide adequately, by means of Regular troops, for the emergency of war with a great Power. (2) That, if the foregoing be admitted, it follows that the Regular Army, the "Police of the Empire," is required only to garrison the over-sea stations, to deal with "little wars," and, by means of the small reinforcing surplus at home, to furnish an example in peace and a nucleus in war for a *National Army* organised for use only in cases of national emergency. (3) That if the functions of the Regular Army have been correctly stated, there is no room in that branch of the Service for two systems of enlistment, or for any resulting variations in the standard of efficiency. *Quality*, not *quantity*, should be the aim, and any measures taken to promote expansion which involve reduced efficiency are therefore pernicious. (4) That if we create a "National Army" sufficiently strong for the over-sea operations that a fight for Empire would certainly involve, we should at the same time lay effectually the "Invasion Bogie;" because, until after gaining command of the sea we should be unable to send that army abroad, and once the sea became ours we could laugh at invasion. (5) During the time occupied by the Navy in gaining command of the sea, we should be able to render a National Army efficient for service, provided that the officers and men had thoroughly learned in their youth the rudiments of soldiering, and been kept fairly up to their work upon a system analogous to that now followed in the Volunteer Force; *i.e.* chiefly by company training in the evenings—drill in winter, and exercises in summer.

I contend that a preparatory training in schools, followed by six months' further training, under competent instructors, at the

age of seventeen or eighteen, and an easy annual course, with a final pulling together during one or two months after mobilisation, would produce for us a National Defence Force fully capable of meeting, man for man, any conscript army in the world. At all events I am certain that if left free from interference and "duties," I could, in six months, train one hundred recruits to a standard superior to that of any company I have ever commanded during any period of my service in the Army.

It is amazing to find that on looking around him for units to be regarded as "redundant," Mr. Arnold Forster has laid his hand heavily upon the Militia. If it be true, as I am sure is the case, that we cannot afford, and moreover do not need, to prepare against a great war by means of a Regular Army sufficiently numerous for such a purpose, it would seem that the Militia stands ready to hand as the natural foundation on which to build a great "National Army." Instead of this Mr. Arnold Forster proposes to interpolate a bastard organisation, comprising a mere handful of sham Militiamen or sham Linesmen, it is difficult to say which!

Considered solely by the light of the cold logic of facts, redundancy is to be found only in the excess of the Regular Army beyond the numbers actually required for the "Police of the Empire," and in the Volunteer Force. In the case of the Militia the numerical weakness of a unit does not render it "redundant," but rather impresses the need for reforms calculated to replenish the diminished ranks. But the Volunteer Force, for all practical purposes of Imperial Defence, is entirely "redundant." The Volunteers have done much by their patriotic example to resuscitate the military spirit of the nation, and in time of war their existence would tend to prevent panic; but to talk of their actually defending their country, even were they ten times as numerous and efficient, is to waste breath. With the advent of conditions under which the Volunteers could be called upon to defend Great Britain against invasion, there would be nothing left to defend.

Moreover, though we might have, for what is called "Home Defence," an army of 400,000 or 4,000,000 of the best trained troops in the world, and even if every ship, naval and commercial, belonging to a great Continental Power had been sunk or captured, we should still fall short of procuring an advantageous peace unless we had arranged matters so that an army of at least half a million could actually be made ready for service abroad. Having such an army, we might not require to use it, but being without it we should most certainly be compelled to create it.

Whatever scheme may be adopted for the regeneration of the British Army, the "recruiting difficulty" remains the crux of the

problem. It may or may not be possible to evolve a system under which an ample supply of recruits would be obtained by voluntary enlistment, for both Regular and "National" Forces; but in any case compulsion could be employed only in the case of the latter. Mr. Arnold Forster has endeavoured to show that what he is pleased to call "conscription" is out of the question upon account of the expense, altogether apart from other objections. But his arguments are entirely fallacious: he assumes that we must train 380,000 men annually, for one year, whereas we could obtain forces ample for our needs by the enlistment of 100,000 annually for twelve years' training and reserve service, and all the efficiency required could be secured under the by no means onerous conditions already suggested above. Mr. Arnold Forster further assumes that, as the result of adopting compulsory service, the pay of the Regular Army would need to be doubled. The reason of this is not apparent; the effect would most probably be in the contrary direction.

In order to prevent the adoption of universal service from yielding more recruits than were required, we should merely have to fix a sufficiently high moral and physical standard; and, in order to equalise matters, secure to the young men selected for the Army some permanent advantages in reference to taxation. Working upon such lines, it would probably be feasible to fill the ranks of a large militia army, and to supply it with qualified officers, without any further compulsion than obliging the rejected to pay special taxes, at rates suitable to their positions in society, towards the remuneration and upkeep of their defenders.

Mr. Arnold Forster has failed in his efforts at Army Reform, first because he has not made even reasonable provision against the exigencies of a great war, and secondly because the adoption of his actual proposals in the required direction would merely aggravate those very causes of notorious inefficiency which he himself has in the past so deeply deplored and so ably and forcibly denounced.

For the British Regular Army what is required is *quality*—uniform quality—not *quantity;* whilst for a National Defence Force, immediately tangible *quantity* coupled with latent *quality* would suffice for our needs; because, in our case, unlike that of a Continental Power, the Navy, not the Army, is our "First Line," as well as the foundation of all our strength, offensive and defensive.

A. W. A. POLLOCK.

HOW TO GET RECRUITS.

By "Colonel."

Some years ago I took the trouble to investigate the history and to test the worth of an enormous number of Army Reservists who applied to me for help. I do not remember one out of the number as being a tradesman or mechanic. Only two proved satisfactory and stuck to their work as bricklayers' labourers. Of the rest, the less said the better. In nearly every case the story was the same—no trade, or lazy or drunken, or worthless. This applied especially to the town-bred. A boy born in the slums in some large town goes to school up to the age of thirteen or so, and is then turned adrift. He has been taught no trade; and unless his parents are sober, thrifty, and industrious, and look after him, the boy gets into bad ways, and soon learns to dislike regular work. He earns next to nothing, and so at the age of sixteen or seventeen he enlists—calling himself eighteen. He probably enlists under an assumed name. As a recruit he knows no trade, and is entered in the books of his regiment as either a "clerk," a "miner," or a "labourer." During the six or seven years of his Army service he learns no trade. If he had a slight smattering of one he quickly loses it.

The natural, the logical, result is, that bad habits, contracted before enlistment, are accentuated by military service; for the boy has money to spend on cigarettes, drink, gambling, and worse; he is treated as a man, has free access to the canteen, can stay out late at night, has no cares about food or clothes, and is concerned only to do the minimum of drill required by regulation. He "skrimshanks" as much as he can, and not improbably joins that class of Tommy who infest Hospital in order to avoid irksome duties. This class is larger than outsiders have any notion of. Yet, on discharge, these men probably have a "good" character, and flourish this at one when applying for "work," *i.e.* pecuniary aid, for *work* is about the last thing they really want.

Now, it is precisely this class of men who, on passing to the Reserve, spread abroad, among their intimates and acquaintances, all kinds of tales about the irksome life of the soldier, and prevent

many would-be recruits from enlisting. The fond parent likewise instils into people's minds the absolutely unveracious idea that her dear boy's loose and thriftless ways are the result of his military training, and not of her own upbringing. When her hopeful offspring joins the vagrants one sees in St. James's Park and the Green Park, and writes to her for money, she trenchantly denounces that vicious school of evil, the Army, and her neighbours are not slow to follow suit. The result is that the Army still has, and so long as the present system continues is bound to have, a bad reputation amongst the class of people from whom a large percentage of recruits are obtained. There is, however, much to be said in favour of the view that military life has a deleterious effect upon Tommy Atkins, and therefore it is desirable to remedy those defects which admittedly exist, rather than to cast all the blame on the man and his childhood's upbringing. What, then, are the defects of Army service which affect recruiting?

In the van I place, without hesitation, the beer-canteen as the curse of the private soldier,* even as the sergeants' mess is the curse of the senior non-commissioned officers and their families. As I am dealing only with the question of recruiting, I will not enter into the question of sergeants' messes further than to say that the N.C.O. in charge is placed in a false position from the start, in a position of serious temptation; and that drunkenness and gambling are the inevitable result of the institution, whilst immorality is certainly not lessened thereby. The sergeants' mess dances are abominations—pitfalls for wives and sisters and daughters; snares for bachelors; ruin for many a married man.

The beer-canteen is excused on the plea that as men *will* drink, it is better to give them wholesome drink in barracks, under military supervision, than to let them get unwholesome drink outside. This plea is remarkable more for its sophistry than for its correctness; for, as a fact, all men do not drink beer or stout, and the canteen acts as a direct incentive to intemperance. Many a man has told me he first took to drink in the canteen owing to the chaff of other soldiers.

It is also a mistake to suppose that Tommy likes the canteen. Only the topers do so. It is, at best, an evil-smelling, cheerless, pot-house. The stuff sold there as beer and stout is systematically doctored or watered by the man in charge, who is regarded by those "in the know" as singularly unfortunate if he does not make a tidy sum unknown to the authorities. Moreover, the beer

* The results of abolishing the canteen in the United States do not seem encouraging. In my opinion the arguments in favour of retaining the canteen are not based upon "sophistry," but on common sense.—ED. U. S. M.

consumed in the canteen is not drunk at meal-times but after meals, and between meals, and so at improper and unwholesome periods of the day. If the men were allowed one glass of light beer with their dinner in their barrack-rooms, they would not rush off to the canteen. But, as they eat their dinner dry, they feel thirsty afterwards, and resort to the uninviting canteen, where they consume an inordinate and wholly unneccessary quantity of fluid, which injures instead of doing good, even in this climate. In tropical or semi-tropical countries its effects are actively injurious, and productive of various forms of fever. As an instance, I quote what occurred at Sialkote when the Carabineers were quartered there in 1885–6. A serious outbreak of heat-apoplexy alarmed the authorities, who, acting on very wise advice, closed the beer-canteen, with the immediate result of stamping out this deadly affection, caused mainly by heat of the blood. Although a large number of young soldiers contract the bad habit of swilling tankards of beer in the canteen, an almost equally large number do themselves serious injury, especially in India, by going to some cheap shop outside barracks to drink aërated waters of doubtful quality. Enteric fever is not seldom traced by Army doctors to this practice. In either case the men resent having to divorce their drink from their food, and when on furlough, etc., take care to let the facts be known.

I tried the experiment of allowing the men to drink either a glass of beer or a bottle of aërated water at their midday meal, and found it worked admirably. By this simple expedient drunkenness was practically put an end to, and the men were made happy. It certainly conduced to sobriety and steadiness.

In connection with this experiment was another, viz. a men's mess-room. I turned a barrack-room into a dining-room, with the most satisfactory results. The absence of mess-rooms is a great cause of complaint among the men, and, I have reason to believe, seriously affects recruiting. The men object, and naturally so, to feeding in the room in which they sleep. Any one can understand how objectionable it is, especially in winter in England, to sit down to breakfast in a room reeking with blacking, pipe-clay, oil, stale tobacco, humanity, and wet clothes. If the men were given mess-rooms they would behave better, and like Army life better. A separate room for meals fosters habits of self-respect, of order, and good-fellowship—especially if comfortable easy-chairs, table-cloths, a kettle, a saucepan, a fry-pan, newspapers, writing materials, and books are provided for it. It makes the men feel as though they had a home, instead of a prison. In my own experience it stopped going out into the town at night, kept the men together, and

induced habits of study. A mess-room is very useful for lectures and so forth.

This leads me to mention the grave bane of Army service, especially in the barrack-room; and that is the *unhomely* life the men, all of them young and impressionable, are forced to lead. I do not refer to enforced celibacy, or to the want of creature comforts, but to the entire absence of kindliness, of affection, of tenderness and sympathy, of consideration for trifling infirmities. No mother's voice, no sister's aid, no gentle, no friendly, face. The officers keep aloof from the men, and take practically no interest in their happiness and private concerns.* All they are concerned about is attention to orders, efficiency at drill, punctuality, kit inspection, and so on. An occasional "penny-gaff," or theatrical entertainment, forms the extent of fraternization between officers and men. Between non-commissioned officers and the men the gulf is almost as widely fixed. The authorities do not encourage friendships between non-commissioned officers and Tommies.

Hence the men have to look elsewhere than in barracks for that milk of human kindness for which they long. In those garrisons where unsectarian Soldiers' Homes exist—and these are lamentably few—the men feel they have at least one friend to whom they go when in trouble, and that is the lady in charge. By Soldiers' Homes I do not mean those Church of England "Institutes" which have been erected more or less out of opposition to such institutions as those run by Miss Daniells, Miss Sandes, Miss Robinson, and other ladies. I allude to Homes such as those conducted by the above-named ladies, and in no way subject to the chaplains. The men do not take to the former, they do appreciate the latter, and I speak with some knowledge, as almost all my acquaintance with Tommy's inner life has been gained from men who use these unsectarian Homes. Tommy objects to sectarianism, and loves perfect freedom out of barracks.

The moral of all this is, obviously, provide good unsectarian Soldiers' Homes, in charge of kind ladies, in every garrison, outside barracks, and yet handy thereto, where men can resort of an evening instead of loafing about the streets or getting into mischief. Especially is this desirable in India. It is there that much of Tommy's life is spent. It is there he loses health and strength. It is there that all the evils already alluded to are to be found in full force, with the added trials of heat, mosquitoes, flies, fleas, bugs, bad lamps, bad punkahs, badly fitting doors and windows, which

* Such has not been my experience; but if the allegation be well founded, even in reference only to a few particular cases, then a possible explanation is afforded of why some units in South Africa proved so inferior to others.—ED. U. S. M.

let in the hot air and dust, bad food, the "long, long Indian day," hot, dusty, uninviting roads to walk on by way of amusement, no means of exercise and recreation, fevers, heat-apoplexy and sun-stroke, vile native drinks, viler native-made aërated waters, filthy bazaars, and haunts of vice—and no alternatives, no relief, no variety. It is in India that the need of Soldiers' Homes is most felt. It is there that the kindly influence of good ladies is most desirable. I know, from what the men have told me, and from what I have seen, that their loneliness, the homeless life they are forced to lead, the lack of sympathy, and the absence of Soldiers' Homes, make Tommy detest India.

In the old long-service days matters were entirely different. In these short-service days the young soldier has but one idea, and that is to get out of India as soon as possible. He *will* not re-engage, and who can wonder at his refusing to do so? The life of an infantry soldier in India is most miserable, and calculated to induce sickness and disease. The men write home to their friends and tell them so; all those who join the Reserve spread the truth abroad; the spectacle of broken-down invalids landing every week acts as an eye-opener to the public, and thus it is yearly becoming more difficult to induce decent men to enlist. Another trouble connected with Army service—a serious one, and one which affects recruiting to a considerable extent—is inability to earn a living after Army service. India is responsible for much. The habits contracted there are not conducive to steady work in civil life. Few men escape without some illness which affects their strength and ability to earn wages. There are many reasons for this.

In the first place the barracks and cantonments of India are unwholesome. The trees which have been planted, though refreshing to the eye and grateful as shade, cause the air to stagnate, and prevent its free circulation during the hot weather. The natives are permitted to defœcate within cantonments, as they never were when I was a young officer; and this has fouled the neighbourhood of barracks. Native bazaars have been allowed to approach barracks, and thus add their quota to the sources of pollution. The surface round barracks has become impregnated with urine and decaying matter thrown out of barrack-rooms and kitchens. The roofs and walls of barracks are now built so thin, and of such porous and absorbent materials, as to cause the men to suffer greatly from the heat—especially at night. For all these reasons barrack-life in India is odious to the men, and distinctly conducive to ill-health.

Some, if not all, these evils could be remedied without very

serious expense. During the cold weather the troops should vacate barracks and cantonments; the surface round barracks should be dug up in their absence, fresh earth being spread all round.

It has always been a wonder to me why the troops in India are not employed on irrigation work, considering that want of irrigation is one of the troubles of India. Instead of sending regiments to the hills, there to fritter their time away, why not set them to work to form great dams and reservoirs, so that the rains and melted snows may be utilised which now are wasted? The working pay thus earned might be placed on deposit so as to increase soldiers' pensions on discharge. I am quite sure that outdoor labour of this sort would keep the men in health. It certainly would benefit India, and make Indian service less obnoxious to the soldier.

Then, again, why are the men not employed as tradesmen and artificers on repairs and maintenance of barracks wherever possible, instead of idling their time away in the hot weather as they are obliged to do? I see no reason why carpenters, joiners, tailors, bootmakers, tentmakers, sailmakers, smiths, plumbers, stonemasons, should not work at their trades under cover in the hot weather. Nor is there any particular reason why, in the hills, soldiers should not be employed road-making, hut-building, drainage, water-supply, etc. In these ways men would keep up their trades; those who do not know a trade could have an opportunity of learning one, and so one trouble would be got over.

Then, again, the Government should insist on very thick roofs and very thick walls in India; tiles which *reflect* but do not absorb and radiate heat, materials which do not act as heat conductors for walls and floors. This would reduce the heat in barracks and give the men a chance of retaining their health. At present the red tiling used is porous and absorbent; the roofs are thin and hot; the walls are much too thin; the doors and windows are wretchedly bad; the stone floors used are objectionable in many ways.

Good, well-kept cricket grounds, quoit grounds, skittle alleys, covered ball courts, should be provided by military labour.

Every station with one British regiment should have its unsectarian Soldiers' Home. Soldiers should be encouraged to keep gardens where vegetables can be grown. Bazaars should be banished from the neighbourhood of barracks. Good hospitals with lady nurses, comfortable chairs and couches, good reading lamps, nice gardens and libraries, should be maintained in every station, with good cooks and decent crockery, instead of the uninviting basins now used.

Why are sickly regiments not moved to the sea-coast to recuperate? I can vouch for the fact, in my own case, that ten days at Bombay during the rains cured me of dysentery contracted at Secunderabad.

It has long been a mystery to me why the British authorities do not approach the Portuguese authorities with the view of establishing a good sanatorium on the hill above Marmagoa, where there is excellent sea-bathing, fishing, sailing, and sea-air. A hot weather there would brace up the sickliest, whereas transfer to the hills very often kills a man. It is a mistake to suppose that the hills of India are healthy. They are not healthy for those who have livers, nor are they an unmixed blessing to the Tommy, as at present used. A man fresh from England would of course feel well in the Indian hills. Not so the unfortunate who has passed several hot weathers in the plains. Very often the change renders him ill. It is not rarefied air that a man needs, but bracing and invigorating ozone, and healthy exercise and occupation, with decent food and freedom from the pests of the plains. None of these are obtainable in the hills of India.

So long as short service exists, so long must India be a perennial difficulty in the matter of recruiting. Why should not the British Army in India be kept entirely distinct from the rest of the British Army, and made a special long-service Army, with recruiting depôts of its own, under the India Office, with a system of working-pay pensions as suggested above?

I am confident that if these various points were attended to in a generous and businesslike spirit, there would be no lack of recruits for India—and Army service would become agreeable rather than unpleasant. There would be no need to send regiments to England every ten years.

But whilst considering the happiness of the men we must not forget that of the officers, for the one is more or less dependent on the other. Now, the chief annoyance officers in India have to suffer is bad house accommodation. Unless one has experienced it one has no notion what an Indian officer's bungalow is like. As a rule it is built of sun-dried bricks set in mud. The mud floors are rough, uneven, and infested with white ants and other insects, which destroy uniform and clothing. The walls are white-washed. The doors and windows are loose, rattling, and full of holes, and unable to keep out the dust and heat. The roofs are wretchedly bad, very often crumbling and dangerous. The servants' godowns and stables are disgraceful hovels, unfit for cattle. These bungalows, as a rule, are owned by half-castes, who once were in Government employ, and ask preposterous rents, but never

execute repairs; or else they belong to wealthy native shylocks, who extort high rents and neglect their property *à l'Indienne.* The furniture is, as a rule, hired from some Mahommedan cheap jack, and has to be seen to be understood. It is filthy, worm-eaten, uncomfortable, and unsafe. Officers have to provide their own quarters, and yet are forced to live within "regimental lines," *i.e.* within a specified area. They are thus at the mercy of grasping and worthless landlords. So long as this system, or rather want of system, prevails, so long may one expect young officers to contract enteric fever, and older officers' tempers to be the reverse of that of angels. In other words, so long must Tommy suffer for his officer's irritation. It seems but right that officers should be supplied with decent and healthy Government quarters. Whatever ministers to their comfort conduces to their health, and to the resultant happiness of the men.

Indian life is not the only drawback to Army service. There is "foreign service" in colonies to be reckoned with. I should be inclined to give the palm to Gibraltar, as the most trying station for Tommy. The barracks in the town are bad and unwholesome, owing to being surrounded by dirty people. They are cramped and confined within too small an area. They are old and dirty. The facilities for drinking vile liquor are innumerable. Half-ripe, or over-ripe, fruit and vegetables are cheap and handy. Tobacco is bad and plentiful. No facilities exist for outdoor games or exercise. The men are cooped up in narrow streets, filled with drink-shops and haunts of vice, and the only recreation they can get is at the North Front outside the Rock, which is a long way off, and not very inviting. Gibraltar fever is particularly bad, and easily contracted. The officers can ride into Spain most days and get a mouthful of air; the men cannot, yet upon fresh air and exercise depends health in Gibraltar. Life there is horrible for the men—there is no disguising that fact; and this interferes with recruiting, no doubt.

Could not arrangements be made with the Spanish authorities for the hire or purchase of a large camping-ground in Spain, where regiments could go for a month in the hot weather? Anything which would vary and break the dullness and monotony of the men's existence in a place like Gibraltar, with its numerous guards and sentries, its trying levanters or east winds, and not too perfect drainage, would promote health and improve recruiting, by putting an end to grumbling and ennui.

Over and above the foregoing causes of discontent there are many minor evils which Tommy treasures up and retails to his friends at home.

(*a*) *Stoppages from his pay* for barrack damages, hair-cutting, etc., over which he has no control.

(*b*) *Stoppages from his pay* for the upkeep of the regimental clubs, over which he has no control.

(*c*) *Stoppages from his pay* for clothing and necessaries worn in the public service. Some officers are much harder on the men than others, and order them to provide themselves with new clothing, which is supplied from store and debited to them in their accounts. Some quartermasters are specially hard on them in these matters.

(*d*) *Stoppages from his pay* for hospital. Why should any man suffer in pocket for being ill, if the illness is caused neither by his own fault nor his own sin; or, indeed, why should the word "stoppage" be connected with hospital as it is?

(*e*) *Hospitals.* Why are they made gloomy, harsh, and uninviting abodes? Why are army surgeons as a rule so hard on the sick? Why do they speak to and treat them as scheming malingerers or worthless clods without feelings? I have been a witness to conduct which—in a civil hospital—would have created a "public scandal." The men feel this treatment acutely, and do everything in their power to avoid falling into the army surgeon's hands. They obtain physic from quacks and from cheap medicos rather than "report sick." Many a man has concealed his disease until past cure, from fear of rough treatment in hospital and of hospital stoppages. Vice should be punished as a crime, but not by hospital stoppages through the army surgeon. It should be dealt with in the orderly-room in the usual manner, but with great severity. If the vicious, the drunken, the idle were made to do extra guards and fatigues in peace-time, I venture to think that vice and intemperance would not, as at present, place *hors de combat* some forty or fifty men in every regiment. If army surgeons would unbend sufficiently to treat the Tommies as civil doctors do their patients, the effect would be magical on recruiting and on the health of the men.

These, then, are some of the matters which are causing the War Minister so much trouble by stopping the flow of suitable recruits. It is vain to adopt violent measures, such as reduction in numbers, so long as the canker is eating at the heart of the machine. Increase of pay is not the panacea required; but more considerate regard for the welfare, the health, the happiness of men who forsake their homes, give up their liberty, and submit to irksome restraints in unhealthy climes and not too pleasing abodes.

If I might venture to offer suggestions, they would take somewhat this form:—

I. Form *training depôts* in healthy localities—such as Aldershot, Salisbury, Dartmoor, Curragh, etc.—where able-bodied lads shall, for two years, be taught trades, and made to work at them so as to earn sufficient to pay for their keep—whilst learning to be soldiers.

Philanthropic institutions such as Dr. Barnardo's, Mr. Fegan's, etc., would doubtless co-operate, and instead of drafting their best lads to Canada, would transfer them to these depôts, and so provide one regular source of supply without resorting to that slippery agent the recruiting sergeant.

II. These lads must on joining the training depôts enlist as soldiers—

(*a*) Long service for India, with pension and working pay.

(*b*) Medium service for Colonies, with working pay.

(*c*) Short service for Home, with working pay.

III. Every lad must know, and be proficient in, a trade before quitting the depôt. A labourer is not a tradesman.

IV. Throughout Army service the men to be encouraged, assisted, and obliged, whenever possible, to work at their trades; all work about barracks and cantonments being carried out by them under military foremen of works.

V. A system of annuities, or pensions, commencing at forty-two years of age, should be started for Indian service.

VI. Any Reservist desiring to start in a *bonâ fide* business to be entitled to an advance for that purpose, to be repaid by easy instalments.

VII. Abolish all "stoppages" from pay except for vice and drunkenness. Let fatigues be done by defaulters and vicious characters.* Make drunkenness a serious military crime instead of a mere fault.

VIII. Abolish the beer-canteen. Allow each man one glass of light beer at dinner or one bottle of ginger-beer or aërated water, making the officer commanding responsible that the price is recovered from the men in their accounts, a ticket being produced far each charge so made; no "odd man out" or similar practice to be permitted.

IX. Provide lady nurses in all hospitals, and good cooks. Give plenty of comfortable easy-chairs, couches, books, papers, and reading lamps. Encourage officers off duty and ladies to visit the men non-officially.

X. Provide *mess-rooms* for the men, fitted with table-cloths, cutlery and crockery, a fry-pan, saucepan and kettle, easy-chairs, papers and books.

XI. See that the men have wholesome food; decent playing grounds; good libraries; comfortable barrack-rooms; sanitary surroundings; good baths; and warm water in winter.

XII. It is a mistake to suppose the men mind going to bed early. They get up very early, and require plenty of sleep. Only the "bad-hats" as a rule stay out late. Abolish, therefore, the midnight pass, and make tattoo at 10 P.M., so as to prevent the men going to public-houses, or low places, as a matter of course.

XIII. In India especially do not treat vice as a necessary concomitant of military life. On the contrary, treat it with severity, and instead of providing facilities for indulgence therein, and preventive measures recommended by so-called medical authorities, make it known that vice is vice, and will be treated as such. Moreover, let lectures by officers be given to recruits and to the men at intervals on the evils of vice. Do not permit these lectures to be given by chaplains only, as the men regard all such as mere "religion" to be jeered at in private; whereas if an officer addresses the men they pay attention.

XIV. In peace-time do not multiply sentries; do not make the men suffer needlessly by being strapped up in tight-fitting garments, especially in warm weather. Have some consideration for the comfort and happiness of the men, remembering they have feelings. Make the barrack-rooms as homelike as possible. Give prizes for the tidiest rooms. Encourage sobriety, order, cleanliness. Insist that no gambling, card-playing, or drinking be indulged in. In short, create a wholesome, healthy atmosphere—*mens sana in corpore sano*—the officers taking the lead, by precept and example. If the officers make the men happy and set them good examples, recruits will be plentiful.

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* So they already are—to the utmost. In a well-behaved corps there are not enough defaulters to do the work. Scavenger's and dustman's work certainly is not the proper duty of good soldiers. Why should not barracks be scavengered under arrangement with the civil authorities?—ED. U. S. M.

XV. I believe that if the War Office were to appoint lecturers, with magic lanterns, to instruct recruits and young soldiers as to things to be avoided (*a*) in home barrack life, (*b*) in foreign stations, (*c*) in India, the results would be beneficial, for ignorance is the fertile parent of disease.

Any one who knows Tommy is aware that he is quite ignorant of the value of good and clean teeth, of keeping his toe-nails in order, of guarding his neck and spine from the sun, of avoiding chills, of personal cleanliness, of sobriety and temperance in living, of regular exercise, of fresh air, and so forth. It is hardly credible, but it is a fact that I have known a Tommy in almost the last stage of typhoid get out of bed to steal a comrade's food and die in consequence, whilst another Tommy suffering from syphilis has ridiculed the idea of its loathsomeness and danger to others. The word "fever," as a rule, conveys but one idea to Tommy, viz. enteric. The majority of the men who "fall out" during long marches or field-days come under one or other of the following categories :—

(1) Those who neglect their feet.
(2) Those who drink to excess.
(3) Those who exceed in other ways.

Yet no steps are taken by the authorities to instruct the men on these points. It is just these three categories who form the grumblers and recruit-stoppers.

BRITISH SOLDIERS IN FOREIGN ARMIES.

By Dr. T. Miller Maguire.

I propose in this article to support a theory which I have endeavoured to maintain amidst much opposition on various platforms for twenty years, to wit, that the natives of these isles are by nature among the most martial of mankind. I hold that the present absolutely and relatively infirm condition of our soldiery is not racial but accidental. It is to be ascribed to political vote-catchers and popularity hunters; and I hold also that even the degeneracy of our town-folk and the unfitness of our females for the first duties and privileges of their sex is due entirely to the neglect, apathy, and base selfishness of our richer and governing classes. I also hold firmly that these evils, bad as they are, might be corrected in a generation if our present Cabinet were composed of men like Raleigh, Drake, Bacon, Cromwell, or the Pitts, or even Palmerston.*

The canker of the State is the deplorable neglect of duty on the party of its leaders, and especially the neglect of education, physical, moral, and mental, which is the *differentia* of our party leaders, our society magnates, our public school heads, and our University dons.†

That we are a martial race I will prove in this essay by illustrations of what our people have done when they fought as mercenaries or allies for other States.

Colonel Sir Howard Vincent, in his letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, 6th May, 1904, contends with Lord Bacon, who wrote 300 years before, that the Militia and Volunteers of these isles are capable of making excellent soldiers, and that the first aim of our rulers should be to adopt provident methods suitable to our isles to cultivate and utilise our military spirit. He quotes also Pitt's orders, 1804, and he quotes Colonel Hale's views on the value of

* Since I penned these lines I have been rejoiced to learn that Lord Hugh Cecil and the Hon. and Rev. Gadderley have adopted very similar themes, and are ready to join a crusade for promulgating religion and honour among the richer classes.

† See the recent remarks on this subject of General Smith-Dorrien, Sir Oliver Lodge, the Moseley Commission, Colonel Maude, and Mr. Spencer Wilkinson.

our auxiliaries, and I may add that when Gambetta was displaying great energy in 1870–71, the arrival of some 50,000 British troops would have turned the balance in favour of the French against the Germans.

How the British might have acted, 1871.

I have evidence on foreign authority in support of this view, and, moreover, I was asked by Captain Grierson, now General Grierson, at Woolwich, in 1894, the following question:—

"But there is one question I would like to ask Dr. Maguire, with a view to pointing a moral. We have heard a great deal of late years of the absolute impossibility of the British Army ever taking part in wars in Europe outside of England, of British military forces having nothing more to say on Continental questions, and of Great Britain having nothing to do with Continental politics. I do not for a moment apprehend that we shall ever be engaged in war against Germany, but as a mere theoretical question of strategy, I should like to ask Dr. Maguire to give us his opinion as to what would have been the effect towards, I will not say the end of this campaign, but towards the time when the Germans started from Orleans to pursue General Chanzy towards Le Mans, of from 75,000 to 100,000 British troops being landed on the theatre of operations. I should like to have his opinion upon what the effect of the arrival of an army, which would have been equal, certainly numerically, to the German forces which were spared from Metz to finish up the campaign of the Loire, would have been on the termination of that campaign."

My reply was:—

"I am very glad, indeed, that Captain Grierson is one of those Englishmen who do not believe that the traditions of England would teach us to efface ourselves. I have not the slightest doubt that an English force, such as the gallant captain refers to, might at any moment, either in the history of the past, or during the history of the future, in our generation, or in any future generation, produce a most powerful influence on any European campaign, especially when each side is getting tired. In war after war, for more than 150 years, British corps appeared on the Continent, and the British fleet being mistress of the sea, our generals or our allies were able to turn those corps to very good account indeed. I believe if the gallant captain had put the question to a German speaker he would have received the answer that I propose to give him. That such a force thus landed, and England having command of the sea, would have been a very serious obstacle in the way of the successful prosecution of the investment of Paris. Just

on the spur of the moment I would, if I may, suggest where they might have been put."

Captain Grierson.—"The question is purely strategical and not at all international."

Dr. Maguire.—"Assuming, therefore, that there was some cause of quarrel at this particular date, and that it was a good time to cut in. When the Germans had all these troubles about Paris and were hampered from the Loire and from Amiens, supposing we had put the force at Havre at the time when Faidherbe was coming down about the 9th or 12th January towards Amiens, and when the Germans found it very hard to hold Rouen and Amiens simultaneously against Roy and Faidherbe, 75,000 English would have compelled the Germans to evacuate all that part of France on the spot—or 35,000 English. That admits of no discussion at all, I take it.

"But I will take another point. Supposing that they came in at the mouth of the Loire and went up to Angers, and supposing when the German 75,000 men were moving past the Loire and were fronted by 118,000, that they came up to St. Amand and put themselves where General Curten was, where would the German advance to Le Mans have been? Rapidly the Germans would have had to countermarch to Orleans, and very probably Chanzy's army at Le Mans would have moved by Chartres on Paris."

I now proceed from speculation to historical experience, and maintain that every Continental power since the first century, A.D., has rejoiced to receive the help of Britons in a crisis.

The celebrated Roman General Frontinus, the friend of such a great emperor as Trajan, was in charge of the Roman forces in Britain. He wrote a book on Stratagems, from which I hope to quote some day, with the vain hope that the public schoolmasters will use its wisdom instead of the Pornography of Ovid for their army classes. Well Frontinus conceived the very highest opinion of the martial energy of the Britons, and was most careful as to the construction of his camps in their vicinity, not only so, but he considered them most admirable recruits for the Imperial legions.

BRITISH LEGIONARIES.

Tacitus observes, that the strength of the Roman Army consisted of foreign troops; and of these foreign troops such were the effects of the conciliatory and judicious measures in the government of Frontinus, that no small part was raised and recruited in Britain. According to ancient inscriptions, and the *Notitia Provinciarum*, as quoted by Camden, the following were among the corps in the pay of Rome, serving in the various provinces;

Britons then, as often since, distinguishing themselves in France, Spain, Germany, and Egypt:—

Battalion (or wing) of a thousand in Britain (*ala Britannica milliaria*).

4th battalion, or wing (*ala*), of Britons in Egypt.

1st Aelian cohort of Britons.

3rd cohort of Britons.

7th cohort of Britons.

10th cohort of Britons in Armenia.

British under the master of the infantry } Among the Palatine
Invincible younger British. } auxiliaries.

Younger British Slingers (*funditores*); light, irregular, skirmishing troops.

Britons with the master of the horse in Gaul.

Invincible younger Britons in Spain.

Elder Britons in Illyricum (Croatia, Dalmatia, Salmatia, etc.).

The *ala* was a term applied to foreign troops of the same import to that of the Roman legion.

The cohort consisted of about 600 men.

I take it that these details will be of fresh interest to my readers. I am often surprised that our landed gentry do not study the remnants of Roman military engineering on their estates. They might practise tactics with their tenants and the lads of their schools in their neighbourhood. It would be as good fun as preserving game or shooting tame birds, I should imagine. They will find ample details of these wonderful structures in General Roy's 'Military Antiquities of the Romans in Great Britain,' or in Camden's *Britannia*, which should be in every country gentleman's library.

Anglo-Saxons at Constantinople.

When the Norsemen gave up their forays and settled down in their conquered lands, the corps of Varangians, which protected the degenerate descendants of Constantine by the shores of the Sea of Marmora and within the Golden Horn, would have died out only that so many recruits from our islands were forthcoming. William the Conqueror and his men-at-arms robbed the Saxons even as these had destroyed the ancient Britons. Hence after the rout of the Emperors of the West by Goths and Huns, many English warriors went to the Byzantine Empire.

In the time of the Emperor Comnenus a considerable body of Anglo-Saxons furnished recruits for his body-guard.

A large proportion of the Varangians were, in fact, Anglo-Saxons; but in the confused idea of geography received at the

court of Constantinople, they were naturally enough called Anglo-Danes, as their native country was confounded with the Thule of the ancients, by which expression the Archipelago of Zetland and Orkney is properly to be understood, though, according to the notions of the Greeks, it comprised either Denmark or Britain. The emigrants, however, spoke a language not very dissimilar to the original Varangians, and adopted the name more readily, that it seemed to remind them of their unhappy fate, the appellation being in one sense capable of being interpreted as exiles. Excepting one or two chief commanders, whom the Emperor judged worthy of such high trust, the Varangians were officered by men of their own nation; and with so many privileges, being joined by many of their countrymen from time to time, as the crusades, pilgrimages, or discontent at home, drove fresh supplies of Anglo-Saxons, or Anglo-Danes, to the East, the Varangians subsisted in strength to the last days of the Greek Empire, retaining their native language, along with the unblemished loyalty, and unabated martial spirit, which characterised their fathers.

This account of the Varangian Guard is strictly historical, and might be proved by reference to the Byzantine historians; most of whom, and also Villehardouin's account of the taking of the city of Constantinople by the Franks and Venetians, make repeated mention of this celebrated and singular body of Englishmen, forming a mercenary guard attendant to the person of the Greek Emperors.

So in the Middle Ages the British, during the Hundred Years' War and after the death of the Black Prince, formed themselves into famous bands of *Condottieri* or mercenary soldiers, and were the prop of many a petty despot or Italian Republic. Very famous indeed were some of their bands, especially those of the chief Hawkwood, called Aguto, in the "soft Etruscan tongue," Champion of Florence, whose name is famous in Italian history, and in romance and poetry even till now.

The French kings employed Scotchmen throughout the whole fifteenth century as among their most trusty soldiers. But it was during the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that migratory soldiers were at a premium, and men of British birth fought under every banner, Hapsburg, Bourbon, Nassau, from Buda-Pesth to Amsterdam, and from the banks of the Vistula to the banks of the Guadiana. A new aristocracy of Scotch and Irish gentlemen, who had no properties except a good education, plenty of courage and brains, and keen eyes and trusty weapons, pervaded all the armies of the Continent, and their descendants in the last century have been among the most celebrated citizens of France, Austria, and Spain. The seventeenth

century type of soldier of fortune is skilfully drawn by Sir Walter Scott in 'Dugald Dalgetty.'

The English were less adventurous, and, indeed, the exile of the Celts was largely due to the pressure of the Anglo-Saxons who, under Cromwell, Charles II., and William III., harried with impartiality Irish Catholics and Scotch Presbyterians.

Queen Elizabeth's policy was an enigma. The champion diplomatic liar of all the Spanish Empire admitted her superiority in the art of duplicity. Her troops would very gladly indeed have thrown themselves heartily into the religious contests and constant revolts that agitated France and the Netherlands, but she thwarted their most ambitious projects by her vacillating policy, but though she might starve them, she could not extinguish their energy. British soldiers were publicly commended by such an enemy of their name and nation as the Duke of Parma. British officers defended Bergen-op-Zoom and Helvoetsluys. Lord Willoughby and other Englishmen conduced in no small degree to the triumph of Henry of Navarre over the League. Among the many touching and terrible episodes of the revolt of the Netherlands, one of the best known is the death of Sir Philip Sidney at Zutphen, 1586.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618–1648.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century an appalling disaster broke over central Europe. It is hard to estimate the injury done to Germany by the Thirty Years' War. Most of you gentlemen have read Schiller, but every author admits that Germany, from being one of the most flourishing nations, became one of the poorest owing to the horrors of this period. Parts of the Fatherland have never recovered from the devastating license of the champions of two Christian creeds, whose barbarities rivalled the horrors of the "great horde" or the worst violence of Islam. The savage soldiery lived by plunder wherever they went, and the arrival of a Swedish Army, under Gustavus Adolphus, though good for Protestantism, was not of much benefit to Germany at large. Who were some of the very best troops fighting on the Continent of Europe in this Thirty Years' War?—Scotch and British soldiers. The military tutor of Cromwell learned the art of war in Germany. Leslie, who commanded at Dunbar against Cromwell, learned the art of war in Germany. As to the army of Gustavus Adolphus, some of the most eminent soldiers of that Swedish Prince were Scotchmen. At the battle of Lützen, where Gustavus Adolphus was killed, the reserve was commanded by Henderson, a Scotchman. In the Swedish Army, then the best in Europe, there were no fewer than six British generals, thirty British

colonels, and fifty-one British lieut.-colonels. So famous was the soldiery of Britain, that they were eagerly welcomed in any army under the banner of which they volunteered to serve. Our King James I. is not illustrious for his military policy, but his troops, in spite of the manner in which they were checkmated by their Government, maintained the fame of the soldiers of Crecy and Agincourt, fighting on the Oder, the Saale, the Elbe, and the Danube. A very well-known incident and a very satisfactory incident in the opinion of the House of Austria, was the murder of Wallenstein, the most singular and ablest soldier of the period—next to Gustavus Adolphus. There was not to be found in all the Empire any man brave enough to beard him and to murder him except an Irishman or a Scotchman, and accordingly Wallenstein met his death at the hands of five Britons, Fitzgerald, Butler, Devereux, Leslie, and Gordon. Three Irish and two Scotch soldiers of fortune killed Wallenstein and they were liberally rewarded by the Emperor of Germany, not a German being found to volunteer for the task. However, we need not be too proud of this particular incident.

ALMANZA, 1707.

The battle of Almanza, in which, through the fault of our allies, the British were defeated, is a curious example of the state of things that then prevailed. Some of the best soldiers of each power were exiles from the hostile power. The leader of the British Army at Almanza in 1707 was a French Protestant called De Ruvigny (Lord Galway); the leader of the French Army was Berwick, an illegitimate son of James II., an English Catholic in the service of France. And this leads me to another very remarkable fact in connection with my subject.

The chosen guardians of the French Kings were not Frenchmen, they were Swiss to some extent, but the most select guardians were Scotchmen. From 1416 till the French Revolution the chosen body-guard of the French Kings were gentlemen of Scotch descent and Scotch name. Moreover, after the restoration of the Bourbons, Scotchmen were selected to carry the remains of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette to their last resting-place in the chapel of St. Denis. Far more remarkable was the Irish brigade in the service of France. It was the only brigade in that service that in the last century inflicted in the open field a decisive defeat on British Infantry. As to the British soldiers in Europe—I do not care whether they were Roman Catholic, Protestant, English, Scotch, or Irish—whatever service the British soldier entered, he soon came to the fore as a good fighting man.

In the war of the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748, the British fought as allies of the Austrian Empress of Germany, Marie Theresa, in alliance with the Dutch against the French and Frederick of Prussia, and in the Seven Years' War, 1756–1763, as allies of Frederick of Prussia as against the French. In each war our troops distinguished themselves and won the hearty applause of Continental critics, and the only opponents that were able to cope with them efficiently were the Irish regiments in the service of France.

I have only space for one incident of the battle of Dettingen, 1743, when King George II. was himself in the field.

The 21st Royal Regiment of North British Fusiliers also did themselves honour at Dettingen. When the French cuirassiers pounced upon them, Sir Andrew Agnew, deeming it impossible to withstand their charge (for the impenetrable square was not then known in the British Army), ordered the regiment to fall back from the centre by right and left. The cuirassiers rushed madly into the lane they formed, believing that the line had been broken. The 21st then delivered a volley and charged the horses with the bayonet, nearly annihilating the French corps. The King did not fail to see the movement and its result. "Ah, Sir Andrew," said his Majesty, pleasantly, after the battle, "the *gens d'armes* got in among you to-day!" "Yes, please your Majesty," answered the brave Scotch knight, "but they did not get out again."

At the battle of Fontenoy, 1745, the British were practically deserted when Marshal Saxe pressed them close, and the action of their immortal column of Infantry is celebrated by no less severe a critic than Voltaire.

The Duke of Cumberland, whose bravery that day merited the highest eulogium, at the head of a great column of 14,000 or 15,000 British and Hanoverian Infantry, accompanied by twenty pieces of cannon, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, and the destructive cross-fire from the guns of the village of Fontenoy, and of the redoubt unassaulted by Ingoldsby, forced his way beyond *both*, into the French centre. "There was one dreadful hour," alleges the Marquis d'Argenson, a looker-on with Louis XV., "in which we expected nothing less than a renewal of the affair at Dettingen; our Frenchmen being awed by the steadiness of the English, and by their rolling fire, which is really infernal, and, I confess to you, is enough to stupefy the most unconcerned spectators. Then it was that we began to *despair of our cause*." And no wonder they "began to despair!" Of their Infantry, battalion after battalion of their best regiments, of their Cavalry, squadron after squadron gave way, shattered by the

musketry, or smashed by the cannon, of that moving citadel of gallant men, from whose ranks, as having penetrated above three hundred paces beyond the redoubt and village in spite of all that had *yet* crossed their path, the shouts of anticipated victory resounded over the plain! But by this time, though its depth seemed undiminished, the column had suffered much; it looked as if astonished at finding itself in the middle of the French, and without Cavalry; it appeared motionless, as if without further orders, yet maintaining a fierce countenance, as so far master of the field of battle. Like a noble bull, faced by none with impunity, and wounded only at a distance by those still venturing to wound, *there* it stood, in the midst of a hostile amphitheatre, triumphant and bellowing defiance, though weakened by past exertions and loss of blood. Had the Dutch now burst through the redoubts from Fontenoy to Antoine in support of the Anglo-German column, the French would have been not only beaten, but ruined, since there would certainly have been no escape for the mass of their army and, perhaps, no retreat even for the King and the Dauphin.

The Irish brigade at Fontenoy, led by fierce exiles of the old Septs and descendants of nobles of "the Pale," won fame equal to that of the English Guards themselves, and Lally, Dillon, O'Neils, Fitzgeralds, O'Briens, MacCarthys, Maguires, O'Sullivans, Butlers, Kearneys, and other similar names appear in the French records, and on the British side were French Huguenots. Mountcashel's Irish regiment is said to have taken an English colour.

While these events were going on in Belgium the Keiths and other Scotchmen were among the best soldiers of Frederick, who later on owed the victory at Minden, 1759, to the British contingent. At this battle Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who commanded in chief, was enchanted with the conduct of his English allies, and no wonder, for the enemy were in greatly superior numbers, and had designed the entire destruction of the little band. In the 'Campaigns of Prince Ferdinand' these words occur:—

"Notwithstanding the loss they sustained before they could get up to the enemy; notwithstanding the repeated attacks of the enemy's Cavalry; notwithstanding a fire of musketry well kept up by the enemy's Infantry; notwithstanding their being exposed in front and flank, such was the unshaken firmness of these troops that nothing could stop them, and the whole body of French Cavalry was routed."

Numerous anecdotes are on record, illustrative of the character of the soldiery at Minden. The 20th Regiment had been terribly cut up, having had no fewer than 6 officers, 1 sergeant, and 79

rank and file killed, and 11 officers, 12 sergeants, and 212 rank and file wounded; yet the corps refused to avail itself of the exemption from duty, which Prince Frederick had humanely and spontaneously granted. The 20th may look back with pride on the memorable order :—

"Kingley's Regiment, *at its own request*, will resume its portion of duty in the line."

I have said enough to support my text that British troops have ever been highly esteemed as auxiliaries in every age and land. I have no space to dwell on their services to Europe at large, as well as to their own country, during the long struggles between the outbreak of the French Revolution, 1793, and the *fall of* Napoleon, 1815, and I conclude this article by a quotation from one of the ablest Prussian officers of that period :—

Of the British Infantry, Baron Müffling, writing chiefly with reference to his observations of the Waterloo Army, said : "There is not, perhaps, in all Europe an Army superior to the English in the actual field of battle. That is to say, an Army in which military instruction is entirely directed to that point as its exclusive object. The English soldier is strongly formed and well fed, and nature has endowed him with much courage and intrepidity. He is accustomed to severe discipline and is very well armed. The Infantry oppose with confidence the attack of Cavalry, and show more indifference than any other European Army when attacked in the flank or rear. Such an Army as the English is most precious for those they may act with, as the most difficult task of the modern art of war is to form an Army for pitched battles."

T. M. MAGUIRE.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN STRATEGY.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, late R.E.

X.

THOUGH Waterloo brought with it the downfall of Napoleon, it by no means diverted attention from the extraordinary man who for so long had defied all Europe in arms. Every mind was turned towards the solution of the strategic puzzles he had prepared, and the methods of his adversaries received but scant attention. Moreover, the course of his wars had made and unmade hundreds of reputations, and the latter sought to justify their failure by attacking the principles and conduct of the former. Hence for years the libraries groaned under a perfect plethora of accusatory and self-justificatory memoirs in which confusion of thought made matters worse confounded, and to make things worse, the great genius sought to justify himself by endeavouring in a series of most mendacious self-exculpatory volumes to explain his career by reference to those very principles of a bygone science which he had himself most persistently violated, and never regarded except when untrue to his own doctrines. I allude especially to his long expositions as to the care he habitually devoted to his lines of communication.

With most of these I have already dealt in previous chapters, but to make the sequence of my argument clearer, I will refer again to the alleged opening up of fresh communications with France in the Marengo campaign by the occupation of the St. Gotthard Pass, and to his orders for the establishment of intermediate fortified bases at Wurzburg and elsewhere during 1805 and 1806. In the former case, as I have pointed out, the line could only be of use as long as the French were victorious, for the Swiss would have risen against them *en masse* in the event of serious defeat, and the latter were of no value as long as things went well in front, whilst every valid man absorbed by them for their defence was one man less in the fighting-line, where alone the decision lay. As police stations they were doubtless very necessary indeed, but their adoption was a departure from Napoleon's cardinal

maxim, that one can never be too strong at the decisive point, and, as the event proved, they were useless in defeat, because they were never strong enough in themselves to arrest the advance of the pursuing armies.

In the dust clouds raised by these almost purely personal discussions, the essential cause of his ultimate defeat, viz. the fact that the numerical strength of the forces the French Revolution had called into being, far exceeded the power of control which could be exercised by a single man without trained expert assistance, was entirely overlooked, and whilst men continued to discuss what might have been had mistakes not been made, they entirely neglected to organise the training of their men and officers so as to eliminate or reduce the percentage of mistakes which in the nature of things must be made.

Meanwhile, in Prussia—in which country all real German military reform originated, a point too often forgotten—the art of defeating one's enemy in the field was being studied from a very different standpoint. The Prussian Army had been by no means so dead to the necessity of military study in the years before Napoleon's appearance as it has been the custom to imagine. Its reputation had attracted some of the most brilliant intellects in the North of Germany, of whom Scharnhorst was the chief; and they had all received a very sound education not merely in military matters, but in philosophy, mathematics, and, indeed, in all sciences which tend to develop a man's intellectual power.

When these men came face to face with the realities of war, and twenty-five years in the school of defeat gave them ample opportunities, they were not satisfied with superficial explanations founded on text-book cram, but wanted to get down to the very heart of things and to know why armies fought at all.

This was practically the question propounded by Scharnhorst in his early pamphlet, entitled 'Die Ursachen der Siege der Franzosen im Feldzug 1792–3,' which seized hold of the central idea of a "nation in arms, and may be said to have underlain, consciously or unconsciously, all schemes of Army Reform propounded and discussed before Jena, and out of which Scharnhorst ultimately produced his "Universal Liability to Service Act," which persists in all essentials to this day.

But Scharnhorst did not live to see the full development of his system, and after his death it was von Clausewitz upon whom devolved the task of sifting out and arranging the teaching of the past campaigns. For this his previous training had admirably fitted him. He had been on the Prussian Headquarter Staff all through the disastrous campaign of Jena, and had afterwards

served with the Russian Army in 1812, and again with his own in 1813, 1814, and 1815. He had thus enjoyed ample opportunities of seeing how things ought not to be done, and having trained a naturally clear and powerful mind by the systematic study of philosophy in the school of Immanuel Kant, he went down to the bed-rock of his experiences and formulated in accurate language the limitations of human knowledge as applied to the conduct of war.

He died with his work unfinished, but his works published after his death were seized upon by every thinking Prussian officer as the exact expression of his own thoughts, and became at once the standard book on War for his generation.

Most English readers find it difficult to understand either the popularity his book enjoys abroad or to realise the profound thinking it contains; but we as a race had never been through the same school of defeat and been compelled to go down to the very foundation of things as had the Germans. With them each man knew from his own experience the whole depths of human weaknesses and passions, and realised the limitations on action these imposed. They had seen what they believed to be the most perfectly disciplined and trained armies in existence, led by masters of the old eighteenth-century game, beaten and shattered by Republican and Imperial troops alike; and they had seen patriotism fanned to a white heat, but wanting the welding, discipline alone can give, melt away before the astounding power of Napoleon's genius, and they all felt that something more than abstract geometrical relations between lines and bases was needed to give a satisfactory explanation of these many and varying phenomena.

This was exactly what Clausewitz's work, even in the unfinished state in which he left it, supplied. Every one felt that at last some one had put into words what all had been unconsciously thinking, and thus the book achieved perhaps the most remarkable success ever attained by any military work in its own country. To analyse it in detail is beyond both my power and space, but its essence lies in this, that it views War as the "struggle for the survival of the fittest" amongst the races, and shows how the human element in it dominates practically all other considerations. The will to succeed and the courage to endure are the two essentials, and given these, Victory may be achieved under the most adverse conditions.

In Frederic the Great's time everything had been sacrificed to the idea of economy of human life. The soldier cost money, and no State had any to waste. The essence of the art of War consisted in bringing the greatest number of individuals face to face

with the enemy and handling them as a unit under the control of the one man best fitted to wield them. It did not pay to send imperfectly drilled troops into the field, for not only did they eat as much as well-trained ones, but their inefficiency endangered the execution of the chief's design, on which the success of the whole depended; and it did not pay to over-march them or exact avoidable privations from them, because this brought them on the field too exhausted to fight their best; and though a genius like Frederic could hit the happy mean, and in fact never hesitated to call on his men for their utmost, lesser men mistook the ends for the means, and, having devoted their whole attention in peace time to perfecting the machine, when they took the field were afraid to use it for fear of spoiling its appearance.

The French, however, started with the root idea that a musket and bullets were all a man needed to kill his opponent, and cared nothing for the cost of life. Men they had in abundance, but no money; and the whole history of the twenty-three years' fighting, from 1792 to 1815, was simply a record of successive experiments to determine what value of each of the many factors which go to make an army—numbers, skill-at-arms, drill, equipment, transport, etc.—would give when combined the greatest possible product. And the solution arrived at by Prussia was the three years' short service army, which gave numbers enough, without over-straining the wealth-producing power of the population, to meet their possible enemies on a reasonably broad front.

There does not seem to have been any inkling of the extraordinary economic advantages which were to accrue to the country from this adjustment of the length of service, or of the marvellous way in which the short term of service was to develop the intellectual capacity of the whole body of officers; but accidentally the Prussians lit on a solution of their problem of defence which facilitated most wonderfully the second great principle which Clausewitz had in his mind.

The French Revolution had shown that campaigns were no longer decided by the tactical skill of a single leader handling his army as a fighting unit as in Frederic's day. For the overpowering "blow" of the old line in the hands of a master, in which everything and everybody co-operated towards a single aim, the looser style of fighting evolved as a consequence of the lack of cohesion and training in the hordes of men with muskets the Revolution turned out, introduced the idea of "attrition"—the gradual wearing away of the enemy's strength in a series of partial encounters, in which victory fell to the side which could turn out not the best general, but the best average of generals capable of

handling forces not exceeding about 25,000 men. Certainly Clausewitz and his school fully realised what Napoleon's personal presence always meant, but they knew, too, that such men were exceptional, born, not made, and elected as the safer course to devise a method of training average men to give a uniform average of sound leading as the best antidote to the exceptional merit of a born leader.

Without Clausewitz's book, however, this system would have been impracticable, for there would have been no scientifically prepared groundwork to build upon; and it is the consequence of our neglect to study his works that for so many years the best intellects the Army could produce—and they are second to none in any other branches of investigation—have failed to turn out anything but an empiric solution of all warlike problems, which, like all empiric methods, is liable to be upset by the last newly discovered fact or incident.

We laughed loudly over the poor old Boer women who painted their babies green to cure them of measles; but our own methods in tactics and strategy are not a bit more scientific. Green happens to be a peculiarly good colour for reducing fevers; the only mistake they made was in laying it on in the form of paint. Invisibility in war at times also happens to be a good thing, but when it leads to the painting of horses "khaki," you are pushing the principle too far; and the same may be said of the abuse of "cover," of "extended order," and most particularly of the sacrifice of mobility in the Cavalry in order to secure fire power. Such errors would be absolutely inconceivable in an Army trained on Clausewitz to recognise the inherent "polarity" in all military practice. There is no "absolute" good or bad in war, only a "relative" relation of better or worse, according to the action of the other side.

A "Staff College" had been in existence in Prussia for many years, but its teaching had been as everywhere else, and still with us, almost entirely "empiric." Under Clausewitz's influence it became "scientific," in the true sense, beginning from an absolute foundation of facts, and eliminating all "opinion" which could not stand the stress of analysis. This was the very reverse of "pedantry" in spirit, though in actual application it might easily have degenerated into that condition, but for the check automatically introduced into the working of the educational machine, by the action of the short-service principle.

In the old Prussian Army, with long service, recruits had been few in number, and their training, particularly the minor tactical side of it, had been left by tradition in the hands of the veteran N.C.O.'s and soldiers, who, as long as war seemed imminent, had the best of all incentives, their own security in face of the enemy,

to see that their pupils thoroughly understood their work. They knew too well by experience the dangers to which sleeping on sentry-go, dullness and stupidity on advance guard duty, etc., might expose them. But, as the risk of war became less evident, and the generation of old soldiers passed away, the exigencies of the parade ground and barrack square absorbed their attention, and the young soldier was taught, not how to exercise his wits against an actual enemy, but how to get through his day's work with the least chance of bringing down extra duties and drills upon his company or squadron, and by degrees the N.C.O.'s became a screen between the officers and men, with the one and only object of maintaining the existing standard of appearance with the least possible trouble to every one concerned. Thus the young officer—exactly as was the case in our own service not many years ago—found, not only no obvious incentive to work with and through his men, but if he tried to do so, was met with passive obstruction from all ranks, who liked the existing condition of affairs because it saved everybody trouble, and had no desire to see it disturbed.

Hence there existed no means of selecting as recruits for staff training men who not only had brains capable of development, but also a practical knowledge of the men and their needs, and in the absence of such recruits, officers were chosen either for clerical industry and amenability to empiric methods, or by downright favouritism—precisely as happened in this country not very long ago.

Compulsory short service without substitutes, however, completely upset the whole arrangement, for now the officers were compelled to train their own men, and as these were both physically and intellectually above the average of the nation, they were compelled to exercise their own intellects to gain the men's confidence, and again, without the sound common sense of Clausewitz to support them, they could not have taught so as to carry conviction to the minds of their pupils. With ten years' training in such a school, officers soon learnt to understand the practical human-nature elements of warfare, and probably mainly as a cause of the excessive stagnation of life in their small unchanging garrison—a well-recognised evil half a century before Lieutenant Bilse achieved his unenviable notoriety—commanding officers had little difficulty in discovering the real character and grit amongst their young officers, and recommending the best for further training at the Staff College.

Hence it became possible to dispense with competitive examinations and to substitute a qualifying test only, and it is this

qualifying test, as opposed to the competitive one, which is the essential cause of the excellent results obtained by the Prussian General Staff considered as a whole. It gives them command of a supply of practical men whose wits are sharpened and characters strengthened by perpetual intimate contact with human nature, and eliminates that most dangerous breed, who, disliking contact with the everyday conditions of their existence, seek to escape from it by devotion to the study of books whose meaning they cannot fathom, because they are ignorant of this very knowledge of men as they really are, from the best opportunities of acquiring which they are most anxious to escape.

Given a competitive system, and such men are almost bound to survive to the exclusion of better soldiers, for their clerical and studious habits soon bring them to the front on their office stools, from which lofty elevation they in turn condition the subjects to be studied and the books to be issued to succeeding generations, with the ultimate result that after half a century intellect is eliminated from the competitive examinations and cramwork, pure and simple, becomes the standard. Fortunately our constant sequence of small wars has prevented our reaping the whole fruits of such a system; but I think that no one who can recall what our Staff College education of fifteen years ago had become will question that we have had a very narrow escape.

Since then, however, the virtues of short service, even with a voluntary system, have asserted themselves, and, given reasonable continuity in the conditions, success is still within measurable distance of achievement, though by how many years it may have been thrown back by the hasty and ill-considered changes of the past few years it would be difficult to estimate.

The essence of Prussian excellence lies in their continuity of tradition. For nearly a hundred years now the process above described has been in operation, and the intellectual pick of the Army has received a practical training, and thus there has grown up in the country a very large body of expert military opinion, in whose judgment the nation reposes unlimited confidence.

When the General Staff speaks, the majority of the public, having served in the ranks, knows that the subject has been approached from every possible side, and the last word has been said; and if a minority of Socialists and other discontented people raise objections, the ex-soldiers, who are always in a majority—for nearly two-thirds of the whole population have been through the ranks—treat these opinions with dignified contempt, as the utterances of creatures who, not having been found fit to serve, are really not healthy men at all, and therefore not fit to give an opinion on

military subjects. It is exactly the attitude of the ex-public school boy to the ex-private school pupil, when the latter attempts to reform our educational arrangement. Yet, trivial as the circumstance may seem, it lay at the root of the German strategical conduct of the war of 1870.

The German Staff, being only human, made mistakes in spite of their training, and knew that a certain percentage of mistakes were inevitable; but secure in the knowledge of this weight of opinion backing them, they carried out undisturbed their ideas, without fear of the possible consequences local mistakes in execution might involve in the nation behind them—the exact opposite of the position of the French Government, to whom the *vox populi* meant *vox dei* in its fullest significance,—after South Africa, we can afford to sympathise with them. This was the broad principle which underlay the German victories in France, the fact that the military chiefs enjoyed the full confidence both of the Army and the nation—the two being, in fact, almost synonymous terms. In detail, the principal consequence of this training was to add enormously to the mobility of the armies they directed.

It does not appear that "mobility," *per se*, had ever appealed specially either to Clausewitz or his colleagues. With European armies, all with much the same proportion of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, there seemed no possibility of appreciably varying the rate of movement. Their principal care was rather directed to the elimination of the friction resulting from the effort to direct large masses towards a common cause. They had seen again and again how both the Austrians and themselves had thrown away most brilliant opportunities, partly because their leaders could not decide rapidly as to what course to pursue, but mainly perhaps because when they had decided it took them so long to issue orders to their subordinates that the chance had passed before the Army had begun to move, and to remedy this they went a step beyond their Napoleonic model, and not merely organised their armies in Corps, Divisions, Brigades, and so forth, but deliberately trained a Quarter-master-General's Staff to handle them. Since they could not keep the Army always at war to supply this staff with practical experience, they provided the best expedient they could in the shape of autumn manœuvres, and to prevent men growing up with the idea that manœuvres and war were the same thing, they compelled them to study and understand military history in its widest sense, which is a very different subject indeed to the superficial generalisations on insufficient and inaccurate data which masquerades under that name in our educational curriculum.

Hence, when the campaigns of 1864–66 and 1870 ensued, though

there were still in the higher ranks a few survivals of Napoleonic times for the most part too old to learn new tricks, each of these had at his right hand a picked and trained intelligence, accustomed to sift the true from the false, and to decide rapidly, on sound general principles comprehensible to all, what orders to issue to meet the special emergency. Their manœuvre training gave them the necessary grasp of the situation, and their military history study the knowledge of the strength of their materials, *i.e.* prepared them to estimate the phenomena inseparable from war, the confusion of the battlefield, the excitement of victorious troops and the depression and exhaustion of defeated ones, at their due and proper value in relation to the work remaining to be done and the sacrifices still necessary to secure the ultimate result.

This is the true purpose of the study of military history, and the end cannot be gained by confusing the subject with what we are pleased to call "strategy." The simple combinations which are discussed with such tedious elaboration in the pages of 'Hamley's Operations of War,' for instance, in so far as they are true at all, can be grasped by 90 per cent. of the subalterns of every Army. The difficulty of enforcing their execution in a peace-trained force, in which the junior ranks know nothing of the all-absorbing excitement and extreme tension of mind, soul, and body involved, is quite another matter, and the only guarantee possible that the phenomena of war, when encountered, should be judged in their proper proportion lies in a dissemination amongst all ranks of a knowledge of what these things are and how they have been conquered, or the reverse, by their forefathers in days gone by.

"What men have done that men can do" is a saying intelligible to every one; and if in a regiment when face to face with a difficult situation, every man more or less remembers how the same regiment met and overcame the same or similar difficulties, they, as a corporate body, will bear with ease dangers and hardships, which without such knowledge would fill them with the deepest despondency.

F. N. MAUDE.

(*To be continued.*)

THE VOLUNTEER ADJUTANCY.

By "Trainband."

It is reported that the Army Council is about to take measures which will ensure that Royal Engineer officers shall be appointed Adjutants to the Volunteer Units of their own branch of service. This decision, which is altogether a wise one, has again brought forward the vexed question of the Volunteer Adjutancy in general.

It will be remembered that during the late war in South Africa a very large number of Volunteer battalions and corps were deprived of the services of their Regular Adjutants. In such cases the duties were usually performed by Volunteer officers, and, it must be acknowledged, with such frequent success that there is some justification for the proposal advanced by many critics that these appointments should always be filled by Volunteer officers. It is urged that in this way Volunteer battalions would be entirely independent of extraneous assistance, and would be—if the expression may be pardoned—self-contained. It is also pointed out that in too many instances the Regular officer only accepts a Volunteer Adjutancy because he has just been, or is about to be, married, or because from characteristic laziness he seeks a "soft berth." Should, by chance, a keen officer take up one of these appointments, it is alleged that he often displays such a lamentable lack of recognition of Volunteer conditions that he effects more harm that good.

Now, there is much truth in all this, but it by no means tends to prove that an officer from a Line battalion does not as a rule make a better Adjutant than his brother in the Volunteers.

Other things being equal, a professional is better than an amateur. Of course there are "gentlemen" who in the pigskin or at the wicket can hold their own with any professional. So are there some Volunteer officers of high military attainments. But it is to meet the average case that regulations must be framed, and the only change needed in those at present in force with regard to the Volunteer Adjutancy is the addition of some attraction which would render the position more acceptable to the right stamp of officer.

He is not, indeed, hard to find, and, whatever may be said to the contrary, he starts work in a Volunteer corps with much in his favour. The fact of his being a professional soldier gives him really an immense influence amongst all ranks, and it is his own fault if he loses it. He is almost certain to possess more military knowledge than any of the Volunteer officers, and is quite certain to have a much wider experience of Service customs and traditions —a far greater advantage than is at first apparent. If, then, with sufficient keenness and conscientiousness in the discharge of his duties he combines tact, adaptability, and a due recognition of the vastly different conditions which necessarily prevail in a Regular regiment and in a Volunteer corps, he is sure to prove a success.*

The qualifications just enumerated are undoubtedly to be found in a large proportion of our army officers, and without in any way depreciating the admirable manner in which so many Volunteer officers occupied the position of Acting-Adjutant of their battalions, it seems but reasonable to think that it would be to the disadvantage of the Volunteer Force as a whole, if officers of the Regular Army on the active list were no longer gazetted to these appointments.

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* It is passing strange that the authorities when selecting officers for duty with Colonial Corps during the late war did not take into consideration the fact that the most suitable men for their purpose would generally be those who had previously proved their worth as adjutants of Volunteers. A really good soldier who has reasonable tact can get satisfactory work out of any Volunteers that are of any use at all. Men will readily obey a *man*, though they are prone to resent the sway of a donkey—be he only stupid or actually vicious.—ED. U. S. M.

ACROSS THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER.

By Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B.

Daybreak on the Thibetan frontier: but a few moments ago it was still quite dark, and then a greyness came stealing down the pass; the snow-capped hills around us take on a pearl-coloured and then a soft pink hue, rocks with the snow lying in their fissures are drawn sharp against the sky—and that old campaigner, the Punjaubee mule-driver, is as usual heralding the morn by coughing his very soul out by the embers of last night's fire. The men—British and Native—bivouacked within the high walls of the pass, are beginning to rise from the nooks and corners wherein—at an elevation of 14,000 feet above sea-level—they have dozed through the September night; half an hour ago it was impossible to distinguish objects more than a very few yards away from the radius of the dying camp fires round which the men were lying, but the darkness and the dank mist it brought with it are rapidly giving place to daylight, and already one can see the sentry from the picquet at the head of the pass stamping up and down on his post, thinking more of getting the numb feeling out of his toes than of the giant peaks encircling him, the deep valley below, and the silence by which he is encompassed. A little stream tinkles down the pass, up which winds the trade-route from the plains of India to the highlands of Thibet: climb upwards, and you stand upon what seems like "the world's white roof-tree," on the north-east frontier of India,—downwards, and you come upon the scene of last evening's fight, where huddled heaps in frowsy rags keep a silent vigil.

Yesterday morning—can it be only twenty-four hours ago?—we awoke at Gnatong, and found that, in the language of the camp, the Thibetans had "given themselves away;" during the dark hours they had come down from behind their walls on the southern slopes of the Jalep and Pemberingo passes, and had erected sangars nearly three miles in length along the hills at the head of the Gnatong valley, whence they had shrilled defiance to us in the camp below. We had never hoped for such good luck, and felt that the Lord had delivered them into our hands. The whole summer through we had possessed our souls in patience within our

stockade at an elevation of 12,000 feet, where every night the snow had snapped our ridge-poles, and every day the sun had melted the snow into a morass about our feet; living in a region where in six months the rainfall averages a hundred and sixty inches, waiting on and ever waiting for that "break" in the monsoon when our transport should find its legs and we might go out against the enemy and attack him in the passes; and here at last was our chance. The Thibetans had themselves come down to meet us, abandoning their triple line of loopholed walls at which they had laboured throughout the summer, for a narrow distant ridge roughly fortified in the dark hours of an autumn night. The preparations, which had already been made in anticipation of an advance, were hurried on; the British force moved out, and by the evening the Thibetans had been driven from the ridge and followed to the slopes of the Jalep La. We were too close upon their heels for them to make any stand among their defences, and as the sun went down the enemy were in full retreat over the mountains while the main body of the British force was filing up the narrow rocky pass. Heavy clouds were rolling down from the peaks and mingling with the mists rising from the valleys, and at the coming of the dusk a fine penetrating rain commenced to fall, threatening a comfortless bivouac. We had long since emptied our haversacks of the food we had hastily thrust into them on leaving camp in the morning, and the mules, carrying stores and blankets, were stumbling among the rocks at the mouth of the pass until long after midnight; some of us had crept into the forsaken tents of the Thibetans; others had—unwisely—put on the skin coats thrown away by the enemy in their flight, only to find that these were thickly populated by what the explorer, Chandra Dass, calls "demons;" and the rest of us had alternately roasted and shivered through the night as we rolled from side to side in front of the camp fires.

But now the camp is well astir, and the company of British infantry which has been promised the lead into Thibet is already moving up to the summit of the pass a few hundred feet above the bivouac. It was one of those perfect mornings which in India the close of the rainy season so often brings with it. We had now left the gloomy pass behind us, at our backs was the loose stone wall where the Gnabu Depen had intended to make his final stand, and before us, bathed in radiant sunlight, lay the road to Lhassa. To right, left, and immediately below us are rocks—nothing but rocks—amongst which the pathway winds and falls, but lower down appear wintry shrubs and dwarf rhododendron, which again give place to primeval forest, in which the rough road is presently lost

to view. Nowhere very broad, the valley narrows further on to a gorge of scarcely sufficient width to contain the torrent fed from the snows of the frontier; at the narrowest point of the valley a green spur runs down from the wall of rock on the left, and while it effectually shuts out any view of the village which we know lies beyond, it discloses a trace of habitation in the Tajwi monastery, perched upon the bluff overhanging and dominating the route. Beyond again rise hills at right angles to our course, and these must, we know, be on the further side of the Chumbi valley, whither we are bound: above and beyond these hills rise range upon range of mountains, while towering over all and girt about with fleecy clouds stands the white cone of Chumulhari. At the elevation at which we stand Nature seems still and lifeless; only last night and the rocks were echoing "the tumult and the shouting" while belated fugitives were hurrying across the Thibetan frontier, but here on the roof of the world is now no sound of strife, no hum of insect, no sight of living thing, and all that comes faintly to our ears is the muffled roar of the torrent rushing to join the Mochu river.

But the advanced guard is now "stringing out" down the hill, and already we have invaded Thibet; the road lies clear before us, and we are piloted by Ugyen Gyatshu, who knows the way as far as Lhassa, if need be, as well as any man. Immediately below the summit of the pass we come upon a gloomy mountain tarn, whose dark waters flowing over a lip of rock swell the stream which springs from Jalep La. The men are all eager for the advance into the new country of which they have heard so much, and which has been so long denied them, and the first mile or two of the descent is soon passed over, and it is not until we reach the edge of the forest that a halt is called to enable the transport and the rear-guard to close up, when the advance is resumed with equal expedition and increased caution. The road now winds among huge boulders and scattered forest trees—descending abruptly to the edge of the stream or climbing precipitously above it. With every step the trees grow closer together and the undergrowth becomes denser, while now and again we meet with traces of the enemy in the still smoking embers of wayside fires and broken potsherds, where a lagging fugitive has been brewing himself a bowl of brick tea, and halts are called in two small clearings round a few dilapidated huts, which our guide tells us are the villages of Langrang and Behuetang. We again descend to the stream, which now runs past with tremendous velocity, and which has swollen almost to a river; the valley has narrowed until the path has to find its way as best it can, now on one bank and

now on the other, with a bridge thrown across whose timbers are lying broken in the eddies. Our leading files cross hastily over—half wading, half clambering along the broken piers—and are fired on from the jungle fringing the further side; but the enemy is clearly not in any strength, and we push on to secure the passage of the defile. Within the next mile we meet with six or eight more broken bridges, which all need repair before the mules can cross; but the afternoon sun is getting low, and the General sends on two companies of British infantry to seize the village of Rinchagong, where we are to pass the night, and pushing on, we emerge from the defile into a smiling valley, wherein lies our destination. Above us on the left stands the Tajwi monastery among fields and pastures, and on the right, on high pine-clad hills, can be seen small parties of armed Thibetans watching our advance. These are the men who—commanded by Serkham-se, the Thibetan father of the Rani of Sikkim—have been holding another pass, the Donglam La, and who are now falling back to prevent us from cutting off their retreat, and by pushing on we can at least bar their entrance into Thibet and drive them into Bhutan. We fix bayonets and press on, the enemy racing along the hills parallel to us; there is a shot from the front, answered by another from the left, but at the turn of the road we can see the white houses of the village below us. The men double eagerly down the steep path, part swing round to the left in order to take the woods in reverse, a half company rushes down to the end of the village, and the remainder, joining hands, wade waist-deep through the torrent and sweep unopposed through the courtyards and alleys of Rinchagong.

The hillsides overlooking the village are picqueted, and before darkness sets in we have time to explore the place. Instead of the cluster of rude huts which we had expected to see, we find a well-built hamlet of substantial stone houses, two and three stories high, whose thick walls give us infinite trouble when we try to loophole them for defence. Every house has its yard containing several cows—which Thomas Atkins immediately proceeds to milk in an amateurish way—while cocks and hens are busy among the many rubbish-heaps, and rough woolly ponies, ready saddled and bridled, testify to the haste with which the evacuation of Rinchagong has been carried out. A well-built, covered bridge spans the Jalep stream just above its junction with the main river flowing down the Chumbi valley, and on either side of the roadway of the bridge are ranged huge prayer-wheels, ready to turn on the least movement of the hand of the most casual devotee. Rinchagong has evidently served as a rendezvous and general store for the traders who in more peaceful times crossed the Jalep La—the

"Easy Pass"—between Bengal and Thibet. But the events of the last few months have transformed the place into something resembling the base of an expeditionary force. Every house is piled from floor to garret with food, clothing, and munitions of war; in one are stacked bags upon bags of "atta"—or coarse flour; in another are piled in careless confusion large skin-covered "kiltas," or hampers, containing gunpowder; in a third house the huge rooms and long passages are filled with heavy bales of clothing—long woollen boots, capacious coats, and Chinese hats. But the largest house of all is packed full of long double-edged spears, short, straight, heavy swords, powder-flasks, pouches containing flint and steel, and stacks of hundreds of clumsy matchlocks with pronged rests. Larger ordnance is here too, heavy iron jingals mounted on wooden tripods, and a well-made smooth-bore brass gun, the fresh fouling in which shows that it has lately been in action; prisoners speak with respect and bated breath of this gun, and ascribe to it a modest range of six miles. A small room in one of the houses contains the stores of the Thibetan Army Medical Department, and here are a few "medical companions," holding a choice assortment of curious drugs, and pills of various hues—red, yellow, blue, black, and white.

There was rain during the night, but the morning broke fair and sunny, and the charming valley into which we had descended was at its best. We were now at a level of something under nine thousand feet above sea-level, and in an ideal climate. The Himalayas appear to act as a reef, against which the rain-clouds of the monsoon expend themselves, leaving fine weather and clear blue skies on the northern side. There was health and freshness in the pure air circulating among the low pine-clad hills of this elevated valley; the sky was cloudless, the turf beneath our feet was green and springy. Beside us—between broad and level banks—ran the Mochu river down the centre of the Chumbi valley, its snowy waters hurrying from their source below the glaciers of Chumulhari to mingle under the shadow of the Garo hills with the great stream of the Brahmaputra. Our start is not made very early, for we are going no further than Chumbi, where stands the summer palace of the Sikkim Raja. Our force is first divided; the transport under a strong Gurkha escort turns back on the Jalep road to a camping ground at Nyatoong, where we are to bivouac this night on our return to India or rather Independent Sikkim, while the larger portion of the invading force takes the road up the valley towards Chumbi. With every turn of the road the scenery grows prettier; where the road bends to the left is a small cluster of forsaken farm buildings, having the look of comfort

and prosperity—almost of home. A little further on we cross by stepping stones a shallow brook bustling to the Mochu past a picturesque but deserted village. Across the river stands the comfortable two-storied house of the Chinese frontier-resident, an official who has been greatly disturbed by recent events, and who has spent every moment of the hours since our arrival beneath the shadow of his country's flag, which he has wagged ceaselessly before our eyes. The countryside is so quiet, and looks so peaceful, that it is difficult to believe that the fugitives of a semi-barbarian army, 11,000 strong, have fled but yesterday along this valley. A short distance outside Chumbi we were met by a small deputation, headed by the Poorboo Dewan, a gentlemanly person occupying a high official position under the Sikkim Government. He had long been on our side, and had done his best, according to his lights, to counteract the overpowering Thibetan influence at the court of the Sikkim Raja, and he had now arrived to welcome us to Chumbi, which was soon in sight. We found the palace to be little more than a large well-built house, surrounded on three sides by a number of barn-like structures, occupied by the usual army of dilapidated dependents who attach themselves to an Eastern court. The palace itself stood close to the river, immediately facing a bridge, over which the road here passed. The valley beyond opened out, and the hills which enclosed it appeared higher and more imposing; we could see for perhaps another mile down the valley, but then the road seemed to turn sharp to the right—to Phari Jong, whither *this* time we may not follow. Our troops filed across the bridge and piled arms in the meadow by the water's edge, while a company of British infantry quietly formed a cordon round the palace, so as to prevent anybody from entering in or going forth.

The political officer at once instituted inquiries regarding the Sikkim Raja, who was believed to be hiding somewhere in the vicinity, and an armed party entered the palace to search for him and for incriminating papers. We gained admission through a hall, freely but rather crudely frescoed with sporting scenes of tiger hunting in the jungle. The ground floor was taken up principally with store-rooms containing rubbish and ancient weapons, so we mounted by a broad ladder—like a ship's companion—to the first story, and found ourselves at once in something like an old English country house. The windows were small, the doors of the different rooms opening from the landing were of a black wood resembling old oak, while the rooms were up and down two or three steps or round a corner, as one often finds them in old houses in England. But on entering the rooms we were at once in a strange world—

half monastery, half court, and wholly Eastern. At the back of the house was a large room running the full length, and filled with the idols, masks, trumpets, prayer-wheels, and bells which appear inseparable from Buddhist worship. We were received here by the mother of the Sikkim Raja, and she handed round small cups containing a straw-coloured rather fiery liquor, tasting something like spirits of wine. She was a pleasant-featured, well-preserved old lady, dressed with considerable taste, and wearing upon her head a horseshoe-shaped structure, about twelve inches high, studded with precious stones, and hung with strings of seed pearls. She conducted some of us to her own particular sanctum—a cheerful room with a pretty window looking out upon the river, the walls hung with draperies of Chinese dragon-silks, while a half-open door gave us a glimpse of inner rooms decorated with curious carvings, painted wall-screens, and tall China vases. On the floor above the rooms were plainer, but the palace altogether presented an appearance of comfort and even of luxury, although outside and within a few yards of the threshold dirt, and old and horrible dust-heaps were everywhere visible. The Raja was not to be found, and we had no orders further to explore the Chumbi valley; so the force retraced its steps to Rinchagong, where a company was left to destroy the enemy's stores and to empty the gunpowder into the river. That night we bivouacked some two miles up the road, on open ground below the Tajwi monastery. Next morning we set our faces towards India, and with our departure from the sunny valley the heavy clouds settled once more over us. It was a wet and toilsome march up the steep and broken path towards the Jalep, and as we neared the summit of the pass the rain was falling heavily, and men and mules slipped and fell as they struggled on. The dusk was deepening, and the mists were gathering thicker as we gained the wall which crowned the Jalep La; but there were yet five miles of a mountain track between us and our camp. The scattered tents of the Thibetan army were still standing, white and ghost-like, as the soldiers swung past in the half-light; but of the men who had occupied them some lay among the bushes and boulders on the slopes above Gnatong, while even the living were carrying the tale of their rout to Lhassa, "the Land of God."

H. C. WYLLY.

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

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EXTRACTS FROM THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR ANDRÉ.

FOR permission to reprint the following extracts, the Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE is indebted to Brigadier-General Theo. F. Rodenbough, Editor of the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* of the United States, whose invariable courtesy and kindness it is a great pleasure to have so notable an opportunity of acknowledging.

DESCRIPTION.

It is the autograph manuscript Journal of Captain John André, from June, 1777, to the 23rd November, 1778, the approximate date of General Grey's sailing for England, with additions—assumed to have been subsequently written up by André himself in chronological sequence, in his regular and beautiful calligraphy, and the numerous plans and maps, also made by him, inserted.

As a voucher for the handwriting of André (the volume itself not containing his signature), a photograph of the letter in three to four sheets, 4to which he addressed to General Washington the day before his execution is placed with the Journal. The photograph was obtained by Earl Grey from America, where the letter is preserved. We append herewith a copy of that letter.

The Journal was recently discovered by Earl Grey, on his opening at his house a box that had not seen daylight for at least 100 years. It is an important MSS., and especially interesting to Americans.

The Journal is an oblong 8vo book, $7\frac{1}{2} \times 6$ inches, in limp boards (the number of pages is set forth in the collation), in which have been inserted forty-four maps and plans, wonderfully well drawn and many coloured, ranging in size from $6\frac{7}{8} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$ up to $40\frac{3}{4} \times 19\frac{1}{2}$, mostly within ruled borders, folded and fitted to the volume, many with textual explanations.

It opens in June, 1777, the British forces then being under General Sir William Howe, and ends at the close of 1778, the forces then being under General Sir Henry Clinton. André was aide-de-camp to General Grey.

It follows the operations and movements of the British Army

within that period, more particularly that part of it in which Major-General Charles Grey acted.

It traces the operations in New Jersey in June, 1777, to the return to New York in July, gives details of the embarkation and distribution on board the fleet for the Chesapeake, the landing at Elk River, the daily marches, movements, and positions; plans and descriptions of the battle of Brandywine, 11th September; action at Trudusfrin, 19th and 20th September, and of the battle of Germantown.

A break occurs in the Journal at the 30th December, 1777, with the troops going into winter quarters at Philadelphia.

It re-opens in June, 1778, with the operations under General Sir Henry Clinton, upon the evacuation of Philadelphia, with details of the march across the Jerseys, plans and sketches of the positions of the troops from the 21st to 28th June, covering the battle of Monmouth.

After the arrival at New York the last part of the Journal is occupied with the Expedition of General Grey to Bedford Harbour and Fair Haven, on the Accushonet River, New England, in the beginning of September; that up the North River towards the end of September, and General Grey's successful surprise of Washington's Dragoons at Tappan on the 27th of that month.

Major-General Grey and André were exceptionally intimate friends, and hence the preservation of this MSS. amongst Earl Grey's papers. It was probably brought home by Grey to show what he had done, and he did not return to America. In 1782 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief in America, but the war coming to an end, he never took up the command.

Captain André became aide-de-camp to General Sir Henry Clinton, and Clinton's chief confidant. Later he received his majority and the position of Adjutant-General of the British Forces in America. His fate in 1780 is well known.

INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR LODGE.

The Journal begins on the 11th June, 1777, at New York, the British forces then being under the command of Sir William Howe, and André just having joined the staff of Major-General Grey, who had arrived from England on the 3rd June. The Journal describes first Howe's untimely movement in force into New Jersey, by which he neither drew Washington nor forced him to fight, nor flanked him, nor in any manner got him out of the way. Then comes an account of the return to New York, the embarkation of the troops, their arrival in the Chesapeake, the landing near the

head of the Elk, the advance and the victory of the Brandywine. Then follow the march on Philadelphia, the battle of Germantown, and a full account of the hard fighting and severe losses of the British in taking the works at Red Bank and Mud Island, by which they gained control of the river. The futile effort made in December to bring Washington to action, the march out for that purpose, and the subsequent retirement to the city are all recounted at length.

With the going into winter quarters on the 30th December the entries cease, and are not resumed until June, 1778, when they again begin with the evacuation of Philadelphia, and tell in detail of the retreat to New York and the battle fought on the way at Monmouth. The remainder of the Journal describes the raids of General Grey into New England at New Bedford, Fairhaven, and Martha's Vineyard, and his surprise of Baylor's dragoons in September. With the statement on the 15th November that the troops went into winter quarters the Journal closes.

Accompanying the Journal are forty-four maps and plans, showing battle-fields, camps, and the position of troops, some of them coloured, and all very well drawn.

General Grey returned to England in the autumn of 1778, and apparently took the Journal with him, as it covered the period of his service in America and gave an account of all the operations in which he had been engaged. But however it reached England, it certainly came into and remained in the possession of the Grey family. Then it disappeared from sight and memory, and was only recently again brought to light. In January, 1902, it was purchased from the present Earl Grey, the great-grandson of General Grey, by Mr. W. K. Bixby, of St. Louis, to whose generous kindness The Bibliophile Society is indebted for the opportunity of printing and publishing it.

The Journal is purely military in character. It gives in detail all the movements and positions of the troops, their disposition in the battles, in the transports, and on the march, as well as an account of the regiments engaged. It is entirely free from comment, and the absolute veracity of the writer is clear in every statement. That he may have fallen into errors is quite probable, because in an active campaign it is not possible for an officer on one side to obtain all the facts. At the same time, the purpose of André to state every fact just as it occurred is apparent in every line of the Journal. He not only refrains from comments upon his opponents, but he is singularly free from any attempt to exaggerate the American losses, a very obvious temptation. He never gives way to the practice of describing in general terms the

losses of the enemy as far greater than his own, affording in this manner a curious contrast to the reports of British officers in the Boer War, in which the losses of the Boers reached the most enormous figures and always exceeded those of their opponents. In like manner he does not think it necessary to insist on the British axiom that all persons opposed to them in battle are cowards. He has too much veracity of mind not to see whither this axiom led.

The Journal gives the best version that has yet been given of the British side of the campaign of the Brandywine and Germantown and of the battle of Monmouth. It is especially interesting in regard to the latter engagement, which is one of the most discussed and disputed episodes of the Revolutionary War. André's clear, dry sentences throw much light upon all these operations, from the English side, and cannot fail in this way to be of great value to the military history of that year, and also to the local history of the region of country in which so much of the fighting occurred. The Journal confirms in a curious way the charge which has always been made by the Americans as to the amount of pillaging and violence indulged in by the British and German troops, but it is also shown that the British commanders made the most strenuous efforts and inflicted most severe punishments in order to stop these outrages, something for which American historians have never given them sufficient credit.

We also obtain here a detailed account of the raid into southern Massachusetts, which was of no military importance, but is of interest as exhibiting the pointlessness which characterised so many of the British operations. Indeed, the most interesting feature of the Journal, as a whole, is the evidence which it affords of the utter failure of the British commanders to grasp the situation, either from the military or political standpoint. We see very plainly from the Journal how entirely the British failed to realise the futility of their movements, and that, even when they were successful, their victories led to nothing because there was no comprehensive scheme of operations in any one's mind. It is clear that they did not in the least appreciate that they were making no real progress, that while the surrender of Burgoyne was a deadly blow, the victories of the Brandywine and Germantown and the capture of Philadelphia led to nothing. Nowhere is this failure to realise the situation more apparent than in André's accounts of the retreat of the Army to New York from Philadelphia. He speaks of it as a most successful movement, not seeing, apparently, that the mere fact of the retreat to New York and of the abandonment of Philadelphia constituted a serious blow to the British cause. None of them appear ever to

have looked beyond the movement or further than the skirmish or battle of the day.

Altogether the Journal, from the military point of view, is one of the most interesting contemporary documents of the Revolutionary War which has come to light in recent times, and deserves the attention of all students of that period.

MAJOR ANDRÉ'S JOURNAL.

June 11th. (1777.) The Commander-in-Chief came from Amboy to Brunswick, joining on the road the escort of the provision-train, consisting of the 7th, 26th, and part of the 71st Regiments.

12th. Several Regiments from Amboy and Bonham Town joined the Army at Brunswick, and encamped on the heights above the town and bridges. The Army to take the field was brigaded, —vide Orders.

13th. The Army ordered to march in one column. The First Division under the command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, the second under Lieutenant-General De Heister. For the order of march and the General Officers and Brigades assigned to each Division see the Orders of this day.—

DISTRIBUTION OF CORPS INTO BRIGADES THE 12TH JUNE, 1777.

1st Brig.	1st Battalion Guards 23rd 40th	Lt.-Col. Trelawney.
2nd Brig.	4th 15th 44th	Brig.-Gen. Agnew.
3rd Brig.	10th 27th 46th	Lt.-Col. Markham.
4th Brig.	17th 38th 64th	Lt.-Col. Mawhood.

* * * * * * *

From the Orders it appeared that the First Division was to form in column of march on the Princeton Road at 11 o'clock in the evening, but with respect to the Second Division, altho' it was expressed they were to strike tents, no place of rendezvous was appointed, nor were they directed to form in column, tho' the order of march was given. General De Heister had understood he was included in the Order given to the First Division to assemble on the Princeton Road, and proposed bringing up his column in the rear of Lord Cornwallis. General Grey, on the other hand, abiding by the letter of the Order, thought we were

[illegible] remain on our ground till further Orders should be received. The Adjutant-General gave the latter explanation to it.

The Second Division struck tents in the evening and lay on their arms.

[illegible] At daylight Lord Cornwallis's Division having begun to move, a message was sent intimating it had been expected the Second Division would have been already formed in the rear of the first. At [illegible] o'clock the Second Division, being formed in order of march on the Princeton Road, began to move. Lord Cornwallis, having exchanged a few shots with a flying party of the Rebels at [illegible] (Hillsborough or Somerset Court House), repaired the bridge which they had begun breaking down, and crossing the river formed on the heights of the Western bank. The Second Division formed at Middlebush, six miles from Brunswick and two from the Millstone.

[illegible] We changed the dispositions of the troops at Middlebush.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE PART OF THE ARMY NOT MOVING WITH THE MAIN BODY.

[illegible]			
[illegible]	Hessian	Major-General* Prescott	
[illegible]	British		
[illegible]	British	New York	Lt.-Gen. Knyphausen
[illegible]	Hessian		
[illegible]	Hessian	Kingsbridge and Independence	
Artillery [illegible] British [illegible] Volunteers		Colonel Eybe	
Brunswick [illegible]	British	Brig.-Gen. Matthew	
[illegible] Brigade	Hessian		

* This must have been Robert Prescott, although at that time he appears to have been [illegible] in rank, and it is not clear why André gives him this high rank, which he [illegible] until 1781, unless he had it by courtesy as commander of a [illegible]

The piquets were ordered to be relieved in future at daybreak—to have a double piquet at that hour.

Great symptoms of a disposition to plunder being perceived in the Troops, the Commander-in-Chief sent a message to General De Heister desiring him to warn the Hessians not to persist in such outrages, as they would be most severely punished. Most of the Brigades received the same injunctions from the Officers commanding them.

16th. Two Serjeants of the Light Dragoons and one trooper were either killed or taken this morning. They were on a patrole. This morning at daybreak we began throwing up three redouts near Headquarters and the provision-train. Twelve hundred with a proportional number of Officers were employed on this duty. The Troops desisted working at the redoubts at 11 o'clock at night.

It was reported that the Rebel Army had quitted the heights above Bound Brook.

17th. The women who had followed the Army were sent back to Brunswick. A Serjeant from the Welsh Fusiliers deserted, it was said, in consequence of his wife being sent away.

The Troops retained their same position; the Enemy seemed to vary theirs. The few tents we saw scattered on the hills appeared every day in different spots.

The Rebel Light Horse were frequently seen hovering about Lord Cornwallis's Camp, and the avenues to both Camps were infested by ambuscades which fired on our patrols and out sentries.

18th. Orders were given for the Second Division to march. Two Hessians were killed this evening and four others wounded on an advanced post from Lord Cornwallis's Camp.

19th. The whole marched in one column at 6 o'clock this morning, the Second Division in front and by the right. The Army arrived at Brunswick before noon, and encamped on the heights around it on either side the Raritan: General Leslie's Brigade extending to Bonham Town.

20th. In the morning the piquet of the Grenadiers was fired upon by about 200 of the Rebels, who came upon them from the wood. Upon a party of Grenadiers marching to support their piquet the Enemy retired; no one was hurt.

General Grey being Major-General of the day, the affair of the plundering a house at the landing came under his notice; he confined a Corporal and three soldiers of the 5th Regiment.

The 17th Dragoons, 35th, 33th and 52nd Foot marched to Amboy; the 7th and 26th Regiments took up their ground. The flat boat, carriages and pontoons were sent to Amboy. A great

deal of firing was heard towards eight o'clock in the evening in the direction of the Rebel Camp, both of cannon and small arms.

The piquets were ordered to load in consequence of General Grey's reporting that this was always neglected.

21st. General Howe referred the affair of the Soldiers of the 5th Regiment, confined for plundering a house, to a regimental Court-martial. It is worth notice that the Hessians Officer who exclaimed against this depredation confessed the Hessians had been concerned, yet confined none, but complained of the British to General De Heister. A Hessian Subaltern's Guard was next door to the house plundered. Major-General Vaughan proceeded to Amboy, escorted by Koehler's Battalion. About 200 of the Enemy made their appearance at Bonham Tower but did not advance upon the Troops there.

22nd. Several men deserted last night, four from the 44th, three from the 27th, one from the 23rd, and some others from other Corps. At 2 o'clock in the morning the whole Army struck tents, but the Second Division (which was encamped two miles from Brunswick on ye road to Amboy, and therefore waited for the Troops encamped near Brunswick) did not begin to move till 7. At about 5, the Rebels appeared at the Jäger post and a few shots were fired. The Army had scarce begun their march when a body of the Enemy shewed themselves on the heights behind Brunswick and where the Hessian Grenadiers had been encamped. They fired several cannon across the river. The other body, which had marched from Bound Brook on the Northeast of the Raritan and had shewn themselves at the Jäger post, proceeded from thence towards Piscataqua and fell in with the column of march at the place where the Quibbletown Road meets and turns into the Amboy Road. They attacked the Light Infantry, but were immediately driven back; they, however, shifted their position from one thicket to another and hung upon the flanks and rear for some distance. They killed or wounded about twenty of our people and a woman, a Grenadier's wife.

In the front, Brigadier-General Leslie advanced with his Brigade and took post at Short Hills, a mile or two beyond Bonham Town towards Amboy. In consequence of the firing in the rear, the Second Division halted for a little while at Bonham Town, and the baggage was sent forward. The Second Division was again halted near Amboy for nigh two hours by an ill-comprehended or ill-delivered Order. The 4th, 15th, 23rd, 27th, 44th, and 64th Regiments and Stirn's Brigade of Hessians crossed from Amboy to Staten Island and encamped at Prince's Bay. General Grey crossed and took up his Quarters at Billops.

23rd.—

24th. The Hessian Brigade embarked at Prince's Bay. The 64th Regiment were ordered by General Grey to change their ground.

25th. The Regiments at Amboy received Orders to strike their tents and send them with their baggage to the water's side. Those at Staten Island had Orders to leave theirs standing, and repair by 8 o'clock in the evening to Billops Point. The transports, with the Hessian Brigade on board, went round from Prince's Bay to Amboy. The movement of the Troops at Staten Island was meant to be secret; that of those at Amboy might appear as a preparation to embark or to cross over to Staten Island. The Hessian transports, coming up to Amboy at the same time, might well seem destined to receive Troops on board. At about 10 in the evening the Troops crossed from Staten Island to Amboy. The Army lay on their arms, on the Brunswick and Woodbridge Roads.

26th. Two columns being formed, the Right commanded by Lieutenant-General Lord Cornwallis and the Left by Major-General Vaughan. The Right marched a little before sunrise and took the Woodbridge Road. The Left began moving at sunrise and took the Bonham Town Road.

The Right passing through Woodbridge turned to the left and by a circuit gained the road to Scotch Plain. On their march they fell in, not far from Woodbridge, with a part of the Rebels, who fled on their approach, leaving, it is said, some killed and wounded.

The Left, proceeding for a few miles on the Bonham Town Road, turned in to the Quibbletown Road, and taking afterwards to the right at Metuchen Meeting House, fell into the Scotch Plain Road and came up with the rear of the Right Column. Colonel Prescott, with the 28th and 35th Regiments and the Hessian Battalion of Loos and Donop, was detached to Bonham Town on the Left Column turning into the Quibbletown Road.

The Army was now in one column. The front soon reached Ash Swamp, where they came up with a considerable body of the Rebels commanded by Lord Sterling, who had taken post on a rising ground, in order (it was supposed) to cover the retreat of about seventy waggons, which they had begun to draw off on the news of our approach, and the hindermost of which were discovered by the head of the Column. They made very little resistance, but dispersed as the Grenadiers of the Guards and a few Companies of Light Infantry advanced upon them. A Troop of Light Dragoons pursued the fugitives and took about thirty prisoners, killing or wounding several more. In this affair Captain Finch of the Guards

Warren, where, having forced intelligence from a Blacksmith, they came in upon the out sentries, piquet, and Camp of the Rebels. The sentries fired and ran off to the number of four at different intervals. The piquet was surprised and most of them killed in endeavouring to retreat. On approaching the right of the Camp we perceived the line of fires, and the Light Infantry being ordered to form to the front, rushed along the line putting to the bayonet all they came up with, and, overtaking the main herd of the fugitives, stabbed great numbers and pressed on their rear till it was thought prudent to order them to desist. Near 200 must have been killed, and a great number wounded. Seventy-one Prisoners were brought off, forty of them badly wounded were left at different houses on the road. A Major, a Captain, and two Lieutenants were amongst the prisoners. We lost Captain Wolfe killed and one or two private men; four or five were wounded, one an Officer, Lieut. Hunter, of the 52nd Light Company. It was about 1 o'clock in the morning when the attack was made, and the Rebels were then assembling to move towards us, with the design of attacking our baggage.

Colonel Musgrave marched a different way and took post on the Philadelphia Road at the Paoli. It was thought he would have first fallen in with their outposts. By our attacking them on the flank next to Colonel Musgrave's Post, they retired the opposite way and his Detachment saw nothing of them.

A second Brigade had joined Major Wayne the evening before and 1500 Militia under Smallwood lay at the White Horse.

We took eight waggons and teams with flour, biscuit, and baggage; their guns we could not overtake. The Detachment returned to Camp by daybreak by the Paoli and the road Colonel Musgrave had marched.

* * * * * * *

ANDRÉ'S LAST HOURS.

PREFATORY.

Americans, although recognising both the necessity and the justice of André's sentence, have never felt toward André himself anything but profound pity together with admiration for his gallant bearing and high courage in his last hours. In printing this Journal, however, it seems not amiss to reprint one of his own letters, as well as certain opinions of the American officers who were brought in contact with him during the closing scenes of his life.

It was not the intention of André to approach within the

American lines; he was ordered by his commander to meet Major-General Arnold upon neutral ground, but in the night was led past the sentry into the enemy's camp. While there he committed the fatal indiscretion of changing his uniform and accepting papers from Arnold. Hence, Washington was moved to say of him: "He was more unfortunate than criminal."

Hamilton said that upon the occasion of one of his visits to the prisoner shortly before the execution, "He begged me to be the bearer of a request to General Washington for permission to send an open letter to Sir Henry Clinton. 'I foresee my fate,' said he, 'and though I pretend not to play the hero, or to be indifferent about life, yet I am reconciled to whatever may happen, conscious that misfortune, not guilt, will have brought it upon me. There is only one thing that disturbes my tranquillity: Sir Henry Clinton has been too good to me; he has been lavish of his kindness. I am bound to him by too many obligations, and love him too well, to bear the thought that he should reproach himself, or that others should reproach him, on a supposition that I had conceived myself bound by his instructions to run the risk I did. I would not for the world leave a sting that would embitter his future days.' He could scarce finish the sentence, bursting into tears in spite of his efforts to suppress them, and with difficulty collected himself enough afterwards to add, 'I wish to be permitted to assure him I did not act under his impression, but submitted to a necessity imposed upon me, as contrary to my own inclination as to his orders.'"

The request was readily granted, and the following letter was written by André, two days before his execution, to his commander, Sir Henry Clinton:—

"SIR,

"Your Excellency is doubtless already apprized of the manner in which I was taken, and possibly of the serious light in which my conduct is considered, and the rigorous determination that is impending.

"Under these circumstances, I have obtained General Washington's permission to send you this letter; the object of which is to remove from your breast any suspicion that I could imagine I was bound by your Excellency's orders to expose myself to what has happened.

"The events of coming withing an enemy's posts, and of changing my dress, which led me to my present situation, were contrary to my own intentions, as they were to your orders; and the circuitous route, which I took to return, was imposed (perhaps unavoidably) without alternative upon me.

"I am perfectly tranquil in mind, and prepared for any fate to which an honest zeal for my King's service may have devoted me.

"In addressing myself to your Excellency on this occasion, the force of all my obligations to you, and of the attachment and gratitude I bear you, recurs to me. With all the warmth of my heart, I give you thanks for your Excellency's profuse kindness to me; and I send you the most earnest wishes for your welfare, which a faithful, affectionate, and respectful attendant can frame.

"I have a mother and three sisters, to whom the value of my commission would be an object, as the loss of Grenada has much affected their income. It is needless to be more explicit on this subject; I am persuaded of your Excellency's goodness.

"I receive the greatest attention from his Excellency General Washington, and from every person under whose charge I happen to be placed. I have the honour to be, with the most respectful attachment,

"Your Excellency's most obedient, and most humble servant,

"JOHN ANDRÉ,

"Adjutant-General."

[MAJOR ANDRÉ TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.]

"Tapaan, the 1st October, 1780.

"SIR,

"Buoy'd above the Terror of Death by the Consciousness of a life devoted to honourable pursuits, and stained with no action that can give me Remorse, I trust the request I make to your Excellency at this serious period, and which is to soften my last moments, will not be rejected.

"Sympathy towards a Soldier will surely induce your Excellency and a military Tribunal to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of honour.

"Let me hope, Sir, that if aught in my character impresses you with esteem towards me, if aught in my misfortunes marks me as the victim of policy, and not of resentment, I shall experience the Operation of these Feelings in your Breast by being informed that I am not to die on a Gibbet.

"I have the honour to be your Excellency's,

"Most obedient and most humble Servant,

"JOHN ANDRÉ,

"Adj.-Gen. to the British Army."

NOTE.—The above pathetic appeal, to which no reply was ever made, was written by André to Washington on the day previous to the execution. The fact that no reply was sent is condoned by the statement that Washington, finding it impossible to grant

EXECUTION OF MAJOR ANDRÉ.

Major André was executed at Tappan, on the 2nd October, 1780. Dr. Thacher, then a surgeon in the Continental Army, and present on the occasion, has given the following account in his journal:—

"Major André is no more among the living. I have just witnessed his exit. It was a tragical scene of the deepest interest. * * * The principal guard-officer, who was constantly in the room with the prisoner, relates that when the hour of execution was announced to him in the morning, he received it without emotion, and, while all present were affected with silent gloom, he retained a firm countenance, with calmness and composure of mind. Observing his servant enter his room in tears, he exclaimed, 'Leave me, until you can show yourself more manly.' His breakfast being sent to him from the table of General Washington, which had been done every day of his confinement, he partook of it as usual, and, having shaved and dressed himself, he placed his hat on the table, and cheerfully said to the guard-officers, 'I am ready at any moment, gentlemen, to wait on you.' The fatal hour having arrived, a large detachment of troops was paraded, and an immense concourse of people assembled.

"Almost all our general and field officers, excepting his Excellency and his staff, were present on horseback. Melancholy and gloom pervaded all ranks, and the scene was awfully affecting. I was so near, during the solemn march to the fatal spot, as to observe every movement, and to participate in every emotion the melancholy scene was calculated to produce. Major André walked from the stone house in which he had been confined between two of our subaltern officers, arm in arm. The eyes of the immense multitude were fixed on him, who, rising superior to the fears of death, appeared as if conscious of the dignified deportment he displayed. He betrayed no want of fortitude, but retained a complacent smile on his countenance, and politely bowed to several gentlemen whom he knew, which was respectfully returned. It was his earnest desire to be shot, as being the mode of death most conformable to the feelings of a military man, and he had indulged the hope that his request would be granted. At the moment, therefore, when suddenly he came in view of the gallows, he involuntarily started backward and made a pause. 'Why this emotion, sir?' said an officer by his side. Instantly recovering his composure, he

the request, did not wish to wound André's feelings by a positive refusal, preferring to leave to him until the last moment the consoling hope that his wish might possibly be granted.

said, 'I am reconciled to my death, but I detest the mode.' While waiting, and standing near the gallows, I observed some degree of trepidation—placing his foot on a stone and rolling it over, and choking in his throat as if attempting to swallow. So soon, however, as he perceived that things were in readiness, he stepped quickly into the waggon, and at this moment he appeared to shrink; but, instantly elevating his head with firmness, he said, 'It will be but a momentary pang;' and, taking from his pocket two white handkerchiefs, the provost marshal with one loosely pinioned his arms, and with the other the victim, after taking off his hat and stock, bandaged his own eyes with perfect firmness, which melted the hearts and moistened the cheeks not only of his servant, but of the throng of spectators. The rope being appended to the gallows, he slipped the noose over his head and adjusted it to his neck, without the assistance of the awkward executioner. Colonel Scammel now informed him that he had an opportunity to speak, if he desired it. He raised the handkerchief from his eyes, and said, 'I pray you to bear me witness that I meet my fate like a brave man.' The waggon being now removed from under him, he was suspended, and instantly expired. It proved indeed 'but a momentary pang.' He was dressed in his royal regimentals and boots. His remains, in the same dress, were placed in an ordinary coffin, and interred at the foot of the gallows; and the spot was consecrated by the tears of thousands.

"Thus died, in the bloom of life, the accomplished Major André, the pride of the royal army, and the valued friend of Sir Henry Clinton."

Sacred to the Memory
of
MAJOR JOHN ANDRÉ
who raised by his Merit at an early period of Life to the rank of Adjutant
General of the British Forces in America,
and employed in an important but hazardous Enterprise
fell a Sacrifice to his Zeal for his King and Country
on the 2nd of October, A.D., 1780,
Aged 29.
Universally beloved and esteemed by the Army in which he served
and lamented even by his
FOES,
His gracious Sovereign, KING GEORGE the Third
has caused this Monument
to be erected.*

* Inscription on tomb in Westminster Abbey.

Here died, October 2, 1780,
MAJOR JOHN ANDRÉ, of the British Army,
who, entering the American lines
on a secret mission to Benedict Arnold
for the surrender of West Point,
was taken prisoner, tried and condemned as a spy.
His death,
though according to the stern code of war,
moved even his enemies to pity;
and both armies mourned the fate
of one so young and so brave.
In 1821, his remains were removed to Westminster Abbey.
A hundred years after his execution
this stone was placed above the spot where he lay,
by a citizen of the States against which he fought,
not to perpetuate the record of strife,
but in token of those better feelings
which have since united two nations,
one in race, in language and religion,
With the earnest hope that this friendly union
will never be broken.*

* Inscription on slab erected at Tappan, marking the place of André execution.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

Proposed Abolition of the Rifle in the Cavalry.

Sir,

There appears to be a laudable desire on the part of the Secretary of State for War to reduce the cost of the Army, and in this connection I would suggest to him the desirability of dispensing with the rifle as part of the Cavalry soldier's equipment. The adoption of this proposal would, I am sure, be hailed with delight by the Cavalry Generals, and by some C.O.'s, as at once getting rid of a bugbear and a white elephant. I judge this from the fact that Cavalry training, as now carried out, is based entirely on shock tactics, and the rifle appears to have no place. Any one doubting the fact has only to proceed to a Cavalry station and there find brigades, regiments, squadrons, and troops, daily practising the charge in addition to close drill, until all ranks are absolutely stale with it. There is no variation!

Some months ago the new rifle was issued to regiments, and has since been carried in a short M.I. bucket, with a sling over the shoulder. During the incessant drilling and charging, the woodwork, bolts, and sights have been greatly damaged, and the appearance of the cantle of the saddles has been ruined by the banging of the rifle against it, an eyesore, no doubt, to spit and polish; and it is safe to say that whilst this damage has been inflicted the rifles have, practically, never been used except for compulsory range practice. It is therefore little wonder that the Cavalry shoot badly when they are taught by their leaders to rely only on the sword, and to regard the rifle as an encumbrance when in the saddle.

It has been a marvel to me all this summer that the rifles have been carried at all on parades, as they only added to the weight on the horse; but possibly even the necessity for lightness is now forgotten. From what I have seen there are few Cavalry regiments in which any interest is taken in musketry—the 11th Hussars being a brilliant exception—and why? Because their brigadiers do not believe in it, and therefore do not judge of their efficiency by their prowess with the rifle, as well as with the sword. If the rifle is to be retained, no regiment should be reported as fit for service unless it comes up to the Infantry standard of musketry efficiency; the alternative seems to be to take the rifles into store and save further expense upon account of damage and waste of ammunition. If it be indeed necessary to further gull the public by carrying rifles, let iron or wooden dummies be issued for parade purposes.

That the controversy upon the subject of arming and training Cavalry is still raging is proved by the letters and articles always appearing in print. One way out of the difficulty might be to have

one-third of each regiment turned into what some call *real Cavalry*, armed as such with only sword and lance, and educated to believe that nothing can withstand a well executed charge. Into these regiments might be drafted all those officers who hold such views, and let them be led by our present brigadiers. When next we go on service, the rest of the Cavalry, armed as at present, and supported by guns and pom-poms, might be told off to see that their fire-eating comrades do actually charge home, and that they have no previous engagements.

Personally I think it is about time the subject was settled once and for all; otherwise I would vote for a Japanese general being put on the Army Council, and another made Inspector-General of Cavalry.

I am, etc.,
"TAXPAYER."

SUNDRIES.

I.

THE Committee on the Reorganisation of the Chinese Army, under the presidency of Prince Ching, alluded to in last month's Sundries, have laid before the Government a plan for the introduction of universal service in China: the period of service would be for 12 years, of which 3 would be passed in the Regular Army, 3 in the 1st, 3 in the 2nd Reserve, and 3 in the Landwehr. The pay would be 10 dollars (about 19 shillings) a month, and the families of the men enrolled would be entitled to a relaxation in their taxation. The provinces would, at the commencement, enroll only 1000 men, and these would be trained as a nucleus, in close-order formations according to German methods, whilst for field service they would receive Japanese training. The Governor-General Huanschi-kai has received orders to immediately commence the raising of an army of 42 infantry divisions in Petchili, each division to be composed of 12 battalions of 500 men each, or altogether 252,000 men.

II.

The Governor-General of Kiang-si has decided to fortify the island Tsung-ming, at the mouth of the Yangtsi. He also intends to obtain German and Japanese officers to train his new troops.

III.

In his work *Enseignements de deux guerres recentes* General Langlois endeavours to deduce certain general rules of tactical evolution drawn from the experiences of the Russo-Turkish and Anglo-Boer Wars. It is impossible to follow the author in all the lengthy and most interesting deductions he has drawn from the South African War, but they may be briefly summarised as follows:

1. Before the arrival of Lord Roberts the British applied the principles and methods taught them during peace manœuvres and in Colonial wars. General Langlois is of opinion that the unfortunate proceedings of the Russians at the commencement of the 1877 campaign were even more aggravated in the case of the British; the lesson to be drawn from them is, so to speak, negative, merely showing what should not be done.

2. After the arrival of Lord Roberts another method, appropriate to the altogether special circumstances, was applied, which consisted in advancing on an enormous front by small columns, each column so composed as to have a numerical superiority over any enemy it might encounter, and to avoid attacks in full strength. These tactics in no way respond to the conditions of European warfare.

3. After the departure of Lord Roberts it became merely guerilla warfare, from which no general lessons can be learnt.

IV.

The *Militär Wochenblatt* devotes a long article to the study of the situation in German South West Africa. It appears that at the end of July of this year General von Trotha had the following troops at his disposal: In the Herero country 255 officers, 57 doctors, 7 chemists, 17 veterinary surgeons, and 6561 men. In the Nama country, 20 officers, 3 doctors, 1 veterinary surgeon, and 512 men. That is to say, a total of 275 officers, 60 doctors, 7 chemists, 18 veterinary surgeons, and 7073 men.

The great importance given to the medical services will at once be seen from the number of doctors, chemists, and veterinary surgeons, the proportion of whom to the forces is enormous. This proportion is fully justified by the number of sick. The epidemic of typhoid fever last May resulted in 300 cases of sickness, and there were nearly 300 other cases of sickness; that is to say, a good deal more than a tenth of the total present strength. About 300 reservists and 200 time-expired men, who are retained with the Colours, form a portion of that effective. The number of Hereros capable of bearing arms is estimated at 5000 men, in round numbers, by Colonel Leutwein, but it is impossible to assemble them all at the same point. The largest force yet met with, at the action of Onganjira, was about 3000 men.

V.

The *Strassburger Post* states that the 2nd Composite Regiment, formed at the camp at Munster and now at sea on its way to

German West Africa, took with them more than 200 dogs, some as despatch carriers and others for guard purposes. The 2nd Artillery Brigade Division, on leaving Doberitz, where they were formed, took with them 15 dogs. With regard to this announcement the *Strassburger Post* says that it is probable that the use of war-dogs, at present limited to Jaeger battalions, will in future be extended to all the dismounted branches of the Service in Germany, viz. infantry, pioneers, foot artillery and railway troops.

VI.

The total number of young men who presented themselves to the Alsace-Lorraine recruiting authorities in 1903 amounted to 30,900. Of that number 13,845 were born in 1883, 8977 in 1882, 7147 in 1881, and 931 in previous years. The greater part of the later could not be found. Of those who personally came before recruiting boards, 30 were morally unfit to serve; 1190 were unfit from physical defects; 2176 were assigned to the Landsturm; 5105 to the Erstz Reserve. In all 7550 young men, or 713 more than during the previous year, were called out and enrolled in the Army, 6954 in the combatant, and 108 in the non-combatant branch of the Service, whilst 488 were assigned to the Navy. The number of youths who enlisted voluntarily in the Army in 1903 amounted to 1763, of whom 272 came from Upper and 1051 from Lower Alsace, whilst 440 came from Lorraine. Of the number of conscripts enrolled in the Regular Army, 2193 belonged to Upper, 3083 to Lower Alsace, and 2274 to Lorraine.

VII.

The folding canvas boats in use in the German Cavalry are about to be replaced by a material in sheet steel. The following are some details with regard to the latter:

Instead of 1 six-horse waggon for the folding canvas boat, each Cavalry regiment will have 2 four-horse waggons, each of which will carry 2 half boats of sheet steel, 2 trestles, 4 portions of flooring, and the necessary anchors, oars, and ropes. In addition, a supply of explosives will be carried on each waggon. This *matériel*, according to what it is designed for, is capable of making a roadway of 1 metre for men on foot, of 2 metres for men on horseback, or for bridge 3 metres wide. Trestles and boats are used as supports, the latter either singly as half boats, or else joined together forming an entire boat. A raft supported on two whole boats may be formed from the *matériel* of a regiment, with a superficial area of 16 square metres.

VIII.

The *Neue Militarische Blätter* states that official statistics show that in 1903, for the combined German Army and Navy, 773 soldiers were sentenced for ill-treatment of inferiors, as against 777 in 1902, and 770 in 1901. It would appear, then, that the numbers

are fairly equal each year, and that up to the present no efficient remedy has been found for this class of offence.

Amongst the different Army Corps, the XVIth (Lorraine) had, in 1903, the largest number of such cases, viz. 69. In 1902 this Army Corps had the same number, but were surpassed by the Guards Corps, which had 74 in that year and not more than 52 the previous year, when it took second place! Most of the Prussian Army Corps had from 30 to 40 such cases. The Navy had 25 cases in 1901, 33 in 1902, and 32 in 1903.

These figures, although high, are nevertheless far from representing the actual number of men ill-treated. Many have been overlooked from want of supervision by superiors, or from the fear of subordinates to make complaints. On the other hand, certain non-commissioned officers have been found guilty, after inquiry, of hundreds of cases of brutality, often of a most grave nature, where the victims have not dared to complain until the person guilty had been sentenced.

IX.

The *Ueberall* gives the age of the Japanese Field-Marshal Oyama, recently appointed to the chief command in Manchuria, as 62; General Kodama, 55; General Kuroki, 61; and Field-Marshal Yamagata (since deceased), nearly 70 years of age. Of the Russian chief officers, Admiral Alexieff is 61, General Sakharoff is 51, General Sassulitch 60, General Stoessel, commanding at Port Arthur, is 56, General Sarubaieff, commanding the IVth Siberian Army Corps, is 60. General Mishensko is 51, and the Chiefs of the Staff of the Ist, IInd, and IVth Siberian Army Corps vary from 47 to 52. The average age of brigadiers of all arms is said to be 52½ years.

X.

The *Moniteur de la Flotte* states that the Higher Council of the Russian Navy has decreed that the Baltic fleet shall sail for the Far East on 15th September next, *viâ* Cape Horn and the Pacific, the Suez Canal route having been rejected on account of the delay which would be caused by the large number of transports which must accompany the fleet. The plan of campaign, according to that journal, is briefly the following: Fifteen days before its expected arrival in Far Eastern waters, viz. some time in October, the Vladivostock and Port Arthur Squadrons will make a simultaneous sortie, and give battle to Admirals Togo and Kamimura, whose squadrons, or such portions of them as then remain, will be quite unable to contend with the powerful fleets opposed to them. Subsequent events must, however, have compelled some modification of this plan.

XI.

The Report of the Federal Council for 1903 on military questions contains the following information with regard to the Swiss Cavalry: 580 recruits were enrolled in the Cavalry and drilled in 1903. (It must be remembered that with regard to the Cavalry,

which, in addition to the 4 Cavalry brigades, consists of 12 companies of guides and 4 machine-gun companies, the period of drill for recruits is 80 days). Revision boards were established in the 4 Cavalry brigades and the 12 companies of Guides. Various new experiments were tried with a view to making the Cavalry more experienced in dismounted action, and in fire discipline. These have resulted in certain changes of detail in the Cavalry regulations, which will contain definite instructions on the employment of machine-gun companies. The necessity for adding to these later has been recognised, and the increase will take place this year.

XII.

The *Allegemeine Schweitzerische Militär-Zeitung* publishes some details on the new scheme for the re-organisation of the Swiss Army.

According to this scheme, service in the *élite* will be between the ages of 20 and 33, that in the Landwehr between 34 and 39, and in the Landsturm between the ages of 40 and 50 years. Army Corps will no longer be made up in peace time; during peace time only a certain number of Army Corps staffs will exist, and the Army Corps themselves will only be formed in war time conformably to the views of the General Commanding-in-Chief. There will be 6 divisions, each consisting of 3 brigades of 3 battalions; a Cavalry brigade and an Artillery brigade. In addition, 6 Alpine regiments will be formed into brigades.

The duration of the recruits schools will be for 80 days in the Cavalry, and for 60 in other branches of the Service; that is to say, the period of instruction for the Infantry recruits will be increased by 15 days. The administration will be very decentralised, and most questions will be dealt with by the divisional commanders.

XIII.

The *Engineer* states that a severe test of the United States Holland type of submarine boat *Fulton* took place on June 6th last. The vessel was taken to a point off Point Judith, Newport R.I., and from there went submerged through a ten-mile course. The periscope was used successfully, the submarine coming to the surface directly between two targets off Block Island, which marked the end of the course. The ten miles were covered in one hour and twenty minutes.

XIV.

The same Journal announces that experiments with an apparatus which forces into the breech of a gun a stream of compressed air and steam, thus syringing out the gun before another charge is inserted, are being conducted at the Washington Navy Yard, under the instructions of the United States Bureau of Ordnance. This, says the *Engineer*, is only one of the many devices which have been suggested to prevent flare-backs. On the *Illinois* one has been installed by which the forced draught used for the Whitehead torpedo tubes is turned into the breech of the guns at a pressure of about 100 pounds per square inch.

REVIEWS.

'SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. I.'

SAARBRÜCK TO PARIS. 1870.

A STRATEGICAL SKETCH.

By Lieut.-Colonel Sisson C. Pratt late R.A. With ten Sketches and Maps. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd. Paternoster Square. 1904. Price [illegible] net.

Now that we have had time to regain our senses and to realise, therefore, the very limited scope of the lessons taught by the Boer War, we return naturally to the campaign which had been displaced by our temporary delusions from its proper position as the most reliable guide to the conduct of future wars. The history of the Russo-Japanese War has yet to be written; but it is already clear that it is from the teachings of the Franco-German rather than from those of the Anglo-Boer War that the Japanese have obtained their most useful inspirations. For example, the Japanese have consistently followed the golden rule that where a strategical opening is to be seen, complete success is of greater consequence than its cost in human life, and that, in fact heroic measures, if well conceived and executed, are cheaper in the end. In South Africa the British lost many more men owing to the prevailing tendency to starve their tactics than would in the end have been expended by the use of bolder methods. The speedy attainment of strategical supremacy must ever depend upon the thoroughness with which the tactical obstacles to it are removed from the path of conquest. We appear to have imagined that omelettes could be made without breaking eggs, whilst the Japanese have been hindered by no such self-deception. The true aim of every sound general is to achieve the utmost, strategically and tactically, at the least cost to his own army; but the price to be paid must be governed by the paramount urgency of inflicting the utmost injury upon the adversary, cost what it may. The complete rout or capture of the hostile force is worth to the victors whatever it may cost them, and he who shrinks from pushing his advantages because he himself suffers in the process thereby demonstrates his incapacity more completely than if he were to waste lives by indiscreet boldness.

Lieut.-Colonel Sisson Pratt has given an excellent sketch of what remains the most instructive of modern wars, accompanied

by admirable maps upon which the student can follow the tactical as well as the strategical operations of the campaign. The minute detail of the official account is necessarily absent, but enough is given to enable the general nature and course of every battle to be thoroughly mastered. Altogether this is a very valuable book, and furnishes a secure foundation for more detailed study of the events of the war and the lessons taught by it.

'THE FEEDING OF FIGHTING ARMIES.'

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870–1871.

By Lieut.-Colonel THOMAS AUGUSTUS LE MESURIER, late of the Army Service Corps. Vol. I. With special Map of the Seat of War, by Mons. HENRY BARREN, of Rue du Bac, Paris. London: Harrison & Sons, St. Martin's Lane, W.C., Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 1904. Price 10*s*. net.

IT would be very difficult to say whether this very admirable book will be found more useful by the combatant officer who wishes to learn from history the influence of supply systems, good and bad, upon strategy and tactics, or by the commissariat officer who approaches the questions involved rather from the opposite point of view. Needless to say, supply is a strategical question of the first importance, and great strategical manœuvres are affected by the efficiency or otherwise of the commissariat and transport arrangements and facilities far more than are the tactical issues of particular battles. The soldier, indeed, fights best with a full belly, but if he has generally been well fed and kept fairly warm, he can make shift to fight cold and hungry when the need occasionally arises; whilst, upon the contrary, the strain of long marches, day after day, on insufficient rations, must inevitably destroy, sooner or later, the best of armies.

Colonel le Mesurier has followed the strategical and tactical proceedings of the Franco-German War in detail sufficient for the purpose of demonstrating to the full the supply and transport problems involved by them; and in order that the reader may the more intelligently grasp the conditions under which the work was carried on, preliminary chapters are devoted to the organisation of the German *Intendantur* and of the French *Intendance*, in particular reference to the situation immediately preceding and attending the outbreak of hostilities. The author's verdict is strongly adverse to the French—as was indeed inevitable; yet he has not, perhaps, made sufficient allowance for the fact—to which, however, he of course draws attention—that within a few days after the campaign had commenced the French commissariat became involved in the general dislocation of everything. At the end of the book we are given "German *explanations*," but "French *excuses*;" and the author's "conclusion" is a summing up of the case against the

French military authorities in general, more than against Bazaine or his own *Intendance* officers in particular.

Sundry references are made to analogous circumstances in South Africa and even in the present Russo-Japanese War. Altogether the book is an extremely valuable one.

'INFANTRY TRAINING: CANADA, 1904.'

Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau. Price 20 cents.

THE principle followed by Lord Dundonald in the preparation of new instructional manuals for the Canadian Army has been to exclude everything not absolutely essential and to assimilate, so far as possible, the drill of Cavalry and Infantry. Whether in his anxiety to avoid attempting what in the limited period of a militia training it is impracticable to do well, Lord Dundonald has set too low—or, in other words, too exclusively a *Mounted Riflemen*—standard for the Canadian Cavalry, is a matter of opinion; the writer of the article on "Cavalry Training, Canada" (published in the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE for July) condemned that book upon this account, and presented a strong case in the prosecution of which he seems, however, to have overlooked the admirable simplicity, and other merits of the system. So also in the case of "Infantry Training;" many officers, including the present writer, who hold strong views upon a number of particular questions of drill and tactics, could easily fasten upon some point or points of disagreement with Lord Dundonald, and by a lengthy condemnation of the offending matter cast discredit upon the whole book. For example, the basis of Lord Dondonald's company organisation is the "eight;" two "eights," comprising eight men front rank and eight men rear rank, form one section; the company contains as many sections of twenty (including "eight" and "section" leaders, with a serrefile), as will go into its strength, the normal strength being 120 sergeants and rank and file, or six sections; there is no "half-company. Now, accepting the "eight" as a sound basis, it would seem better that an "eight" should be composed of four front and four rear-rank men, and that in forming "fours" each front rank "two" should have its rear rank "two" abreast of it. Lord Dundonald has, in fours, the front "eight" and rear "eight" marching in column of "twos" abreast of each other, in the manner of the obsolete "double files" formation of British Infantry. The obvious result is that if four or more men are wanted from the head of a company marching in fours, two "eights" will be dismembered—and there is no apparent advantage to counterbalance this. Other examples might be quoted in order to find fault with Lord Dundonald's drill; but it would be at least as easy to exploit the virtues of many of the most novel of his ideas, or to dilate upon

the skill that has been shown in cutting down the contents of the book to so small a size, and yet omitting nothing essential to militia training, in drill, musketry, and duties in the field. The book is capable of improvement; yet the improvements would be required chiefly in matters which are really of but slight importance.

'THE ARMY ON ITSELF.'

By H. A. GWYNNE, Reuter's Chief Correspondent Boer War, 1899–1902. London: Frederick Warne & Co., and New York. 1904. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*

A BRIEF notice of this valuable little book was given in the August number of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, in which its undeniably great merits were acknowledged, whilst lack of space prevented any proper description of its character. Mr. Gwynne, a man of great and varied experience, has seen our own and other troops engaged in warlike operations of different kinds, and has now compiled a number of questions, in the answers to which he has endeavoured to find the causes of inefficiency in the British Army and the needful remedies. The names of the officers from whom Mr. Gwynne has obtained replies are necessarily—and, apart from this, advantageously—withheld; so that the bare words themselves are to be judged on their own merits and without regard for the greatness or otherwise of the reputations of those who have written them. The general conclusion to which Mr. Gwynne has arrived is that "real reform must come from within." This, however, does not appear to be the official view of the matter. The regimental officers, N.C.O.'s, and men are the least likely of any to be seriously consulted. What usually happens is that well-meaning civilian legislators are misled by distinguished officers whose real acquaintance with the routine and training of units is always small and often infinitesimal.

Mr. Gwynne does just what any sound Army Reformer ought to do; he propounds questions, obtains several answers to them, and then gives his judgment according to the evidence before him. There is but one more thing left for Mr. Gwynne to do, and that is to now make himself a "court of appeal," as it were, and ask for fresh opinions upon the evidence hitherto obtained, and also upon the judgments already given by himself upon it. Numerous regimental officers could give a variety of reasons to show how right Mr. Gwynne has been in the majority of the conclusions to which he has arrived, and also many reasons why in a few cases those conclusions are incorrect. Mr. Gwynne has done good work by investigating so many important points for the benefit of his countrymen; but he might advantageously perfect what he has begun, and also add fresh questions arising from recently proposed

legislation for the Army. Meanwhile we have a remarkable book compiled by a remarkably able man, and it is greatly to be hoped that it may be read as widely and as carefully as it deserves.

'THE OXFORDSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY CHRONICLE,' 1903.

AN ANNUAL RECORD OF THE 1ST AND 2ND BATTALIONS, FORMERLY THE 43RD AND 52ND LIGHT INFANTRY.

Compiled and Edited by Lieut.-Colonel A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN. Volume XII. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, Government and General Publishers, East Harding Street, E.C. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*

LIEUT.-COLONEL MOCKLER-FERRYMAN still continues to perform his annual labour of love with the same success that has attended his efforts from the first. A regimental 'Chronicle' necessarily contains many details that are interesting only to those who belong to the corps, and the whole volume is naturally devoted to matters that are intimately connected with past or present events of regimental history; but, taking for example the Peninsular War, the records of the 43rd and 52nd represent almost completely the history of that war, because the Light Division was well-nigh ubiquitous. Thus a well-edited regimental publication can, as in the present case, do much for military education, and it is a great pity that annuals of this description are not more general. The difficulty, of course, is to find capable editors who can afford to devote sufficient time, without remuneration, to the production of the desired results. Economy in the Army estimates is yearly becoming more and more imperative, but it seems nevertheless worthy of consideration, whether a small fee, say £100 a year, might not advantageously be granted to the Editors of regimental 'Chronicles.'

During 1903 the battalions of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry changed places, the 43rd proceeding to India, and the 52nd returning home. The South African War Memorial, on which are inscribed the names of 132 officers, N.C.O.'s, and men who were killed, or died during the campaign, has been unveiled at Oxford. The "Dalzell Trust and Pension Fund" has been finally constituted; and the colours carried by the 43rd in Spain have been found in possession of Mr. George Mathews, of Hollymount, Co. Fermanagh, to whose father they appear to have been presented in acknowledgment of his gallantry in defence of them at the battle of Toulouse. Many other matters of present interest are recorded, as well as others relating to regimental history, amongst which is the "Waterloo Roll" of the 52nd. The 'Chronicle' is,

as usual, profusely and admirably illustrated, and the subscribers to it obtain in every respect very good value for their money.

'WITH "THE THIRTY-SECOND," IN THE PENINSULAR AND OTHER CAMPAIGNS.'

By HARRY ROSS-LEWIN, of Ross Hill, Co. Clare. Edited by JOHN WARDELL, M.A. Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co., Ltd., Publishers to the University. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., Ltd. 1904. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*

THIS interesting work, which is in the form of a personal narrative, was first published in 1834, under the title of 'The Life of a Soldier By a Field Officer,' and then contained other matter which Mr. Wardell has struck out, deeming it to be redundant. Not only the author, Major Ross-Lewin, but also his younger brother, served in the 32nd, and in that regiment saw a great deal of the severe fighting and hardships in which it shared so honourably during the memorable period of the Napoleonic wars—including the ill-conceived and ill-conducted expedition to Walchern, as well as Copenhagen, the West Indies, the Peninsula, and Waterloo. It need scarcely be said that reminiscences extending over so wide a field are valuable as well as interesting. At the end of the volume Major Ross-Lewin expresses his opinions upon a variety of military questions, including the objectionable character of "Confidental Reports."

'A FIGHT TO A FINISH.'

By Major C. G. DENNISON, D.S.O., late officer commanding Dennison's Scouts. With twenty-seven Illustrations. Longmans, Green & Co., 39, Paternoster Row, London, New York, and Bombay. 1904. Price 5*s.*

MAJOR DENNISON is a fine old soldier, with a distinguished fighting record extending over nearly thirty years. He did gallant service with the "Flying Column," under Sir Evelyn Wood, in Zululand, in 1879, when the writer of this review had the pleasure of making his personal acquaintance. In the late Boer War Major Dennison was rather unfortunate, and it is because he was so keen to serve his country, to the utmost of his undoubtedly excellent ability, that he has been somewhat embittered in consequence of obstacles that seem to have rather frequently, and in some cases provokingly, raised themselves in his path. Thus Major Dennison has been led to join those who have put nearly all "Imperial officers" into one category, thinking of them as noodles who inquire about "Baws," and wear eyeglasses for

[illegible] Great Britain means many things, and according [illegible] are [illegible] are mostly so; yet it is a fact [illegible] are [illegible] in the Colonies. Some day we shall [illegible] that the right men to lead our troops are [illegible] whether they be home born or Colonial—such [illegible] the proper application of the term "Imperial [illegible]. The British officers appointed to serve with Colonial [illegible] were not always invariably suitable for the [illegible] some were [illegible] and others, some had not sufficient [illegible] and a very few by manifest incompetency, dis[illegible]—as in a particular case in which Major Dennison [illegible]. The latter as a body and judged impartially, [illegible] the Regular army do their duty nobly, and if their [illegible] had been equal to their courage, there would [illegible] little cause to find fault with them. Major Dennison has [illegible] that he is one of only a very few Colonial [illegible] provinces, whilst regular officers who have [illegible] are rather numerous, much more [illegible] have been rewarded beyond their deserts.

[illegible] the question of whether the author of this book [illegible] or not is a loyalty the tone that generally pervades his [illegible] there is [illegible] to doubt that he has written instructively. [illegible] Dominion's loyalty to its Sovereign has ever been active, [illegible] many a man who has never raised a finger upon behalf of the Empire and indeed some who have wrought hard to destroy it have received greater consideration than he. Colonial grievances [illegible] are [illegible] and in many cases they are really [illegible] and may be remedied by the Imperial authorities. But there is no smoke without fire, and our officials [illegible] that their Colonial business is better done in the [illegible] there is no branch of our political administration that [illegible] more [illegible].

THE ANCESTOR.

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF COUNTY AND FAMILY HISTORY, HERALDRY AND ANTIQUITIES.

Edited by [illegible] F.S.A. Number X. July, 1904. London: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd. Price 5s.

THE *Ancestor* for July, 1904, is fully up to the mark; the very interesting series of illustrations representing fifteenth century costume is continued, and Mr. Horace Round reverts to the "Trafford Legend," in reply to the criticisms of Mr. Bird. Mr. Round seems to have much the best of the argument, for it is, at least, clear that Saxons usually had Saxon names, and "Randolpus" is none such. In "Our Oldest Families," No. XII., the Editor, whilst he does not finally accept in full the pedigree

of the Gresleys, claims for it that its accuracy has not yet been disproved in spite of some fierce attacks upon it, and that "when the last word has been said it may be that the Gresley pedigree will dispute for place with the oldest line in England."

"What is Believed" is dealt with in the same playful spirit as in past numbers; the "Grosvenor Myth," for example, having once again been brought up receives corrective attention. "The Builders of the Navy: a Genealogy of the Family of Pett," should interest many, and "The Origin of the Comyns," with other references to various families and matters of antiquity or importance, will obtain the attention of many readers.

'THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY.'

By FRED T. JANE, assisted by officers of the Japanese Navy. London: W. Thacker & Co. 1904. Price 21*s.* net.

THE peculiar value of Mr. Jane's book lies in the fact, as set forth both on the title-page and in the preface, that the author has had much assistance from Japanese naval officers. Although he has not qualified for the writing of this book, as he did for the first edition of his book on the Russian Navy, by paying it a visit in its own home, yet Mr. Jane, in virtue of his large acquaintance with the many Japanese ships and naval officers that find their way to Portsmouth, has enjoyed exceptional opportunities of collecting information. As he himself tells us, it is impossible to "pump" Japanese officers as to their own share in events of interest, and it is from this cause presumably that the account of the war with China is meagre and undetailed when compared with the exact and full descriptions of the ships themselves. On ships, guns, equipment, and so forth, Mr. Jane's friends have seemingly added the benefit of their experience to what is to be gleaned from our own technical press; but as to the actual details of the war of 1894 they have been reticent to a degree. This is to be regretted; but if, as Mr. Jane assures us is the case, it is the result of a deep-rooted national characteristic, we may say good-bye to any hopes of ever gaining any very full account of that war, or, indeed, of the present war with Russia. Mr. Jane has always seemed to prefer the spoken to the written word, including for this purpose official despatches in the former category. Thus his accounts of both the great Japanese wars are *jejune*. He has not applied his Colomb and Mahan with a view to elucidating the course of events; but he rests content with a brief narrative of concrete facts as observed by those present, and on the reports of officers commanding. Most valuable material, no doubt, and Mr. Jane is to be thanked for adding to the store of it; but still it is not history proper, and attempts little logical explanation of cause and effect.

The book is in every way impartial, and, though of no great length, omits none of the many branches into which a great naval

service is divided. It is also very fully illustrated, including sketches by Japanese artists and official photographs. As is not infrequently the case with books produced to meet the needs of a crisis, it exhibits some traces of haste in production, but these are neither many nor serious.

PROCEEDINGS OF U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE.

VOL. XXX., NO. 2. JUNE, 1904. WHOLE NO. 110.

Edited by PHILIP R. ALGER.

THE current number of the Proceedings opens with two scientific papers, one on the "Work of the Naval Observatory," the other on the "Camp of Sanitation at League Island, 1903." Then comes a very interesting little paper by Commander W. H. Beeler, illustrated by photographs. This advocates for the U. S. Navy an adoption of the practice of the Germans in constructing, for purposes of instruction, skeleton models of men-of-war. The cost had been held to be prohibitive; but the author contrived to produce, at very moderate cost, and without special labour or materials, a very serviceable and satisfactory model of his ship, the *Monterey*. Lieutenant Commander Worthington's paper on "Coal Consumption in Warships" is interesting and suggestive. The gist of it is that if such data as are available were more fully used by the engine-room staff, the real, as against the nominal, endurance of ships could be more correctly determined. This is doubtless true, and amounts in reality to a demand for more clerical work to be thrown on the engineers. But the paper serves well as a detailed illustration of the many petty ways in which the coal goes. Professor Rawson's paper on "The Naval Profession: its History and Ideals" is weak in its historical aspects. Such an idea could not be worked out well without a due appreciation of the influence exercised by the growth of the sea-keeping ship on naval policy, and, through that, on character and aims. Yet it is just this that the author has missed. He makes no mention of the transition from a policy of cross raiding to one of sea-keeping and sea-control; and, therefore, he naturally omits to mention the developments in marine architecture to which this was due. His paper also exhibits many petty inaccuracies. The remaining essays are on technical subjects, "The Evolution of Smokeless Powder," "Blank Torpedo Shooting," by Commander G. M. Dahl, of the R. Norwegian Navy, and on "Estimating Distances."

The Discussion on the Prize Essay is in the main favourable to the author, who is however charged, truly enough, with proposing the building of a large number of additional ships without

specifying the services for which they are needed; and with proposing to station a battle squadron in the Pacific, where it could be of no conceivable use. The Professional Notes, as usual, comprise a series of extracts from the Service Press of England and America during the space of three months, and form a valuable commonplace book.

THE "Report of the War Office (Reconstitution) Committee," together with the maps showing the proposed sub-division of the United Kingdom into military districts has been reprinted, in a handy little volume, by Messrs. W. Clowes & Sons, 23, Cockspur Street. Price 1*s*. (net). This reprint is most welcome.

The Log Series has for its twelfth volume "The Commission of H.M.S. *Perseus* 1901–1904," which has been written very well indeed, by A. Reeve. These little volumes are interesting in themselves, but beyond this they have, or should have, a great influence towards educating the British public in naval affairs, and bringing home to the people of this country the vital importance to them of maintaining an efficient Navy. It is the duty of every one to do all he can to aid the circulation of "The Log Series," and the task is rendered easier by the fact that all the "Logs" hitherto published have been well worth reading. The "Log of H.M.S. *Perseus*" includes a great number of excellent reproductions from photographs. The publishers are the "Westminster Press," and the price is 4*s*. net.

The Journal of the United States Infantry Association made its first appearance on the 1st July, 1904, and promises to be an extremely useful Service periodical, devoting its pages chiefly to Infantry questions, yet keeping touch at the same time with other matters. The United States Army has now its Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry "Associations" (each with its own Journal), in addition to the "Military Service Institution," and the "United States Naval Institute." The Journals of all these associations evidently obtain large circulations since otherwise they would be without their very numerous pages of advertisements. It is not so in this country; it is in vain that British officers commit their thoughts to paper, because scarcely any of their countrymen, and but few even of their brother officers, will take the trouble to read what is written. The greatest curse of the British nation is that it is not only ignorant but unashamed. Nothing seems to be capable of rousing us to a sense of our danger. It would be well

if we would take the United States for our example of a "free people," to whom freedom is something more than a platform catchword—something worth defending.

First Stage Steam is the title of a little book written by J. W. Hayward, M.Sc. (Vict.) "to meet the requirements of the Board of Education examination; and containing the examination papers set in the years 1901–1904." The great majority of officers of the Army are little concerned with steam engines or machinery of any kind, and for some years to come the same may almost equally be said of naval officers; yet sometimes in the course of duty, and more frequently upon other occasions, thoughtful officers find reason to regret their ignorance of mechanics and subjects kindred thereto. In Mr. Hayward's manual the "reason why" is given simply upon a variety of points, and also the methods to be followed in making various calculations in reference to power, heat, etc. Moreover, the officer who has become rusty in his mathematics will find some very ordinary, but often needful, promptings in the opening chapter on "Mensuration." The book is published by W. B. Clive, 157, Drury Lane, W.C.

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